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Abstract 
Over the course of 2013, a trio of important Western donors unexpectedly announced major 
redirections of their aid spending trajectories: Australia abandoned a decade-long aid spending 
expansion; the United Kingdom (UK) became the first G20 country to achieve the 0.7% of Gross 
National Income (GNI) aid spending target; and the Netherlands abandoned the 0.7% target 
after having met or exceeded it for almost four decades. Motivated by this puzzling set of 
decisions, this thesis responds to the question: why do states change the trajectory of their aid 
policy? 
 
The existing frameworks offered by the International Relations literature are unable to 
satisfactorily explain why three similar states would make contemporaneous choices about the 
trajectory of their aid policy that were both at odds with expectations and divergent from one 
another. The key weakness of existing literature is its framing around the search for a single 
driving explanation located at a single level of analysis—either the domestic or international 
levels. In turn, this thesis attributes this failure to an inability, both methodological and 
conceptual, to understand the role of individuals in aid policy change and how they handle the 
competing pressures upon them. 
 
In response, this thesis makes two major moves. First, it appropriates insights from the Foreign 
Policy Analysis subliterature to build a multilevel framework for reconstructing aid policy 
decisionmaking episodes. The multilevel framework is used to reconstruct a series of six 
individual aid policy decisionmaking episodes (two in each case study country) as a basis for 
understanding why these states decided to reorient their aid spending trajectories. The 
reconstruction process led to the most important empirical finding of this study: that states 
change the trajectory of their aid policy when powerful individual political actors pay sustained 
attention to aid policy issues.  
 
The second move is to draw on the agenda-setting literature to develop a theory of how 
individual political actors influence the aid-giving behaviour of states. This required clarifying the 
powerful incentives that usually prevent individual political actors from devoting their scarce 
attention to aid issues, before identifying circumstances where this tendency is overcome. The 
actor-specific theory of aid policy change advanced by the thesis incorporates two explanatory 
mechanisms—decider salience and aid salience shocks. Together, these mechanisms map the 
attentiveness of individual political actors to aid issues over time. Decider salience explains the 
top-down, individual actor-driven process by which aid issues reach the political agenda, while 
aid salience shocks conceptualise the momentum for policy change that emerges once they do.  
 
To demonstrate the utility of these mechanisms, this thesis uses them to organise accounts of 
aid policy change in Australia, the UK and the Netherlands. Interrogating a state’s aid policy 
choices from an actor-specific perspective, rather than the actor-general perspective of existing 
frameworks, generates new understandings of what factors influence aid policy change and how 
they do so. This thesis finds that the agency of powerful individual actors is crucial in initiating 
and sustaining aid policy change. For example, one must understand Prime Minister David 
Cameron’s personal commitment to the 0.7% target to explain the UK’s aid expansion. Yet at 
the same time, the thesis finds that key domestic and international factors operate to either 
impede or reinforce the momentum for change. In the case of the UK, momentum towards the 
0.7% target was reinforced by a powerful development constituency, a series of institutional 
path dependencies, and the ascendance of the moderate faction within the Conservative Party 
who adopted a relatively internationalist approach to global engagement. 
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Glossary 
*An asterisk denotes a term that has been contributed and developed by this thesis. 
 
Actor-general theory Theory that focuses “on the state as a unitary actor and 
systemic as well as relational variables as determinants of 
action” (Hudson and Vore 1995:210). 
Actor-specific theory Theory that is based on the argument that “all that occurs 
between nations and across nations is grounded in human 
decision makers acting singly or in groups” (V. M. Hudson 
2005, 1). Actor-specific theory is “concrete, contextual and 
complex” (Hudson 2005, 14).  
*Aid salience shock An instance of an aid policy issue reaching the political agenda 
and staying on it for a sustained period of time. An aid 
salience shocks therefore describes a prolonged disturbance 
in the usual degree of attention paid to aid issues by powerful 
political actors.  
Aid policy The distinct subset of a state’s foreign policy that is 
concerned with questions about why, how, where and on 
what to expend its Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
contributions. 
Aid policy system The institutional setting within which aid policy 
decisionmaking occurs in a given state.       
Aid policy decision The output of a process of deliberation which is primarily 
concerned with how a state expends its ODA budget.  
Aid policy decisionmaking 
episode 
A series of linked decisionmaking processes leading to an aid 
policy decision. 
*Decider Salience The degree to which an individual political actor is personally 
motivated to devote serious and sustained attention to an 
issue. 
Decision Unit An individual or group of individuals within government “with 
the ability to commit the resources of the society and, when 
faced with a problem, the authority to make a decision that 
cannot be reversed” (M. G. Hermann 2001, 48). 
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Development Constituency “[T]he network of actors active in shaping and/or 
implementing development cooperation programs” in a given 
country (Horký and Lightfoot 2012, 17).  
Framing 
 
The activity of “select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality 
and mak[ing] them more salient [by communicating] in such 
a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described” (Entman 1993, 52).  
Individual Decisionmaker An person who: 
a) has some degree of involvement in an aid policy 
decisionmaking episode and: either 
b)  has the authority (or has been delegated the 
authority) to act in the name of the state with 
reference to the decision at hand (R. C. Snyder, Bruck, 
and Sapin 2002a, 59), or;  
c) has a role in supporting or assisting an actor who has 
the authority (or has been delegated the authority) to 
act in the name of the state.  
International Aid Regime The “broadly accepted standards of international behaviour” 
(Florini 1996, 363) concerning international aid provision. 
Issue Area A distinct domain of policymaking. 
Issue Area Characteristics Those characteristics and dynamics that distinguish a distinct 
domain of policymaking from another.  
Issue Salience The relative importance or significance that an actor (not 
necessarily an individual actor) ascribes to a given issue on the 
political agenda (Oppermann and de Vries 2011, 3). 
Media Agenda The list of issues to which the media devote their attention. 
National Identity “[A] basic worldview, combined with ideas about the type of 
national image a nation aspires to, as well as a sense of the 
values represented by the nation” (van der Veen 2011, 28). 
*Personal Salience Profile The way an individual political actor personally orders the 
importance of various issues at a point in time.  
Political Agenda The list of issues to which political actors, and the people 
closely associated with them, devote their attention1. 
                                                          
1 This definition is an amalgam of the definitions advanced by Kingdon (1995, 3) and Green-Pedersen and Walgrave 
(2014b, 1). 
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Principal In relation to an aid policy decisionmaking episode, the 
principle is the highest-ranking member of a Government 
with formal responsibility for aid policy.  
Public Agenda The list of issues to which the public devote their attention. 
*Salience Attachment A process where an aid policy issue becomes increasingly 
identified with, or symbolically linked to, another more 
salient issue over time as a result of framing by political 
actors. 
*Salience Sweet Spot The idea that aid policymaking (especially around aid 
spending) operates at an optimal level of political importance 
(salience)—very low, but not exceedingly so—for becoming a 
site of conflict amongst political elites. The issue area 
characteristic of aid mean aid policy issues often become a 
‘blank screen’ onto which ideological, factional, political, or 
personal conflicts are projected. 
Strategic level foreign policy Strategic level foreign policy “is made as a series of 
commitments and attitudes on the relations between a 
society and the outside world, usually expounded in general 
policy statements and ministerial speeches” (Gyngell and 
Wesley 2007, 22). The strategic level of foreign policymaking 
features the active involvement of senior individual political 
actors considering ‘big picture’ questions. I consider the 
‘strategic level’ of aid policy to predominantly entail 
questions regarding the strategy, size, structure, and shape of 
a given state’s aid program.  
 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political attention is scarce, and it is consequential. 
 
Green-Pedersen and Walgrave, 2014 
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1 Introduction 
ver the course of 2013, a trio of important traditional, Western donors—Australia, the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands—announced major redirections in their aid 
spending trajectories. In each case, these announcements were unexpected and at odds with 
recent political and historical trends. This thesis explores and explains these decisions as a way 
of engaging with a broader puzzle in the International Relations2  literature: why do states 
redirect their foreign policy? (C. F. Hermann 1990). This introductory chapter overviews the way 
I responded to this problem, outlining the thesis’ approach and previewing the argument it 
prosecutes, the research findings it generates, and the contributions it makes. To begin, 
however, I present three vignettes to introduce the empirical puzzles that this project emerged 
in response to.  
 
At a press conference on 5 September, just two days before polls were scheduled to open in 
Australia’s federal election, then-Shadow Treasurer Joe Hockey announced that the Coalition 
would cut aid spending by $4.5 billion if they won Government. This shock announcement 
marked the end of a dramatic decade-long expansion that saw Australia’s aid spending increase 
by over 80% in real terms. Until Hockey’s election-eve revelation, it had been widely assumed 
that the bipartisan commitment to raise aid spending to 0.5% of Gross National Income (GNI) 
known as the ‘Golden Consensus’ would hold.  
 
Only four months earlier, in May, and under a Labor government, Australia was on track to 
becoming the world’s 6th largest donor (Howes 2013b) and its independent aid agency, AusAID3, 
was lauded in an international review (OECD DAC 2013; R. Davies 2013a). In June, Australia’s 
first cabinet-level Minister for International Development was appointed. As late as August, 
during the election campaign, informed observers were anticipating that the major political 
parties would maintain existing policy trends (R. Davies 2013c). Yet Hockey’s announcement 
triggered a sudden and dramatic reversal of Australia’s aid spending trajectory, sending aid 
                                                          
2 In accordance with convention, I capitalise ‘International Relations’ throughout this thesis when referring to the 
discipline. When ‘international relations’ is rendered in lowercase, it refers to interactions between states. 
3 AusAID is the acronym of the now-former Australian Agency for International Development. 
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spending levels plummeting from an historic peak in 2012 to where, just four years later, 
Australia’s aid to GNI ratio reached an all-time low4. 
 
2013 was also turning point in the trajectory of the United Kingdom’s aid spending. On 20 March, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne confirmed that the UK would spend 0.7% of GNI 
on aid for the first time in history, capping a steep aid spending expansion that made the UK the 
first G8 country to reach this target5. Osborne’s budget speech initiated a new phase of UK aid 
spending, which has been maintained at 0.7% of GNI since. 
 
While Conservative Party leader David Cameron had promised since 2006 to reach the 0.7% 
target by 2013, few observers expected him to keep his word, especially once he became Prime 
Minister in 2010. The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) had plunged the UK into a deep recession in 
2008 and Cameron’s promise to save the country from Labour’s prolificacy required him to inflict 
savage cuts to spending. To this end, Cameron oversaw a Spending Review at the outset of his 
Prime Ministership that cut departmental budgets by an average of 19% over four years as part 
of a plan to address the UK’s ballooning budget deficit (H. M. Treasury 2010b, 17). Surprisingly, 
the aid budget was protected from these cuts—'ring-fenced’ from the process alongside the 
health budget.  
 
Yet by 2013, as the date for handing down the budget approached, not only had these spending 
cuts failed to rein in the budget deficit, but the UK faced the very real prospect of a ‘triple-dip’ 
recession. Increasing aid spending towards 0.7% in such circumstances struck most observers as 
politically inconceivable. Not only had public opinion turned decidedly against the idea of 
increasing aid, the prospect incensed the right-wing of Cameron’s Conservative Party and 
provided constant anti-Cameron ammunition for the tabloids. And yet, despite this array of 
political obstacles, the Cameron-Clegg Coalition Government kept its 0.7% promise, despite 
reneging on others.  
 
Just weeks after Osborne confirmed the UK would become the newest member of the select 
‘0.7% club’ of donors, the Netherlands confirmed it would rescind its longstanding membership. 
Participation in this club had symbolised Dutch leadership in international development since 
                                                          
4 Unless otherwise indicated, aid spending figures quoted in this thesis are from the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and accessed via the 
OECD.Stat database. DAC figures record Australia’s 2016 Official Development Assistance (ODA) to GNI radio as 
0.25%, equal lowest in its history (alongside 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2005). However, figures used by the Australian 
Government align with the Australian fiscal year (which runs from 1 July to 30 June), rather than the calendar year 
figures of the DAC. Australia’s ODA to GNI ratio for the 2016-17 fiscal year—0.22%—was the lowest in history. 
5 Germany reached the 0.7% of GNI spending mark in 2016. 
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1975, when it first achieved the 0.7% milestone. However, on 5 April 2013, the Dutch Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs published A World to Gain: A New Agenda for Aid, Trade and Investment, A 
World to Gain, a manifesto which included a blueprint for reducing foreign aid spending from 
0.7% to 0.55% of GNI by 2017 (MFA 2013, 60)6. With this, A World to Gain overturned four 
decades of policy tradition.  
 
Dutch adherence to the 0.7% target had become such a matter of faith—not just to the Dutch 
themselves, but to the international community—that the decision to abandon the 0.7% came 
as a shock, even for development sector insiders. The sense of shock was heightened given a 
‘purple coalition’ had formed following the 2012 election. This political arrangement, which 
paired the centre-right Liberals and the centre-left, social democratic Labour Party was 
predicted to mark the return of traditional, centrist, consensus-based decisionmaking in the 
Netherlands after a decade of political upheaval. It was assumed that, in this relatively tranquil 
political environment, the 0.7% target would be maintained. Yet one of the most decisive first 
steps taken by the new Rutte II cabinet was to abandon the 0.7% target. 
 
§§§ 
 
 
1.1 The Research Question  
One year. Three states. Three unanticipated and virtually simultaneous decisions to enact major 
aid policy change. Furthermore, these three traditional Western donors made choices about the 
trajectory of their aid policy that were not only at odds with expectations, given the politics and 
historical trends in each country, but also diverged from one another. Motivated by this puzzle, 
this thesis responds to the following question: 
 
Why do states change the trajectory of their aid policy? 
 
For the purposes of this study, I consider a state’s aid policy to be the distinct subset of its foreign 
policy that is concerned with questions about why, how, where and on what to expend its 
                                                          
6 After dropping below the 0.7% threshold in 2013 and 2014, Dutch aid spending returned to 0.75% in 2015, before 
dropping under 0.7% again in 2016. The brief return to 0.7% is an aberration that is accounted for largely by the fact 
that domestic spending on supporting refugees can be counted as ODA under current DAC rules. Dutch 
contributions under this component increased dramatically in 2015. So, while technically Dutch aid spending once 
again exceeded the 0.7% threshold, the actual volume of spending available for what can broadly be categorised as 
‘development purposes’ has been drastically reduced.  
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Official Development Assistance (ODA) contributions. While I acknowledge that ODA is not a 
perfect measure, it remains the best readily-available proxy for a (DAC-member) state’s ‘aid’ 
budget7. For reasons of simplicity, I use the term ‘aid’ as a proxy for ODA throughout this thesis. 
Furthermore, I consider ‘aid’ to be synonymous with the terms ‘foreign aid’, ‘development 
cooperation’, ‘international development, ‘development aid’ and ‘development assistance’ 
(Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi 2015, 11). Although I acknowledge that each of these terms has 
subtly different meanings or intimations, these distinctions are not important enough to the 
aims of this study to persuade me to deviate from the clear preference in the determinants of 
aid literature to use the term ‘foreign aid’8. That said, in the empirical chapters of the thesis, the 
language I use tends to reflect the particular terminology favoured in each jurisdiction. In my 
experience, ‘foreign aid’ is the term favoured in Australia, ‘international development’ is most 
regularly used in the UK, while ‘development cooperation’ is preferred in the Netherlands. While 
on the subject of terminology, I include definitions for terms I use regularly, or that have 
contested meanings, in the Glossary. I indicate a term that is included in the Glossary by 
rendering it in bold typeface the first time it appears in each chapter (including in this 
Introduction). 
 
It is important at this early stage, as I undertake ‘boundary work’ to convey how I approached 
the thesis question, to acknowledge that my decision to specifically defining aid as an element 
of a states’ foreign policy is potentially controversial. This is because equating aid as a 
component (or tool or instrument) of foreign policy has taken on normative connotations. 
Supporters of aid often object to aid being classified as a ‘tool of foreign policy’ because this 
suggests accepting the premise of the ‘foreign policy approach’ originally advocated by 
Morgenthau (1962)—that aid should be deployed to secure national interests. To be clear, my 
equating aid as a tool of foreign policy is a purely technical stance, not a normative one9. Aid 
policy is foreign policy precisely because it constitutes an action of a state “directed in whole or 
part outside of the boundaries of the state” (Gyngell and Wesley 2007, 19).  
 
                                                          
7 ODA is precisely defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) to enable comparison of ODA flows across member states. However, for the 
immediate purposes of this paper, ODA can be considered as the voluntary transfer of resources from one state to 
another for the purposes of promoting development. This approach preserves compatibility with a variety of 
literatures and scholars who employ a variety of different terms with essentially the same meaning.   
8 As I highlight l later in this chapter, and detail further in chapter two, I consider this thesis to a contribution to the 
qualitative comparative aid policy literature (see Table 2.B). The five most recent key studies of this literature use 
the term ‘foreign aid’. Four of these use the term in the title of the book (Van Belle, Rioux, and Potter 2004; 
Lancaster 2007a; van der Veen 2011; Lundsgaarde 2013).   
9 For an extended discussion on this position, see Day (2016, 650). 
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Conceptualising aid policy as a component element of a state’s foreign policy provides a means 
to interrogate a shortcoming of the International Relations literature: its limited ability to explain 
why states choose to reorient their foreign policy (C. F. Hermann 1990). Even the subfield of 
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), which focuses on decisionmaking processes, tells us “little about 
the sources and conditions that give rise to significant alteration to state foreign policy” (Alden 
and Aran 2017, 125). In light of this, the cases introduced in the opening vignettes are of “special 
interest” to scholars of foreign policy because they are each examples of “[c]hanges that mark 
a reversal or, at least, a profound redirection of a country’s foreign policy” (C. F. Hermann 1990, 
4). Furthermore, the fact these cases involve redirecting the same type of foreign policy 
heightens the likelihood of advancing theoretical understanding about how change proceeds. 
“While it might be impossible to formulate a viable theory that would purport to explain all types 
of foreign policy,” argues Jervis (1976, 18), “there is good reason to think that theoretical 
progress would be easier to achieve if the ambition was limited to explaining certain types of 
foreign policy.” In short, as the title of the thesis conveys, my ‘paying attention to aid’, is a means 
of engaging with the broader problem of explaining foreign policy change.  
 
This is not to deny that there is not a growing need to pay attention to aid in its own right. 
Foreign aid has rapidly become an important feature of international relations, despite only 
emerging as a distinct element of foreign policy relatively recently (Picard and Groelsema 2008, 
7; Hook 1995, xi, 19; Firth 2005, 273; Lancaster 2007a, 5). It is instructive that Australia, the UK, 
and the Netherlands each spend considerably more on aid than they do on diplomacy 10 . 
Moreover, global aid spending is increasing. Over the last two decades, the members of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC)—historically considered the representative ‘club’ of traditional donors—have 
expanded their expenditure on official development assistance (ODA) by 134% in real terms, 
from US61.32 billion in 1997 to US143.33 billion in 201611. The proportion of Gross National 
Income (GNI) that DAC members devote to aid has also expanded by 52%, from 0.21% of GNI in 
1997 to 0.32% in 2016, while the volume of aid provided by non-DAC members has also been 
rising dramatically. Quite simply, as van der Veen (2011, 13) has argued, “[t]he sheer volume of 
aid makes development assistance a topic of considerable importance…” In summary, in both 
theoretical and empirical terms, there is a pressing need for aid policy to be studied as “a sui 
generis tool of contemporary foreign policy” (Hook 1995, xiii; see also Potter 1980).  
                                                          
10 For example, just prior to its demise, AusAID’s budget was roughly four times larger than that of the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
11 Constant 2015 prices. Only a very minor component of this dramatic expansion is accounted for by the expansion 
of DAC member countries since 1997 (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia). ODA 
from these new DAC-member states constituted only 0.86% of total DAC ODA in 2016.     
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One final piece of ‘boundary work’ is required before moving on to situate my study within the 
International Relations literature. This thesis is limited to examining what Gyngell and Wesley 
(2007, Chapter 2) identify as the ‘strategic level’ of foreign policy. Strategic level foreign policy, 
according to Gyngell and Wesley (2007, 22), “is made as a series of commitments and attitudes 
on the relations between a society and the outside world, usually expounded in general policy 
statements and ministerial speeches”. The strategic level domain of foreign policymaking 
features the active involvement of senior political actors who consider ‘big picture’ questions. I 
consider the ‘strategic level’ of aid policy to predominantly entail questions regarding the 
strategy, size, structure, and shape of a given state’s aid program. As such, aid policy 
decisionmaking at the strategic level involves actors with the authority to act in the name of the 
state (R. C. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 2002, 59) answering four questions: why do we give aid? 
(strategy); how much aid will we give? (size); how will we organise our aid (structure) and how 
and where will we spend our aid? (shape). These aspects of strategic-level aid policy 
decisionmaking can be summarised as the ‘four S’s’. 
 
While I engage with each of the four S’s during this thesis, one way I have limited the scope of 
this project in my research design is by focussing primarily on the question of size. I deliberately 
framed how I set up the puzzle at the outset of this Introduction in terms of aid spending 
changes. Yet those familiar with these aid policy changes will be aware that the spending 
changes announced in 2013 in Australia, the UK and the Netherlands were all accompanied by 
significant changes in other strategic dimensions. In Australia, cuts to aid were followed almost 
immediate by the decision to integrate Australia’s aid agency, AusAID, into the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), thereby ending four decades of autonomous existence. The 
abandonment of the 0.7% target in the Netherlands was also accompanied by machinery of 
government changes. Moreover, each of the states in question conducted serious rationalisation 
exercises in the post-GFC period where they dramatically reduced the number of partner 
countries supported by their respective aid programs.  
 
While not ignoring non-spending strategic level changes, I focus on aid spending for five reasons. 
First, the size of the aid budget the aspect of aid policy which generates the most media and 
public interest. Second, a state’s level of aid spending is accepted widely accepted proxy for how 
important a government considers aid to be (even though the success of its policy is clearly 
dependent on many other factors than aid volume, not least aid quality) (Hook and Rumsey 
2016, 61). Third, the 0.7% target clearly still exerts a powerful normative hold on the actions of 
states, as my accounts of aid policy change demonstrate. Fourth, for the three reasons just 
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provided, the size of the aid budget is generally the strategic aid policy issue political actors care 
most about. And fifth, defining change in the other dimensions of strategic aid policy is 
considerably more difficult. In summary, I made the assessment that a focus on aid spending 
was likely to provide the most explanatory purchase within the complex and difficult terrain of 
aid policy change.  
1.2 The Shortcomings of the Literature and my Response 
Beyond the immediate empirical motivation of explaining the puzzling choices outlined above, 
two distinct shortcomings of the International Relations literature commend this question as 
one worthy of sustained investigation. I have already raised the first shortcoming of the 
literature: a difficulty to explain when and why states redirect their foreign policy (C. F. Hermann 
1990; see also Alden and Aran 2017). The second shortcoming relates to the inability of the 
International Relations literature to decisively explain why states give aid, despite having 
grappled with the question for well over half a century. 
 
A sense of confoundment has always overshadowed the International Relations scholarship on 
aid. In 1962, Hans Morgenthau (1962, 301) observed that “of the seeming and real innovations 
which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy, none has proved more 
baffling to both understanding and action than foreign aid”. Later that decade, Morgenthau’s 
fellow Realist Kenneth Waltz (1967, 185) conceded that foreign aid was “something new under 
the sun” and defied existing assumptions about state behaviour. A surge of scholarly interest in 
aid during the late 1970s and early 1980s shed important new light on what factors led states to 
provide aid, but failed to account for why, how, or when these factors impacted aid policy. By 
the late 1990s, Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor (1998, 295) recognised that the scholarship on 
foreign aid was trapped in an “intellectual vacuum”.  
 
This assessment has continued to be invoked by contemporary aid scholars surveying the state 
of the ‘determinants of aid literature’—the body of scholarship concerned with “which donor 
gives to which recipient and why” (Alesina and Dollar 2000, 34) and the subliterature most 
relevant to this thesis12. One such scholar, A. Maurits van der Veen (2011, 2), concedes that “the 
factors shaping foreign aid remain ill-understood”. Ahmed, Marcoux, Russell and Tierney (2011, 
6) concur, acknowledging that there is “little consensus in the aid literature concerning which 
                                                          
12 Alesina and Dollar (2000, 34) view the literature on foreign aid as comprising two components. As I have noted, 
the determinants of aid literature, which I am concerned with here, considers “which donor gives to which recipient 
and why”. The other component “studies the effects of foreign aid on the receiving countries.” This question, while 
extremely important, is outside the scope of this thesis. 
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factors most influence changes in donors’ aid effort” before adding add that, “[e]ven when 
scholars agree on which variables matter most they frequently disagree on the precise effects 
that those variables will have.” More than five decades after baffling Morgenthau, the core 
question the determinants of aid literature grapples with continues to perplex scholars.  
 
This thesis contends that the twin shortcomings of the International Relations literature just 
explicitly referenced derive from a shared flaw; a reticence to examine state behaviour through 
a sufficiently wide lens capable of capturing sources of change originating from within all levels 
of analysis—individual, domestic and international13. My full diagnosis of the malaise that afflicts 
the ‘determinants of aid’ literature is documented in chapter 2. In summary, I describe how the 
major frameworks to emerge from this literature are incapable of answering the question this 
thesis asks because they are anchored in a single level of analysis. The historically dominant 
selfish-selfless framework prioritises international factors. The chief alternative framework, the 
domestic determinants framework, seeks to correct this weakness by focussing on domestic 
factors. Yet in doing so, this approach suffers from the very same problem it was trying to 
rectify—prejudging from which level the most important explanatory factors originate from. In 
summary, the key existing frameworks disagree about whether international factors or domestic 
factors should be prioritised. Furthermore, these frameworks both ignore individual factors.  
 
By focussing unduly on factors originating from a single level of analysis, the existing frameworks 
generate accounts of aid policy change that are frustratingly incomplete, like trying to read a 
novel with missing pages. Only by actively considering factors originating from all levels of 
analysis—simultaneously–can a more satisfying narrative be created. To develop more complete 
explanations of aid policy change in Australia, the UK, and the Netherlands, I engaged the FPA 
subliterature to build an integrated (i.e. multilevel) aid policy decisionmaking framework. In 
chapter 3, I describe how this ‘recapturing scheme’ is powered by the idea that the individual 
decisionmaker acts as the “locus of theoretical integration across levels of analysis” (V. M. 
Hudson 2002, 5). 
 
The integrated aid policy decisionmaking framework functions as a tool to guide the 
reconstruction of a series of aid policy decisionmaking episodes (the six episodes are specified 
further below). Yet these reconstructions did not, in themselves, constitute answers to the 
question this thesis poses. Rather, they functioned as an access point for understanding aid 
                                                          
13 For reasons that will become more evident in chapter 2, I adopt the common three-tiered framework advanced 
by Waltz (1959) when referring to ‘levels of analysis’ during this thesis. In doing so, I acknowledge there are 
alternative approaches, notably the divisions advocated by Hudson, who identifies nine major levels of analysis (V. 
M. Hudson 2014, 34).  
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policy decisionmaking dynamics and produced the amalgam of empirical material from which 
my answer emerged. To build a more generalised argument from this raw material to explain 
why states change the trajectory of their aid policy, I also drew on the agenda-setting literature. 
As I document in chapter 4, I appropriated concepts from the agenda-setting literature to 
construct a pair of explanatory mechanisms that explain the divergent aid policy choices made 
by Australia, the UK, and the Netherlands in 2013. As I preview in the next section, these 
explanatory mechanisms are tools that I used to help explain the story of aid policy change in 
my cases.   
1.3 The Argument 
I answer the question this thesis poses by advancing an actor-specific theory of aid policy 
change. Existing frameworks for understanding why states give aid are built on actor-general 
theory. These frameworks ‘ground’ their analysis at the level of the state. In contrast, I explicitly 
identify the human decisionmaker, rather than the state, as the “the point of theoretical 
intersection between the primary determinants of state behaviour” (V. M. Hudson 2005, 3). In 
chapter 4, I explain how this theoretical move allows me to address the deficiencies of the 
determinants of aid literature. Most important, it facilitates the development of multilevel 
explanations of aid policy change; beginning with the human decisionmaker does not prevent 
the integration of domestic and international factors into explanations of aid policy change— it 
enables it. This is fundamentally because “decision makers can take their cue from any level of 
analysis” (Welch 2005, 23).  
 
The central argument of this thesis is that states change the trajectory of their aid policy when 
powerful individual political actors pay sustained attention to aid policy issues. The theory of aid 
policy change I advance encapsulates this argument via two explanatory mechanisms, decider 
salience and aid salience shocks. Together, these mechanisms are designed to map the 
attentiveness of political actors to aid issues in a state over time, thereby allowing for the policy 
change process such political attention promotes to be identified, traced, and explained.  
 
While the notion that “serious policy change” (Baumgartner, Green-Pedersen, and Jones 2006a, 
959) occurs when political actors increase the attention they pay to an issue is well-established 
in the agenda setting literature, the implications of this for aid policy dynamics have not been 
explored. Crucial to the agenda setting literature is role of the political agenda, which I define 
in this study as the list of issues to which political actors, and people closely associated with 
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them, devote their attention14. ‘Getting on’ the political agenda is a precondition for policy 
change to occur in an issue area, including aid. As Green-Pedersen and Walgrave (2014b, 6) 
relate, “the selection of issues that deserve political attention determines all further steps in the 
political process”, including major changes in spending allocations.  
 
Issues typically reach the political agenda via a ‘bottom up’ process reflecting the public’s 
priorities, as political actors in democracies are incentivised to devote their limited time and 
attention to issues that are also deemed important by the public (Bevan and Jennings 2014, 39). 
Aid issues, however, are unable to ‘reach’ the political agenda in this manner. While the public 
may notionally support the provision of aid, voters do not view aid as important relative to other 
priorities. In short, the low issue salience of aid prevents aid issues from reaching the political 
agenda via the regular ‘bottom up’ process. (Chapter 4 includes an extended defence of the 
claim that aid has low issue salience—see section 4.4). This means that, for aid issues to reach 
the political agenda, they must do so via a ‘top down’, actor-driven process.  
 
The explanatory mechanism of decider salience makes sense of the unique way which aid issues 
reach the political agenda. Decider salience refers to the degree to which an individual political 
actor is personally motivated to devote serious and sustained attention to an issue. Only once 
an individual political actor’s level of decider salience crosses a threshold level will they be willing 
to expend the necessary political capital to put (and then keep) a low salience issue like aid on 
the political agenda. Furthermore, while exceeding the decider salience threshold is a necessary 
condition for getting aid issues on the political agenda, it is not sufficient. The relevant political 
actor must also possess the required authority or influence to get a low salience issue onto the 
political agenda, a condition only fulfilled by powerful individual political actors.  
 
What motivates a powerful individual to invest their limited time and attention on aid issues? 
According to my research, they do so for one of two reasons: either they maintain a strong 
personal interest in aid, and seek to change aid policy in accordance with their policy 
preferences; or they identify aid policy as a politically useful proxy to demonstrate or signal their 
position on a more salient political issue or position. In short, aid issues exceed the threshold 
level of decider salience when an individual actor seeks to effect policy change for direct or 
indirect reasons.  
 
                                                          
14 This definition amalgamates definitions advanced by Kingdon (1995, 3) and Green-Pedersen and Walgrave 
(2014b, 1). 
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I refer to an instance of an aid policy issue reaching the political agenda for a sustained period 
as an aid salience shock. During an aid salience shock, political actors devote more attention to 
aid than is usually the case, disturbing the default dynamics of the aid policymaking subsystem15. 
Once an aid salience shock has been triggered, heightened attention is afforded to aid policy 
issues until the desired policy change is either achieved or thwarted, or until the political actor 
responsible for triggering the aid salience shock loses their ability to influence the political 
agenda.  
 
Aid salience shocks function as explanatory mechanisms once they are conceptualised as a force 
which acts to ‘push’ or ‘pull’ the trajectory of aid policy towards a policy objective (the examples 
documented in this thesis primarily function to either increase or decrease aid spending). Just 
like physical forces, aid salience shocks are vectors; they have a magnitude and a direction. 
Additionally, more than one aid salience shock may operate at any given time, potentially 
reinforcing, or cancelling out, momentum for aid policy change in a state. Tracing an aid salience 
shock as it ‘travels through’ an aid policy subsystem over time highlights the factors which act 
to impede or assist aid policy change. In this sense, aid salience shocks function as the 
conceptual equivalent of tracer dye used in medical diagnoses16. Aid salience shocks, like tracer 
dyes, help illuminate how a system is functioning, despite not being a constituent part of that 
system.  
 
The process by which aid policy change is achieved varies depending on the initiating actor’s 
motivation, allowing for a two-fold typology of aid salience shocks. When the initiating actor’s 
motivation is to change aid policy in accordance with their policy preferences, they effect change 
by intervening repeatedly in aid policy decisiomaking processes to initiate policy action or 
protect existing policy choices. I refer to this as a direct (Type I) aid salience shock. On the other 
hand, when an initiating political actor’s primary motivation is to use aid policy change as a 
means for achieving another political end, they deploy framing to change how aid is perceived. 
This is as an Indirect (Type II) aid salience shock. These alternative pathways leading to aid policy 
change are illustrated in Figure 1.A below.  
                                                          
15 Note that just because an issue reaches the political agenda does not mean it becomes suddenly more visible to 
the public. In fact, for low salience issues, it is much more likely that political actors prefer that the public are kept 
unaware of where they are directing their attention. 
16 The metaphor of a tracer dye is adapted from Green-Pedersen and Walgrave (2014b, 9), who deploy it to convey 
the value of “tracking attention to issues through time to learn about political systems”. 
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Figure 1.A: Aid Salience Shocks as Pathways to Aid Policy Change 
 
 
As I demonstrate in the empirical component of thesis, the explanatory mechanisms of decider 
salience and aid salience shocks function as devices around which to construct multilevel 
explanations of aid policy change. By joining up the “discrete and disconnected pieces of the aid 
puzzle” (Hook 1993, 44), these mechanisms generate more complete accounts of aid policy 
change than existing alternatives, helping make sense of why Australia, the UK and the 
Netherlands made divergent aid policy choices in 2013. 
1.4 Research Design 
As the opening vignettes conveyed, this project emerged in response to a trio of confounding 
aid policy announcements made over the course of six months in 2013. These announcements 
signalled a definitive policy choice had been made by these states regarding their aid spending 
trajectories: Australia would abandon its decade-long spending ramp-up to 0.5%; the 
Netherlands would abandon its 40-year long policy of spending at least 0.7%; and the UK would 
realise its promise to achieve the 0.7% target and maintain this level of expenditure on aid. 
 
This project was designed to explain these ‘real world’ events by asking about their causes 
(Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 42). In a methodological sense, the driving objective was to uncover 
“the many and complex causes of a specific outcome (Y) [i.e. aid policy change] and not so much 
[to examine] the effects of a specific cause (X)” (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 80). In 
methodological terms my case selection is Y-centred, with this study adopting a ‘causes of 
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effects’ approach, rather than an ‘effects of causes’ approach (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 41)17. 
This is typical of FPA scholarship, which generally seeks to explain why a given foreign policy 
decision was made.  
 
As the basis for understanding why Australia, the UK and the Netherlands changed the trajectory 
of their aid policy, this research reconstructed six aid policy decisionmaking episodes, two in 
each of the three case study countries (see Table 1.A below)18 . My starting point was to 
reconstruct the decisionmaking episodes that led to the ‘definitive declaratory statement on aid 
policy’ produced by each government responsible for the trio of announcements that triggered 
the research—the Abbott, Cameron-Clegg and Rutte II government’s respectively (Series II). To 
provide for temporal comparison, I also reconstructed the decisionmaking episodes leading to 
the definitive declaratory statement on aid policy produced by the predecessor governments to 
those above—that is, for the Gillard, Brown, and Rutte I governments respectively (Series I). 
Beyond helping to reveal change over time, this move adds methodological value because in 
each country, the government in Series I is replaced by one of a different ideological orientation 
in Series II.  
 
The chief methodological contribution of this thesis is the development and application of an 
integrated ‘Aid Policy Decisionmaking Framework’. The framework allowed the six 
decisionmaking episodes summarised in Table 1.A below to be reconstructed in a comparable 
manner. The framework is ‘integrated’ in the sense that it incorporates potential factors shaping 
aid policy decisionmaking from all levels of analysis—international, domestic, and individual.  
 
Reconstructing these episodes provided a ‘way in’ to discovering aid policy decisionmaking 
dynamics, revealing the competing constraints political actors face when making aid policy. This 
process uncovered potentially relevant causal ‘threads’ which could then be followed back and 
forward through time using causal process tracing methodology to generate theoretically-
                                                          
17 Scholars working within the ‘quantitative culture’ operate using an ‘effects of causes’ approach. Such scholars 
prize the controlled experiment and seek to “estimate the average effect of an independent variable of interest” 
(Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 41). In contrast, as Blatter and Haverland (2012, 99) point out, “[s]mall-N research with 
an emphasis on causal-process tracing does not rely on the co-variation of variables across cases to draw causal 
inferences”.  
18 I also considered examining Canada, Norway, and Switzerland as potential alternate case study countries. Amongst 
these alternative cases, Canada was the most compelling, as Canada’s then-government also surprisingly announced 
a major aid policy change in 2013 (R. Davies 2013d). It confirmed that the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA), which had been independent for 45 years, would be subsumed into the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade (DFAIT) (Mackrael 2013). Ultimately, the major reason for choosing to examine aid policy 
making in Australia, the Netherlands and the UK relates to the fact these policy changes, although incorporating other 
aspects, were primarily expressed at the political level in terms of a sudden departure from, or realisation of (in the 
case of the UK), a long-agreed bipartisan spending target. Practical considerations also played a role, particularly as 
having two cases in Europe minimised fieldwork travel expenses, allowing for repeat trips to each case study country.  
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orientated narratives (George and Bennett 2005, 205) that explain what factors influence 
changes in aid policy. As I followed these threads by “immersing myself in the details of the 
case[s]” (Bennett and Checkel 2015a, Loc 527), I inductively began to appreciate the importance 
of agenda dynamics in triggering major aid policy change19. This in turn led me to leverage the 
agenda-setting literature to inform the construction of explanatory mechanisms that, by 
conceptualising how and why aid policy changes, respond directly to the question posed by this 
thesis. 
Table 1.A: Aid Policy Decisionmaking Episodes Reconstructed in this Study 
 State Episode Defining Declaratory Aid Policy Publication 
Date 
Government 
Se
rie
s I
 
Australia AUS I 
An Effective Aid Program for 
Australia: Making a real difference—
Delivering real results 
July 2011 Gillard Labour Government 
UK UK I Eliminating World Poverty: Building our Common Future July 2009 
Brown Labour 
Government 
Netherlands NED I 
Letter to the House of 
Representatives presenting the 
spearheads of development 
cooperation policy 
March 2011 
Rutte I 
(Centre-right 
Coalition) 
Se
rie
s I
I 
Australia AUS II Australian aid: Promoting prosperity, reducing poverty, enhancing stability June 2014 
Abbott 
Government 
UK UK II Spending Review 2010 October 2010 
Cameron Coalition 
Government 
Netherlands NED II A World to Gain: A New Agenda for Aid, Trade and Investment April 2013 
Rutte II 
(‘Purple’ Coalition) 
 
In building the accounts of aid policy change presented in Part II of this thesis, this research 
draws on a wide range of contemporary data sources, including speeches, government reports, 
memoirs, diaries, biographies, newspapers, magazines, parliamentary reports, blogs, journal 
articles and books (where kindle versions of books have been used that don’t include page 
numbers, ‘locations’ are recorded in the in-text citations, denoted by ‘Loc’ following surnames 
of author/s and date of publication). Most notably, this research also draws on over 40 hours of 
interview material collected during over fifty formal interviews, including with many individuals 
who directly participated in one or more of the six decisionmaking episodes that were 
reconstructed. These interviews were conducted under the auspices of ANU Human Ethics 
                                                          
19 Leaving space for inductive insights is a key feature of causal process tracing (Bennett and Checkel 2015a; Blatter 
and Haverland 2012, 30). 
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Protocol Number 2014/426. A list of interviewees can be found in Annex 1. Interviewees have 
explicitly consented to the use of all the interview data that appears in this thesis.  
 
Crucially, given the importance of political actors to this study, this research draws on interviews 
with eight politicians who held aid policy-related appointments during the period in question. 
This includes interviews with the former Parliamentary Secretary for Development Cooperation 
in Australia (Bob McMullen), two former UK Secretaries of State for International Development 
(Clare Short and Andrew Mitchell) and the former State Secretary for European Affairs and 
Development Cooperation from the Netherlands (Dr Ben Knapen).  
1.5 Research Findings 
To demonstrate the plausibility of my theory of aid policy change, I trace the path of a series of 
aid salience shocks as they ‘travel through’ the aid policy subsystems of Australia, the UK, and 
the Netherlands (see Table 1.B below). In doing so, a picture emerged of the factors that prove 
important for shaping strategic level aid policy across each of these cases. Before introducing 
these factors below, however, I offer previews of how the explanatory mechanisms I propose 
help explain aid policy change in Australia, the UK, and the Netherlands. 
Table 1.B: Aid Salience Shocks Documented in this Study 
 # Name Key Political Actor/s (position/s) Type Timeframe Impact on Aid $ 
Au
st
ra
lia
 
SS1 Rudd aid salience shock 
Kevin Rudd (Labor Party Leader, 
Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs) 
I 2006-2012 Increase 
SS2 Budget deficit aid salience shock 
Tony Abbott (Prime Minister) 
Joe Hockey (Treasurer) 
II 2013-2014 Decrease 
SS3 
Liberal Party 
factionalism aid 
salience shock 
Tony Abbott (Liberal Party 
Leader/Prime Minister) 
Julie Bishop (Deputy Liberal 
Leader/Minister for Foreign 
Affairs) 
II 2011-2014 Decrease 
U
ni
te
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
 
SS4 Short aid salience shock 
Clare Short (Shadow/Secretary of 
State for International 
Development) 
I 1997-2003 Increase 
SS5 Cameron-Mitchell aid salience shock 
David Cameron (Conservative 
Party Leader/ Prime Minister) 
Andrew Mitchell 
(Shadow/Secretary of State for 
International Development) 
I 2006-2013 Increase 
SS6 ‘Tory modernisation’ aid salience shock 
David Cameron (Conservative 
Party Leader / Prime Minister) II 2006-2013 Increase 
N
ED
 
SS7 ‘Elite hobby’ aid salience shock 
Geert Wilders (Leader of the Party 
for Freedom, PVV) II 2008-2012 Decrease 
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1.5.1 Explaining Aid Policy Change in Australia 
Australia’s abandonment of the 0.5% target in 2013 must be viewed in relation to the decade-
long expansion of that preceded this decision. This expansion was driven by Kevin Rudd, who, 
while occupying a series of senior political positions—Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Opposition Leader, Prime Minister and subsequently Minister for Foreign Affairs—consistently 
and deliberately inserted himself into aid policy decisionmaking, driven by his personal belief 
that Australia’s aid spending should increase to 0.5% (SS1). While Rudd’s authority ensured he 
could keep his ‘personal project’ on the political agenda during this period, his influence also 
masked the underlying fragility of the ‘golden consensus’. Once Rudd resigned, and was no 
longer capable of protecting the aid budget, a distinct lack of broad political and institutional 
support for ongoing aid spending increases was exposed, alongside political weakness of the 
development constituency.  
 
Aid may well have simply receded from the political agenda at this point, with aid spending 
plateauing or slowly reverting to more politically sustainable levels. Yet from 2013, Australia’s 
aid spending dived twice as rapidly as it had increased. The jarring U-turn in aid spending can be 
explained by the emergence of two indirect (Type II) aid salience shocks, each of which exerted 
downward pressure on aid spending. The budget deficit aid salience shock involved Prime 
Minister Tony Abbott and Treasurer Joe Hockey repeatedly exploiting the political value of 
framing cuts to aid spending as evidence the Coalition Government was serious about ‘fixing’ 
the growing budget deficit (SS2). The Liberal Party factionalism aid salience shock saw aid policy 
become an ideological wedge between the Liberal party’s conservative and moderate factions 
(SS3). The net effect of the co-mingling of these indirect aid saliences shocks was to incentivise 
the political benefit—both internally (within the Party) and externally (within the public)—of 
repeatedly cutting aid spending.  
1.5.2 Explaining Aid Policy Change in the United Kingdom 
In significant ways, the story of aid policy change in the United Kingdom is the reverse of 
Australia’s. Most plainly, a longstanding aid spending target was achieved in the UK, whereas it 
was abandoned in Australia. The groundwork for accomplishing the 0.7% target was laid by Clare 
Short. Assisted by the political cover provided by Brown and Blair, Short succeeded in her desire 
to establish the new Department for International Development (DFID) as a powerful agency 
focused on poverty reduction (SS4). She also ensured DFID secured substantially increased 
funding. However, like Rudd, Short relinquished her personal influence over aid policy by 
resigning. 
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The UK could maintain its trajectory towards 0.7% post-Short because, unlike in post-Rudd 
Australia, the ‘forcing direction’ of the subsequent aid salience shocks pushed aid spending 
higher. The Cameron-Mitchell aid salience shock was initiated by the high decider salience for 
aid issues of then-Opposition Leader David Cameron and his Shadow Development Secretary, 
Andrew Mitchell. Both men kept aid on the political agenda because they were personally 
invested in realising the 0.7% target (SS5). At the same time, Cameron saw the political benefit 
of framing the Conservative Party’s embrace of the 0.7% target as symbolic of the Party’s 
modernisation (SS6). The momentum created by these two salience shocks, reinforced by a 
supportive institutional environment and a large and influential development constituency, saw 
the creation of a ‘virtuous cycle’ toward 0.7%. Even given these favourable conditions, without 
Cameron’s decisive personal intervention at two critical points during his Prime Ministership, 
the UK would not l have achieved the 0.7% target in 2013.  
1.5.3 Explaining Aid Policy Change in the Netherlands 
The story of aid policy change in the Netherlands unfolds entirely differently from those in 
Australia and the UK. Rather than being the product of a combination of aid salience shocks, aid 
policy change in the Netherlands was driven by a single, powerful indirect (type II) aid salience 
shock. I argue that Dutch abandonment of the 0.7% target in the Netherlands is a product of 
Geert Wilders’ framing of aid issues (SS7).  
 
Despite never enjoying formal executive power, Wilders—an iconoclastic populist and the 
leader of the Party for Freedom (PVV)20—possessed an unprecedented ability to dictate the 
terms of Dutch political discussion during the period of study. He devoted some of his attention 
on framing aid as an ‘elite hobby’—a strategy that reinforced his more politically potent anti-
immigration, anti-Islam and anti-Europe positions. Critically, Wilders’ powerful reframing of the 
0.7% target took place during a period where the notion of Dutch identity was increasingly 
contested. Over generations, Dutch adherence to 0.7% had become a symbol of Dutch identity, 
yet as aspects of this identity were eroded, the symbolism of the 0.7% target was liable to being 
reinterpreted. Wilders knew this and methodically portrayed the 0.7% target as symbolic of the 
misplaced priorities of an out-of-touch Dutch elite whose behaviour increasingly marginalised 
‘ordinary’ Dutch people.  
 
                                                          
20 PVA is the Dutch acronym for Partij voor de Vrijheid. 
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From the outside, the long-standing Dutch consensus around 0.7% appeared to fracture 
instantly. This apparent fracturing was in fact the result of a long build-up of pressure exerted 
by Wilders—pressure that, over time, led the consensus to become exceedingly brittle. To be 
sure, the pressure applied by Wilders’ ‘elite hobby’ aid salience shock was reinforced by a range 
of other domestic and international factors, not least the changing international development 
landscape. Yet without Wilders’ determination to keep aid on the political agenda, it is difficult 
to envision a scenario whereby abandoning the 0.7% was viewed as good politics by the leading 
political party.  
1.6 Factors Shaping Aid Policy Change  
Using decider salience and aid salience shocks to explain aid policy change in Australia, the UK 
and the Netherlands revealed six specific factors that decisively shaped the policy change 
process across these states that are largely unexplored in the determinants of aid literature. I 
examine these factors in detail in chapter 8. It is significant that these six factors, which I briefly 
outline here, originate from across all levels of analysis.  
 
The key finding emerging from this study is that major aid policy change is driven by senior 
political figures, usually individuals at the party leader level. As the explanatory mechanisms the 
thesis constructs convey, powerful individual political actors play a crucial role in both initiating 
and sustaining momentum for aid policy change. Also at the individual level, this thesis also 
found that crucial decisions on aid spending are often made by small groups who ultimately 
control a state’s budget. For example, in the UK, David Cameron’s willingness to twice overrule 
the objections of his colleagues in the ‘Quad’—which acted as the inner cabinet of the Cameron-
Clegg Coalition Government—ensured the UK decided against abandoning the 0.7% target (SS5). 
 
At the domestic level, the strength and character of the development constituency in a state, 
especially the extent of its political connections, shapes the momentum for policy change. The 
political sophistication of the UK development constituency helps explain why the UK could 
achieve, and then maintain, a dramatic increase in aid spending, while the one-dimensional 
nature of the Australian development constituency meant it was unable to stall the dramatic 
spending reductions after 2013.  One of the more unexpected findings of this thesis is identifying 
that aid spending became a wedge issue within the dominant centre-right political parties in all 
three case study countries—the Liberal Party in Australia, the Conservative Party in the UK, and 
the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)21 in the Netherlands. The conservative wings of each of 
                                                          
21 CDA is the Dutch acronym for Christen-Democratisch Appèl. 
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these parties favoured cuts to aid spending, while the moderate wings desired aid spending to 
be maintained or increased. Yet even more important than this was the way the prospect of aid 
policy change activated factional conflict around other issues. Positioning on aid spending 
functioned as a proxy for where intraparty factions stood on issues such as party leadership 
(Australia and the UK), approach to managing the budget deficit (Australia and the UK), the 
degree of appropriate cooperation with far-right political parties (the Netherlands) and party 
electoral positioning (UK).   
 
At the international level, I found that the chief ‘standard’ of the international aid regime—the 
0.7% target—functioned as a reference point against which domestic political debates occurred. 
The 0.7% target carried heavy symbolic weight and the burden of this weight shifted over time. 
This means that deploying the 0.7% target as a political symbol is a double-edged sword for 
politicians and policymakers. And finally, global power shifts function as prompts for states to 
reassess how to engage in the world, which activates debates about national identity that flow 
into the politics of aid.   
 
Together, these factors reveal how the characteristics of the aid policy issue area make aid policy 
liable to being a site of political contestation. In chapter 8, I develop the notion that aid policy 
resides in a ‘salience sweet spot’ for engendering elite political conflict. This concept refers to 
the idea that aid policy is just important enough to make ‘playing politics’ with aid potentially 
worthwhile, but not so important that the political costs of doing so are prohibitively high. In 
short, aid policy is uniquely suited to becoming a site of political contestation, with aid policy 
positions functioning as proxies for broader debates between groups. 
 
1.7 Research Contribution  
This thesis advances the study of International Relations through several innovations. This study 
is the first to examine aid policy decisionmaking dynamics at the strategic level in comparative 
perspective. It is also the first to reconstruct a series of distinct aid policy decisionmaking 
episodes in similar manner to the way classic decisionmaking episodes have been examined in 
the FPA literature, such as the Bay of Pigs Crisis (Janis 1972) and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Allison 
1969, 1971). Additionally, this thesis is one of the few studies that sets out to construct an 
‘integrated’ explanation of foreign policy choices across three levels of analysis. By focusing on 
a non-crisis domain of foreign policy and examining non-United States cases, the study moves 
beyond the subject matter typically associated with FPA. Finally, by tracing “levels of attention 
to issues within government over time” (Baumgartner, Green-Pedersen, and Jones 2006a, 959), 
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this study represents one of the few comparative studies of policy agendas. These innovations 
position the thesis to make original empirical, methodological, and theoretical contributions to 
International Relations. 
 
This thesis makes an original empirical contribution by providing detailed accounts of recent 
instances of major aid policy change in Australia, the UK, and the Netherlands. Even now, four 
years after the decisions were announced, there remains considerable conjecture about why 
these states dramatically changed the trajectory of their aid spending. Very little academic work 
has been done to document the details of each case in isolation, much less viewed from a 
comparative perspective. Furthermore, as just mentioned, this thesis shows how six specific 
factors that have not been well-considered in the literature to this point influence the aid-giving 
behaviour of states.  
 
The thesis makes a methodological contribution by developing and applying a multilevel ‘aid 
policy decisionmaking framework’. This framework represents a contribution to the ongoing 
efforts of FPA scholars to develop integrated frameworks for explaining foreign policy (Mintz 
and DeRouen 2010; Yetiv 2011b; V. M. Hudson 2014). While the framework was specifically 
designed to reconstruct of aid policy decisions, it can be applied to decisionmaking episodes in 
other realms of foreign policy. The methodological technique of using the reconstruction of 
decisionmaking episodes leading to declaratory policy documents (‘white paper’ type outputs) 
as the entry point from where causal process tracing is employed to further examine why change 
occurs also has wider applicability 
 
Finally, this thesis contributes new theoretical knowledge by postulating an actor-specific theory 
of aid policy change. In a demonstration of mechanisms-based theorising (Bennett 2013) the 
study advances the concepts of ‘decider salience’ and ‘aid salience shocks’ as devices to explore 
and explain how political attention drives aid policy change. The prospects for the application of 
these ideas to realms of foreign policy beyond aid are addressed in more detail in chapter 9.  
1.8 Thesis Synopsis 
This thesis unfolds in two parts, bookended by this introduction and a conclusion. The trio of 
chapters forming Part I engage sequentially with the three key bodies of literature the thesis 
interacts with to generate an answer to the thesis question. Chapter 2 situates my study within 
the determinants of aid literature, the ‘home’ literature this study engages with and seeks to 
extend and speak to. By employing Kenneth Waltz’s (1959) levels of analysis framework to 
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organise my survey of this subliterature, I show how the major existing frameworks for 
understanding why states give aid are distinguished by the credence they give to explanatory 
factors arising from a particular level of analysis. The literature review demonstrates that to 
generate more complete explanations of aid policy change requires examining such instances 
through a less-exclusionary lens than currently available. 
 
In response, chapter 3 explains how I imported key ideas from the Foreign Policy Analysis 
subliterature to construct a multilevel recapturing scheme to reconstruct aid policy 
decisionmaking episodes. By depicting how political actors mediate between constraints 
operating simultaneously at different levels of analysis, my ‘aid policy decisionmaking 
framework’ serves as a visual depiction of how I conceptualise aid policy decisionmaking to 
operate. The framework also functions as a methodological device by ensuring variables of 
‘theoretical interest’ are accounted for when reconstructing decisionmaking episodes (George 
and Bennett 2005, 69). The concluding section of chapter 3 explains how I operationalised the 
framework, discussing how I used the reconstructed decisionmaking episodes the framework 
generated as the basis for developing analytical explanations of aid policy change in each case 
study country by using causal process tracing. 
 
Chapter 4 describes how I appropriate key insights from the agenda-setting literature to develop 
an actor-specific theory of aid policy change. Here I explicate the explanatory mechanisms of 
decider salience and aid salience shocks that allow me to explain how and why states change 
the trajectory of their aid policy. Underpinning the operation of these explanatory mechanisms 
is an assessment of the characteristics of the aid policy issue area (Lundsgaarde 2013, chapter 
2)—characteristics which hinge on aid’s low issue salience.  
 
Part II of the thesis demonstrates the plausibility of the theory of aid policy change. It does so 
by telling the stories of aid policy change in Australia (chapter 5), the UK (chapter 6) and the 
Netherlands (chapter 7) using decider salience and aid salience shocks as the basis for each 
narrative. These chapters adhere to the same basic structure, with the explanations of aid policy 
change since the early 2000s unfolding across four ‘acts’ in each case. At the same time, these 
chapters differ in their tone and focus, reflecting the subject matter. For example, the chapter 
on Australia focuses quite heavily on budgetary concerns, while the chapter on the Netherlands 
looks closely at recent changes in Dutch identity.  
 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are very heavily footnoted, a product of my causal process tracing 
methodology. Rather than aggregating of this material in a methodological annex, I decided that 
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footnoting it not only allows the reader to rapidly access additional supporting information for 
the claims I make, but is also the best way to convey how these accounts were developed. Part 
II concludes with chapter 8, which compares aid salience shocks in comparative perspective and 
highlights specific factors that decisively shaped aid policy change across the case studies.   
 
Following Part II, a Conclusion recalls the steps the thesis undertook to generate a response to 
the research question, before reflecting on some of the limitations of the study. I then consider 
the contributions the study makes to the literature. Based on this discussion, I make a series of 
recommendations for future research, especially regarding further testing, verification, and 
application of the explanatory mechanisms this thesis introduces. 
 
§§§ 
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2 Assessing the ‘Determinants of 
Aid’ Literature 
 
“Foreign Aid is something new under 
the sun.” 
—Kenneth Waltz, 1967 
 
“[T]he ongoing debate over the foreign 
aid regime remains trapped in 
something of an intellectual vacuum”.   
—Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor, 1998 
 
“[R]ather than one level containing the 
variables that are most significant for all 
problems, the importance of each level 
may vary from one issue area to 
another”  
—Robert Jervis, 1976  
 
 
hy do states give aid? This seemingly straightforward question has puzzled international 
relations scholars since the emergence of the modern aid regime. In 1962, Hans 
Morgenthau (1962, 301) observed that “of the seeming and real innovations which the modern 
age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy, none has proved more baffling to both 
understanding and action than foreign aid”. Despite substantial scholarly attention over the 
course of more than half a century, this sense of bafflement remains (van der Veen 2011, 2; 
Lancaster 2007a, 3; Ramalingam 2013, 10; Hoeffler and Outram 2011, 237). “[T]he factors 
shaping foreign aid,” conceded van der Veen (2011, 2) in a definitive recent assessment, “remain 
ill-understood”. This thesis set out to improve this understanding.  
 
More troubling than the continuing lack of understanding of the factors shaping foreign aid is 
the growing sense that scholarship in this area has reached an intellectual cul-de-sac. In 1998, 
Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor (1998, 295) remarked that, “the ongoing debate over the foreign 
W
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aid regime remains trapped in something of an intellectual vacuum”. It is telling that the authors 
of some of the most important aid scholarship in the past twenty years have made a point of 
acknowledging the ongoing relevance of this assessment22. In some ways, however, a sense of 
confoundment has always hovered over the scholarship of aid. As the Waltz (1967, 185) 
epigraph that introduces this chapter suggests, it has long been the case that the empirical 
realities of aid policy defy existing categories of thought and analysis. A pertinent question for 
anybody engaging with the determinants of aid literature to ask, therefore, is to ask why this is 
the case.  
 
In response to this question, this chapter surveys the historical trajectory of the determinants 
of aid scholarship—a subliterature concerned with “which donor gives to which recipient and 
why” (Alesina and Dollar 2000, 34)—within the broader International Relations literature. 
Reviews of this literature most commonly proceed by explaining how each the dominant 
International Relations paradigms account for donor behaviour23. I chart a different course here, 
arguing that owing to a combination of disciplinary, historical and scholarly reasons, two 
predominant approaches have dominated how scholars approach explaining the aid-giving 
behaviour of states.  
 
Most aid scholarship operates within the ‘selfish-selfless framework’ or the ‘domestic 
determinants framework’ (see Table 2.A below). The ‘selfish-selfless framework’ describes an 
approach that, at root, seeks to determine whether selfish or selfless motives predominate in 
the observable aid-giving behaviour of states. This approach crystallised in the late 1970s and 
has stressed third image factors. Scholars working from within this approach typically deploy 
quantitative models to determine why states give aid. The ‘domestic determinants framework’ 
emerged in response to the ‘selfish-selfless’ framework, as part of the domestic politics turn in 
IR. Scholars working within this alternate framework typically deploy qualitative methodologies 
to ascertain why and how certain domestic factors influence aid giving behaviour of states. 
 
In the two sections that comprise this chapter, I review these frameworks in turn, charting the 
emergence, findings, and explanatory deficiencies for each. My purpose in doing so is to reveal 
what the existing literature neglects, thereby building the case for what needs to change if the 
                                                          
22 van der Veen (2011, 9), for example, quoted this statement, while Piciotto (2007, 477) makes a similar argument 
when contending that “the need for competent analyses of foreign aid – the complex, innovative, and by now 
indispensable instrument of international relations – is urgent.” 
23 Good examples of this approach to surveying the determinants of aid literature include Van Belle, Rioux and 
Potter (2004, 8–23), Hook (1995, 34–40) and van der Veen (2011, 24–28). 
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determinants of aid literature is to progress. By presenting such a diagnosis, this chapter 
prepares the way for the prescription I develop in chapter 3.   
Table 2.A: Approaches for Explaining Why States Give Aid 
 Selfish-Selfless Framework Domestic Determinants Framework 
Level-of-analysis Third Image (International) Second Image (Domestic) 
Status Historically dominant Alternative 
Key question 
Do selfish or selfless motives 
predominate the aid-giving behaviour of 
states? 
What domestic level factors influence the 
aid-giving behaviour of states? 
Empirical Focus What factors influence aid giving behaviour of states 
Why and how certain domestic factors 
influence aid giving behaviour of states 
Period of 
Emergence 
Late 1970s, with McKinlay and Little’s 
development of the recipient-need—
donor-interest model 
Late 1980s, with the ‘first wave’ of domestic 
determinants scholars 
Reason for 
emergence 
To test the increasingly dominant 
‘foreign policy view of aid’ (i.e. realist 
view) 
The simplistic and unsatisfying explanations 
offered by the selfish-selfless framework 
 
Over the course of this chapter, I highlight three major deficiencies in the determinants of aid 
literature. First, it relies heavily on generalisations about state motivations. Scholars have 
prioritised discovering patterns in aid allocative behaviour, rather than illuminating exactly how 
and why the process of aid policy change occurs. Second, the two frameworks are alike in that 
they both virtually ignore the role of first image factors—factors which, as Waltz (1959:16) 
described, “are found in the nature and behaviour of man”. Over the course of the chapter, I 
demonstrate how—to paraphrase from the Jervis (1976, 16) epigraph above—the two 
frameworks give explanatory precedence to factors explaining aid policy choices that originate 
from one level of analysis (international or domestic). And third, by discounting the role of 
factors stemming from the unique perspectives and preferences of individual human 
decisionmakers in determining why states give aid, the explanations the popular frameworks 
generate provide about aid policy change are narrow and incomplete. In sum, the literature 
review connects to the core question of this thesis—why do states change the trajectory of their 
aid policy?—by revealing the limitations of the default approaches which are typically employed 
to respond to this question.  
 
Before commencing the review, however, it is important to address two potential concerns the 
reader may have. The first relates to what some may consider to be the reductionist way I have 
framed the determinants of aid literature. My characterisation of this literature as featuring two 
broad frameworks is not meant to deny that some aid scholarship has deliberately sought to 
move beyond the strictures these frameworks impose. (Indeed, throughout this chapter, and 
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especially in the opening section of chapter 3, I highlight examples of such innovative 
scholarship). Rather, my decision to use this chapter to document the disciplinary, historical and 
scholarly reasons behind the emergence and direction of these two main frameworks stems 
from my desire to chart the big-picture trajectory of the determinants of aid subliterature. I do 
this in order to demonstrate why aid scholarship has neglected first-image explanations for why 
states give aid. Only when these reasons are understood is it possible to being to think about 
how to overcome them.  
 
The second potential concern I wish to allay is this; by demonstrating the extent to which aid 
scholarship in International Relations neglects first-image explanations, I do not mean to imply 
that the discipline (and closely related ones such as policy studies) has not developed relevant 
conceptual tools and approaches for examining how first image factors contribute to foreign 
policy change. Scholars have shown how individuals can drive foreign policy change using 
concepts including foreign policy entrepreneurship (Carter and Scott 2009; Mintrom and 
Norman 2009; Mintrom and Luetjens 2017; Davies and True 2017), policy gatekeepers (Busby 
2007; 2010) and veto players (Tsebelis 1995; 2002), to highlight some prominent examples. 
While I will return to these concepts later in the thesis, especially to highlight their relation to 
the new concepts I propose, my immediate objective here is to explain why, as Fuchs and Dreher 
(2017:3) recognise, the determinants of aid literature “barely touches on the role of the 
decision-makers responsible for the provision of development assistance.”  
 
§§§ 
 
 
2.1 The Third Image Approach: The Selfish-selfless Dichotomy  
At the heart of the determinants of aid literature lies an enduring and unresolved debate 
concerning whether states give aid for selfish or selfless reasons (Alesina and Dollar 2000, 35; 
Heinrich 2013; Palmer, Wohlander, and Morgan 2002, 8; van der Veen 2011, 2; Berthélemy 
2006, 179). In this section of the chapter, I argue that the Manichean quality that pervades this 
literature flows from the selfish-selfless framework upon which much aid scholarship is built 
(van der Veen 2011, 9). Tracing the emergence of this framework in the late 1970s shows that it 
was developed as a direct response to a contemporary debate concerning whether realist or 
idealist theories of state behavior best explained aid allocation. Reflecting the prevailing trends 
in International Relations, the selfish-selfish framework rapidly become the dominant approach 
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employed by scholars of aid. As a result, it followed much aid scholarship has inadvertently 
focused on resolving the incompatibility between the traditional International Relations 
paradigms.  
2.1.1 The Foundations of the Selfish-Selfless Framework 
To understand the determinants of aid literature, and especially the Manichean quality of the 
dominant third-image based selfish-selfless framework, it is critical to understand its genesis. 
The established post-World War II wisdom held that the provision of aid was a moral imperative 
(Riddell 1987, 74). President Harry S. Truman’s 1949 inaugural speech (the ‘Four Points’ speech), 
which according to Hattori (2003, 229) “launched the worldwide phenomenon known as foreign 
aid”, was decisive in establishing this view. “Only by helping the least fortunate of its members 
to help themselves”, Truman (1949) declared, “can the human family achieve the decent, 
satisfying life that is the right of all people.” Truman committed the United States to sharing the 
benefits of “scientific advances and industrial progress” in order to assist the “growth of 
underdeveloped areas” of the world. 
 
From the 1950s to the mid-1970s, an ‘unquestioned consensus’ held that states provided 
development assistance for altruistic reasons. The moral case for aid was “stated boldly, 
repeatedly and usually without any explanation” (Riddell 1987, 6), especially by political leaders, 
who—taking their cue from Truman—cast the provision of foreign aid provision as an imperative 
for rich nations24. This rationale for aid provision was linked closely with the idealist (or liberal) 
paradigm for understanding international relations. For idealists (then and now), aid 
represented a shared, collaborative enterprise that delivered mutual benefits (Van Belle, Rioux, 
and Potter 2004, 18). The rapid emergence of the international aid regime only reinforced this 
notion. In 1961 alone, for example, the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act passed into law, the UN 
General Assembly declared the 1960s to be a ‘Decade of Development’ and the Development 
Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
was established (Arase 2017). For idealists, the rapid growth and influence of aid-related 
initiatives during the post-World War II period demonstrated the potential for institutions and 
norms to override power politics (Walt 1998, 38; J. Snyder 2004, 56).  
 
                                                          
24 A good example is from President John F. Kennedy’s inaugural address from 1960, delivered a decade after 
Truman’s’ four points’ speech. “To those people in the huts and villages of half the global struggling to break the 
bonds of mass misery,” Kennedy pledged “our best efforts to help them to help themselves, for whatever period is 
required – not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right” 
(Kennedy, quoted in Riddell 1987, 6). 
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Realists disputed this reading of events. Although their views were marginal in the public 
discourse on aid at this point, realists had long been sceptical that states provided aid for 
altruistic reasons, assuming instead that self-interested motives were the most important 
determinant in how states allocated development assistance. This ‘foreign policy view’ of aid 
was most clearly advocated by Morgenthau (1962, 301), who rejected the notion that the 
provision of foreign aid carried “its own justification” that transcended foreign policy. “A policy 
of foreign aid is [and should be] no different from diplomatic or military policy or propaganda,” 
argued Morgenthau (1962, 309), “[t]hey are all weapons in the armoury of the nation.” 
Morgenthau’s fellow realist Samuel Huntington reinforced these views in a pair of articles in 
Foreign Policy in late 1970 and early 1971. Huntington (1970, 167) rejected what he termed the 
‘purist rationale’, which considered foreign aid an ‘end in itself’. In other words, both 
Morgenthau and Huntington, along with other realists, viewed foreign aid in the same way as 
other tools of statecraft. “[F]rom the realist perspective,” explains Hook (1995, 34), “foreign 
assistance should primarily, if not exclusively, be designed to facilitate donor interests.” 
 
The ‘moral case’ for aid held sway so long as the West enjoyed the increasing prosperity of the 
long post-World War II economic boom. It also helped that during this time the field of 
development economics reinforced the belief that economic progress was possible in the 
developing world. It was only in the wake of the economic uncertainty created by the early-
1970s oil crisis that the message of political realists began to resonate more widely. Alongside 
the ‘foreign policy view’ of aid advanced by political realists and led by Morgenthau and 
Huntington, two additional critiques of the ‘unquestioned consensus’ emerged from related 
disciplines (Riddell 1987). Peter Bauer, an influential development economist, was the 
intellectual leader of a viewpoint that objected to the provision of aid because it failed to achieve 
its policy objective. According to Bauer (1969, 1972, 1981, 1984), aid was not effective in 
alleviating poverty. A further critique, emerging from moral philosophy, held that states have 
no moral obligations to provide aid (Hayek 1973; Nozick 1974). As these complementary aid-
sceptic views gained traction, the realist view of aid became more acceptable. However, just as 
conditions were conducive for the message of political realists to be heard, it was recognised 
that strong empirical evidence to support this theoretically-based view was lacking.  
 
The determinants of aid literature emerged in direct response to this shortcoming. McKinlay and 
Little (1978a, 460), the founders of the determinants of aid literature, expressly acknowledged 
that “while there is strong corroboration of the foreign policy view of aid, this view has not been 
systematically developed”. Building upon the insights of Packenham (1966) and Dudley and 
Montmarquette (1976), McKinlay and Little set out to ‘systematically develop’ a theoretical 
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model to test whether the predominant ‘foreign policy view’ of aid was in fact supported by data 
(McKinlay and Little 1978a, 460). Since donor motives cannot be directly observed, this entailed 
developing “empirically testable hypotheses relating observed aid flows to observable 
developing country characteristics” (McGillivray and White 1993, 2–3). McKinlay and Little 
developed two alternate models – ‘recipient need’ and ‘donor interest’ – and tested their 
relative fit against the historical disbursements of the four major donors of the time (Berthélemy 
and Tichit 2004, 254): the United States (McKinlay and Little 1977, 1979); Britain (McKinlay and 
Little 1978b); France (McKinlay and Little 1978a) and Germany (McKinlay 1978).  
 
The work of McKinley and Little launched a substantial line of scholarly enquiry. However, as we 
will see, this literature has never entirely broken free from its original dualistic foundation. 
McKinley and Little designed their studies with a very clear rationale: to determine which of the 
two dominant paradigms in international relations, idealism (the ‘moral view’ of aid) or realism 
(the ‘foreign policy view’ of aid), best explained the aid allocations of traditional donors. The 
either-or nature or this motivating question continues to dominate the international relations 
scholarship examining why states give aid.  
2.1.2 The Findings of Selfish-Selfless Framework 
McKinlay and Little’s influential series of studies spawned a large family of publications which 
continues to grow (Hoeffler and Outram 2011, 237; Neumayer 2003, 18)25. Since the 1970s, 
scholars building on McKinlay and Little’s work have made increasingly sophisticated attempts 
to disentangle the relative importance of selfish and selfless motives in aid policy by employing 
quantitative methods (Berthélemy 2006, 179). Studies that are direct descendants have two 
distinguishing features: they employ variations of the donor interest (DI) versus recipient need 
(RN) model first introduced by McKinlay and Little; and they utilise DAC datasets26. Scholars have 
worked to advance this literature by refining the standard DI-RN model (for example by 
populating it using different variables) 27, interrogating newly available data, or doing both (see, 
for example, Tierney et al. 2011). The models utilised by most studies control for the “political, 
economic, military-strategic and cultural interests of donors”, while per capita income is the 
                                                          
25 The almost exclusive use of DAC datasets in the determinants of aid literature has meant that the determinant of 
aid literature is overwhelmingly focused on traditional donors, especially the largest of these (i.e. the United States, 
Japan, Germany, France and the UK).  
26 Key studies in the determinants of aid literature that examine bilateral aid allocation include (Maizels and 
Nissanke 1984; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Gates and Hoeffler 2004; Berthélemy 
and Tichit 2004; Berthélemy 2006; Hoeffler and Outram 2011; Heinrich 2013). McGillivray and White (1993) survey 
the earlier literature, while Neumayer (2003) provides a more recent overview.  
27 Neumayer (2003, 21–29), provides an excellent summary of existing studies in this family in an exceedingly 
detailed table in which he specifies the variables each study uses to model donor interest and recipient need.  
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most regularly employed proxy for recipient need (Neumayer 2003, 19). Models which include 
variables which account for the social needs of recipient states, such as levels of health and 
education, or the broader economic needs of the recipient, such as the state of government 
finances, are also common (Neumayer 2003, 19).  
 
The aggregate conclusion of the determinants of aid literature is that donor behaviour is better 
explained by self-interested motives than selfless ones (Gates and Hoeffler 2004; Hoeffler and 
Outram 2011, 237; Alesina and Dollar 2000, 35; Lightfoot, Davis, and Johns 2015, 12). In their 
seminal study, Alesina and Dollar (2000, 35) point out that the “idealistic view [of aid 
motivations] sharply contrasts with a voluminous literature that has argued that strategic 
foreign policy concerns explain the pattern of foreign aid”. These results imply that the selfless 
rhetoric political leaders use to explain (or justify) aid policy decisions does not match their 
ultimately selfish motivations (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998, 319; Thiele, Nunnenkamp, and 
Dreher 2007, 596). As Schraeder, Hook and Taylor (1998, 319) conclude: “the results clearly 
reject the rhetorical statements of policymakers within the industrialized North who public 
assert that foreign aid is an altruistic tool of foreign policy.”  
 
There is one striking departure from the general finding of the determinants of aid literature 
that states provide aid for self-interested reasons: “the aid allocation patterns of the Nordic 
countries are not the same as those of other bilateral aid agencies” (Gates and Hoeffler 2004, 
2). The behaviour of these Nordic states—Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, with the Netherlands 
and sometimes Canada included—has consistently been found to be driven at least in part by 
selfless motives28. Alesina and Dollar (2000, 33) and Berthelemy (2006) have emphasised that 
these donors respond more readily to the ‘correct’ incentives. This finding aligns with the 
general reputation the Nordic donors enjoy as superior performers when it comes to good 
development practice. All have a long history of providing aid for development, have usually 
been ranked amongst the most generous donors (measured as proportion of GNP), and are 
perceived to be at the vanguard of development practice and innovation.  
 
Qualitative studies designed to probe the insights of the determinants of aid literature are not 
as beholden to the selfish-selfless dichotomy as their quantitative counterparts. Instead, these 
studies invariable find that donor behaviour is more complicated than the quantitatively-driven 
selfish-selfless model implied. Nonetheless, this family of studies reinforces the notion that 
donor states provide aid primarily for self-interest reasons. Scholars tracing the foreign aid 
                                                          
28 See, for example, Alesina and Dollar (2000, 33), Berthélemy (2006), Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 
(2003); Gates and Hoeffler (2004), Ingebritsen (2002), Stokke (1989c) and Neumayer (2003, 5). 
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policies of individual countries over time, including the US (Atwood, McPherson, and Natsios 
2008; Lancaster 2007a), the UK (Williams 2005), Japan (Rix 1993) and Australia (Davis 2006; Firth 
2005, 270–294; Rosser 2008; Davis 2011), for example, have shown them to be substantially 
driven by self-interest.  
 
One key way that scholars working in the qualitative tradition have sought to escape the 
strictures of the prevailing selfish-selfless dichotomy is by suggesting typologies which allow for 
a more nuanced appreciate of donor motivations. For example, Carol Lancaster (2007a, 13), in 
her seminal comparative study investigating why countries give foreign aid, found that 
governments give aid for four main purposes: diplomatic (“goals involving a government’s 
international security and political interest abroad”); developmental; humanitarian relief (“the 
least controversial of aid’s purposes”); and commercial29. While such typologies point to the 
underlying complexity of state behaviour, and are certainly useful heuristics for understanding 
state motivations, they ultimately remain wedded to the Manichean categories they are trying 
to escape, as each of the typologies is readily reducible to a self-interested or selfless motivation. 
For example, aid provided for ‘commercial’ purposes can be interpreted as a subcategory of 
‘selfishness’. These taxonomies therefore represent augmentations to the dominant conceptual 
apparatus for understanding why states give aid, and do not provide a fundamentally different 
lens through which to generate new insight. 
 
The same can be said for another approach which is regularly used to try and escape the 
analytical strictures of the selfish-selfless dichotomy. Essentially, this approach conceives of a 
state’s foreign aid policy as comprising a mix of motivations (Lancaster 2007a, 6) which, when 
aggregated together, reveals a ‘summary motivation’ that can be located along a spectrum 
ranging from entirely selfish to entirely selfless30. This result is that a proliferation of studies that 
could be termed ‘donor profiles’ have emerged, outlining whether selfish or selfless motives 
predominate in state’s bilateral aid policy31. This approach can be helpful in providing a more 
detailed snapshot of donor behaviour at a point in time and for revealing how motivations shift 
                                                          
29 In contrast, van der Veen (2011, 10), identifies seven broad frames relevant to aid policy; security, 
power/influence, wealth/economic self-interest, enlightened self-interest, reputation/self-affirmation, 
obligation/duty and humanitarianism. Riddell (Riddell 2007, 91), meanwhile, talks of “six main clusters of motives” 
which have, “historically influenced donor decisions to allocate aid”. 
30 As Maizels and Nissanke (1984, 880) argue, “[b]oth of [the] broad motivations for giving aid - to assist 
development and to promote the interests of the donor - are no doubt present in most aid allocation decisions, and 
it is to be expected that the balance between the two will vary among the different donor countries as well as over 
time” (Maizels and Nissanke 1984, 880). 
31 For the USA, national security and commercial interests predominate. For France, veneration of former colonies is 
important (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003, 9; Lancaster 2007b, 29). Commercial and diplomatic 
imperatives drive Japan’s aid policy (Rix 1993). On the other hand, moral and humanitarian obligations concern the 
Nordic countries (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003, 9; Gates and Hoeffler 2004; Ingebritsen 2002; 
Berthélemy 2006). 
Chapter 2 
Page 34 
over time. Yet we are still left with little insight as to precisely what triggers these changes. Once 
again, the ‘donor profiles’ approach augments the dominant conceptual apparatus for 
understanding why states give aid, rather providing a new lens through which to view the 
question at hand.  
2.1.3 Evaluating the Selfish-Selfless Framework 
The still-dominant framework pioneered by McKinlay and Little answers the question ‘why do 
states give aid’ by seeking to understand whether selfish or selfless motives dominate the 
foreign aid allocations of a given state (Palmer, Wohlander, and Morgan 2002, 8). Once this 
distinct approach to responding to this question gained supremacy in the determinants of aid 
literature, a Manichean approach to analysing aid-giving behaviour infused the study of aid in 
International Relations. The development of fresh analytical perspectives has been hindered 
because of the inadvertent focus on resolving the incompatibility between the visions of the 
traditional international relations paradigms (Feeny and McGillivray 2008, 516; Schraeder, Hook, 
and Taylor 1998, 320). The determinants of aid literature, via its foundations in the donor-
interest versus recipient-need model, has reified a pair of incompatible metatheoretical 
understandings of how the world works as our principle conceptual categories for understanding 
why states give aid. As Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor (1998, 297) have explained, “scholars hold 
a priori assumptions that lead them to create and adhere to competing paradigms about which 
interests motivated donor involvement in the foreign aid regime of the cold war era.” 
 
The selfish-selfless formulation may be a parsimonious analytical framework for understanding 
aid policy that continues to dominate the public (and even some professional) discourse. But for 
the advancement of scholarly understanding of how aid policy is formulated, it has an obvious 
shortcoming: it is overly simplistic32 (Breuning 1995, 236; Heinrich 2013, 433; Riddell 1987, 
Chapter 4). The persistence of the artificial selfish-selfless dichotomy as the key framework for 
explaining aid allocation has meant that the literature prioritises categorisation at the expense 
of understanding and examines outcomes at the expense of process. Riddell (2007, 92) cuts to 
the heart of what this means in practice when he observes that “while no one seriously doubts 
                                                          
32 Of course, part of the reason the dualistic selfish-selfish framework remains so dominant, especially in the realm 
of public discourse, is precisely because it is so simple. It conveys a substantial degree of information that allows for 
a rapid assessment or predication of state behaviour. And as explained earlier, the categories on offer readily align 
with most people’s philosophical predilections. In short, the selfish-selfish framework is a powerful heuristic for 
understanding why states give aid—one that even the most sophisticated analysts of aid policy commonly resort to.  
Finally, given the limited public and political understanding of aid policy, coupled with the inherent complexity of 
this aspect of foreign policy, it is unlikely to expect this heuristic, which already dominates the way debates on aid 
policy are conducted, will be discarded any time soon. This is especially the case in a sound-bite driven media 
culture in the West that increasingly rewards politicians who engage with the type of either-or lens offered up by 
the determinants of aid literature. 
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that donor commercial pressures and national self-interest have been and continue to be 
important to the allocation of aid, the precise way in which this influence is manifested remains 
contested.” What Riddell is expressing is that the literature remains overly wedded to a 
framework that explains what factors influence aid allocation. This comes at the expense of 
adequately explain why, how, or when these factors impact aid allocation33. We are left unsure 
of exactly how or why changes in aid policy occur. Tobias Heinrich (2013) drew attention to this 
fundamental oversight in the literature by titling his recent article ‘When is Foreign Aid Selfish, 
When is it Selfless?’ 
 
To be clear, the claim I am forwarding here goes beyond simply highlighting the need for more 
work to be done in fleshing out the existing framework. My charge is that—whatever other 
limitations it has—the selfish-selfless framework can only ever provide a partial explanation of 
state behaviour. This is because the determinants of aid literature assumes that the “locus of 
cause” (Waltz 1959, 13) of a state’s aid allocation decisions relates to the international system. 
To state this another way, while the realist and liberal/idealist paradigms disagree about the 
potential and scope for cooperation in the international realm, they share fundamental 
assumptions about the nature of the context states operate within. A shared commitment to 
rationalism means both paradigms treat “the identities and interests of agents as exogenously 
given” (Wendt 1992, 391). In an anarchical world where states are the highest authority, 
international society represents a strategic realm “in which individuals or states come together 
to pursue their pre-defined interests” (Reus-Smit 2005, 192). These interests, in line with 
orthodox approaches to International Relations that have been ‘baked in’ to the determinants 
of aid literature, are exogenously determined, largely by material structures (Mielniczuk 2013, 
1076).  
 
The way the donor-interest—recipient-need model is formulated means quantitative studies in 
the determinants of aid family inherently “treat the state as a unitary, utility maximizing agent” 
(Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi 2015, 13). The various indicators of state behaviour incorporated 
into the model are aggregated at the level of the state. The state is the actor whose behaviour 
is examined. And the behaviour of a donor state, whether ultimately found to be selfish or 
selfless, is assessed based on their interactions with other states. All of this means that second 
image factors are ‘black-boxed’ by the model (Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi 2015, 13). The donor-
                                                          
33 For example, Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi (2015, 13) record how it is common for quantitative researchers in this 
tradition to “find that a certain donor gives more aid to its trading partners, but they will usually not go into details 
explaining which domestic constituency this benefits, how they lobbied for this, or why the government decided to 
support these particular interests as opposed to others, which may, for example, favor allocating aid along poverty 
reduction criteria.” 
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interest—recipient-need model’s ability to explain nuanced state behaviour is further cast into 
doubt given aid allocation motives are inferred from proxy variables (Breuning 1995, 236). Most 
notably, per capita income is the most regularly employed proxy for recipient need (Neumayer 
2003, 19)—a problematic assumption given that recent research is showing that the majority of 
the world’s poor people are now found within middle-income countries (Kanbur and Sumner 
2012; Sumner 2012)34.  
 
The selfish-selfless framework has a limited ability to explain policy change. Like other traditional 
utility-maximising models in international relations, the selfish-selfless framework explains 
outcomes by looking at variations in capabilities and constraints (van der Veen 2011). Van Belle 
is among those who have acknowledged that third image explanations, while inherently 
important, provide inescapably incomplete accounts of foreign policy decisions. Such accounts 
“can establish the limits that the international area and the attributes of the state impose upon 
the leader’s menu of available choices” but are incapable of uncovering the domestic forces 
motivating the decisionmaker (Van Belle 1993, 151). Increasingly aware of this reality, aid 
scholars from the late 1980s onwards began to pay much more attention to how within-state 
factors influenced aid policy choices, much like their colleagues in the broader discipline. 
 
§§§ 
 
 
2.2 The Second Image Approach: Domestic Determinants of Aid 
International Relations scholarship increasingly focused on systemic factors as the Cold War 
progressed, in large part in response to Waltz’s discipline-shaping structural realism (Waltz 
1979). “[B]y the end of the 1980’s,” recalls Kaarbo (2015, 193) the dominant theoretical 
paradigms of “constructivism, liberalism, and realism largely divorced international politics from 
domestic politics and decision making.” Likewise, Milner (1997, 3) had earlier observed how 
“[d]omestic variables were largely driven out of international relations theory in the 1980s...”35 
The implications for the determinants of aid literature was that the selfish-selfless framework 
for understanding why states give aid acquired dominance in large part because its focus on 
third image factors hewed closely to the theoretical priorities of the broader discipline.  
                                                          
34 Sumner (2012, 15) relates how, “[i]n 1990, approximately 90 percent of the world’s poor people… lived in low 
income countries….[while in] 2008, 70-80 percent of the world’s poor people…. lived in middle-income countries.” 
35 Smith (1986, 14) agrees, acknowledging that “[i]n all three general perspectives [dominant at the time of writing 
in the 1980s] the critical determinants of foreign policy are to be found in the nature of the international system.”   
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Yet since the late 1980s, a ‘domestic politics turn’ has been evident in International Relations 
(Kaarbo 2015), driven by a series of important articles and books emphasising the importance 
of incorporating domestic politics into International Relations theory in order to explain foreign 
policy choices (Putnam 1988; Zakaria 1992; Milner 1997; Fearon 1998; De Mesquita 2002). This 
section of the chapter documents how the domestic politics turn in International Relations was 
reflected in determinants of aid literature. Specifically, I show how the ‘domestic determinants’ 
framework for understanding why states give aid emerged in response to the ‘selfish-selfless’ 
framework, as aid scholars increasingly focused on opening up the black box of the state to 
examine how domestic-level factors influenced aid policy. 
 
In the first two parts of this section of the literature review I describe the two ‘waves’ of aid 
scholarship driven by the ‘domestic determinants’ framework (refer Table 2.B below). Then, in 
the concluding part, I argue that the second image-rooted ‘domestic determinants’ framework, 
while greatly advancing our knowledge of why states give aid, ultimately exhibits similar 
deficiencies as the ‘selfish-selfless’ framework it responded to. Despite being much more 
capable of making sense of the complexity of aid policy, the explanations offered by the 
‘domestic determinants’ framework are likewise partial. 
 
In making this argument, I focus predominantly on a subset of the determinants of aid literature 
that I refer to as ‘qualitative studies in comparative aid policy’ (see Table 2.B below). While these 
studies exhibit significant differences, they are alike in four important ways. Most obviously, 
each of these book length studies employs the comparative case study methodology, which 
reflects a desire to provide a more detailed and nuanced explanation of why states give aid. 
Second, these studies all conceive of aid policy as its own issue area—a considerable departure 
from previous studies. Third, each of these studies explicitly rejects the selfish-selfless 
framework as being inadequate for the task of explaining aid policy36. Finally, to generate more 
detailed explanations of aid policy, these scholars actively incorporate and integrate domestic 
factors into their analysis. 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 For example, Breuning (1992, 17) made it clear that her doctoral research responded to “the dichotomy that 
presents foreign assistances as either stemming from selfish political motives or an altruistic development 
orientation”, a perspective that was (and remains) “in need of reevaluation”. 
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Table 2.B: Two Waves of Qualitative Comparative Aid Policy: Selected Studies 
 
I have four reasons for focusing on this subset of the determinants of aid literature here. First, 
the studies highlighted in Table 2.B have had a disproportionate impact on the study of aid policy 
in international relations, setting the agenda in the field. Second, they each respond to the same 
types of questions that my research does, interrogating the reasons why different states adopt 
different aid policies at an elevated level of detail. Third, I approach the study of aid policy with 
a similar sensibility as these authors. Perhaps it is primarily for this reason that I have found 
these studies to be both the most illuminating and most influential for my research. Fourth, I 
view my thesis as fitting into the tradition established by these authors. This thesis’ contribution 
to new knowledge is tied to continuing and extending the line of enquiry pioneered by the 
scholars feature in Table 2.B above. Where I diverge from these scholars is to examine how 
individual actors engage in specific aid policy decisionmaking episodes, using this as a basis for 
understanding which factors impact a state’s aid-giving behaviour.  
                                                          
37 Later published as an article in International Studies Quarterly (Breuning 1995). 
 Title Author/s, Date Cases Timeframe 
Fi
rs
t W
av
e 
Western middle powers and 
global poverty 
Olav Stokke (editor), 
1989 
Canada, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden (5) 
Focus on 1975 to 
late 1980s. 
National role conceptions and 
foreign assistance policy 
behavior: toward a cognitive 
model (doctoral thesis) 
Marijke Breuning,    
199237 
Netherlands, Belgium, United 
Kingdom (3) 1975-1990 
National interest and foreign 
aid 
Steven W. Hook,        
1995 
Denmark, Switzerland, 
France, US (4) 
Focus on the 
1980s. 
Se
co
nd
 W
av
e 
Media, Bureaucracies and 
Foreign Aid 
Van Belle, Rioux and 
Potter, 
2004 
United States, United 
Kingdom, Canada, France, 
Japan (5) 
1985-1998 
Foreign aid: diplomacy, 
development, domestic politics 
Carol Lancaster,         
2007 
US, Japan, France, Germany, 
Denmark (5) 
Post WWII to 
early 2000s 
Ideas, interests and foreign aid A Maurits van der Veen, 2011 
Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Italy, Norway (4) 1950 to 2000 
The domestic politics of foreign 
aid 
Erik Lundsgaarde,       
2013 
Denmark, France, 
Switzerland, US (4) 1980-2005 
New Europe's new 
development aid 
Simon Lightfoot and 
Balázs Szent-Iványi,   
2015 
Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
(5) 
The decade 
following 2004 
EU accession 
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2.2.1 The ‘First Wave’ of Comparative Aid Policy Scholarship 
The chief harbinger of the domestic politics turn in the determinants of aid literature was the 
emergence of convincing critiques of the prevailing Manichean selfish-selfless framework. The 
development specialist38 Roger Riddell (1987, 65–73), in his book Foreign Aid Reconsidered, was 
the first author to make a sustained argument that the dichotomy at the heart the determinants 
of aid literature was both false and misleading, and did not take account the complexities of the 
real world. David Lumsdaine extended Riddell’s critique in his 1993 book Moral Vision in 
International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime 1949-1989. Lumsdaine embedded Riddell’s 
critique explicitly in the International Relations literature by examining and challenging the 
underlying theoretical assumptions that the selfish-selfless framework was based on. Lumsdaine 
(1993, 13) rejects the notion that “international politics is a realm apart, utterly distinct from 
human character and domestic society” and offers a five-point critique for why the “system-
level determination of self-interest” does not always hold. (While important precursors to the 
comparative aid policy scholarship, I have not recorded Riddell and Lumsdaine’s contributions 
in Table 2.B as they do not use the same cross-country case study methodology as the scholars 
that are included).  
 
For Lumsdaine (1993, 62), “the character of international politics is not wholly determined in 
advance by an unvarying human nature or international system but reflects moral choices which 
become embodied in the regular patterns of international affairs.” To support this argument, 
Lumsdaine examines the aid giving practices of states over a fifty-year period. His investigation 
reveals that “foreign aid cannot be explained on the basis of economic and politics interests of 
the donor countries alone, and any satisfactory explanation must give a central place to the 
influence of humanitarian and egalitarian convictions upon aid donors” (Lumsdaine 1993, 29). 
Lumsdaine’s account of change in the foreign aid regime gave further credence to the idea that 
accounting for second image factors is an indispensable component for understanding aid policy 
change.  
 
The progress achieved by Riddell and Lumsdaine was complemented by the work of a group of 
scholars who challenged the veracity of the dominant third image selfish-selfless framework 
using middle power theory. A volume edited by Olav Stokke (1989c)—Western middle powers 
and global poverty: the determinants of the aid policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Norway, and Sweden—sought to discover why the aid policies of these similar states were 
                                                          
38 Foreign Aid reconsidered was written while Riddell was a research fellow at the Overseas Development Institute 
(ODI). 
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typically distinct from other donors. The study concluded that the major determinants of “[t]he 
aid policies of the five countries reflect, for most dimensions, the dominant socio-political values 
of the domestic environments” (Stokke 1989b, 309). Yet, in a reflection of how scholars studying 
aid were increasingly comfortable integrating third and second image perspectives to explain 
aid’s complexities, Stokke explained how aid policy is “moulded in a setting in which traditions, 
norms and interests of both the domestic and the external environment influence the outcome,” 
and that, “such determinants vary from one system to another” (Stokke 1989a, 9). A companion 
volume to Stokke’s study edited by Pratt (1990b) sought to examine why these five middle 
powers took a particular interest in development issues, found that a these states prioritised 
development issues relative to other western donors because such issues were congruent with 
the prevailing political culture in these middle powers (Pratt 1990a, 15). These twin studies of 
Western middle powers typified the emerging comparative aid policy scholarship. Scholars 
active in this space were resolved to ‘look inside’ the black box of the state to discover why the 
aid policies of similar states differed. 
 
Three especially important studies were published in 1995,a making it a key year  in the 
comparative aid policy literature. Steven Hook’s (1995) National Interest and Foreign Aid, 
Marijke Breuning’s (1995) International Studies Quarterly article (a condensed version of her 
doctoral dissertation (Breuning 1992)) and Alain Noël and Jean-Philippe Thérien’s (1995) 
contribution to International Organization together encapsulate the ‘first wave’ approach to aid 
scholarship. Most evident was the shared frustration with the constrictive and ineffective (for 
their purposes, at least) ‘selfish-selfless’ framework. Breuning (1995, 236), for example, finds 
that the “donor interest versus recipient need dichotomy is too simplistic”. Noël and Thérien, 
for their part, point out that “[i]nternational relations scholars obviously remain a long way from 
a consensus on the motivations underlying development assistance.” Even for Hook, whose 
study incorporates statistical analysis based directly on McKinley and Little’s model and, of the 
three studies, gives by far the most credence to third image factors, acknowledges that “a 
comprehensive understanding of state behavior requires an additional assessment of the role 
of unit-level characteristics [which Hook explicitly calls ‘domestic factors’] that bridge the gap 
between systemic context and observable behavior” (Hook 1995, 159).  
 
Hook, Breuning, and Noël and Thérien each bring new theoretical concepts to bear on the study 
of aid. Steven Hook, beginning with his doctoral work (1993), through his first book (1995) and 
beyond (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998; Hook 2008a; Hook and Rumsey 2016), has used 
regime theory (Krasner 1982) to examine how the foreign aid regime functions to both reflect 
and constrain donor state’s aid policy choices. (I discuss the literature on the international aid 
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regime in more detail in chapter three, subsection 3.3.3). Breuning’s work also commenced with 
her doctoral studies (1992). She continues to deploy role theory to better understand aid policy 
choices (Bruening 2013), most notably by extending Holsti’s (1970) notion of national role 
conceptions (Breuning 1995, 1998). (I also discuss the literature on national identity and aid in 
more detail in chapter 3, subsection 3.3.2). Noël and Thérien’s 1995 article links the concepts 
introduced by Hook and Breuning to investigate how “welfare principles institutionalized at the 
domestic level shape the participation of developed countries in the international aid regime” 
(Noël and Thérien 1995, 523). 
2.2.2 The ‘Second Wave’ of Comparative Aid Policy Scholarship 
As indicated in Table 2.2, there was something of an interregnum in the production of important 
new qualitative studies in comparative aid policy between 1995, when Hook’s monograph, 
National Interest and Foreign Aid, was published, and 2004, when Van Belle, Rioux and Potter’s 
Media, Bureaucracies and Foreign Aid came out. While there was certainly ongoing interest in 
furthering understanding of ‘Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?’ (the title of Alesina 
and Dollar’s highly-cited 2000 study), much of the scholarly output during this interregnum 
period are comprises quantitative studies designed to elicit the type and relative influence of 
particular determinants of aid-giving behaviour)39.  
 
In most respects, the second wave of qualitative studies of comparative aid policy is simply an 
extension of the first wave. The five studies I deem as forming an identifiable ‘second wave’ of 
second-image orientated comparative research on aid policy (refer Table 2.A) built on the 
momentum created by the first wave, sharing the existing research orientation and objectives. 
Second wave scholars, however, experienced the added frustration that the study of aid seemed 
“trapped in… an intellectual vacuum” (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998, 295)40.   
 
The most noticeable change between the first and second waves was in fact an external one. By 
the mid-2000s, the influence of agenda setting works such as Milner’s Interests, institutions, and 
information: domestic politics and international relations—a book which explicitly sought to 
revive domestic explanations of foreign policy (Milner 1997, 3)—ensured that ‘opening up the 
                                                          
39 Key studies from this period include those by Schraeder, Hook and Taylor (1998), Alesina and Dollar (2000), 
Neumayer (2003) and Berthélemy and Tichit (2004). More recently, especially as new datasets have become 
available, aid scholars conducting quantitative research have become interested in a broader array of questions 
than those that motivated the earlier decedents of McKinlay and Little. These questions include whether aid 
allocations of traditional donors: align with the MDGs (Thiele, Nunnenkamp, and Dreher 2007), are impacted by 
terrorist incidents (Dreher and Fuchs 2011) or are significantly different from other groups of donors (Dreher, 
Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2011; Szent-Iványi 2012).  
40 On such scholar is van der Veen (2011, 9), who quotes this line in his contribution to the literature.   
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black box of the state’ was no longer a peripheral central concern of International Relations. 
More than their contemporary quantitative colleagues, who continued to focus on determining 
what factors mattered in aid allocation, second wave scholars were driven to understand how 
aid policy was determined. They sought more nuanced and comprehensive understandings of 
how various domestic-level processes influenced aid policy and explained cross-country 
differences and policy change41.  
 
Lancaster’s Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics emphatically brought the 
domestic politics turn to the study of aid. Her pioneering study, as the title suggests, 
“emphasises the role of domestic political factors” (Lancaster 2007a, 5)42. Lancaster (2007a, 4) 
claims that “none of [the] theories of international politics explain adequately the complexities 
of aid’s purposes”. Yet rather than advancing a model of her own—“there are too many 
interacting variables to justify a model that would be both parsimonious and insightful”, she 
argues (Lancaster 2007a, 9)—Lancaster deploys a four-component conceptual framework to 
analyse the aid giving practices of the United States, Japan, France, Germany and Denmark. 
Lancaster (2007a, 18–23) shows how four ‘domestic political forces’ are responsible for shaping 
foreign aid policy: ideas (or ‘worldviews’); institutions (the rules of the political game); interests 
(the views of the public and how they are mobilised); and organization (the arrangements of the 
aid bureaucracy).  
 
The contribution of van der Veen (2011), published four years after Lancaster’s Foreign Aid, is 
considerably more methodologically and theoretically ambitious. His work is also the most 
avowedly constructivist of the second wave43. Building upon the insights of Holsti (1970) and 
Breuning (1995) and Chong and Druckman (2007), van der Veen employs the concept of frames 
to examine how national identity impacts aid policy choices. To construct these frames, he 
analyses fifty years (1950-2000) of legislative debates in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Norway. In doing so, van der Veen (2011, 2) argues that “the central factor overlooked in the 
literature on aid is ideational: ideas about the goals and purposes of aid policy shape its 
formulation and implementation.”  
 
                                                          
41 Lancaster (2007a, 9), for example, describes her use of the in-depth, case-study approach as “appropriate to the 
complexity of my topic and my intent to deepen our understanding of the politics of foreign aid.”  
42 For the remainder of this part of the chapter, I provide a capsule review of each of the ‘second wave’ comparative 
aid policy studies in chronological order. Readers will notice, however, that I begin with Lancaster and not Van Belle, 
Rioux and Potter’s (2004) contribution, which was published prior to Lancaster’s. This is because Lancaster provides 
a more natural starting point for the present discussion. I provide a capsule review of Van Belle, Rioux and Potter’s 
later in the chapter, where I emphasise the integrative ambitions of this particular study. 
43 “In identifying frames as determinants of foreign policy outcomes,” writes van der Veen (2011, 22) regarding the 
nature of his scholarly contribution “I add to the growing constructivist literature in international relations theory.”  
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Lundsgaarde (2013) builds on Lancaster’s approach by offering a more rigorous theoretical 
framework for “understanding foreign aid choices that places domestic politics and the 
development policymaking process at the centre of the analysis” (Lundsgaarde 2013, 1). His 
framework “views the supply of poverty-orientated foreign aid as a produce of domestic politics 
in donor countries” (Lundsgaarde 2013, 21). In examining Denmark, Switzerland, France and the 
United States, Lundsgaarde (2013, 7) focuses on how societal actors and government actors 
interact in the domestic sphere. By doing so, Lundsgaarde (2013, 4) addresses a critical gap in 
the determinants of aid scholarship, which “does not attempt to explain where donor 
motivations originate”. Lundsgaarde (2013, 196) acknowledges that “[i]nstitutions do much of 
the heavy lifting” in his explanation for understanding aid policy choices.  
 
Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi’s study is particularly relevant to this project given its very similar 
research question: “[w]hat factors and dynamics account for the paths and trajectories taken in 
[the aid] policy area?” (2015, 32). Given that the main driver of the re-emergence of the 
development programs of all five of the East Central European (ECE) states these authors 
consider 44 , they acknowledge the observed divergence their aid policy trajectories must 
necessarily be explained by domestic factors (2015, 32). However, while Lightfoot and Szent-
Iványi (2015, 13), acknowledge there have been “considerable advancements” in understanding 
the role of domestic politics of foreign aid decision-making since the turn of the millennium, 
they nonetheless concede they remain “poorly understood”.  
 
In response, these authors devise "an actor-based theoretical framework for understanding how 
international development policy, as a subfield of a country’s foreign policy is made" (Lightfoot 
and Szent-Iványi 2015, 13), using Alison’s bureaucratic politics model as a platform. It follows 
that these authors conceive of aid policy-making “as a bureaucratic negotiation game within the 
government” (Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi 2015, 23) involving three key sets of interactions: 
international actors and national governments; domestic stakeholders and national 
governments; between government agencies (Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi 2015, 32). As I discuss 
in more detail below, Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi’s study points beyond the second wave in 
important ways, especially in the way the theoretical framework employed is both actor-based 
and focused on domestic decisionmaking processes. Nonetheless, this study can be categorised 
with other second-image focused ‘second-wave’ studies on account of its finding that variation 
in aid policy trajectories of ECE states needed to explained by two key domestic reasons: 
                                                          
44 The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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“differences in the influence of national NGOs, and different dynamics within governments” 
(Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi 2015, 173). 
2.2.3 Evaluating the ‘Domestic Determinants’ Framework 
The same basic proposition informs the ‘domestic determinants’ of aid scholarship: to explain 
the complexity of aid policy, it is imperative to move beyond the hitherto dominant and 
reductionist selfish-selfless framework and examine domestic politics and processes. In keeping 
with the trajectory of their discipline, International Relations scholars studying aid in the post-
Cold War period became increasingly inclined to open the black box of the state to better explain 
how states interacted in world politics.  
 
Scholars were drawn to consider second-image factors because of the mismatch between 
empirical observations of and theoretical explanations offered by existing literature. As Jervis 
has explained, “[t]o argue that the international environment determines a state’s behaviour is 
to assert that all states react similarly to the same objective external situation” (Jervis 1976, 18). 
Yet states experiencing similar external situations often adopt divergent aid policies. As I noted 
in the chapter 1, this is the manifestly the case in my three case study states. It was even more 
emphatically the case in the five ECE states examined by Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi (2015, 173). 
 
The logical analytical step to take when third-image theories do not explain variation is to 
assume that the sources of variation are domestic45. In essence, this describes the reaction of 
the International Relations discipline in the aftermath of the Cold War, an event which led to a 
deep questioning of the dominant actor-general theory —theory that focusses “on the state as 
a unitary actor and systemic as well as relational variables as determinants of action” (V. M. 
Hudson and Vore 1995, 210).The same questioning was apparent in in the International 
Relations scholarship examining aid. As van der Veen (2011, 21) would later write, the existing 
variation in aid policy across states and over time “is greater than can be explained with most 
conventional models of foreign aid, which privilege the diametrically opposed motivations of 
self-interest and altruism.” 46 
 
                                                          
45 The explanatory shortcomings of system-level theories, explains Hook, requires opening the ‘‘black box’’ of 
domestic politics. (Hook 2008b, 153). 
46 Similarly, van der Veen (2011, 36) notes that “[w]hen domestic or international constraints are tight, liberal or 
realist variables can predict policy outcomes quite accurately. However, this is not always the case, and in the 
context of development assistance it is only rarely so”. 
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Yet breaking apart “the monolithic view of nation-states as unitary actors” (V. M. Hudson and 
Vore 1995, 210) incurred costs. ‘Dropping down’ from the level of systemic theory adds “much 
detail to the analysis of [International Relations]” (V. M. Hudson and Vore 1995, 211), and hence 
reduces the prospects of developing elegant and parsimonious theory. Given how unsatisfying 
the dominant selfish-selfless framework had become, this was a price many scholars of aid were 
willing to pay. In fact, as I have described, a key motivation of these scholars was to provide 
more expansive and nuanced accounts of aid policy dynamics These scholars were eager to 
move away from merely identifying what factors mattered in shaping aid-giving behaviour (the 
focus of the pre-Cold War literature), to examining how these factors influenced aid policy 
choices. They were also much more interested in explaining aid policy change, something 
systemic-level theories did not facilitate.  
 
Although clearly an over-simplification, a helpful heuristic for understanding the determinants 
of aid literature is to view the pre-Cold War contributions as preoccupied with system-level 
factors and the post-Cold contributions period as comparatively much more concerned with 
domestic factors. What is clear is that the two dominant approaches I have outlined to this point 
in the chapter maintain conflicting stances about what level of analysis should be prioritised in 
the analysis. As we have seen throughout the current section, the strong recent trend, is that 
the second image is the “appropriate level of analysis” (Jervis 1976, 21) for examining the aid 
policy issue area. Despite this trend, the ‘domestic politics turn’ in aid scholarship has not fully 
resolved an underlying lack of theoretical confidence about which levels of analysis matters and 
when for aid policy. The level of analysis problem is not unique to the study of foreign aid, of 
course— it has been puzzling scholars of international relations for a long time (Singer 1961). 
Nonetheless, this problem has proven especially prickly for scholars of aid, and remains so. 
 
Almost three decades ago, Putnam (1988, 427) observed how, “domestic politics and 
international relations are often somehow entangled, but our theories have no yet sorted out 
the puzzling tangle.” This description remains an extremely pertinent one concerning scholarly 
understandings of aid. Moreover, inherent in Putnam’s observation is a diagnosis for the 
theoretical paucity of the aid literature. International Relations scholars have tended to examine 
aid through either third image or second image lenses. The interaction between levels of 
analysis—the ‘puzzling tangle’ part of the Putnam’s equation—has rarely been the focus of 
investigation. Viewed from this perspective, each of the frameworks that dominate the 
determinants of aid literature are similarly exclusionary—they differ merely on what level of 
analysis should be the focus of attention. The implication for the question this thesis addresses, 
therefore, is that each of the main frameworks offered by the determinants of aid literature can 
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provide only partial explanations for why Australia, the UK, and the Netherlands each recently 
changed the trajectory of their aid policy.  
 
§§§ 
 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
At the outset of the post-Cold War era, Steven Hook (1993, 44) noted how “[s]cholarly research 
has tackled discrete and disconnected pieces of the aid puzzle, but ultimately has failed to join 
them”. A quarter-century later, this assessment remains an accurate description of the 
literature. The determinants of aid literature has focused on generating better understandings 
of discrete determinants of aid originating at a single level of analysis, rather than developing 
better understandings of the interrelationship between determinants, especially between 
determinants residing at different levels of analysis. The narrow focus of both the existing 
frameworks for explaining aid policy change mean they are capable of providing only partial 
explanations of aid policy choices.  
 
The ongoing concern of the determinants of aid literature has been to ascertain “which 
motivating factors have been of greatest importance in the formulation and implementation 
of... ‘foreign aid disbursement’ policies” (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998, 295). This chapter 
has argued that, in seeking to identify these motivating factors, International Relations scholars 
have tended to adopt one of two approaches, and that these approaches employ frameworks 
that give primacy to either third or second image explanatory factors.  
 
This chapter has emphasised how the trajectory of the determinants of aid literature reflects 
the trajectory of the discipline of which it is a part. What we see is a theoretical and analytical 
progression from the ‘outside in’—that is, a shift in focus from explanatory factors outside of 
the state to factors inside of them. Yet despite the presence of this general outside-in trajectory, 
the determinants of aid literature scholarship remains almost entirely devoid of individual actor-
based accounts of aid policy change. So, while an ‘outside-in’ outside trajectory is clearly 
evident, there remains scope for this trajectory to be extended to include first image 
explanations for why states give aid47. Indeed, as Fuchs and Dreher (2017:3) point out, the 
                                                          
47  The few individual-actor-based accounts of aid policy that do exist tend to be in related disciplines such as 
development studies or public administration. Even then, these accounts tend to point out the influence of a high-
profile politician responsible for the development portfolio, such as Clare Short (Vereker 2002; Morrissey 2002; 
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literature “barely touches on the role of the decision-makers responsible for the provision of 
development assistance.” 
 
What I found in conducting my research, however, was that individual leaders are crucial in 
initiating and sustaining aid policy change. The importance of individual actors was widely 
acknowledged by those participating in and observing aid policy decisionmaking. Kevin Rudd 
was uniformly viewed as crucial to the Australian aid spending expansion. David Cameron and 
Andrew Mitchell were regularly cited as pivotal to the UK’s achievement of the 0.7% target. And 
Clare Short’s reforms were highlighted by almost every interviewee I spoke with, including those 
outside the UK.  
 
Given this, how do we construct a framework that can capture and test this importance? And if 
the existing frameworks operate from the outside-in, can this approach be reversed in order to 
view the individual as the locus of cause, rather than the external environment? In the 
forthcoming chapter, I demonstrate that, by making use of key insights from the foreign policy 
analysis literature, such a reversal is indeed possible.  
 
§§§ 
                                                          
Barder 2007) or Jan Pronk (van Gastel and Nuijten 2005), as a sidenote of a larger or more central enquiry. In short, 
there has virtually no systematic, dedicated work done on how individual-level dynamics at the political leadership 
level influence why state’s gives aid.. The contributions I am aware of which fit this description include Bruening 
(2013), Joanna Spratt’s (2017) doctoral thesis and the aid-related aspects of Joshua Busby’s work on how moral 
movements impact foreign policy (Busby 2007;2010). 
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3 Approach and Methodology: 
Constructing a Multilevel Aid 
Policy Decisionmaking 
Framework 
Scholarly research has tackled discrete 
and disconnected pieces of the aid 
puzzle, but ultimately has failed to join 
them.  
—Steven Hook, 1993 
 
 [I]t is ultimately impossible to explain 
all of international relations by resort to 
only one of the three images.  
—Byman and Pollack, 2001 
 
All attempts to describe and explain 
human behavior require that what has 
already transpired be recaptured – not 
in all its original detail, but selectively 
according to a scheme employed by the 
reporter or observer. 
—Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 1962.  
 
This chapter describes how I constructed and applied a multilevel aid policy decisionmaking 
framework in response to the critique made in the previous chapter. The choice to devote an 
entire chapter to methodology-related issues reflects a conviction that methodological 
innovation constitutes a significant part of this thesis’ contribution to new knowledge. 
Furthermore, the process of applying the aid policy decisionmaking framework to reconstruct a 
series of aid policy decisionmaking episodes paved the way for the inductively-driven theory 
construction this thesis undertakes (addressed in chapter 4). 
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Analysing foreign policy from a decisionmaking perspective is certainly not new. Nor is the desire 
to develop multilevel frameworks for examining foreign policy decisions (Garrison 2003, 154; 
Gustavsson 1998, 198; V. M. Hudson 2014, 7; Rosenau 1987, 1; Yetiv 2011a). Where this thesis 
breaks new methodological ground is by engaging in these two familiar scholarly endeavours 
simultaneously on the unfamiliar terrain of aid policy decisionmaking. In other words, my 
methodological innovation derives from treating aid policy as a sui generis issue area and then 
seeking to examine discrete aid policy decisionmaking episodes through a multilevel lens (refer 
Hook 1995, xiii).  
 
This chapter comprises four sections. In the first section, I show how multilevel integration has 
only been pursued to a limited degree within the literature studying aid. By documenting how 
the Comparative Aid Policy Literature has sought to ‘join up’ the discrete pieces of the aid puzzle, 
we see that, even in the most ambitious cases, the individual level of analysis has been set aside 
in order to reveal how factors from the second and third levels of analysis influence aid policy. 
On the other hand, despite multilevel integration not having been or realised—or even 
pursued—in a comprehensive, explicit fashion, there are obvious signs that aid scholars are 
inherently aware of the benefits that such an approach could yield, provided the attendant 
methodological constraints could be overcome.   
 
In the second section of the chapter, I explain how I mobilise theoretical insights from FPA to 
construct a multilevel aid policy decisionmaking framework which incorporates factors from all 
levels of analysis. In particular, I elaborate on the core conceptual insight that powers my 
‘recapturing scheme’; the idea that the individual decisionmaker acts as the “locus of theoretical 
integration across levels of analysis” (V. M. Hudson 2002, 5). By depicting how individual 
decisionmakers mediate between constraints operating simultaneously at different levels of 
analysis, the framework serves as a visual depiction of how I conceptualise aid policy 
decisionmaking to operate.  
 
The framework also operates as a methodological device. In the third section of the chapter, I 
show how the aid policy decisionmaking framework catalogues six variables of ‘theoretical 
interest’ (George and Bennett 2005, 69), thereby ensuring they are systematically considered 
during the process of recreating the decisionmaking episode at hand. The framework’s chief 
methodological function, therefore, is to foreground those factors likely to influence aid policy 
change.  
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The concluding section of the chapter is dedicated to explaining, in practical terms, how I applied 
the framework to reconstruct aid policy decisionmaking episodes. My chief task here is to 
document the process by which I used causal process tracing to transform six ‘reconstructions’ 
of aid policy decisionmaking episodes into the explanations of aid policy change presented in 
Part II of the thesis.   
 
§§§ 
 
 
3.1 The Comparative Aid Policy Literature: Towards Multilevel 
Integration? 
I argued in chapter 2 that the determinants of aid literature has concentrated on generating 
better understandings of discrete determinants of aid, rather than paying attention to 
developing better understandings of the interrelationship between determinants of aid, 
especially between determinants residing at different levels of analysis. This idea is neatly 
conveyed in the Hook epigraph commencing this chapter: “[s]cholarly research has tackled 
discrete and disconnected pieces of the aid puzzle, but ultimately has failed to join them” (Hook 
1993, 44). However, while Hook’s assessment remains accurate, some attempts towards ‘joining 
up’ determinants from multiple levels of analysis have been made, particularly over the past two 
decades.  
 
In this opening section of the chapter, I review these steps, focusing on how scholars I identified 
as epitomising the comparative aid policy subliterature have approached the ‘joining up’ process 
(refer Table 2.B). This review makes it clear that, while multilevel integration has only been 
pursued to a limited degree, there is a latent recognition within the literature that such an 
approach would be valuable if it could be fully implemented. In sum, I argue that while the 
literature gestures towards multilevel integration, it has not actively pursued it or entirely 
understood the benefits of this approach, in large part because of the methodological challenges 
it entails. 
3.1.1 The State of the ‘Joining Up’ Process  
A defining characteristic of the comparative aid policy subliterature is its insistence that 
domestic factors must be added to international factors if aid policy choices are to be properly 
understood. As I argued in chapter 2, this characteristic of the comparative aid policy 
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subliterature emerged as a conscious response to the international level orientation of the 
dominant selfish-selfless framework. What this means is that the comparative aid policy 
literature naturally inclines toward multilevel integration to some degree. Yet, as I now move to 
show, the extent to which comparative aid policy scholars have been explicit about this 
objective, and the methodologies they embrace to realise it, vary significantly.  
 
Lancaster’s approach was to acknowledge the role of international factors, but to proactively 
bracket them off for the purposes of her study. Lancaster resists specifying a theoretical model 
that conceptualises the “relationship between domestic and international influences over 
foreign aid” (Lancaster 2007a, 8), justifying this decision by arguing that “[t]here are too many 
interacting variables to justify a model that would be both parsimonious and insightful” 
(Lancaster 2007a, 9) 48 . Instead, Lancaster organises her study around “four categories of 
domestic political forces shaping foreign aid” (Lancaster 2007a, 18). Yet, by her own admission, 
the choice to exclude international factors from her framework limits it explanatory power. 
“International events, trends, and pressures are important sources of change,” concedes 
Lancaster (2007a, 222) at the conclusion of her study, before noting how these forces of change 
“often work through domestic political forces, and those forces also produce change, 
independent of what is going on beyond their borders.”49 So, while Lancaster sees international 
factors as important, the model she provides does not capture them, or explain how they 
interact with domestic political forces.  
 
Lundsgaarde rejects Lancaster’s approach, examining aid through the lens of an explicitly 
multilevel framework (Lundsgaarde 2013, 187). To generate “leverage for understanding aid 
choices across countries”, Lundsgaarde builds a model to include a combination of “societal-
level and state-level variables” Using this model, Lundsgaarde (2013, 4) sets out to addresses a 
critical gap in the determinants of aid scholarship, which he recognises “does not attempt to 
explain where donor motivations originate”. Lundsgaarde’s study skilfully demonstrates how 
donor motivations are generated within institutions. However, he largely overlooks the 
possibility that donor motivations first originate in the minds of the individuals who populate 
these institutions.  
 
                                                          
48 It is significant that most other comparative aid policy scholars reject the notion of not specifying a model, often 
citing Lancaster in the process. Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi (2015, 14) are amongst those who do so explicitly: “[w]e 
disagree with Lancaster and think that theoretical models are necessary in order to better understand the drivers of 
why aid policies differ among donors and to allow meaningful comparisons.” Lancaster’s approach is also 
challenged by Lundsgaarde (2013, 7). 
49 Lancaster also implicitly acknowledges the importance of international factors when she critiques existing 
theoretical approaches because they do not fully “capture the interplay of domestic and international influences 
over aid’s purposes” (Lancaster 2007a, 9).  
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Breuning (1992, 1995) and van der Veen (2011) both seek to understand why states give aid 
through the lens of parliamentary debates. In the sense that coding parliamentary debates 
captures the perspectives of individual parliamentarians, one could arguably claim that these 
studies incorporate individual level perspectives. However, the sheer volume of material 
collected in these studies—Breuning analyses fifteen years of debates, while van der Veen 
analyses fifty—mutes the ability to detect the influence of any individual decisionmaker. This 
does not concern these scholars because the fundamental reason they are coding parliamentary 
debates is to reveal which foreign aid policy ‘role’ was prevalent at a particular time (Breuning), 
or to ascertain dominant ‘frames’ that governed aid decisionmaking at a particular time (van der 
Veen). These scholars are focussed on explaining the impact of domestically-formed preferences 
on aid decisionmaking over extended periods, rather than uncovering the reasons why specific 
aid policy decisions were reached.  
 
As Van Belle, Rioux and Potter (2004, 17) observed in the mid-2000s, “there are few efforts to 
explicitly apply foreign policy decision-making models to the study of foreign aid.” A notable 
exception is the recent work of Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi. These authors appropriate one of the 
best-known frameworks to emerge from FPA—Allison’s ‘government politics’ model—in their 
study of aid policy in EEC countries, and adapt it for use in explaining aid policy decisionmaking 
by incorporating relevant international actors that influence aid policy (Lightfoot and Szent-
Iványi 2015, chapter 2)50. As a result, Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi (2015, 32) limit their focus to 
“[t]hree key sets of interactions: (1) international actors and national governments; (2) domestic 
stakeholders and national governments; (3) between government agencies.” So, while Lightfoot 
and Szent-Iványi push the comparative aid policy scholarship forward in key ways, especially by 
paying close attention to interactions between levels of analysis, they accomplish this by setting 
aside the individual level of analysis. It is therefore instructive that these authors make a point 
of highlighting how they were consistently directed towards the special role played by Šimon 
Pánek in transforming Czech development assistance while conducting their research (Lightfoot 
and Szent-Iványi 2015, 140). This suggests that there are indeed times when individual actors 
are consequential in driving major aid policy change.  
3.1.2 Explaining the Absence of the Individual Level of Analysis 
Why have scholars been so reluctant to include individual level factors in models explaining why 
states give aid? Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi give voice to the major reason when, despite 
acknowledging they would like to expand their model to incorporate variables beyond 
                                                          
50 Specifically, the EU, the UNDP and the OECD (Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi 2015, 24). 
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bureaucratic politics, they admit that doing so “would increase the complexity of the model, 
potentially to a point where it would no longer be manageable” (Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi 
2015, 177). In short, incorporating individual level factors into a model, while still accounting for 
domestic and international level factors, rapidly becomes a complex enterprise. As Van Belle, 
Rioux and Potter (2004, 18) have acknowledged, “[p]art of the difficulty in bringing the foreign 
policy analysis literature to bear on the aid question and part of the reason its use has been 
limited might be the sheer magnitude of the task.”51  Inevitably, any impulse that seeks to 
generate more complete explanations for why states give aid needs to be balanced against the 
information requirements that this requires.  
 
Van Belle, Rioux and Potter’s study is also methodologically interesting. These authors frame 
their study as an effort at theoretical integration. However, rather than striving for multilevel 
integration, these authors are predominantly concerned with achieving integration across ‘areas 
of study’—namely foreign aid policy making, media studies, and bureaucratic processes. This 
multidisciplinary focus explains why this study defies easy categorisation, as its authors readily 
admit (Van Belle, Rioux, and Potter 2004, 1–2). The study employs the ‘domestic political 
imperatives model of foreign policy decision-making’ developed by Van Belle (1993). While the 
practical effect of adopting this model is to focus the analysis on domestic factors, given that the 
model is concerned with locating the power blocs constituting a democratically-elected leader’s 
support base, individual level considerations are not entirely removed from the account. 
 
Steven Hook, easily the most prominent and consistent proponent of the need to examine aid 
from a multilevel perspective has not been deterred by these methodological challenges52. His 
excellent and unique study of the emergence of the Millennium Challenge Account (Hook 
2008b) represents the most comprehensive multilevel explanation of an aid policy decision in 
the literature—in the sense that it countenances influences from the individual, domestic and 
international levels of analysis. However, the incorporation of individual level factors is relatively 
fleeting, as Hook focuses more on explaining how “principled and causal beliefs that were widely 
circulated… prior to [George W. Bush] administration’s coming to power” (Hook 2008b, 162) 
                                                          
51 The overwhelming information burden required to produce multilevel explanations of foreign policy was a major 
reason why the comparative foreign policy project broke down in the late 1980s. For a detailed explanation of this, 
see Hudson (2014, 28–31). 
52 It should come as no surprise that Hook is an FPA scholar, best known as the author of U.S. Foreign Policy: The 
Paradox of World Power, a widely used textbook now in its fifth edition (Hook 2017). Hook’s lengthiest 
consideration of the need to understand aid from a multilevel perspective remains his doctoral thesis (Hook 1993). 
In a section tracing the history of FPA, he argued that “[w]e still seek an increased understanding of foreign policy 
behavior across spatial and temporal lines, and to understand the relative impacts of individuals, governmental 
institutions societal and systemic influences” (Hook 1993, 63). Hook’s doctoral work consciously sought to apply this 
sensibility to the study of foreign aid.  
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were transmitted through domestic structures and then on to the executive, aided by a ‘policy 
window’ that facilitated change (Kingdon 1995).  
 
It is methodologically significant that Hook generated his multilevel explanation by reducing the 
complexity of his study in two key ways. First, he focused on explaining a specific aid policy 
decision. Second, he used a single case methodology53. Hook (2008b, 163) acknowledges that 
this methodology means his study “can only be suggestive of broader patterns of foreign policy 
change”. Nevertheless, Hook’s account stands as a positive outlier, a singular example of the 
impressive explanatory power of a multilevel approach when applied to interrogating a defined 
aid policy decision. This thesis builds on this example, devising a framework to facilitate 
systematic comparison of aid policy decisionmaking episodes within and across states.  
3.1.3 Unrealised Aspiration: Gestures towards Multilevel Integration  
In reviewing how the comparative aid policy literature has tackled the ‘joining up’ process, the 
message of chapter 2 has been reinforced: the determinants of aid literature defaults to 
focussing on factors from one level of analysis at a time. Multilevel integration has not been 
realised in a comprehensive way. Nor is it widely acknowledged as an important pursuit, or an 
overtly recognised objective of research. Yet despite this lack of public recognition, this 
subsection argues that the comparative aid policy literature does, in fact, inherently recognise 
the prospective value of examining aid policy dynamics with a multilevel lens, even if it does not 
explicitly couch it in those terms. In making this case, I hone in on three important indicators. 
 
The first indicator is that comparative aid policy scholars are united in their recognition that to 
adequately explain aid policy requires employing a multifaceted lens. There is widespread 
appreciation that aid dynamics are not captured with existing frameworks. And there is 
agreement that traditional International Relations theories do not yield a great deal of 
explanatory purchase when applied to the aid issue area, at least when these theories are 
deployed in isolation. . Lancaster (2007b, 4), for example, argues that none of the mainstream 
“theories of international politics explain adequately the complexities of aid’s purposes.” In 
response, scholars are cognisant of the benefits of new, hybrid approaches. To illustrate, Hook 
(2008b, 149) has made the case that, in the case of aid, only a “theoretical synthesis [of 
rationalist and constructivist theory]… facilitates a comprehensive understanding of foreign 
                                                          
53 Hook (2008b, 163) acknowledges that his single case methodology means his study “can only be suggestive of 
broader patterns of foreign policy change”. 
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policy behaviour [sic] in discrete instances that is otherwise unattainable through the use of a 
single analytic lens.” 
 
When scholars have developed new frameworks with which to examine aid giving behaviour, 
they have been reluctant to explain them as efforts to ‘join up’ determinants of aid from 
different levels of analysis (Steven Hook being the most notable exception)54 . This lack of 
specificity about theoretical objectives forms a second indicator of a largely unrecognised 
appetite for multilevel integration. As I have documented, numerous aid scholars do, in fact, 
accomplish multilevel integration to a degree. However, in almost every case, the interaction 
between levels of analysis is not explicitly modelled and is not the key focus of the study. The 
‘puzzling tangle’ component of the aid policy story (to use Putnam’s language) is not 
interrogated systematically and is usually left to blend into the background. Part of the reason 
for this is that the limited scholarship that does treat aid policy decisionmaking as a distinct 
realm “has only sparingly relied on theoretical models” to guide the analysis of aid choices 
(Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi 2015, 8)55.  
 
To the extent that multilevel integration has been demonstrated by comparative aid policy 
scholars, it has only been shown to functionally occur between the second and third levels of 
analysis (in particular by the work of Lundsgaarde (2013) and Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi (2015)). 
The comparative aid policy literature is yet to take a self-conscious ‘step down’ to the first level 
of analysis. Even so, evidence is beginning to emerge that shows individual actors can and do 
influence aid policy decisions. I noted earlier how Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi (2015, 140) recently 
documented Šimon Pánek’s influence on Czech aid policy, while Hook (2008b) has shown how 
President George W. Bush’s beliefs contribution to the creation of the Millennium Challenge 
Account). The growing acknowledgement of the influence of individual actors on aid policy in 
the literature represents a third indicator that deeper multilevel integration is required to 
deliver fuller explanations of state’s aid giving behaviour.  
 
Rather than continuing to gesture at multilevel integration, the comparative aid policy literature 
would benefit from fully embracing this approach, bringing it into line with the foreign policy 
analysis literature.  Garrison (2003, 154) has observed how “[i]t is now broadly accepted that 
different levels of analysis—individual factors, inputs into the decision process, and institutional 
                                                          
54 The work of Noël and Thérien is an outlier in this regard. These authors position their study as “a contribution to 
the analysis of the links between the domestic and the international orders” (Noël and Therien 1995, 524). 
55 Most notably Carol Lancaster (2007a), eschewed adopting a theoretical framework to guide her highly influential 
study Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics, arguing that “there are too many interacting 
variables to justify a model that would be both parsimonious and insightful” (Lancaster 2007a, 9). This approach is 
challenged by both Lundsgaarde (2013, 7) and Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi (2015, 13–14). 
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as well as cultural and society factors—converge to shape foreign policy outputs.” The father of 
comparative foreign policy, James Rosenau (1987, 1), made the same basic point even earlier:  
Where students of local politics tend to hold the national scene constant, 
where students of national politics tend to do the same for the international 
scene, and where students of world politics tend to treat subnational 
variables as constants, those who study foreign policy must, perforce, 
concern themselves with politics at every level… 
While such logic is embraced within the FPA subdiscipline, the implications of it have yet to be 
digested by the comparative aid policy scholarship. This is despite the three indicators outlined 
above pointing to the fact that the need for a multilevel lens to examine aid is at least 
subconsciously recognised by numerous comparative aid policy scholars.   
 
Provided one accepts the premise that those who study aid policy must “concern themselves 
with politics at every level”, the next challenge is how to practically accomplish this. This is the 
challenge to which I turn in the next section of the chapter. In approaching this task, I draw on 
the Foreign Policy Analysis literature. As Van Belle, Rioux and Potter (2004, 16–17) have pointed 
out, “the empirical and theoretical literature on foreign policy analysis has not been fully 
exploited for what it can lend to the study of foreign aid.” In my case, I construct a multilevel 
framework by exploiting FPA’s notion that, in practice, the integration process takes place within 
the minds of individual decisionmakers, rather than at the abstract level of the state. In 
summary, this thesis builds on the foundations provided by the comparative aid policy 
subliterate, seeking to contribute to it by drawing on insights from the FPA literature.  
 
§§§ 
 
 
3.2 Constructing a Multilevel Framework: Bringing in FPA  
In this section of the chapter, I explain how I mobilise theoretical insights from FPA to construct 
a multilevel aid policy decisionmaking framework. In particular, I elaborate on the core 
conceptual insight that powers my ‘recapturing scheme’; the idea that the individual 
decisionmaker acts as the “locus of theoretical integration across levels of analysis” (V. M. 
Hudson 2002, 5). Appropriating this insight from FPA and applying it to the study of aid allows 
the generation of new, more complete explanations for why states change the trajectory of their 
aid policy.  
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In the language of the epigraph from Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962, 22), the framework is the 
scheme I used to selectively recapture and recreate ‘what went on’ during the decisionmaking 
episodes I examined. The framework promotes a particular way of looking at the problem, 
functioning as a ‘locating device’ that shows an observer ‘where to look’ when examining aid 
policy decisionmaking dynamics. This section of the chapter is largely devoted to introducing the 
aid policy decisionmaking framework and then specifying it in detail. To begin with, however, it 
is important to explain how a key insight from FPA forms the crucial building block of a multilevel 
framework.  
3.2.1 FPA and Theoretical Integration 
Since its emergence as a subdiscipline of International Relations, FPA has been a “radically 
integrative” venture (V. M. Hudson 2014, 7). FPA’s penchant for theoretical integration takes on 
numerous forms. For example, FPA scholars have been especially open to incorporating insights 
from other disciplines (interdisciplinary integration). They have been unusually willing to “utilize 
theory and findings from across the spectrum of social science” (V. M. Hudson 2014, 43). 
Increasingly, FPA scholars have also advocated for further theoretical integration between FPA 
and International Relations (intra-disciplinary integration)56. Yet perhaps the defining integrative 
reflex of the FPA subdiscipline over its history, and certainly the most pertinent for the present 
discussion, is its desire to integrate across levels of analysis (multilevel integration). As Hudson 
(2014, 7) has noted, a hallmark of FPA is that “it views the explanation of foreign policy decision 
making as multifactorial, with the desideratum of examining variables from more than one level 
of analysis”57. In fact, Hudson (2007, 165) has gone further, arguing that “the true promise” of 
FPA is “theoretical integration: the integration of theory across… several levels to develop a 
more complete perspective on foreign policy decisionmaking”. 
 
 Elsewhere, Hudson (2002, 5) has explained that it is the individual decisionmaker that functions 
as the site of theoretical integration58. How is this the case? Decision-based theory “circumvents 
the levels-of-analysis problem entirely” because “decision makers can take their cue from any 
level of analysis”, explains Welch (2005, 22).Rather than being predisposed to privileging factors 
emerging from a certain level of analysis, decisionmakers act without conscious reference to 
                                                          
56 See, for example, the recent work of Cantir and Kaarbo (2012) and Kaarbo (2015).  
57 Likewise, Kaarbo (2015, 191) has recently emphasised how “FPA research tends to focus on explaining 
governments’ foreign policy decisions through specified factors at multiple levels of analysis”. 
58 FPA isolates the human decision-maker as the “point of theoretical intersection between the most important 
determinants of state behaviour: material and ideational factors” (Hudson 2002, 3). 
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where a pressure or constraint originates59. As Putnam (1988, 431) highlighted in his seminal 
paper on two-level games, “central decision-makers... must be concerned simultaneously with 
domestic and international pressures” (emphasis mine).  
 
During a decisionmaking episode, therefore, the subjective understandings of individual 
decisionmakers act like a funnel, collecting and then sorting amongst competing pressures to 
arrive at a decision (Kaarbo 2015, 191). What this means is that “the nature of the problem—
and, indeed, whether one exists at all—depends on policymakers’ perceptions” (M. G. Hermann 
2001, 53)60. Rosati, for example, (2000, 47) acknowledges the need to assume “individuals are 
likely to view their environment differently and operate within their own ‘psychological 
environment’”61. Taking this logic further, if we assume—as the FPA subdiscipline has since its 
inception—that “state action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state” (R. C. 
Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 2002, 59), then it follows that “[t]o explain a decision to change policy, 
the characteristics of the environmental stimuli must be understood in terms of how they are 
perceived by policymakers” (C. F. Hermann 1990, 15).  
 
An aid policy decision that emerges from a given decisionmaking episode can therefore be 
considered as representing a temporary equilibrium between competing constraints, as 
determined by those decisionmakers acting in the name of the state in the realm of aid policy. 
Aid policy decisionmakers, to extend Putnam’s idea, are engaged in what might be called a 
‘three-level game’62. Not only will they weigh environmental stimuli emerging from the domestic 
and international levels when making a decision, they will also inevitably factor in their own 
personal views on aid. As Hudson (2014, 204) recognises, decisionmakers are somehow 
“integrating variables at many different levels of analysis in order to make a decision”.  
 
At this point, I should clarify that by conceiving of an aid policy decision as representing a 
temporary equilibrium, I am not equating the behaviour of individual decisionmakers involved 
in an aid policy decision with the way the market is theorised to operate in economics. There is 
                                                          
59 Welch (2005, 23) goes on to explain how, in making a decision “leaders must evaluate their environment in the 
light of their values and goals, identify a set of options, and make a choice from among those options. This is true 
whether they concern themselves primarily with strategic, domestic political, governmental, cultural, normative, or 
other factors…” 
60 Elsewhere, Margaret Hermann (2001, 53) explains this idea in a slightly different way: “different policymakers, 
and different governments, may observe the same state of affairs but recognize distinctive problems or no problem 
at all.”  
61 Rosati acknowledges borrowing this term from Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout (1965), from their book The 
Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs. 
62 Lee Ann Patterson (1997) employed the concept of a three-level game in her study of negotiations over 
agricultural policy reform in the European Community. However, Patterson’s analysis left out the individual level of 
analysis, instead concentrating on the interaction of negotiations at the domestic level, the EC level, and the 
international level (1997, 135). 
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no invisible hand at work during an aid policy decisionmaking episode that ensures constraints 
are automatically sifted by the actors involved in a way that ensures the most efficient or optimal 
outcome is reached. Instead, I assume that aid policy decisionmaking processes are profoundly 
political in the sense that the individuals involved are required to make choices between 
competing priorities. The nature of these choices will invariably be a product of the individuals 
involved, decision unit dynamics, domestic political imperatives, and international forces. And 
these competing constraints will be sifted and ordered uniquely at different points in time.  
 
The most likely critique of situating individual decisionmakers as the conceptual engine of an 
integrated framework is this: the range of possible decisions emerging from a given 
decisionmaking process is as varied as the number of potential decisionmakers. If each individual 
decisionmaker responds to constraints in a unique manner and exercises agency in a unique 
way, proceeds such a critique, then it will be impossible to detect generalisable patterns in how 
aid policy choices are made. Robert Jervis has responded to such a critique by arguing that this 
‘cognitive approach’ assumes that “perceptions of the world and of other actors diverge from 
reality in patterns that we can detect and for reasons that we can understand” (Rosati 2000, 52).  
 
Essentially, what Jervis is saying is that there are reasons to expect to find patterns in the 
outworking of human cognition when it comes to foreign policy (as indeed in any other realm of 
decisionmaking). This reality was powerfully demonstrated by Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman in their groundbreaking and extraordinarily influential work in the late 1960s and 
1970s on judgement and decisionmaking (most notably Tversky and Kahneman 1974). (For an 
excellent recent overview of this work and the field generally, see Kahneman 2011).  A working 
assumption adopted at the outset of this project was that there is something innate about aid 
policy which produces its own political calculus. The very things that make aid policy distinct are 
the constraints this issue area presents for decisionmakers across jurisdictions. In other words, 
I am assuming that aid policy subsystems operate according to very similar ‘rules of the game’ 
not only across the three rich Western states this thesis is concerned with, but also across other 
similar states63. (See further in section 4.4).  
                                                          
63 This assumption is consistent with the approach of other research in comparative aid policy, including 
Lundsgaarde (2013), Hook (1993, 1995) and Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi (2015). Lundsgaarde’s excellent discussion 
on aid as an ‘issue area’ was particularly influential in shaping my thinking on this matter (Lundsgaarde 2013, 21–
24). For a broader discussion on issue areas and foreign policy, see Potter (1980).   
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3.2.2 Introducing my Recapturing Scheme 
Owing to the “[t]he number and complexity of factors that influence national action in the 
international system” (R. C. Snyder 1962, 5), there is inescapable need to impose “some form of 
second-order intellectual ‘structure’” (Carlsnaes 2012, 114) on the “exceedingly messy first-
order domain of foreign policy making as an empirical object of study”. Such an intellectual 
structure inevitably does important locating work. It positions the observer to examine empirical 
evidence in a particular way by providing a way to organise and understand information. Most 
foreign policy analysis scholarship proceeds by posing a question at a particular level of analysis 
(Neack 2014, 11)64, a tendency that is reflected in the limited FPA scholarship on aid. In my case, 
however, I have consciously sought to ‘widen out’ from this conventional approach and develop 
an ‘integrated’ framework—an intellectual structure that avoids privileging factors emerging 
from a particular level of analysis. 
 
As I raised in the previous subsection, the perspective of ‘inhabiting’ the thought process of 
individual decisionmakers—and seeking to identify and understand the combination of 
pressures that motivate their choices—offers a unique analytic lens for identifying ‘what 
mattered’ in leading to a certain aid policy decision. Examining aid policy decisionmaking 
through such a lens does not automatically prejudice factors originating from only one level of 
analysis. In other words, such lens facilitates the establishment of a multilevel framework.  
 
This ‘inhabiting’ idea is the concept that animates the aid policy decisionmaking framework 
presented in Figure 3.A below. My chosen recapturing scheme “focus[es] on explaining the 
choice of specific policies” and views these policies “as resulting from” a decisionmaking process 
(Carlsnaes 2012, 118)65. The framework shows how international, domestic and individual level 
factors are all ‘funnelled’ by decisionmakers when arriving at an aid policy decision. It depicts 
how an aid policy decision is the result of a process in which a group of individual 
decisionmakers, responsible to a principal and operating within the context of a decision unit, 
respond to, and mediate amongst, an array of international, domestic, and individual factors 
during an aid policy decisionmaking episode. (I specify the terms highlighted in bold in greater 
detail in subsection 3.2.3 below. (These terms are also included in the Glossary). 
 
                                                          
64 As Neack (2014, 9–11) explains, scholars are generally willing to focus their question on a pre-determined level of 
analysis, and to accept that the understandings such studies generate will be limited, in large part because it means 
the study becomes easier to manage. 
65 A key assumption of this framework, like most in the literature, is that “governments change their foreign policy 
through a decision process” (C. F. Hermann 1990, 13). 
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My aid policy decisionmaking framework refines a model Gustavvson (1998, 1999) has advanced 
to explain foreign policy change. Gustavvson was conscious of developing a multilevel model 
and sought to depict an “approach to foreign policy change that observes the combined 
importance of international and domestic structural conditions, political agency, and the 
decision-making process” (Gustavsson 1998, 198). Gustavsson (1999, 83) describes his model as 
comprising three steps: identification of “a number of ‘sources’ that are mediated by ‘individual 
decision-makers’ who act within the ‘decision-making process’ in order to bring about a change 
in policy.” This sequencing is also embedded in my framework. As well drawing closely from 
Gustavvson’s model, my framework echoes the integrated foreign policy analysis frameworks 
advanced by Charles Hermann (1990, 13) and, more recently, Mintz and DeRouen (2010, 3) in 
that it is a “composite, multilevel model where all factors are present” (Beach 2012, 33). The 
framework also incorporates a definition of the ‘authoritative decision unit’ drawn from a 
project led by Charles Hermann, Margaret Hermann, and Joe D. Hagan66.  
Figure 3.A: Aid Policy Decisionmaking Framework 
 
 
My recapturing scheme differs from the two most developed aid policy decisionmaking 
frameworks presently offered by the literature—those recently advanced by Lundsgaarde 
(2013) and Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi (2015)—in terms of the  scope of factors it seeks to 
incorporate. As I discussed in section 3.1, this pair of existing frameworks are anchored at the 
domestic level of analysis67, reflecting the recent focus of the determinants of aid literature. My 
                                                          
66  A key output of this project was a special issue of International Studies Review (Volume 3, Issue 2, Summer 2001). 
My framework draws most heavily on Margaret Hermann’s contribution (2001) to this special issue.   
67 Lundsgaarde’s framework hones in “characteristics of actors engaged in the aid arena [which he refers to as 
societal level variables] and the qualities of the institutional setting in which aid decisions are made [state level 
variables] represent key determinants of aid choices” (Lundsgaarde 2013, 186). Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi argue 
that explaining divergent aid policy trajectories observed in East Central European (ECE) states is best achieved by 
employing a governmental politics approach. 
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desire to actively account for the potential role of individual level factors in influencing aid policy 
decisionmaking, alongside domestic and international level factors, substantially ‘widens out’ 
the range of factors the framework incorporates. Such an approach offers the potential for a 
more holistic and explanation of recent aid policy decisions. However, such a ‘widening out’ 
necessitates a ‘narrowing in’ of the scope of the framework some other respect (see Lightfoot 
and Szent-Iványi 2015, 14). That is, methodological choices which bring illumination and clarity 
to one aspect of the decisionmaking process inevitably result in other aspects moving into the 
shadows. 
 
In my case, the ‘narrowing in’ occurs chiefly in relation to the timeframe over which the 
framework retains relevance. Whereas the frameworks advanced by Lundsgaarde and Lightfoot 
and Szent-Iványi are applicable over periods of a decade or more, my framework retains its 
fidelity over a much shorter time horizon. It is specifically designed to be used to explain discreet 
aid policy decisonmaking episodes, which typically last only a matter of months. The upshot of 
this narrowing in, however, is that my framework is capable producing very detailed analyses of 
these narrow slices of time68.  
 
The benefit of producing such a fine-grained analysis is that it has the potential to reveal, to a 
greater extent than existing accounts, the interwoven motivations and rationales of aid policy 
decisionmakers. Once potentially salient factors are uncovered, causal process tracing can then 
be employed to trace each causal thread individually over time, in the process painting a broader 
picture of the forces contributing to aid policy change over a longer period (I review the process 
tracing methodology in detail ahead, in subsection 3.4.2). In summary then, the aid policy 
decisionmaking framework functions as a lens that captures a very detailed snapshot of ‘what is 
going’ over a very short time span. This snapshot facilitates a broader examination of those 
determinants of aid policy that have been shown to matter in a given context over a longer 
period of time.  
3.2.3 Specifying the Aid Policy Decisionmaking Framework 
In this concluding subsection of Section 3.2, I specify each of the terms used in the Aid Policy 
Decisionmaking Framework. Namely, I define precisely what is meant by these fours terms; 
                                                          
68 The dilemma I am highlighting here is a familiar one in the literature. As Beach (2012, 33) has pointed out, 
“[c]reating more complex, multilevel models raises the dilemma of whether we should prioritize parsimonious 
theories that explain foreign policy with one or only a few explanatory variables, or whether we should aim for 
more complex models that give us greater explanatory leverage”. 
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individual decisionmaker, decision unit, aid policy decision and aid policy decisionmaking 
episode. 
Individual Decisionmaker 
A variety of individual decisionmakers will contribute to making an aid policy decision, each 
bringing with them their own perceptions to the proceedings. An individual decisionmaker is an 
actor who has some degree of involvement in an aid policy decisionmaking episode and either: 
a) has the authority (or has been delegated the authority) to act in the name of the state 
with reference to the decision at hand (R. C. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 2002, 59), or;  
b) has a role in supporting or assisting an actor who has the authority (or has been 
delegated the authority) to act in the name of the state.  
An individual engaged in such a supporting or assisting role may do so formally (e.g. as a political 
staffer, appointed expert, or in line with their bureaucratic role), or informally (e.g. as a trusted 
personal adviser, academic or lobbyist).  
 
Furthermore, I denote the individual decisionmaker who is the highest-ranking member of a 
government with formal responsibility for aid policy as the principal of an aid policy 
decisionmaking episode. In the case of many traditional donors, as in Australia, this individual is 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs (or equivalent). In the UK, during the period of my study, this 
individual is the Secretary of State for International Development (the ‘Development Secretary’). 
The precise title, and cabinet status, of the principal in the Netherlands changed during my 
research. The principles of the six decisionmaking episodes examined in this study are: Kevin 
Rudd, Julie Bishop, Douglas Alexander, Andrew Mitchell, Ben Knapen and Lilliane Ploumen. 
(Further details regarding these six principals, including their position titles, are included in Table 
3.B in section 3.3). 
 
The principal may not necessarily exercise the most influence over a given aid policy decision, 
as they may choose to delegate their authority to others. Alternatively, for example, a Prime 
Minister may decide to exercise his or her prerogative to intervene at a particular time or period 
of time, potentially even overruling the principal. While the principal is always an individual 
person, sometimes it makes sense to conceive of an aggregation of individuals as an ‘individual 
decisionmaker’ for the purpose of applying the framework69 . For example, the cumulative 
influence of an institution or organisation during a decisionmaking episode—a lobby group, or 
a particular government department, for instance—will often be most easily conceived of as a 
single unified actor for the purpose of analysis.   
                                                          
69 This approach follows Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi (2015, Section 2.3, 17-24). 
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The Decision Unit 
The decision unit is an individual or group of individuals “with the ability to commit the 
resources of the society and, when faced with a problem, the authority to make a decision that 
cannot be reversed” (M. G. Hermann 2001, 48). As alluded to above, the identity of this group 
of individuals, which Hermann calls the ‘authoritative decision unit’, will vary for each decision, 
depending on the nature of the problem, as well as how the aid policymaking subsystem is 
structured in a given state (M. G. Hermann 2001, 47–48). Furthermore, the composition of the 
authoritative decision unit for an aid policy decision will vary from decision to decision, both 
over time and according to the state in which the decisionmaking episode occurs.   
 
I should clarify here that Hermann identifies three types of possible authoritative decision units 
as part of her theoretical framework explaining how decision units shape foreign policy 
(‘predominant leader’, ‘single group’ and ‘coalition of autonomous actors’). While I readily 
accept that these distinctions may be of relevance to aid policy decisionmaking (and return to 
this possibility in chapter 8), for the purposes of the development of the aid policy 
decisionmaking framework presented here, I simply borrow Hermann’s definition of the 
‘authoritative decision unit’ without problematizing or classifying this entity any further.   
 
Just as individuals operate within their own psychological environment (2000, 47), a decision 
unit will also generate its own psychological environment as it meets on various occasions, likely 
in various formations, during a distinct aid policy decisionmaking episode. This is why, as I 
highlighted earlier, the “subjective understandings of leaders are the single factor through which 
all others flow…” (Kaarbo 2015, 191). The decision unit operates in the same way, functioning 
as a kind of ‘aggregate funnel’. Beasley et al (2001, 218) have described how, “[i]n effect, the 
decision unit perceives and interprets the pressures and constraints posed by the domestic and 
international environments.”  
Aid Policy Decision 
Welch (2005, 23) defines a decision as “the output of a process of deliberation”. Following 
Welch, I define an aid policy decision as the output of a process of deliberation which is primarily 
concerned with how a state expends its ODA budget. Inherent in this definition is my definition 
of what ‘aid policy’ constitutes. In line with the discussion in chapter 1, which highlighted how 
defining aid is a “tricky business” (Lancaster 2007b, 12), I consider a state’s aid policy to be the 
distinct subset of its foreign policy that is concerned with questions about why and how to 
expend Official Development Assistance (ODA) contributions. I acknowledge that specifically 
defining aid as an element of a states’ foreign policy may be controversial. However, besides 
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being the clear position of the comparative aid policy literature, my denotation of aid policy as 
a subset of foreign policy should be viewed as a technical definition, rather than a normative 
one70. Similarly, while not perfect, ODA remains the best readily available proxy for a (DAC-
member) state’s ‘aid budget’, and the long record of consistent data collection allows cross-
country and temporal comparisons.  
Aid Policy Decisionmaking Episode 
While the decisionmaking framework above suggests an aid policy decision emerges from a 
singular, linear decisionmaking process, the reality is that an aid policy decision is often the 
product of a series of deliberations. As Hudson (2014, 4) argues, “[o]ne is almost always 
examining not a single decision, but a constellation of decisions taken with reference to a 
particular situation”. Charles Hermann agrees that, in reality, any decisionmaking process is 
more circuitous than the framework implies. “For major problems,” he contends (1990, 14), 
“decisionmaking frequently involves cycles and pauses rather than an orderly process in which 
each stage occurs only and always leads directly into one subsequent step until an outcome is 
reached.”  
 
In light of this nonlinear reality, I define an aid policy decisionmaking episode as encompassing 
a series of linked decisionmaking processes. The ‘return arrow’ in Figure 3.A is designed to depict 
that the decision unit will likely reassemble—in various forms at various times, for various 
reasons—prior to reaching an aid policy decision. At these junctures, important ‘sub decisions’ 
are made along the path to the final decision outcome. They may coincide with the production 
of a sub-output, such as draft document. Consequently, these sub decisions therefore represent 
useful points at which to obtain a snapshot of the prevailing dynamics during a decisionmaking 
episode.   
 
§§§ 
 
 
                                                          
70 I consider a state’s aid policy to be a subset of a state’s foreign policy, providing ‘foreign policy’ is understood as 
that realm of public policy a state conducts outside its borders. If foreign policy is conceptualised this way, aid 
policy—because it is prosecuted outside a state’s borders—must be accepted as component of a state’s ‘foreign 
policy’. This technical definition is somewhat problematic because equating aid as a component (or tool or 
instrument) of foreign policy has become normatively contested in practice. This controversy has not disappeared. 
Supporters of aid often object to aid being classified as a ‘tool of foreign policy’ because this suggests accepting the 
premise of the ‘foreign policy approach’ originally advocated by Morgenthau (1962): that aid should be deployed to 
secure national interests. To be clear, my equating aid as a tool of foreign policy is a technical stance, not a 
normative one. For an extended discussion on this matter—one which underscores why I consider aid policy to be a 
type of foreign policy—see Day (2016, 650). 
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3.3 The Framework as a Methodological Device  
In addition to performing an important ‘locating’ function by promoting a particular way of 
viewing aid policy decisionmaking, the framework introduced and specified in the previous 
section also functions as a methodological tool, provided it is expanded slightly from the version 
presented earlier. The framework performs a methodological function by providing a consistent 
lens through which to view, reconstruct and then compare aid policy decisionmaking episodes. 
The expanded framework presented at Figure 3.B below incorporates six clusters of factors (two 
for each level of analysis) that the literature suggests are likely to shape aid policy 
decisionmaking. By cataloguing and organising factors the literature suggests are important 
determinants of aid policy, the framework shows what to ‘look for’ when reconstructing an aid 
policy decision making episode. By foregrounding these ‘variables of theoretical interest’, the 
framework contributes to generating a theoretically oriented narrative (George and Bennett 
2005, 69, 205).  
Figure 3.B: Expanded Aid Policy Decisionmaking Framework 
 
 
 
In its expanded form, the framework is akin to a checklist. It ensures that factors likely to shape 
aid policy decisionmaking are actively considered in the process of reconstructing how an aid 
policy decision was arrived at. Embedding these pre-identified factors into the framework 
prepares the ground for more effective process tracing (a subject addressed in more                                                                                                                                         
detail in subsection 3.4.2). As Lundsgaarde (2013, 15) has pointed out, in order for such an 
analysis “to be more than a descriptive study, it should be informed by propositions that identify 
the phenomena that a researcher expects to see when theories are exposed to historical 
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evidence” (emphasis added)71. Lundsgaarde’s advice accords with that of Blatter and Haverland 
(2012, 106) who recommend that, ahead of process tracing, “[a] review of existing studies from 
various disciplines provides the researcher with a broad spectrum of potentially important 
factors of influence.” The factors a researcher should ‘expect to see’ when recreating aid policy 
decisionmaking are summarised in Table 3.A below.  
Table 3.A: Six ‘Clusters’ of Factors Capable of Shaping Aid Policy Decisionmaking 
 
The task of this section of the chapter is to overview each of the six potential drivers of change 
summarised in Table 3.A. Before doing so, however, two aspects of how the framework functions 
as a methodological device warrant clarification. First, as per most such categorisation exercises, 
creating neat intellectual boxes within which to confine complex reality is a limited, and 
ultimately somewhat artificial, process. Delineating between levels of analysis is much neater in 
theory than in practice. For example, while I classify ‘decision unit dynamics’ as an individual 
level factor, there are valid reasons why it might have been classified as a domestic level factor. 
(They key reason for my decision to classify decision unit dynamics as an ‘individual factor’ is 
because much of the research on the role of small groups in foreign policy concern how 
psychological factors influence group dynamics). In summary, I concede that there is inevitably 
                                                          
71 Lundsgaarde’s advice accords with that of Blatter and Haverland (2012, 106) who recommend that, ahead of 
process tracing, “[a] review of existing studies from various disciplines provides the researcher with a broad 
spectrum of potentially important factors of influence.” 
Level of 
Analysis 
Cluster of Factors Shaping 
Aid Policy Assumption 
Individual 
Factors 
Decisionmaker beliefs 
The beliefs individual decisionmakers maintain about aid, 
including its purpose and utility, influence aid policy decision 
making. 
Decision unit dynamics 
The composition of, and ‘psychological environment’ within, the 
decision unit responsible for making an aid policy influence aid 
policy decision making. 
Domestic 
Factors 
Domestic political 
contestation 
The contestation amongst the domestic actors that seek to 
influence the political process has the potential to shape aid policy 
decisionmaking. 
National identity The way a state conceives of itself influences aid policy decionmaking. 
 
International 
Factors 
 
The International Aid 
Regime 
The norms prevailing in the international aid regime influence aid 
policy decisionmaking. 
Global power dynamics Global power shifts influence aid policy decisionmaking. 
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considerable ‘bleeding’ between these categories and completing isolating and untangling one 
factor from another can only ever be proximate72.   
 
Second, the framework’s foregrounding of six factors does not imply that other factors are not 
able to shape a given decision making episode. As I discuss in more detail later in the chapter 
(see subsection 3.4.2), the way I applied the framework consciously allowed for other important 
shaping factors to be inductively identified during the analysis, as is considered good practice 
when conducting process tracing (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 30). Yet while there are almost 
an innumerable number of factors which might exert some influence on aid policy 
decisionmaking, the literature does suggest certain factors are especially likely to be most 
relevant in shaping aid policy decisionmaking. I turn now to summarising each of these factors. 
3.3.1 Individual Factors 
Beliefs about Aid 
Alexander George (1980, 57) has explained how, “every individual acquires during the course of 
his development a set of beliefs and personal constructs about the physical and social 
environment”. These beliefs and constructs become heuristics that facilitate a more ordered, 
(albeit partial) understanding of an otherwise confusing external world. An individual 
decisionmaker inevitably employs these heuristics in forming preferences and determining a 
course of action. Because ideas help “order the world”, they function as road maps guiding an 
individual’s choices in uncertain environments (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 13)73. It follows 
that one would expect that the beliefs individual decisionmakers maintain about aid, including 
its purpose and utility, shape aid policy decision making. 
 
However, while there is a considerable literature documenting how the beliefs of political 
leaders influence foreign policy decisions, especially decisions which are national security 
related (for example Yetiv 2013), there has virtually no systematic work produced that 
interrogates how  an individual leader’s views on aid impact a state’s aid policy choices. The 
renewed post-Cold War interest in the study of belief systems as causal mechanisms in foreign 
policy analysis (Schafer and Walker 2006, 3) has not been extended to aid policy74. 
                                                          
72 As Carlsnaes (2012, 114) counsels, it is precisely the “omnipresence of both actors and structures, and the 
intimate and reciprocal link between… factors” that “complicates matters of the foreign policy analyst...” 
73 Goldstein and Keohane (1993, 13) find that “the ideas individuals hold… become important elements in the 
explanation of policy choice.” For a discussion on the way ideas can function as road maps for political 
decisionmakers, see Goldstein and Keohane (1993, 13–17).  
74 The Operational Code Analysis literature, which attempts to codify the belief systems of leaders, represents a 
long running research effort to understand how, why, and when the psychology of leaders impact foreign policy 
decisions. For an overview of this literature, see (Schafer and Walker 2006, chapter 1). Stephen Dyson’s book The 
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 While it is widely accepted within the development community that individuals such as Clare 
Short (Morrissey 2002), Gordon Brown and Tony Blair in the UK (Payne 2006) and Jan Pronk in 
the Netherlands (van Gastel and Nuijten 2005) were able to exert considerable influence over 
the shape of aid policy, the precise way that their personal beliefs, or personal perceptions of 
constraints shaped aid policy at particular moments have not been widely documented, with 
details remaining largely anecdotal. Given Kevin Rudd’s personal enthusiasm for expanding the 
aid budget (Rudd 2010a), and David Cameron’s determination to make support for aid a key part 
of the Conservative Party’s modernisation program (Heppell and Lightfoot 2012), there is reason 
to expect the personal beliefs of these leaders influenced the aid policy decisionmaking episodes 
this research considers. On the other hand, Breuning (2013) has demonstrated, using the 
example of former Belgian State Secretary for Development Cooperation, Reginald Moreels, 
that it is very possible that, despite their best efforts, leaders who are passionate about 
reforming aid policy can be prevented from doing so by circumstances outside their control. 
Their scope of action can be limited by the ‘bureaucratic web’ they operate within and their 
domestic audience (Breuning 2013, 311) amongst other factors.    
Decision Unit dynamics 
The foreign policy analysis subdiscipline features a well-developed literature exploring the 
implications of the fact that foreign policy decisions are regularly made by small groups75. The 
seminal contribution to the small group dynamics literature was Irving Janis’ (1972) study 
Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-policy Decisions and Fiascos. Janis  
demonstrated how a tendency towards Groupthink—when small group members’ “strivings for 
unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative course of action” (Janis 
1972, 9)—contributed to a range of foreign policy fiascos, among them President’s Kennedy’s 
calamitous Bay of Pigs invasion. While the small group dynamics literature focuses on crisis 
decisionmaking, ‘t Hart, Stern and Sundelius (1997, 9) argue that small group analysis is also 
pertinent for routine and low and medium politics issues, potentially including aid.  
 
Of special relevance to this project, given the Cameron-Clegg Government was the first British 
coalition government since the Second World War and the fact that Dutch coalition cabinets are 
routine, are the small group dynamics associated with coalition cabinet in foreign policy 
                                                          
Blair Identity: Leadership and Foreign Policy is an excellent recent example in this genre (Dyson 2009). The work of 
Margaret Hermann, to highlight a key contributor to this literature, has demonstrated how leaders matter in foreign 
policy decisions (see, for example, M. G. Hermann 1980; M. G. Hermann and Hagan 1998; M. G. Hermann et al. 
2001).   
75 For a brief overview of this literature, see Hudson (2014, 19–20). 
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decisionmaking, a research field where the work of Juliet Kaarbo is prominent76 . Coalition 
politics have been shown to influence aid and development policy (Kaarbo 2013, Loc 236). For 
example, there are numerous examples of the development portfolio being used to ‘round out’ 
the politics of coalition arrangements in both Belgium (Breuning 2013, 316) and the Netherlands 
(Kaarbo 2013, Loc 1595). 
 
Decision units generate their own ‘psychological environment’ (Rosati 2000, 50), through which 
policy options are filtered. The manner in which individual decisionmakers come together to 
make decisions during a decisionmaking episode influences the decision outcome (M. G. 
Hermann 2001; Beasley et al. 2001). Accordingly, the aid policy decisionmaking framework 
accounts for the possibility that the composition of, and ‘psychological environment’ within, the 
decision unit responsible for making an aid policy influence aid policy decision making77.  
3.3.2 Domestic Factors 
Domestic Political Contestation 
One of the more productive lines of enquiry within the determinants of aid literature in recent 
times is scholarship that seeks to isolate and understand the aid policy impact of a single 
domestic actor or institution, such as the media or legislatures78. A common desire links these 
ventures: to better understand how, and to what extent, a certain actor or group can access and 
influence the aid decisionmaking process 79 . Accordingly, the framework assumes that 
contestation amongst the domestic actors that seek to access to influence the political process 
has the potential to shape aid policy decisionmaking. When considering domestic political 
contestation, the influence of the development constituency and the aid policy system are likely 
to be especially important.  
 
                                                          
76 Relevant publications include Kaarbo (1996, 2008, 2013), Kaarbo and Beasley (2008; 2014), Kaarbo and Lantis 
(2003) and Cantir and Kaarbo (2012). 
77 Kennedy (2012, 23), for example, advises that “one would naturally need to assess the views of a wider group of 
individuals, while also considering the nuances of the particular decision-making process involved, in order to make 
useful predictions about foreign policy.”  
78 Some of the key threads in the substantial domestic determinants of aid literature include those that, for 
example, examine the impact of: the media’s role in influencing aid effort (Van Belle and Hook 2000; Van Belle 
2003; Van Belle, Rioux, and Potter 2004; Lim, Barnett, and Kim 2008); the role of legislatures in aid allocation 
(Milner and Tingley 2010) the influence of partisan policy and ideology on aid (Thérien and Noël 2000; Thérien 
2002a; Fleck and Kilby 2006; Tingley 2010; Brech and Potrafke 2014); the role of interest groups— particularly NGOs 
(Kim 2014) and business (Lundsgaarde 2013, 194); and the role of public opinion on aid (D. Hudson and vanHeerde-
Hudson 2012a; Milner and Tingley 2013)78. Yet despite considerable advancements in understanding the role of 
these factors and others— particularly since the turn of the millennium—it remains the case that the “domestic 
politics of foreign aid decision-making... remain poorly understood” (Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi 2015, 13).  
79 For a theoretical discussion on access to the policy process in the context of aid policy, see Lundsgaarde (2013, 
32–34). 
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Research is increasingly highlighting how the composition, character, and relative influence of 
the development constituency in each state flavours its aid policy80. Horký and Lightfoot (2012, 
17) define a ‘development constituency’ as “the network of actors active in shaping and/or 
implementing development cooperation programs” in a given country. In adopting this 
definition for use in this thesis, I also include development NGOs, such as CARE, Oxfam, and 
World Vision, to comprise part of the development constituency.  
 
The aid policy system refers to the institutional setting within which aid policy decisionmaking 
occurs81. These institutional arrangements for aid management and oversight will vary in each 
donor state, with implications for which actors are able to gain access to the aid policy 
decisionmaking process and how they are able to do so82. These institutional arrangements will 
also determine how key decision units responsible for aid policy are constituted. Bureaucratic 
politics can also be expected to influence the course and outcome of an aid policy 
decisionmaking episode. Various institutional arrangements to consider when reconstructing 
the dynamics of an aid policymaking decision include: the place where “the main government 
actor with a development mandate” (Lundsgaarde 2013, 191) sits; the extent to which the 
legislature is engaged in, and informed about, development issues (Lancaster 2007b, 219–20); 
how fragmented and decentralised the aid policy system (Lundsgaarde 2013, chapter 2); and 
“the relative power and interests of the bureaucracies involved” in aid policy (Lightfoot and 
Szent-Iványi 2015, 30)83. 
National Identity 
According to van der Veen (2011, 28), “national identity can be conceptualized as a basic 
worldview, combined with ideas about the type of national image a nation aspires to, as well as 
a sense of the values represented by the nation.” The determinants of aid literature shows that 
societal values are reflected in the aid giving behaviour of states, hence the framework assumes 
                                                          
80 In her study examining the domestic politics of aid in the United States, France, Denmark and Lancaster has 
demonstrated the “importance of a constituency for development aid” in “carrying sizeable aid budgets forward” 
for considerable periods (Lancaster 2007a, 220). Horky and Lightfoot (2012, 8) reported similar findings in their 
study on focusing on new Central and Eastern European donors, “quantity of aid is directly related to the ability of 
the domestic development community to mobilize resources.” The unique character of a given development 
constituency also matters. For example, Lunsdgaarde (2013, 13), has documented how the “formal integration of 
the business community in the aid policy process” is a “striking feature of aid policymaking in Denmark”, ensuing 
that, while Denmark maintains high levels of aid expenditure, its aid policy is distinctly influenced by commercial 
objectives (Lancaster 2007, chapter 7).  (The material in this footnote was also included in a similar discussion in Day 
(2016)). 
81 While the exact language varies, all comparative aid policy scholars deploy a term that refers to the broad 
institutional arrangements within which aid policy decisionmaking occurs. For example, Lancaster (2007a, 22) uses 
‘aid organization’ rather than ‘aid policy system’.  
82 A key finding of Lundsgaarde’s (2013, 196–97) is that institutions “determine the way that societal interests are 
incorporated into the policymaking process” at the same time as structuring “the nature of competition between 
governmental actors by determining how policymaking authority is distributed among them”. 
83 Key non-aid studies of bureaucratic politics include Allison (1969), Allison and Halperin (1972) and Halperin, Clapp 
and Kanter (2006). 
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that the way a state conceives of itself influences aid policy decionmaking. Stated another way, 
the way a given society answer the question ‘who are we?’ has implications for aid policy: a 
state’s internal priorities and attitudes can be expected to be reflected in their external priorities 
and attitudes. As Lumsdaine (1993, 22) explains, “[c]itizens and leaders who favour certain 
principles in domestic politics are more apt to approve their worth and see their usefulness in 
international affairs…”   
 
 One of two key ways the literature has sought to examine how national identity impacts aid 
policy relates to the way in which “welfare principles institutionalized at the domestic level 
shape the participation of developed countries in the international aid regime” (Noël and 
Thérien 1995, 523). The model developed by Thérien and Noël (2000, 160) confirmed the “the 
primacy of welfare state socialist attributes and government social spending in the explanation 
of development assistance policies”. Those societies that prioritise income redistribution at the 
national level—including, notably for aid, the Scandinavian countries—are more accepting of it 
at the international level and this is reflected in their propensity to give proportionally more aid. 
Aid giving behaviour can therefore be viewed as an extension of socio-political and cultural 
values of a society (Stokke 1989b, 278; Ball 2010). 
 
A second important way national identity has been shown to impact aid policy is via the notion 
of national role conceptions84. Marijke Breuning, the scholar most closely associated with this 
line of enquiry, has shown how “[d]ecision makers' perceptions of their state's role in the 
international environment form an important cue to the motivations and objectives that 
determine the policies they pursue” (Breuning 1995, 236). In her key 1995 study, which was 
based on her doctoral research (Breuning 1992), Breuning demonstrated that the aid policy 
behaviour of the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom largely fitted their respective 
‘activist’, ‘merchant’ and ‘power broker’ role conceptions (Breuning 1995, 250)85. The fact that 
states that are middle powers have tended to be amongst the leading donors reinforces the idea 
that the roles decisionmakers see their states as playing on the international stage guides 
decisionmakers when making aid policy (Breuning 1992, 241; Stokke 1989a). Breuning (1995, 
237), does caution, however, that role conceptions may vary with respect to different issue 
                                                          
84 For general (i.e. non-aid specific) overviews of how national role conceptions impact foreign policy see Holsti 
(1970) and Wish (1980). 
85 Bruening’s doctoral thesis was titled National role conceptions and foreign assistance policy behavior: toward a 
cognitive model (Breuning 1992). In a series of subsequent publications, Breuning (1995, 1998) continued to 
examine the relationship between national role conceptions and aid policy. In more recent times, Breuning’s 
research has expanded to examining the theoretical potential for role theory more generally (Thies and Breuning 
2012).   
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areas, suggesting that states will often exhibit a unique ‘aid identity’, with certain characteristics 
or preferences repeatedly emphasised over time.  
3.3.3 International Factors 
The International Aid Regime 
Krasner (1982, 186) has defined a regime as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations”. Following Hook’s lead, I embrace Krasner’s definition to conceptualise 
the international aid regime, understanding it to embody the “broadly accepted standards of 
international behaviour” (Florini 1996, 363) concerning aid giving86. While scholarship on aid has 
shown that international norms can influence aid policy decisionmaking (Lumsdaine 1993), the 
international aid regime has undeniably evolved and changed over time, with different 
normative agendas dominating at different times (Thérien 2002b, 462; Hook 2008a, 87)87 . 
Considering these twin realities, the aid policy decisionmaking framework assumes that the 
norms prevailing in the international aid regime influence aid policy decisionmaking. 
 
Several scholars have utilised international relations literature on norms to explain evolutions in 
the international aid regime. Lumsdaine (1993, 24) examined the foreign aid regime from 1949 
to 1989 and found that the “[p]ractices and norms of international life… influence states’ 
international conduct”. More recently, Fukunda-Parr and Hulme employ Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s (1998) analytical framework to demonstrate how the Millennium Development Goals 
became “so widely accepted as an international normative framework of development” 
(Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2009, 2)88. Since the end of the Cold War, the development purposes 
of aid have been emphasised (Lancaster 2007a, chapter 2), with poverty reduction becoming 
“over-arching objective of the international policy agenda” concern since the late 1990s 
(Fukuda-Parr 2011, 122). This emphasis was accompanied with a renewed embrace of the 
international goal of devoting 0.7% of national income to development assistance (Lightfoot and 
Szent-Iványi 2015, 3; Clemens and Moss 2005), with the ‘0.7% target’ becoming “a cause celebre 
                                                          
86 A consistent focus of Steven Hook’s work has been to examine how the international aid regime functions to 
impart systemic pressure on a state’s aid policy choices (Hook 1993; Hook 1995; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998; 
Hook and Rumsey 2016). Hook’s understanding of the ‘international aid regime’ is informed by Krasner’s definition. 
87 Hook and Rumsey (2016, 61) argue that the international aid regime can be viewed as a procedural regime due to 
the fact that the ‘central standards’ of the international aid regime relate to internal outputs of donors, rather than 
effectiveness in reducing poverty levels. They identify four ‘central standards’ of the ODA regime: “the volume of 
ODA as a percentage of donor gross national income (GNI), the proportion of aid provided to governments in 
extreme poverty, the proportion of aid provided as grants rather than concessional (low interest) loans, and the 
proportion of aid that is tied to the provision of donor goods and services” (Hook and Rumsey 2016, 60–61). As the 
body responsible for monitoring and reporting on these standards, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), is often used as a metonym for the aid regime. 
88 For an overview of the history of the MDGs, see Fukunda-Parr (2004) and Hulme (2009). 
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for aid activists and… politicians” (Clemens and Moss 2005, 3)89. With respect to my cases, the 
ongoing aspirational hold of the 0.7% norm was demonstrated in the way in which Australian 
and Dutch politicians finessed their announcements to cut aid spending so they appear not to 
be directly contravening or abandoning their international obligations90. 
 
In recent times the international development regime has again come under pressure, as a new 
‘development landscape’ emerges (Gore 2013; Kilby 2012; Greenhill, Prizzon, and Rogerson 
2013). Ideas about aid, how it should be provided, and who should provide it and where, are 
changing rapidly, with implications for the politics of aid (Woods 2005)91. Given “[t]here is 
general consensus in scholarly and policy circles that the global aid regime is undergoing major 
changes” (Chin and Quadir 2012)92 it is reasonable to expect decisionmakers to ‘factor them in’ 
when making aid policy decisions93.  
Global Power Dynamics 
Substantial changes in the international aid regime and in the trajectory of the aid policy of 
donors map closely with major historical geopolitical shifts. The modern aid regime was 
established in the aftermath of the Second World War. Cold War rivalries shaped aid giving for 
most of the second half of the twentieth century. Aid spending levels contracted sharply 
following the fall of the Berlin Wall, with many questioning whether aid had an ongoing role 
(Riddell 2007, 2). Unipolarity brought with it the opportunity to redefine aid’s purposes around 
promoting development. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, the US-led War on Terror led 
                                                          
89 The defining norm of the international aid regime has been the enshrinement of the 0.7% of ODA to GNI spending 
target as an indicator of donor commitment (Hook and Rumsey 2016, 61). This rather arbitrary target has proven 
remarkably durable considering ongoing constant controversy about its relevance and the considerable gap between 
those states advocating for (and assenting to) the target and those actually achieving it. Only a handful of states have 
reached this spending target since it was articulated in the 1960s. This gap between rhetoric and reality is just one 
example of the common observation that “donor practice is decoupled from the norms of effectiveness they claim to 
support” (S. Brown and Swiss 2013, 752).  
90 In Australia, for example, when the Coalition announced large cuts to aid spending ahead of the 2013 election, 
senior politicians insisted the Coalition remained “committed” to a 0.5% spending target, despite not committing to 
a timeframe (Hockey and Robb 2013b; Liberal Party of Australia and The Nationals 2013). In the Netherlands, the 
Second Rutte Cabinet, after abandoning the 0.7% spending target, began pushing to reform the way ODA was 
counted (Ploumen 2014). 
91 The drivers of these changes are myriad and multilayered. They include, but are not limited to: geopolitical power 
shifts; the dramatic increase in the number of actors involved in global development; the rapid rise of emerging 
donors, especially China, bringing with them competing notions of how to ‘do’ development (Woods 2008; 
Bräutigam 2011); the associated break-down in the traditional donor-recipient relationship; the fact that ODA 
spending comprises an ever-shrinking component of international resources transfers (Development Initiatives 
2013); the increasing emphasis being given to the beyond-aid agenda; and the shift in location of the world’s poor 
(Sumner 2012).  
92 According to Mawdsley, Savage, and Kim (2014) a ‘paradigm shift’ is underway in the international development 
regime. Zimmerman and Smith (2011, 733), meanwhile, contend that the “established international development 
co-operation system is in the midst of a legitimacy crisis.” 
93 The key aid policy documents published by recent governments in Australia, the Netherlands and the UK each 
make specific mention of these changes. Nonetheless, there remains a question as to whether changes in the 
international aid regime was a key factor influence aid policy decisionmakers, or whether they function more as a 
means of justifying or explaining a particularly course or action.   
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to the re-emergence of aid as an important geopolitical tool (Fleck and Kilby 2010, 185). As Roger 
Riddell (2007, 2) has observed, “aid has managed, repeatedly, to reinvent and renew itself after 
repeated bouts of uncertainty, doubt and pessimism.” The historical record of the international 
aid regime, instructs us to expect, as the framework acknowledges, that global power shifts 
influence aid policy decisionmaking. 
 
According to Andrew Cooper (Cooper 2013, 963), we are currently experiencing a “moment of 
transition” in the international system. It follows that states are again redefining the rationale 
for the aid programs. According to Ablett and Erdmann (2013, 4) “the ten years from 2000 to 
2010 saw the fastest-ever shift in the world’s economic center of gravity.” The rapid economic 
growth of emerging economies is transforming global politics, with power shifting away from 
the rich, mostly Western states that have traditionally been aid donors. As emerging powers 
demand roles in global affairs commensurate with their rising economic power, the extant 
Western-dominated global order is being strained, including the international aid regime (Bisley 
2010; Cooper 2013, 964; Golub 2013, 1002; Wesley 2011, 42). In response to these changes, 
states are reassessing how to best engage with their external environment and re-examining 
how aid fits into their foreign policy mix. This reassessment process is particularly challenging 
for states likeAustralia, the Netherlands and the UK, who have acknowledged their declining 
relative global influence and admitted that they are configuring their aid programs in light of this 
reality 94 . These are all reasons to suspect that global power shifts influence aid policy 
decisionmaking. 
 
§§§ 
 
 
3.4 Operationalising the Framework: From application to analytical 
explanation 
The chief objective of this concluding section of the chapter is to explain, in practical terms, how 
I applied the aid policy decisionmaking framework to produce the empirical chapters presented 
                                                          
94 For example, this frank admission features at the outset of A World to Gain: “[t]he influence of the Netherlands as 
a country is decreasing due to the emergence of new actors on the world stage” (MFA 2013, 5). Australian aid: 
promoting prosperity, reducing poverty, enhancing stability commences with this observation: “[t]he world has 
changed—and our aid program must change too” (DFAT 2014, 2). These sentiments are not confined to aid policy 
documents. Australia’s 2013 National Security Strategy recognises that “as the global order shifts, our capacity to 
shape institutions and forge consensus is more important than ever” (Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet 2013, ii). Likewise, Britain’s 2010 National Security Strategy (Cabinet Office 2010, 4) recognised that, “in 
order to protect our interests at home, we must project our influence abroad. As the global balance of power shifts, 
it will become harder for us to do so.” 
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in Part II. In the first subsection, I discuss my research design and case selection, outlining the 
decisionmaking episodes I chose to reconstruct and why. Next, I describe the three-step process 
by which I reconstructed these chosen episodes and transformed this raw empirical material 
into the analytical explanations found in chapters 5, 6 and 7. To conclude, I explain the role elite 
interviews played as a data source. 
3.4.1 Research Design and Case Selection  
I expressed in chapter 1 how this research project emerged in response to a trio of confounding 
aid policy announcements made over the course of six months in 2013. Each of these 
announcements conveyed a definitive policy choice: Australia would abandon its spending 
ramp-up to 0.5%; the Netherlands would abandon its 40-year long policy of spending at least 
0.7%; and the UK, having just reached the 0.7% target for the first time, promised to continue 
to spend this amount for the foreseeable future. I was driven to understand how these choices 
were determined. In methodological terms, my case selection was Y-centred: this research 
proceeded using a ‘causes of effects’ approach, not an ‘effects of causes’ approach (Goertz and 
Mahoney 2012, 41)95. 
 
Case selection based on the dependent variable is often considered taboo when conducting 
social science (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 100), partly due to the influence of King, Keohane 
and Verba’s (1994) volume Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. 
As Goertz and Mahoney (2012, 41) acknowledge, “quantitative scholars have clearly come down 
as a group in favour of the effects-of-causes approach as the standard way to do social science.” 
Yet recent scholarship has shown how “methodologists rooted in the tradition of large-N 
studies… provide misleading advice” (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 100) by mistakenly extending 
the logic of inference used in quantitative research to qualitative research (Goertz and Mahoney 
2012)96. 
 
The reality is that foreign policy analysis is a predominantly Y-centred approach. It generally 
seeks to explain why a given foreign policy decision was made. This research project was initially 
triggered by observing surprising events occurring in the real world. I was motivated to explain 
                                                          
95 Scholars working within the ‘quantitative culture’ operate using an ‘effects of causes’ approach. Such scholars 
prize the controlled experiment and seek to “estimate the average effect of an independent variable of interest” 
(Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 41). In contrast, as Blatter and Haverland (2012, 99) point out, “[s]mall-N research with 
an emphasis on causal-process tracing does not rely on the co-variation of variables across cases to draw causal 
inferences”.  
96 For overviews of the ‘state of play’ of causal inference in qualitative research, see Collier, Brady, and Seawright 
(2010) and Mahoney (2010). 
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these surprising events by asking about their causes (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 42). Alongside 
being “interested in explaining outcomes in individual cases”, I was also driven to study “the 
effects of particular causal factors within individual cases” (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 42). My 
approach was to begin with a series of outputs (significant and confounding aid policy decisions 
relating to aid spending) and work backwards to explain how these outputs were realised. In 
doing so, I proceeded in the manner described by Stuart (2008, 576), who explains how “foreign-
policy decision-making takes as its starting point the dependent variable–a specific foreign-
policy choice by an international actor–and seeks to explain how this choice was arrived at by 
the agents… involved in the decisional process” (emphasis added). 
  
As I conducted preliminary research into the three aid policy announcements that prompted the 
project, it became increasingly evident that to simply recreate the decisionmaking processes 
which led to these policy announcements would not provide a definitive answer to the research 
question. In response, I sought to identify a series of comparable aid policy decision outputs (as 
opposed to announcements) which were the product of distinct decisionmaking episodes. My 
solution was to reconstruct the three decisionmaking processes which led to the definitive 
strategic level aid policy statement published by the Governments in power when the research-
initiating announcements were made—the Abbott, Cameron-Clegg and Rutte I Governments, 
respectively (refer Neack 2014, 9).  
 
Figure 3.C: Research Design Summary 
 
 
 
What soon became clear was that my research design would benefit greatly if, in addition to 
being able to make cross-country comparisons, I could also examine changes within countries 
over time. To generate temporal comparisons, I decided to also examine an additional three 
decisionmaking episodes—those which produced the definitive aid policy statements of the 
government’s preceding those already identified. My final research design therefore called for 
the reconstruction of six aid policy decisionmaking episodes that resulted in what I consider to 
be the definitive aid policy declarations of consecutive Governments in three countries. A 
benefit of adopting this research design for these countries was the way it allowed for the effects 
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of changing government ideology on aid policy to be examined. As Figure 3.C highlights, in each 
of my case study countries, the most recent general election (at the time of settling on my 
research design) had seen government change hands, bringing to power governments of 
different ideological orientation97.  
 
Table 3.B below is an expanded version of Table 1.A presented in chapter 1. A crucial reason I 
selected these six decisionmaking episodes to reconstruct was that the decision outputs that 
were produced were comparable. These episodes resulted in what might be called ‘White Paper 
equivalent’ outputs98 . This was highly beneficial for three important reasons99 . First, such 
episodes conform to a predictable pattern. While many foreign policy decisionmaking episodes 
are difficult to delineate, White Paper-type processes have definitive start and end points. 
Moreover, a formal government announcement and/or press conference usually takes place at 
the initiation of the process and at its completion, where the final policy document is typically 
launched. Media coverage attends these set piece moments, which usually involve speeches 
from the responsible cabinet minister.  
 
Second, the relative accessibility of White Paper-type decisionmaking processes is crucial in 
permitting effective causal process tracing (something discussed in more detail in the following 
subsection). As Blatter and Haverland (2012, 25) argue, “[b]ecause causal-process tracing 
depends on gaining a comprehensive overview over the temporal unfolding of the causal-
process, the ability to provide a dense description of critical moments, and the possibility of 
gaining deep insights into the perceptions and motivations of important actors, the accessibility 
of a case is the primary precondition for investigation”. White Paper-type decisionmaking 
episodes are not conducted as “behind closed doors” to the extent that most foreign policy 
decisions are (Beach 2012, 3) and because of their semi-public nature, it is relatively easy to 
identify the participants100.   
  
                                                          
97 Having a means to compare governments with different ideological stances was particularly important given the 
reason Cameron’s decision to maintain his Government’s commitment 0.7 % was so surprisingly is precisely because 
it confronted expectations about how Conservative governments are likely to behave in times of fiscal pressure. 
Likewise, it was surprising that the Netherlands finally made the decision to abandon the 0.7% target during a 
Coalition in which the PvdA (Labour) was involved, rather than during the previous centre-right coalition (which 
relied on the far-right Party for Freedom (PVV) of Geert Wilders to form government).  
98 The UK Government did not produce a White Paper type policy related to aid during the course of the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government (2010-2015). However, while the Spending Round 2010 
encompasses policy issues ranging far beyond just aid, the process by which this document was produced is 
comparable with a White Paper process.  
99 As discussed in chapter 1, the fact that the decisionmaking episodes from Australia, the Netherlands and the UK 
during this period produced similar outputs contributed to my selection of these countries to study, rather than, for 
example, Canada or Norway. 
100 For example, Building Our Common Future includes a list of the key individuals involved (DFID 2009c, 154).  
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Table 3.B: Case Selection Summary 
  Series One Series Two 
Au
st
ra
lia
 
Defining Declaratory Policy 
An Effective Aid Program for 
Australia: Making a real 
difference—Delivering real results 
Australian aid: Promoting 
prosperity, reducing poverty, 
enhancing stability 
Episode Designation AUS I AUS II 
Short name Effective Aid Australian aid 
Publication Date 6 July 2011 18 June 2014 
Government Gillard Labor Government (minority Government) 
Abbott Government 
(Liberal / National Coalition) 
Political Orientation Centre-left Centre-right 
Head of Government Julia Gillard Tony Abbott 
Principal 
(Position) 
Kevin Rudd 
(Minister for Foreign Affairs) 
Julie Bishop 
(Minister for Foreign Affairs) 
Trigger for Episode 
(date) 
Rudd’s announcement of 
Independent Review of Aid 
Effectiveness 
(16 November 2010) 
Abbott Government’s 
announcement to cut aid spending 
and integrate AusAID with DFAT 
(5 / 18 September 2013) 
Th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
 
Defining Declaratory Policy Eliminating World Poverty: Building our Common Future Spending Review 2010 
Episode Designation UK I UK II 
Short name Building our Common Future Spending Review 2010 
Publication Date 6 July 2009 20 October 2010 
Government Brown Labour Government 
Cameron-Clegg Coalition 
Government (Conservative / Liberal 
Democrat Coalition) 
Political Orientation Centre-left Centre-right 
Head of Government Gordon Brown David Cameron 
Principal 
(Position) 
Douglas Alexander 
(Secretary of State for 
International Development) 
Andrew Mitchell 
(Secretary of State for International 
Development) 
Trigger for Episode 
(date) 
Speech by Douglas Alexander 
(19 January 2009) 
Conservative / Liberal Democrat 
Coalition Agreement commitment 
to conduct a spending review 
(12 May 2010) 
Th
e 
N
et
he
rla
nd
s 
Defining Declaratory Policy 
Letter to the House of 
Representatives presenting the 
spearheads of development 
cooperation policy 
A World to Gain: A New Agenda for 
Aid, Trade and Investment 
Episode Designation NED I NED II 
Short name Spearheads letter A World to Gain 
Publication Date 18 March 2011 5 April 2013 
Government 
Rutte I 
(VVD / CDA Coalition + PVV 
support) 
Rutte II 
(VVD / PvdA Coalition) 
Political Orientation Centre-right Centrist (Purple Coalition) 
Head of Government Mark Rutte Mark Rutte 
Principal (Position) 
Ben Knapen 
(State Secretary for European 
Affairs and Development 
Cooperation) 
Lilliane Ploumen 
(Minister for Foreign Trade and 
Development Cooperation) 
Trigger for Episode 
(date) 
VVD & CDA Coalition Agreement 
commitment to “fundamentally 
review and [modernise]” Dutch 
development policy 
(30 September 2010) 
VVD & PvdA Coalition Agreement 
commitment to reduce aid spending 
below 0.7% 
(29 October 2012) 
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Third, White Paper-type decisionmaking episodes are highly deliberative and the decision 
output therefore can be taken to represent a considered view. Unlike many foreign policy 
decisionmaking episodes, a White Paper-equivalent producing episode ultimately results in a 
tangible decision output of considerable length 101 . The decisionmaking process generally 
incorporates input from a relatively wide range of stakeholders. Although final approval 
ultimately rests with the principal, the collaborative nature of these types of decisionmaking 
episodes is more likely to reveal were tensions and differences of opinions exist between 
different individuals and groups.   
3.4.2 Causal Process Tracing: Towards an explanation  
The chief empirical task of this research project was to reconstruct six aid policy decisionmaking 
episodes, a process guided by the framework introduced above. It must be emphasised, 
however, that these reconstructions, however detailed and illuminating they might be, are not 
ends in themselves. Rather, they are the means by which I sought answers to the question that 
animates this thesis: why do major shifts in aid policy occur?  
 
The six decisionmaking episodes I reconstructed do not result in definitive decisions regarding 
aid spending targets (UK II is the notable exception). Aid policy decisionmaking rarely works in 
that way. Foreign policy decisionmaking episodes akin to the Cuban Missile Crisis, where 
deliberations must reach concrete decisions on a course of foreign policy action, are rare in the 
aid policy issue area. In the absence of such episodes, the next best approach is to examine 
comparable White Paper-type outputs.  
 
Reconstructing White-Paper-type decisionmaking episodes provides a ‘way in’ to discovering 
the prevailing decisionmaking dynamics. In essence, each White Paper functions like Alice’s 
looking glass from Lewis Carroll’s classic novel Through the Looking-Glass. The White Paper 
provides access to another world; the unique world of aid policymaking. Once ‘through the 
looking glass’, I am introduced to characters and ideas and events that allow me to gain greater 
insight into the story of how and why aid policy changed in each environment. The web of forces 
which are exerted on aid policy decisionmakers become suddenly more discernible 
 
Reconstructing how a decisionmaking proceeded reveals potential causal threads which can 
then be followed back and forward through time using causal process tracing methods. Causal 
                                                          
101 By far the shortest of the decision outputs I examine is Spearheads of Development Cooperation, which consists 
of 21 pages. Building Our Common Future, at the other end of the spectrum, runs for over 150 pages.  
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process tracing is particularly suited to foreign policy analysis because “the research is interested 
in the many and complex causes of a specific outcome (Y) and not so much in the effects of a 
specific cause (X)” (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 80). Bennett and Checkel (2015a, Loc 282) 
recently defined process tracing as: “the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and 
conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses 
about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case”. In reconstructing the sequence 
of events leading to particular aid policy decisions, my overriding objective was to explain how 
and why the trajectory of aid policy changed in the countries under consideration. Lundsgaarde 
(2013, 15), who was pursuing very similar research objectives, explains that the “core of the 
process-tracing method is an effort to reconstruct the course of events and the constellation of 
variables that led to a given outcome.”  
 
The literature on process tracing matured rapidly during my doctoral studies, helping 
considerably in my desire to conduct ‘good process tracing’102. Admittedly, conceptions of good 
process tracing remain an open question, with the term suffering from its status as a buzzword 
(Bennett and Checkel 2015a, Chapter One). Nonetheless, as captured by the subtitle of their 
important new book, Bennett and Checkel are confident in asserting that process tracing has 
evolved from a “metaphor to an analytical tool”. In my use of process tracing as an analytical 
tool, I adhered closely to the set of best practice guidelines for process tracing recently outlined 
by Bennett and Checkel (2015a, Loc 589)103. I also sought out scholarship identified in the 
process tracing literature as examples of good process tracing to guide my approach 104 . 
Ultimately, the empirical material presented in chapters 5, 6 and 7 was produced in three 
phases, summarised in Table 3.C below105. The remainder of this subsection of the chapter is 
devoted to describing each of these phases in more detail.   
Phase 1: Building a foundation of prior knowledge 
Prior to undertaking fieldwork and conducting interviews, I invested considerable time building 
up a foundation of ‘prior knowledge’ of my cases (Collier 2011, 824). There were two main 
thrusts of this initial effort. To generate a macro-perspective useful for providing context to the 
decisiomaking episode at hand, I developed an understanding of the broad political, foreign  
                                                          
102 Important volumes on process tracing methods published since 2013 include Beach and Pedersen (2013), 
Bennett and Checkel (2015a). These works build on key works including Mahoney (2010, 2012) Brady and Collier 
(2010), Collier (2011) and George and Bennett (2005).    
103 Bennett and Checkel (2015a, Table 1.1, Loc 589) outline ten steps that they consider constitute “Process Tracing 
Best Practice”. 
104 Research by Fairfield (2013), and Tannenwald (1999) is regularly cited as best practice. Examples that are more 
directly relevant for my study include books by Kaarbo (2013) and Lundsgaarde (2013). 
105 I fully acknowledge that process tracing is a highly iterative process. While my research certainly didn’t proceed 
in a neat linear fashion, I nonetheless found myself needing to work through these three broad phases to produce 
each of my empirical chapters.  
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Table 3.C: Three Phases of Generating Analytical Explanations of Aid Policy Decisionmaking 
Phase 1: Building a foundation of prior knowledge 
Research 
Objective 
 To obtain a historical understanding of aid policy in each state and a contextual 
understanding of each episode. 
Data Sources & 
research 
methods 
 The data sources examined during this phase where typical materials of ‘contemporary 
history’: “official government documents, parliamentary reports, newspapers, biographies, 
contemporary histories, blogs and journal articles” (Gaskarth 2013, 9). Books and journal 
articles offering historical overviews were sought out.  
 Snowballing—where locating one piece of evidence leads to another—was repeatedly used.   
Research 
outputs 
 Contextual information for each case study country, including timelines of key aid policy 
events over the past 15 years.  
 “Base-narratives” for each decisionmaking episode, taking the form of detailed storyboards. 
Base-narratives documented the sequence of events comprising each decisionmaking 
episode and included lists of the actors I knew were involved and the nature of their 
involvement.  
 A checklist of key gaps in knowledge for each episode. 
 Target lists for interviews for each episode. 
Phase 2:  Building Comprehensive Sequential Storylines 
Central 
Objective  To generate detailed chronologically-ordered reconstructions of each episode. 
Data Sources & 
research 
methods 
 Prioritised primary sources during this phase.  
 I reviewed speeches, press releases, policy documents, newspaper articles, budget 
documents, memoirs, social media (including twitter feeds106), radio broadcasts, opinion 
polling, blog posts, YouTube uploads107 and documentaries. 
 Used ‘at-a-distance’ techniques to understand the motives and perspectives of individual 
decision-makers, such as thematic content analysis. (V. M. Hudson 2007, 61) 
 Immersion in detail—‘soaking and poking’ (Bennett and Checkel 2015a, Loc 527). 
Research 
outputs 
 6 x physical files containing all relevant documentation (newspaper clippings, official 
documents, speeches, audio transcripts etc.) for each decisionmaking episode, organised in 
chronological order.   
 3x ‘Comprehensive storylines’ reconstructing decisionmaking episodes sequentially in each 
country, including evidence for the key pressures exerted on each actor (approximately 
35,000 words in length).   
Phase 3: Crafting theoretically-orientated narratives 
Central 
Objective  To generate explanations for why and how aid policy decisions were made. 
Data Sources & 
research 
methods 
 Reauditing data above, including physical files.  
  Re-examining primary sources, especially memoirs, speeches and quotations. 
 Data from elite interviews. 
 Counterfactual analysis. 
Research 
outputs  Part II (chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8) of this thesis. 
  
                                                          
106 A tweet by one particular politician led to a long discussion during an interview. 
107 For example, via YouTube I located video of a speech by Peter Lilley, the chair of the Global Poverty Policy Group 
established by David Cameron following his election as Leader, discussing this process. I also located a speech by 
Lilliane Ploumen to the Centre for Global Development.  
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policy and aid policy dynamics operating in my case study countries, focussing on the post-
Global Financial Crisis era108.  
 
A handful of country-specific texts proved particularly useful in providing broad-based 
introductions to these topics as well as advice on further reading109. In parallel with developing 
this macro-perspective, I also began to reconstruct the decisionmaking episodes in question, 
systematically considering each of the six factors highlighted in the expanded aid policy 
decisionmaking framework. I mapped each decisionmaking episode to the extent possible, 
identifying who was involved and when, observing when decision units were formed and how 
they were configured, and documenting sub-decisions that were reached. 
 
The culmination of this initial foundation-building period was the production of a series of ‘base-
narratives’, as recommended by Collier (2011, 828). These narratives documented the sequence 
of events comprising each decisionmaking episode, taking the form of detailed storyboards. 
They were accompanied with lists of the individuals I knew were involved, or suspected of being 
involved, at various stages of each decisionmaking episode. Devising these base-narratives 
illuminated information gaps, which I reformulated as lists of questions which required 
answering. Many of these questions were subsequently posed to interviewees, or answered by 
uncovering additional data. 
Phase 2: Building Comprehensive Sequential Storylines 
The second phase entailed ‘filling out’ the base-narratives created earlier, in as much detail as 
possible, in order to provide a denser picture of the scene (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 30). 
During this phase, I embraced the role of a detective110 and “immerse[d] [my]self in the in the 
details of the case[s]” (Bennett and Checkel 2015a, Loc 527), searching “for all kinds of 
information about the temporal unfolding of the causal-process [in order to] present a 
comprehensive storyline with a sequence of causal steps” (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 30, 
emphasis added). I was particularly focused on obtaining and analysing primary sources during 
this phase. During this period, I actively followed each lead I found, tracing them as far as 
                                                          
108 For each country, I familiarised myself with: the political system; recent political history; contemporary foreign 
policy debates; the identity of key political parties, their leaders and their distinguishing policy positions (particularly 
in relation to international policy);  the structure and nature of the foreign policy bureaucracy and the position of 
aid policy within it; and key policy documents. 
109 Specifically, these volumes were those by Gaskarth (2013), for the UK; Gyngell and Wesley (2007) for Australia; 
and Andeweg and Irwin (2014) for the Netherlands. 
110 Embracing the role of detective is commonly cited practice in the process tracing literature. See, for example, 
Blatter and Haverland (2012, 105) and Bennett and Checkel (2015a, Loc 510). As Bennett and Checkel suggest, 
‘clues’ in this context are equivalent to ‘causal process observations’. 
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necessary to rule out plausible alternative explanations111. At the same time, I systematically 
probed the potential explanations offered by each of the six clusters of key factors the expanded 
aid policy decisionmaking framework suggests are likely to shape aid policy. Considerable time 
and effort was spent during this phase cross-referencing data sources, as conflicting evidence 
often surfaced, particularly regarding timing and sequencing of events. In response, I settled on 
a rule whereby each key piece of evidence needed to be confirmed by at least two sources for 
me to consider it reliable. 
 
The key research output from this phase was a series of three ‘comprehensive storylines’—one 
for each case study country which incorporated both decisionmaking episodes. These 
documents included substantial background sections containing relevant contextual 
information before presenting a reconstruction of the sequencing of ‘what happened’ during 
each stage of each decisionmaking episode, including tracking the pressures operating on key 
decisionmakers at each point. These ‘comprehensive storylines’ were approximately 35,000 
words in length and, using the Australian example as an indicator, contained references to over 
200 unique evidentiary sources (excluding material generated from elite interviews).  
Phase 3: Crafting analytical narratives 
The process of turning the three comprehensive storylines I developed into convincing 
theoretically-orientated narratives (George and Bennett 2005, 205) was more challenging than 
I had anticipated. Having immersed myself so deeply in decisionmaking details and invested so 
heavily in developing a careful description (Collier 2011, 824) of each aid policy decisionmaking 
process, it became tempting to view these reconstructions as ends in themselves, rather than 
as the raw material from which to generate an “analytical causal explanation”112. 
 
To gain perspective, I deliberately allowed substantial time to elapse between turning the 
creating comprehensive storylines into analytical narratives. This left space for the inductive 
emergence of the idea of decider salience as a cross-case phenomenon and a potential 
organising principle around which I could craft explanatory narratives about aid policy change113. 
I returned to the comprehensive storylines I had created to test the within-case plausibility of 
decider salience and aid salience shocks as causal mechanisms. To this end, I reaudited the data 
                                                          
111 The process tracing literature refers to this process as ‘soaking and poking’. It is that period during which “one 
immerses oneself in the details of the case and tries out proto-hypothesises that may either quickly prove to be 
dead ends or become plausible and worthy of more rigorous testing” (Bennett and Checkel 2015a, Loc 527). 
112 This term is taken from George and Bennett (2005, 211), who describe ‘analytical explanation’ as a distinct type 
of process tracing which seeks to convert “historical narrative into an analytical causal explanation couched in 
explicit theoretical forms.”  
113 Leaving space for inductive insights is a key feature of causal process tracing (Bennett and Checkel 2015a; Blatter 
and Haverland 2012, 30). 
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I had collected and sought more evidence where required. I focused on specifying the 
sequencing of the decider salience mechanism, fact-checking anecdotes and examples that 
illuminated how this processes proceeded, and identifying and critical junctures (Capoccia and 
Kelemen 2007) where path dependencies were initiated or consolidated (Bennett and Elman 
2006; Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000) 114 . I also sought and tested alternative explanations, 
including by employing counterfactual analysis115.  
 
As I became more convinced about the explanatory power of the decider salience concept, I 
dramatically revised the comprehensive storylines so that my analytical explanation was built 
around conveying how salience shifts drove the behaviour of aid policy decisionmakers and 
hence change. Consequently, much of the granular detail about how decisionmaking processes 
unfolded ‘fell out’ of the analysis. While these find-grained details were very important in 
directing me to my eventual explanation, they ultimately often got in the way of the story that 
needed to be told. Likewise, rather than being constrained by a chronological recounting of 
events, as in the comprehensive storylines, the analytical narratives presented in are organised 
more thematically, as they trace the progression of how decider salience drives aid policy change 
(see Schimmelfennig 2015, Loc. 2367).   
3.4.3 Elite Interviews as a Data Source 
Elite interviews are typically a vital data source for researchers examining decisionmaking 
processes. As they did for Lundsgaarde (2013, 16), elite interviews proved crucial in allowing me 
to “pinpoint the actors who have left a decisive mark on aid choices”116. There were three 
reasons why data obtained from elite interviews was especially important for this project. First, 
the contemporary nature of the episodes I investigated meant that there was almost no existing 
scholarly literature available. Many of the participants involved remain in government or in 
politics. A second, related, reason interviews were so important concerned the fact that the 
decisionmaking episodes I reconstructed received very minimal attention from the press. While 
the publication of the final policy document typically received media attention, the 
decisionmaking processes that led to them were not widely reported on. Third, first-hand 
                                                          
114 Collier (2011, 824) advises that to “characterize a process, we must be able to characterize key steps in the 
process, which in turn permits good analysis of change and sequence.” 
115 For example, I tested my argument that Rudd’s personal investment in increasing Australia aid spending supplied 
the initiative and ongoing momentum for aid policy change in Australia by considering what would have likely 
eventuated in the absence of Rudd. Frank Harvey’s (2012) book, Explaining the Iraq War: counterfactual theory, 
logic and evidence is an excellent recent example of counterfactual analysis.  
116 Lundsgaarde’s (2013) research entailed conducting 77 semi-structured interviews, or around 20 per country case 
study. I used this as a rough guide for my own research. Key resources which guided my preparation for interviews 
were Myers and Newman (2007), Mosley (2013) and Beckmann and Hall (2013) 
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accounts, especially from participants, proved especially valuable in yielding insight into the 
‘psychological environment’ of decisionmakers—a key dimension of the aid policy 
decisionmaking framework.  
 
During this project, I conducted 51 formal, semi-structured interviews117. These interviews were 
conducted under the auspices of ANU Human Ethics Protocol Number 2014/426. The interviews 
generated almost 40 hours of recordings, leading to over 150 pages of transcribed interview 
data 118 . Annex 1 lists the individuals I interviewed for this project. Only five of the 51 
interviewees requested anonymity, a pleasing result that I partly put down to my promise to 
interviewees to contact them again to confirm attribution of interview material in the final 
thesis. Formal interviews averaged just over 49 minutes in length, ranging from twenty minutes 
to an hour-and-a-half. Most formal interviews were conducted face to face (40 of 51, or 78%), 
in a range of locations across Australia (Canberra), the Netherlands (The Hague, Amsterdam, 
Nijmegen) and the UK (Leeds, London, Oxford, York). Nine formal interviews (18% of the total) 
were conducted by video conference using Skype, with an additional two interviews (4%) 
conducted via telephone.  
 
From the point at which I began to compile a ‘target-list’ of interviewees, I found it useful to 
distinguish between ‘participants’ and ‘observers’. Participants were those actors who were 
directly involved in the decisionmaking episode and whose role made them partly responsible 
for the decision output (or a sub-output). This way of defining terms sets a high-bar on who I 
recognised as a participant119. To preserve the anonymity of participants who requested it, I am 
limited in the detail I can provide. However, it is important to confirm that I interviewed two or 
more participants for all but one decisionmaking episodes. Overall, I interviewed sixteen 
individuals who I classified as participants, including two principals (Mitchell and Knapen)—
equating to slightly more than 30% (16 of 51) of the total participant pool. Given the very limited 
                                                          
117 I was guided by a semi-structured interview protocol when conducting formal interviews for this product. This 
protocol was approved by ANU’s Human Ethics Research Committee. The protocol was designed to generate 
responses to my three most three fundamental information requirements: the structure of the decisionmaking 
episode (i.e. who was involved and when and how); the perceptions of the decisionmakers involved in the 
decisionmaking episode; and the perceptions of the decisionmakers influenced the decionmaking process. The 
protocol provided me with relatively generic questions in each of the above categories to ensure the flow of the 
interview was maintained, along with various prompts should I wish to press the interviewee for more detail about 
a particular response. While some interviews followed the protocol quite closely, many interviews became quite 
wide-ranging, especially after once I had developed a very detailed knowledge of each decision.  
118 The transcribed interviews generated approximately 80,000 words of material.  
119 This way of defining terms sets a high-bar on who I recognised as a participant. For example, it discounts senior 
bureaucrats as ‘participants’ unless they were taken offline to participate in the secretariat formed to develop the 
policy output. Of course, such a senior bureaucrat would obviously remain a valuable ‘observer’.  
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potential pool of participants, this represents a significant sample, particularly given I 
interviewed most of the lead or key authors for the White-Paper type policy outputs120.  
 
Additionally, as the research progressed, it became more important to seek input from 
interviewees who, while not participants in one the six episodes being reconstructed, were 
participants in related episodes that proved equally—and sometimes more—important for 
telling the story of the aid policy change121. For example, the insights garnered from interviews 
with Clare Short and Kathleen Ferrier proved vital to my ability to tell the story of changes in UK 
and Dutch aid policy respectively, yet these individuals were not participants (as I define the 
term) in the episodes in question.  
 
As distinct from ‘participants’, I define an ‘observer’, as an individual with an intimate knowledge 
of a particular aid policy decisionmaking episode. This designation allows for ‘participants’ to 
also be classified as observers. I sought to keep the number of observers I interviewed across 
the six episodes roughly similar (see Figure 3.D). Most interviewees could be classified as 
observers of multiple decisionmaking episodes—usually both episodes in a particularly 
country122—hence the total number of ‘observers’ adds to well over the number of formal 
interviews undertaken.  
Figure 3.D: Sampling of Observers by Decisionmaking Episode 
                                                          
120 To be more specific here would risk potentially disclosing the identities of individuals who have requested 
anonymity.  
121 For example, it became very apparent early on, in the UK II case, that it would be vital to interview individuals 
involved in the involved in the Global Poverty Policy Group, which was central to the way Cameron’s modernisation 
agenda for the Conservative Party progressed in the aid policy space.   
122 More rarely, an interviewee might have insight into relevant episodes across different countries. 
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In addition to paying attention to the number of observers I interviewed for each decision, I also 
sought to interview a variety of types of respondents, to ensure I heard a variety of viewpoints. 
To this end, I categorised observers into one of six categories: a bureaucrat (e.g. a representative 
of AusAID, the MFA, DFID or another government agency); a political adviser (e.g. a SPAD in the 
UK system); a politician; an academic; a member of the development constituency; or a thought 
leader or member of a think tank (e.g. ODI). To preserve the anonymity of interviewees who 
requested it, I am not able to publish the breakdown of interviewees by type of respondent.  
 
I transcribed most interviews using transcription software and a transcription pedal. In most 
cases, I added my own recollections and notes (recorded during the interview or very soon after) 
to the transcription file at the appropriate places, using a different font to distinguish my 
thoughts from the interviewee’s words. Some interviews did not warrant require full 
transcription. In such cases, I generally summarised key parts of the conversation, fully 
transcribing key sections if relevant.  
 
Once the transcribing was near completion, I collated all the interview data for each case study 
country into a single document. I repeatedly read these documents, highlighting relevant quotes 
and ideas. I then collected these highlighted sections into a new document of ‘key interview 
material’ for each country. Most of this material has been incorporated into the empirical 
chapters. During the production of the empirical chapters, I regularly returned to key interviews 
to make sure my account aligned with participants’ recollections.   
 
§§§ 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter documented how I constructed a recapturing scheme that facilitates examining aid 
policy decisionmaking from a new perspective. The Aid Policy Decisionmaking Framework 
examines aid policy decisonmaking episodes through a much wider lens than other frameworks 
currently offered by the literature, precisely because its chief objective is to explicitly 
incorporate factors from all levels of analysis. The trade-off is that the framework produces 
detailed snapshots of aid policy dynamics in each aid policy system at a point in time. It is crucial 
to keep in mind, therefore, that the product that emerges after the framework is applied to a 
given aid policy decision episode is, at least in the context of this thesis, not an end in itself. The 
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framework is a means to a more important end; answering the thesis question—why do states 
change the trajectory of their aid policy? 
 
The decisionmaking episodes I reconstructed represent critical nodes in the history of each aid 
policy ecosystem in which they occur. By reconstructing them with the Aid Policy 
Decisionmaking Framework, it becomes possible to detect how, and where, and why sources of 
aid policy change emerge, interact, and intersect. Essentially, the framework turns these 
decisionmaking episodes into critical junctures that become a point at which the threads driving 
aid policy change are observable. Tracing these threads then reveals more about how and why 
aid policy change proceeds. 
  
The four chapters comprising Part II of the thesis convey what I discovered as I radiated out from 
each of these six nodes, seeking to uncover the key forces that provided the impetus for aid 
policy decisionmakers to act to change aid policy. However, as I foreshadowed in chapter 1, the 
central ideas holding these accounts of aid policy change together are the concepts of decider 
salience and aid salience shocks. In the forthcoming chapter, I present the argument of this 
thesis by turning my attention to explaining how these concepts underpin an actor-specific 
theory of aid policy change. 
 
§§§ 
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4 Theorising Aid Policy Change 
“We need a much more vigorous effort 
to characterize the conditions that can 
produce decisions for dramatic 
redirection in foreign policy.”  
—Charles Hermann, 1990 
 
“What we must decide is whether there 
are any patterns in the way in which 
decision makers perform the basic tasks 
of processing information and making 
choices that can constitute 
explanations…”  
—David Welch, 2005 
 
“[P]olitical attention is scarce, and it is 
consequential.” 
—Green-Pedersen and Walgrave, 2014 
 
 
 
his chapter sets out an actor-specific theory of aid policy change. At the heart of this theory 
are two interrelated explanatory mechanisms: decider salience and aid salience shocks. 
These explanatory devices make sense of variations in the attentiveness of powerful political 
actors to aid issues, which I argue is the key to understanding the dynamics of aid policy change 
at the strategic level.  
 
The first two sections of this chapter describe the creative steps involved in developing the 
theory. First, I address the significance of actor-specific theorising, highlighting the benefits of 
this approach in light of the thesis question and the deficiencies in the determinants of aid 
literature (section 4.1). Then, in the subsequent section, I unpack the concepts I appropriated 
from the agenda setting literature in order to build the theory of aid policy change (section 4.2). 
Here I introduce the concept of issue salience, highlight the implications of it and explain why 
the political agenda matters for understanding policy change.  
T 
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The third section is designed to stand alone as the decisive statement of the theory of aid policy 
change this thesis advances (section 4.3). As such, it functions as the nucleus of the thesis. It is 
the point to which the preceding chapters have been leading, and the point from where the 
remaining chapters obtain their direction.  
 
The chapter concludes with a section documenting the permissive conditions that allow for the 
operation of the theory of aid policy change I propose (section 4.4). Here I build on the 
scholarship of Lundsgaarde (2013, 22) to catalogue the characteristics of the aid policy issue 
area. Going further than Lundsgaarde, I argue that aid policy exhibits “a politics unto itself” 
(Lundsgaarde 2013, 6) primarily because of its low salience to political actors.  
 
§§§ 
 
 
4.1 Actor-specific Theorising  
I have repeatedly emphasised that the theory of aid policy change advanced by this thesis is an 
actor-specific theory. The role of this opening section of the chapter is to unpack the significance 
of the ‘actor-specific’ descriptor. I approach this task by addressing three questions. What is 
actor-specific theory? What are the benefits of actor-specific theorising? And how did I approach 
the task of building actor-specific theory? Responding to these questions in turn illustrates why 
actor-specific theorising represents an especially relevant means of answering the question this 
thesis poses given the faults of the determinants of aid literature.  
4.1.1 Actor-specific Theory Explained 
To understand what actor-specific theory is, it is helpful to first explain the alternative, and most 
common, mode of theory construction. Actor-general theories are those that “focus on the state 
as a unitary actor and systemic as well as relational variables as determinants of action” (V. M. 
Hudson and Vore 1995, 210). Actor-general theory predominates in International Relations. As 
Hudson (2005, 2) has observed, most “contemporary theoretical work in [International 
Relations] gives the impression” that the ground of the discipline—the foundational level at 
which phenomena in the field of study occur[s]” (V. M. Hudson 2005, 1)—lies in states.  
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Most of the time, scholars of International Relations unconsciously think, talk and conceptualise 
state behaviour as the deliberately considered product of a singular and super-capable, super-
calculating entity. A half-century after Graham Allison began to explicitly articulate the 
assumptions of this “largely implicit conceptual [model]” (1969, 689) as “the ‘Rational Actor 
Model’123, the standard operating assumption in International Relations remains as follows: 
“[e]vents in international politics consist of the more or less purposive acts of unified national 
governments and that governmental behaviour can be understood by analogy with the 
intelligent, coordinated acts of individual human beings” (Allison and Halperin 1972, 41). The 
implication of this standard operation assumption is that actor-general theory ‘black boxes’ the 
“inner workings of nations” (V. M. Hudson and Vore 1995, 210).  
 
There are benefits to operating at this level of abstraction, most notably for developing the type 
of pared-back, parsimonious theory advocated and produced by Kenneth Waltz (Yetiv 2011a, 
11–12). But there are also drawbacks. Actor-general theory leads to a focus on how structure 
impacts the behaviour of states, a “severe theoretical handicap”, according to Hudson (2005, 4). 
Because its strips out the agency of individuals, actor-general theory struggles to explain change. 
“States are not agents” argues Hudson (2005, 2), “because states are abstractions and thus have 
no agency.”  
 
The FPA subliterature is distinguished from the broader body of International Relations 
literature owing to is refusal to ‘abstract away’ from the human decisionmaker. “From its 
inception,” observe Hudson and Vore (1995, 210), “FPA has involved the examination of how 
foreign policy decisions are made and has assumed that the source of much behavior and most 
change in international politics is human beings, acting individually or in collectivities.” FPA’s 
unwillingness to ‘black box’ human decisions makers makes FPA theory “profoundly actor-
specific in its orientation” (V. M. Hudson 2005, 3). For Breuning (2017), it is “[t]he actor-centered 
approach [that] sets foreign policy analysis apart from international relations more generally.” 
 
The numerous theoretical benefits that derive from FPA’s actor-specific orientation flow from 
one crucial idea. “The single most important contribution of FPA to IR theory” explains Hudson 
(2005, 3), is to identify that “the point of theoretical intersection between the primary 
determinants of state behaviour… is not the state, it is human decisionmakers.” In short, it is 
humans that make decisions, not states. And if we are to talk about the state ‘making a decision’, 
what we are really referring to is decisions made by individuals invested the authority to act “in 
                                                          
123 Allison’s most well-known explication of the Rational Actor Model (RAM) is from Essence of Decision (1971), his 
study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which was later fully revised in collaboration with Philip Zelikow (1999). 
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the name of the state” (R. C. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 2002, 59). As Rosati (2000, 47) has pointed 
out, “[i]n reality, countries do not act; people act. States (and organizations) are made up of 
individuals who act on their behalf.”  
 
“Theory comes in different types and each different type can have different aims” observe 
Dunne, Hansen and Wight (2013, 407). The benefits and drawbacks of adopting different modes 
of theorising need to be weighed against the aims and approach of each research project. 
Explicitly recognising that theoretical intersection occurs within the mind of the individual 
decisionmaker, rather than at the level of the state, is a theoretical move that “confers some 
advantages generally lacking in IR theory” (V. M. Hudson 2005, 3)124. Crucially for the aims of 
this thesis, three of the most prevalent of these benefits directly address major deficiencies in 
the determinants of aid literature.  
 
The strengths of actor-specific theorising predispose such an approach to shedding new light on 
the dynamics of aid policy change. Specifically, actor-specific-theorising is positioned to further 
understanding of aid policy change because it: lends itself to generating explanations that 
integrate levels of analysis; incorporates human agency and thus can account for change; and 
generates explanations that aim for completeness rather than parsimony. Each of these 
strengths directly addresses limitations inherent in the existing frameworks offered by the 
determinants of aid literature. I now move to explicating these benefits in turn.   
4.1.2 The Benefits of Actor-specific Theorising 
Actor-specific theory Integrates across levels of analysis 
In chapter 2, I showed how the determinants of aid literature favours frameworks which each 
prejudice factors which originate from one level of analysis. Then, in the first section of chapter 
3, I argued that the scholarly research on aid has focused predominantly on understanding what 
impacts of discrete factors have on the shape of aid policy, rather than exploring the 
interrelationship between factors, especially between factors originating from different levels 
of analysis. Moreover, those studies that do have an integrative dimension have not ‘stepped 
down’ decisively into the first level of analysis and expressly incorporated first image factors.  
 
This reluctance has had crucial implications for the prospects of joining up the “discrete and 
disconnected pieces of the aid puzzle…” (Hook 1993, 44). As I highlighted in the previous 
chapter, Valerie Hudson (2007, 165) believes “the true promise” of FPA is “theoretical 
                                                          
124 For a detailed discussion of these benefits, see Hudson (V. M. Hudson 2005, 3–5). 
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integration: the integration of theory across… several levels to develop a more complete 
perspective on foreign policy decisionmaking”. The source of this promise is the actor-specific 
nature of FPA. States do not, and cannot, integrate variables “at many different levels of analysis 
in order to make a decision” (V. M. Hudson 2014, 204). Rather, humans do this. It is the mind of 
the individual decisionmaker that functions as the “locus of theoretical integration across levels 
of analysis” (V. M. Hudson 2002, 5). As described in the previous chapter, this logic underpins 
the Aid Policy Decisionmaking Framework.  
 
While actor-specific theory certainly begins with the human decisionmaker, it does not end 
there. In other words, to suggest engaging in actor-specific theorising is the same as a 
promulgating a ‘first image only’ model of reality is a false equivalency. Viewing the human mind 
as the point of theoretical intersection does not deny the existence or importance of domestic 
or international factors in influencing aid policy change. Rather, it promotes viewing the 
operation of these factors in a certain way. When ‘the state’ is assumed to be the unitary entity 
which integrates variables “at many different levels of analysis in order to make a decision” (V. 
M. Hudson 2014, 204), as in actor-general theory, the microfoundations of international 
relations typically become an afterthought at best. Actor-specific theory is more conducive to 
producing integrated explanations of complex phenomena than actor-general theory because it 
is easier begin ‘closer’ to reality before abstracting ‘up’ levels of analysis than it is to begin with 
an abstraction and then ‘working down’ towards reality.  
 
While Hudson is adamant that FPA scholars must strive for theoretical integration, she 
nonetheless recently conceded that “it remains a promise unfulfilled for the time being” (V. M. 
Hudson 2014, 204). Studies which set out to “to integrate theory in the sense of channelling 
both material and ideational factors through the human decisionmaker intersection”—as this 
thesis does—“are extremely rare” (V. M. Hudson 2005, 20). The most theoretically 
comprehensive of these rare studies is David Welch’s (2005) Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign 
Policy Change. Welch argues that once it is acknowledged that “[a]ll state behaviour is the 
product of human decisions”—the starting point originally recommended by Snyder Bruck and 
Sapin (2002, 59)—then the key task becomes discovering “whether there are any patterns in the 
way in which decision makers perform the basic tasks of processing information and making 
choices that can constitute explanations…” (Welch 2005, 23). 
 
Yet even comprehensive integrative efforts which do not rely on conceptualising the human 
decisionmaker as the “locus of theoretical integration across levels of analysis” (V. M. Hudson 
2002, 5) recognise the imperative of ‘bringing in’ actor-specific perspectives. For example, in 
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constructing an integrative framework designed to explain the Gulf War in 1991, Yetiv deploys 
multiple ‘perspectives’, which each offer “an alternative take on government behavior, 
emphasizing different levels of analysis and types of decision-making” (Yetiv 2011a, 251–52 
emphasis added). Alongside the perspectives offered by the Rational Actor Model, Domestic 
Politics, Groupthink and the Government Politics Model, Yetiv adds a Cognitive perspective 
which operates at the level of the human mind125.  
Actor-specific theory accounts for change 
In chapter 2, I argued that the existing frameworks offered by the determinants of aid literature 
to explain aid policy change are capable of explaining change only in a partial and incomplete 
manner. This limitation is also evident in the broader International Relations literature. As Alden 
and Aran (2017, 125) testify, we know little about the “sources and conditions that give rise to 
significant alteration to state foreign policy”. These authors also acknowledge that “the role of 
agency, usually embodied in an individual actor, is a common thread” in accounts which seek to 
examine the place of change in foreign policy (Alden and Aran 2017, 126).  
 
The inability of actor-general theory to explain change was brought home by the failure of the 
dominant International Relations theories to predict or explain the collapse of the Soviet Union 
(C. F. Hermann 1995). Interest in FPA and actor-specific theory was rejuvenated126 with this 
powerful demonstration of the reality that “it is impossible to explain or predict system change 
on the basis of system-level variables alone” (V. M. Hudson 2014, 32)127. Whereas actor-general 
theories assume states preferences as given, actor specific theory tells us where these 
preferences originate and why (Yetiv 2011a, 202). Unwilling to black box the human 
decisionmaker, the “methodological orientation” of FPA ensures it “delves into such agency-
oriented concepts as motivation emotion and problem representation” (V. M. Hudson 2005, 4). 
“If our IR theories contain no human beings” argues Hudson (2005, 3), “they will erroneously 
                                                          
125 In related work, Yetiv (2013:2) has shown, through investigation of five prominent decisonmaking episodes in U.S. 
history, how “cognitive biases were more influential in U.S. decision making and security than commonly believed or 
understood.”  
126 An important aspect of the post-Cold War rejuvenation of FPA was the conscious reappraisal of the comparative 
foreign policy (CFP) agenda. An important volume edited by Neack, Hay and Haney (1995) played an agenda-setting 
role in this reappraisal. The contributors to this volume had a dual goal; to build on the legacy established by the 
first generation of CFP scholars; and to “correct, extend or revise… earlier undertakings” (C. F. Hermann 1995, 250) 
in light of the inconsistencies that were manifest during the second generation. According to Hermann (1995, 250–
51), the new generation of CFP-ers rejected their forebears ascent to: the hegemony of positivism, realism, general 
or grand theory and parsimony. On the other hand, they sought to retain the longstanding CFP commitment to 
contextuality, middle-range theories, bridging to other fields and, most importantly, multilevel, multicausal 
explanations.  
127 Similarly, Hermann (1995, 246) observes that “as scholars reflect on the end of the cold war, they increasingly 
recognize that international relations theories must introduce domestic considerations from within nations.”  
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paint for us a world of no change, no creativity, no persuasion, no accountability.” Actor-specific 
theory can explain change because it centres on the only entities that truly possess agency128.   
Actor-specific theory prioritises explanation over parsimony 
Actor-specific theory is a distinctly different style of theorising to actor-general theory (V. M. 
Hudson 2014, 204). Actor-specific theory is at the same time less ambitious in explanatory scope 
and more ambitions in explanatory depth than actor-general theory. Precisely because it seeks 
to account for the “contributions of human beings” (V. M. Hudson 2005, 4), actor-specific theory 
yields explanations of state behaviour that are “fuller and more satisfying”. As a result, actor-
specific theory is more contingent and therefore less parsimonious.  
 
In pointing out these differences, it is not my intention to disparage actor-general theorising. 
My aim is to emphasise that the distinctive approach of actor-specific theory provides utility that 
is at odds with prevailing views of what constitutes more valuable theorising, views which tend 
to be informed by the primary of actor-general theorising in the discipline. In any case, the truth 
is that actor-specific and actor-general theory are not only complementary but also inextricably 
connected. Hudson’s (V. M. Hudson 2005, 21) key argument in her influential 2005 article is that 
actor-specific theory “provides the theoretical micro-foundations upon which actor-general IR 
theory may be grounded as a social science enterprise.” Hudson’s point is that we need to 
understand and articulate prevailing actor-specific dynamics (the theoretical micro-foundations) 
in specific domains in order to be confident that abstracting to the level of the state is a valid 
move in that particular domain.  
 
The theory advanced in the thesis was developed with reference to the circumscribed domain 
of aid policy (explicitly conceived as a subset of a state’s foreign policy, as explained in chapter 
1). The theory was developed to bring order and understanding to the within-case and cross-
case variations I observed in studying recent instances of aid policy change in Australia, the UK 
and the Netherlands. While the proximate goal was to explain the theoretical microfoundations 
of strategic-level aid policy decisionmaking, this does not preclude the theory from having both 
predictive potential and application beyond aid, to other low salience foreign policy issues. (I 
discuss these possibilities further in chapter 9). The more immediate task I now move to 
undertake, however, is to discuss the process of building an actor-specific theory of aid policy 
change.  
                                                          
128 “Only human beings can be true agents”, claims Hudson (2005, 2–3) “and it is their agency that is the source of all 
international politics and all change therein.”  
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4.1.3 The Process of Actor-specific Theorising 
As should be clear from chapter 3, I did not specify the explanatory mechanisms of decider 
salience and aid salience shocks ex ante. Rather, the theory of aid policy change I present in 
detail in section 4.3 of this chapter was developed via an inductive process. The building and 
refinement of the explanatory mechanisms at the heart of my theory of aid policy changed 
emerged from “inductively from close study” of the cases (Bennett and Checkel 2015a, Loc 413). 
As I “immerse[d] [my]self in the in the details of the case[s]” (Bennett and Checkel 2015a, Loc 
527), I searched “for all kinds of information about the temporal unfolding of the causal-process 
[in order to] present a comprehensive storyline” (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 30, emphasis 
added) of aid policy change. As Welch (2005, 23) counsels, I needed to determine if there were 
“any patterns in the way in which decisionmakers perform the basic tasks of processing 
information and making choices that can constitute explanations…” of aid policy change. 
 
As I grappled with how to craft analytical narratives129 about aid policy change, I began to 
appreciate the explanatory utility of examining aid policy change through the ‘agenda lens’ 
(Green-Pedersen and Walgrave 2014b). The appreciation of this ‘pattern’ of decisionmaker 
behaviour grew over time, beginning with my becoming acquainted with the concept of issue 
salience, initially via the work of Kai Oppermann130. This led me to engage more broadly with 
the agenda-setting literature, notably the work of John Kingdon (1995) and frequent 
collaborators Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones (1991, 1993).  
 
The agenda-setting literature provided the conceptual infrastructure on which to build the 
explanatory mechanisms that underpin the theory of aid policy change this thesis advances. 
Mechanisms-based explanations of complex phenomenon are becoming increasing popular, 
especially for qualitative scholars (George and Bennett 2005, 135; Bennett 2013; Bennett and 
Checkel 2015b; Checkel 2016). Part of the attraction of “theorising in terms of mechanisms”, 
argues Checkel (2016, 3), is that it “gives us more determinate, empirically accurate pictures of 
the social world.”  
 
I adhere to the definition of ‘causal mechanisms’ advanced by Bennett (2013, 466): 
“‘ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes through 
which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or 
conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities,’ 
                                                          
129 This term is taken from George and Bennett (2005, 211), who describe ‘analytical explanation’ as a distinct type 
of process tracing which seeks to convert “historical narrative into an analytical causal explanation couched in 
explicit theoretical forms.”  
130 In particular, Oppermann (2010), Oppermann and Viehrig (2011b), Oppermann and De Vries (2011) and 
Opperman and Spencer (2013). 
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thereby changing the latter entities’ ‘characteristics, capacities, or 
propensities in ways that persist until subsequent causal mechanisms act 
upon it’.”131 
Notice how this definition captures how mechanisms-based explanation aligns closely with the 
research priorities I have been discussing. Mechanisms-based explanations: apply within 
circumscribed domains (“in specific contexts or conditions”); are actor-specific (“agents with 
causal capacities”); and they prioritise explanation rather than parsimony132.  
 
Beyond these characteristics, Bennett (2013, 461) highlights “two key functional roles” that 
mechanisms play. First, mechanisms “provide a framework for cumulative theoretical progress”. 
Second, mechanisms constitute “a useful, vivid, and structured vocabulary for communicating 
findings to fellow scholars, students, political actors, and the public.” This second role is 
especially relevant for my purposes. A key claim of this thesis is that scholars, policymakers and 
activists have had trouble understanding why aid policy changes because they have been looking 
in the wrong places. The vivid nature of mechanisms provides a powerful way of communicating 
the essence of an alternative conception of how aid policy dynamics function.   
 
The twin mechanisms underpinning my theory of aid policy change are devices that trace “levels 
of attention to issues within government over time” (Baumgartner, Green-Pedersen, and Jones 
2006b, 959). While employing such an approach is unique in the scholarship on aid, it is common 
in the agenda-setting literature. Green-Pedersen and Walgrave (2014b, 2) relate how the core 
of the policy-agenda tradition “consists of case studies showing that an understanding of agenda 
dynamics is crucial for understanding how and why decisions are made”. In the sense that this 
thesis examines agenda dynamics in the aid policy subsystem, it represents a contribution to the 
study of policy agendas.  
 
The agenda-setting literature is heavily focused on domestic policy. The role of political attention 
in influencing foreign policy has been relatively ignored. According to Wood and Peake (1998, 
181), this is “undoubtedly because foreign policy is fundamentally different from domestic policy 
and requires a different rationale for explaining the rise and fall of issue attention.” This thesis 
goes a step further, and distinguishes what it is that makes aid policy dynamics different than 
foreign policy dynamics more broadly. While this idea is not groundbreaking—“the idea that 
agenda setting and leadership dynamics differ across issues is an old one” (J. S. Peake 2016, 
318)—the implications of this reality have not been have not explored in the realm of aid policy.  
                                                          
131 This block quote contains numerous inverted commas because Bennett creates this definition in part by relying 
on previous work undertaken with Alexander George (George and Bennett 2005, 137).  
132 “[O]ne of the main costs of focusing IR theorizing on causal mechanisms”, acknowledges Bennett (2013, 467) is 
“a loss of parsimony.” 
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In the upcoming section (section 4.2), I explain how I selectively bring to bear some of key 
concepts and ideas from the agenda-setting literature in order to comprehend aid policy 
decisionmaking dynamics. Although it would have been possible, and likely illuminating, to 
frame my explanation of aid policy change around existing frameworks this literature offers, I 
have resisted doing so. (That said, in the comparative analysis at chapter 8, I discuss further how 
concepts already briefly mentioned, including policy entrepreneurship, policy gatekeepers and 
veto players relate to and partially overlap with the concepts I advance). Most clearly, I could 
have employed John W. Kingdon’s (1995) ‘multiple streams approach’, outlined in his classic 
Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, first published in 1984. Kingdon models how three 
categories of independent variables, which he terms the problem stream, the policy stream and 
the politics stream, come together at critical junctures to produce “windows of opportunity” for 
agenda setting133 . His approach has been widely adopted to understand agenda-setting in 
comparative policy analysis. In the thirty years since its emergence, it has been used to examine 
over 300 cases (Béland and Howlett 2016, 223), including aid policy (Travis and Zahariadis 2002). 
The fact that scholars continue to grapple with the framework testifies to its ongoing relevance 
(Béland and Howlett 2016). 
 
There is considerable crossover with Kingdon’s approach in the theory I propose. For example, 
Kingdon’s identification of the role of policy entrepreneurs, “who are willing to invest their 
resources in pushing their pet proposals or problems” resonates closely with my explanation of 
decider salience134. That said, there are important distinctions between the theory I propose and 
Kingdon’s multiple streams approach. Most significantly, my conceptualisation of aid 
policymaking operates from the inside-out. That is, I see change as being initiated by an 
individual decisionmaker after which domestic and international constraints mediate the 
ongoing change process. Kingdon views change as occurring via more of an outside-in 
perspective, whereby domestic and international constraints align at times to create opportune 
occasions for actors to exercise agency. Furthermore, my analysis of the issue area 
characteristics of aid (section 4.4) suggest that the realm of aid policy decisionmaking is rarely 
impacted by what Kingdon refers to as the ‘problem stream’—which relates to how the public 
senses government action is required to solve a policy problem. Instead, I argue that the low 
salience of aid means that the public does not pay attention to aid and, consequently, neither 
do political actors. (Note that I make a defence of these claims, which are controversial, later in 
                                                          
133 For a recent summary of this Kingdon’s multiple streams approach and its impact, see Béland and Howlett 
(2016). 
134 This highlights how I could have also chosen to frame my empirical material around the concepts of ‘norm 
entrepreneurs’ or ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Mintrom and Norman 2009).  
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the chapter, at section 4.4.1). Before mounting this argument, however, it is first necessary to 
relate how the politics of attention influences the political agenda and, in turn, drives policy 
change. It is this subject to which I now turn.  
 
§§§ 
 
 
4.2 The Politics of Attention: The Political Agenda and Policy Change  
“[P]olitical attention is scarce, and it is consequential,” claim Green-Pedersen and Walgrave 
(2014a, 6). This section of the chapter is dedicated to explaining the implications of these 
realities for understanding the aid policy change process. Accomplishing this task requires 
engaging with the agenda setting literature. However, what follows is not a comprehensive 
review of this vast multi-disciplinary literature. My intention here is much more limited: to 
unpack the key concepts I appropriated from the agenda setting literature in order to build the 
mechanisms I created in order to explain aid policy change. I begin this section by introducing 
the concept of issue salience. The discussion then moves to examine the centrality of the 
political agenda for driving policy change (subsection 4.2.2) before considering how individual 
actors may be able to shape the political agenda (subsection 4.2.3). 
4.2.1 Issue Salience Explained 
The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) records that something described as salient is “prominent 
[and] conspicuous” and stands out in consciousness. This general definition has taken on a more 
technical meaning in the International Relations literature, where issue salience, according to 
Oppermann and de Vries (2011, 3), refers to “the relative importance or significance and 
importance that an actor ascribes to a given issue on the political agenda”. This definition raises 
two additional ideas that are pivotal to the current discussion. In this thesis, I define the political 
agenda as the list of issues to which political actors, and people closely associated with them, 
devote their attention135.  
 
Issue salience is fundamentally an expression of the availability heuristic, the cognitive process 
(or mental shortcut) which describes how all human beings are prone to behaving with reference 
                                                          
135 This definition is an amalgam of the definitions advanced by Kingdon (1995, 3) and Green-Pedersen and 
Walgrave (2014b, 1). 
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to the information most readily accessible in their mind (Oppermann 2010, 4). As Oppermann 
(2010, 4) explains, “actors will concentrate their cognitive capacity primarily on issues which are 
amongst their uppermost concerns, i.e. which they consider most salient”. Constrained by the 
inescapable limitations on both their time and attention, humans are forced to pay more 
attention to some issues than others.  
 
Each actor, therefore, can be conceived as maintaining a personal salience profile which reflects 
the unique way that they personally order the importance of various issues. An actor’s personal 
salience profile will constantly evolve over time, with some issues becoming more salient as 
others become less so. The adjustments in this profile are always relative, “since the attention 
and resources that an actor devotes to an issue cannot be devoted again to another issue” (Hose 
2011, Loc. 5639). “Salience is by definition”, explains Oppermann (2014, 27) “a relational 
concept”, meaning that “[a] specific... issue can only be classified as a high-salience issue relative 
to another issue”.  
 
Scholars rarely pay attention to individual salience profiles. This is because the preferences of 
one individual typically have a negligible impact on political decisionmaking. Usually, far more 
explanatory purchase is achieved by assessing how cumulative preferences influence 
decisionmaking. Three such aggregations of ‘priority issues’ are especially important: the 
political agenda (the list of issues that political actors within a society collectively pay attention 
to); the media agenda (the list of issues that media actors within a society collectively pay 
attention to); and the public agenda (the list of issues that voters within a society collectively 
pay attention to) (Lelieveldt and Princen 2011, 208).  
 
The concept of issue salience really only becomes analytically useful when the crucial ‘salience 
for whom’ question is answered (Oppermann and Viehrig 2011a). In line with the threefold 
delineation above, international relations scholars have typically examined issue salience from 
the perspective of the public, intermediary actors (especially the media but also political 
parties), or political elites (Oppermann and Viehrig 2011a)136. The method of measuring issue 
salience varies according to which of these perspectives is adopted. Opinion polling is the most 
common way to assess which issues the public considers to be important, typically by asking 
respondents to identify the ‘most important problem’ facing their nation (Wlezien 2005). For 
providing insight into which issues the media, political parties, and bureaucracies consider 
important, content analysis generally proves more useful (e.g. Van Belle 2003). Finally, elite 
                                                          
136 Oppermann and Viehrig’s (2011b) edited volume, Issue salience in international politics, is structured in three 
sections to reflect these dominant conceptual lenses. 
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surveys are often used to understand the issues resonate most for political elites. Such surveys 
can target parliamentarians (Jäger et al. 2009, 2011) or the foreign policy elite (Riecke 2011).  
 
Although I did not initially conceive of it in these terms, the process of reconstructing aid policy 
decisionmaking episodes functioned as an indirect way of observing the issue salience of aid for 
the political actors involved in the process. Reconstructing the decisionmaking episodes allowed 
me to observe “the actions of elite actors to infer the salience of different issues to them” 
(Oppermann and Viehrig 2011a, Loc 6534). I was able to infer the salience of aid issues to key 
political actors in a variety of ways, including by observing: the amount of time political actors 
and their key staff members devoted to aid-related issues and the extent to which these 
individuals engaged with the policy detail of an aid policy output; the amount of political capital 
powerful political decisionmakers were willing to expend to ensure the aid policy output bore 
their imprint; how eager the political actors involved were to publicise the aid policy output; the 
degree to which the political actors involved were required to get ‘sign off’ from the Prime 
Minister, party hierarchy or cabinet colleagues; and the degree of media interest in the 
decisionmaking process. In short, reconstructing aid policy decisionmaking episodes facilitated 
making an assessment of how prominent aid was in the minds of key political actors 
(Oppermann and Spencer 2013, 41).  
 
The collective message conveyed by these inferences—that aid is a low salience issue amongst 
the political elite—was strongly supported by the testimony of participants and observers, many 
of whom, without prompting, sought to contextualise these episodes for me by alerting me to 
the relatively low position that aid issues typically occupied in the political hierarchy. What was 
impressed on me was that many of the participants and observers close to the aid policy making 
process were keenly aware that that they were working within an issue area characterised by its 
low issue salience. They took it for granted that the attention of powerful political actors was 
rarely focused on aid policy issues.  
4.2.2 Political Attention is Scarce 
Politicians cannot pay attention to everything. “[F]aced with a multitude of competing issues 
and demands”, explain Bevan and Jennings (2014, 41), “policy makers must decide which issues 
are most urgent and important to them, prioritising some of them for their attention”. A key 
way political actors decide how to direct their extremely scarce personal time and attention is 
to focus on those issues which the public deems important. In other words, a political actor’s 
personal agenda will be shaped by the public agenda.  
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In a democracy, we expect the priorities of parliamentarians to be congruent with that of their 
representatives (Schoen 2011, Loc. 859; Bevan and Jennings 2014, 39). As Martin et al (2014, 
500) explain, the “general idea of democratic representativeness is that there should be a strong 
correspondence” between “the policy agenda (issues being attended to by government) and a 
public agenda (issues the public thinks are important).” Furthermore, the link between the policy 
agenda and the public agenda is more pronounced for more salient issues. Oppermann (2010, 
5) confirms that “numerous studies have shown that policy outcomes are more consistent with 
public preferences in cases of high issue salience than in cases of low issue salience.”  
 
If we can assume that “the government acts on the issues deemed most salient by the public” 
(Martin et al. 2014, 516), we can likewise assume the inverse; that there is little pressure for 
governments–and the political actors that comprise them—to act on issues that are not salient 
to the public (Oppermann and Viehrig 2009, 925). In low salience issue areas, “governments are 
relatively free to conduct their policies regardless of public opinion” (Oppermann and Viehrig 
2009, 925). Such policy are extremely unlikely to be highly scrutinised by the public or the media; 
“few, if any, people are expected to respond to policy change” (Franklin and Wlezien 1997, 350). 
The upshot of this is that there is considerable ‘scope for agency’ available to a political 
decisionmaker with the inclination and capacity to inject themselves into decisionmaking 
dynamics in low salience domains (J. S. Peake 2001, 72, 80).  
 
However, while the freedom of action possible in low issue domains may attract political actors 
who seek to ‘make a difference’, there are strong incentives at play that mean elected officials 
generally eschew such opportunities. The scarcity of political attention governs these incentive 
structures. For politicians to stay in office, they must be able to demonstrate, to enough voters, 
that they are representing their interests. They must direct their attention to what the public 
views as important. In fact, political actors “employ their view on which issues are most salient 
to their domestic constituents as a heuristic in deciding what information to attend to and which 
issues to treat as a priority” (Oppermann and Spencer 2013, 40). The tendency for political actors 
to pay most of their attention to high salience issues becomes self-reinforcing, especially in 
terms of knowledge acquisition 137 . Furthermore, a decisionmaker stands to wield more 
                                                          
137 Hugh White, who is now a Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University but who previously 
worked as a senior adviser to former Australian Defence Minister Kim Beazley and former Australian Prime Minister 
Bob Hawke, explained to me how he observed politicians—including those he worked with—becoming familiar with 
intricate details of highly salience domestic policy issues, such as how to reduce hospital waiting times, because 
such matters were the predominant concerns raised in communications received from constituents in each 
politicians electorate. Parliamentarians and their staffers are obliged to pay attention to matters that resonate with 
their constituents and therefore build an in-depth understanding of them. On the other hand, the knowledge-
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‘influence’ (in the narrowly defined political sense of the term) when they pay attention to an 
issues which attract more attention (Jäger et al. 2011, 5130). 
 
A political decisionmaker involving themselves in a low salience policy issue is not, by definition, 
engaging in what the public will broadly consider to be meaningful action. “In issue domains that 
are not salient”, affirm Franklin and Wlezien (1997, 350), “people are not likely to pay attention 
to politicians’ behaviour.” While investing a degree of their limited time and attention on a low 
salience issue may afford a political actor the opportunity to effect significant change, this 
investment has considerable downside. Alongside direct costs to their electoral prospects—
paying attention to low salience issues by definition means there is less time less to invest in the 
high salience issues that the public pay attention to—political actors jeorpardise their prospects 
for promotion by diverting attention away from areas their colleagues, the public and the media 
consider important. There is a reason why political actors generally ‘make their name’ by 
demonstrating their competence in managing a large, highly visible, domestic portfolios 
concerned with the economy, health and education. In contrast, “matters that fail to capture 
the voters’ attention”, observes Chapnick (2012, sec. 5971);  
“tend to be managed by a combination of idealists (who are willing to forsake 
professional advancement to pursue an issue that resonates personally) and 
(more commonly) also rans (politicians who for whatever reason, are unlikely 
to achieve significant power within government).”  
4.2.3 Political Attention is Consequential 
It matters a great deal where political actors choose to direct their limited supply of time and 
attention. It is likely to be especially consequential when an issue that is typically absent from 
the minds of political actors, suddenly moves to being at the forefront of their minds. Once this 
theoretical ‘attention threshold’ is exceeded, the incentive structures facing political actors 
would transform, triggering different behaviour and activating the potential for significant policy 
change, if only for a time. Such moments are then likely to become critical junctures, setting in 
place a policy trajectory that proves difficult to adjust (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; Mahoney 
2000; Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2009; Pierson 2000). 
 
The idea of behavioural thresholds has proven useful for scholars in a range of disciplines, 
including International Relations. In his seminal paper on behavioural thresholds, the sociologist 
Mark Granovetter (1978, 1422) acknowledges adapting the idea from Thomas Schelling, who is 
                                                          
building process for lower salience policy issues, such as defence and international affairs portfolios White advised 
Beazley and Hawke on, had to be much more self-directed.  
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perhaps best known for his work concerning nuclear strategy (Ayson 2004). Granovetter (1978, 
1422) defines the threshold in his conceptual model as being “that point where the perceived 
benefits to an individual of doing the thing in question... exceed the perceived costs”. His core 
idea in is that, once this threshold is exceeded, the incentive structure for participants to become 
involved in a social phenomenon (to join a riot, in Granovetter’s paper) is fundamentally 
altered 138 . More recently, Malcolm Gladwell (2000) popularised the threshold concept by 
adapting it for a more general audience in his book The Tipping Point139. As per Granovetter’s 
work, the tipping point for Gladwell is that point at which social behaviour changes because of 
a dramatic change in the incentive structure for the actors involved. 
 
The agenda-setting literature sees the tipping point, or ‘behavioural threshold’, as occurring 
when an issue reaches the political agenda. As Baumgartner, Green-Pedersen and Jones (2006b, 
959) relate, an “increase in attention to an issue by government signal the likelihood of serious 
policy change.” We have seen that the political agenda predominantly reflects the priorities of 
the public (Martin et al. 2014, 516). Changes in the political agenda are therefore most likely to 
be caused by changes in the public agenda. In other words, the political agenda is principally 
shaped via a bottom up process.  
 
Just because the public primarily shapes the political agenda does not mean that individual 
political actors are precluded from exerting influence over the political agenda. The preferences 
of political actors do influence issue prioritisation (Green-Pedersen and Walgrave 2014b, 7), 
shaping the political agenda via a top-down process. Political actors can make “conscious efforts 
to give higher priority to some issues rather than others” (B. D. Wood and Peake 1998, 174), 
thereby altering the “economy of attention”. These efforts can trigger a tipping point, whereby 
the degree of attention paid to an issue is sufficient to see it reach the political agenda. Once 
this attention threshold is exceeded, the decision dynamics are altered. The potential for policy 
change is drastically heightened. As Opperman (2010, 7) attests, “[f]oreign policy decision-
making can be expected to follow an entirely different path in high-salience environments than 
in low-salience environments”.  
 
Political actors can attempt to initiate policy change, therefore, by making a conscious effort to 
prioritise a particular issue in order to get it on the political agenda. However, as discussed in 
                                                          
138 Granovetter uses the illustration of ‘riot thresholds’ because it is a “convenient and colourful” way of conveying 
this concept, but explicitly considers his analysis as being much more widely applicable, including other “binary 
choice situations” in the political realm (Granovetter 1978, 1423).  
139 Gladwell fused insights from epidemiology with Granovetter’s concepts when collating a series of stories that 
demonstrated how ‘social epidemics’, such as iconic fashion trends were spawned when a critical juncture, or 
tipping point, was reached. 
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the previous part of the chapter, there are significant costs imposed on a political actor who 
focusses their limited attention on a low salience issue. How might this trade-off be approached 
in practice? Or, more specifically, what would it take to prompt a powerful political actor—
especially a highly-capable and ambitious one—to devote their attention to a low salience issue 
area such as aid?  
 
Two possible reasons present themselves. First, an individual decisionmaker might be motivated 
to engage in a low-salience issue area because they are sufficiently personally motivated to 
enact policy change in that area. Not only does such an actor need to possess a personal salience 
profile markedly different to the public (and their political colleagues), they must also have, and 
be willing to spend, the political capital required to devote a portion of their limited attention 
to the issue. A second reason a political actor might choose to engage in low-salience policy 
issues is opportunism. When an issue area has low salience, it becomes more vulnerable to being 
co-opted and deployed as a positioning or signalling device. Precisely because a certain issue 
area or policy proposal has low salience, politicians will feel more comfortable to ‘play politics’ 
with it because the cost of doing so is relatively limited (Pijovic 2016).  
 
This section of the chapter has been concerned with explaining how the agenda-setting 
literature provides insight into policy change. Yet it should not be overlooked that instances of 
policy change are outliers. Most policies, most of the time, are characterised by policy stability. 
Political systems “drift incrementally most of the time”, argue Baumgartner, Green-Pedersen 
and Jones (2006b, 959). A strong status quo bias exists, whereby the incentives to make small, 
incremental changes usually outweigh the incentives to institute decisive change. Baumgarnter 
and Jones’ (1993) model of punctuated equilibrium explains the tendency for ‘policy 
subsystems’ to evolve incrementally. This model holds that the status quo bias is interrupted 
only when “[certain] policies come to the forefront and major political actors begin discussing 
them; at these times policies can change very rapidly” (Baumgartner, Green-Pedersen, and 
Jones 2006b, 962). Importantly, for our purposes here, the status quo bias operates in the 
foreign policy subsystem140.   
 
I now turn to presenting a theory of aid policy change built to explain instances of rapid and 
substantial aid policy change. The theory is premised on the key ideas presented in the first two 
sections of the chapter. The theory is actor-specific. It integrates across levels of analysis. It 
                                                          
140 For example, Matt McDonald (2013b, 177–78) has shown how, in the Australia context, the “prominence of 
[foreign policy issues] on the national agenda… can largely be characterized by continuity rather than change.”  
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entails a mechanisms-based explanation of complex phenomenon and it encapsulates the idea 
that the potential for policy change is activated when aid issues reach the political agenda. 
 
§§§ 
 
 
4.3 An Actor-Specific Theory of Aid Policy Change  
This section of the chapter presents an actor-specific theory of aid policy change. This theory 
constitutes my response to the thesis question: why do states change the trajectory of their aid 
policy? The two interrelated mechanisms that comprise the theory—decider salience and aid 
salience shocks—convey that states change the trajectory of their aid policy when powerful 
political actors pay sustained attention to aid policy issues.  
 
In the opening subsection, I explain the theory of aid policy change in as straightforward manner 
as possible. This explanation has been designed in such a way so it can stand alone as the 
decisive statement of the theory (as presently developed). As highlighted earlier, subsection 
4.3.1 functions as the ‘nucleus’ of the thesis. After presenting the theory, I elaborate on the two 
types of aid salience shocks in turn, highlighting the ways in which they propel aid policy change 
in diverse ways. Figure 4.A below—an expanded version of Figure 1.A presented in chapter 1 —
visually depicts the material presented in this section, serving both as a useful roadmap for the 
discussion ahead and a reference point to return to if required. 
Figure 4.A: Aid Salience Shocks as Pathways to Aid Policy Change 
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4.3.1 The Theory Explained  
Aid issues have low salience and therefore are typically absent from the political agenda. For a 
range of reasons that I describe in more detail in the concluding section of this chapter (section 
4.4) aid issues are rarely at the forefront of the minds of political actors. However, on those 
occasions when aid issues do reach the political agenda, I argue that they pass through the 
‘bottleneck of attention’ via a top down process driven by decider salience. Decider salience 
refers to the degree to which an individual political actor considers an issue to be personally 
important and hence worth dedicating serious and sustained attention to. If an aid issue is 
sufficiently personally important to a political actor—that is, it aid issues exceed that actor’s 
personal salience threshold—they will endeavour to put aid on the political agenda. If this effort 
is successful, with aid reaching the political agenda and staying on it for a sustained period, other 
political actors will be obliged to pay attention to aid. Suddenly the degree of attention aid issues 
receives shifts from the usual baseline level. An aid salience shock results.  
 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines a ‘shock’ as “a disturbance in the equilibrium or 
permanence of something” (Merriam-Webster 2003). An aid salience shock describes a 
prolonged disturbance in the usual degree of attention paid to aid issues by powerful political 
actors. Aid salience shocks are akin to economic shocks, which are substantial deviations from 
an economy’s long-term trajectory. Formally I define an aid salience shock as an instance of an 
aid policy issue reaching the political agenda and staying on it for a sustained period of time. It 
follows, therefore, that during aid salience shocks, political actors pay more attention to aid than 
is usually the case. Heightened attention is afforded to aid issues until policy change is achieved 
or until the individual political actor (or actors) responsible for triggering the aid salience shock 
loses their ability to influence the political agenda, or their desire to do so. The ‘rules of the 
game’ shaping aid policy decisionmaking dynamics (explicated in detail in section 4.4), can only 
be superseded for a certain period before a return to the low-salience status quo. In time, the 
salience afforded to aid issues by political actors will inevitably revert to that afforded it by the 
public. The period of time a given aid salience shock lasts varies. As per economic shocks, an aid 
salience shock may deliver its transformational effects over a relatively short timeframe of a 
year or so, or, in some cases, over a prolonged period of up to a decade. 
 
Once initiated, an aid salience shock acts as a force that ‘pushes’ the trajectory of aid policy in a 
particular direction. Just like physical forces, aid salience shocks are vectors; they have a 
magnitude and a direction. Additionally, more than one aid salience shock can be operating at 
any given time— there might be more than one reason why aid is on the political agenda at a 
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given point. In these circumstances, the ‘forces’ generated by each aid salience shock may either 
reinforce or counteract each other, depending on the intensity and direction of each. 
 
By conceptualising and aid salience shock as a force, it becomes possible to identify the range 
of factors that resist or reinforce the momentum for policy change and the degree to which they 
do so, regardless of the level of analysis such factors originate from. In other words, tracing the 
path of an aid salience shock as it ‘travels through’ an aid policy subsystem over time highlights 
the factors which act to impede or assist aid policy change. In this sense, aid salience shocks 
function as the conceptual equivalent of tracer dye used in medical diagnoses. While not a 
constituent part of the system being investigated, aid salience shocks, like tracer dyes, 
nonetheless illuminate how that system is functioning.  
 
Together, the explanatory mechanisms of decider salience and aid salience shocks constitute an 
actor-specific, middle range theory of aid policy change. The theory is actor-specific in that it 
clearly views individual political actors as decisive in initiating aid policy change, as well as 
sustaining the momentum for change. As I have explained, decider salience encapsulates the 
view that aid issues reach and stay on the political agenda via the agency of a powerful political 
actors. However, it is vital to recognise that just because the theory is actor-specific does not 
mean it discounts the role of structure. Nor, as I have already pointed out, does it ignore the 
policy shaping influence of non-first image factors.   
 
The explanatory mechanisms complement each other by focusing on distinct aspects of the 
change process. Decider salience captures how and why the aid policy change process is initiated 
and sustained. On the other hand, an aid salience shock conceptualises how, once initiated, the 
momentum for change flows through the aid policy subsystem. Although I concede that fully 
unknotting the agency-structure entanglement is ultimately impossible, it is helpful to view the 
explanatory focus of decider salience as falling on agency, while the explanatory focus of aid 
salience shocks is on structure (see Table 4.A, below). While the agency of powerful actors 
primarily determines how aid issues reach and stay on the political agenda, domestic and 
international factors primarily determine the nature and extent of the policy change that results. 
In this way, the theory of aid policy change responds to the emerging view that many of the 
puzzles on the scholarly agenda “demand answers that combine social and institutional 
structure and context with individual agency and decision-making” (Bennett and Checkel 
2015b).  
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The theory of aid policy change presented here encapsulates the idea that states change the 
trajectory of their aid policy when powerful political actors pay attention to aid issues. Yet 
earlier, in subsection 4.2.2 of this chapter, I explained how strong incentives are at work 
preventing political actors from dedicating significant portions of their time and attention to low 
salience issues. Ahead, in the concluding section of this chapter (section 4.4), I describe in more 
detail the reasons why actors are incentivised to ignore aid issues. The immediate task I now 
turn to, however, is to resolve the tension between what might appear to be inconsistent claims: 
that aid policy change occurs when powerful political actors pay attention to aid issues; and that 
political actors have little incentive to prioritise aid issues. When do both of these conditions 
hold? Or, in other words, what leads a political actor to actively choose to put aid issues on the 
political agenda despite the strong disincentives for them to apportion their limited attention in 
this way?  
Table 4.A: The Complementary Explanatory Roles of Decider Salience and Aid Salience Shocks 
 
My research shows that powerful political actors pay sustained attention to aid issues for one 
of two reasons: either they maintain a personal interest in aid issues, and seek to change aid 
policy in accordance with this interest; or they identify aid policy as a politically useful proxy to 
demonstrate or signal their position on a more salient political issue or position. Aid issues 
exceed the threshold level of decider salience when an individual actor seeks to effect policy 
change for direct or indirect reasons. This allows for a classification of types of aid salience 
shocks by initiating actor motivation (see Table 4.B below).   
 
Direct (Type I) salience shocks occur when the initiating political actor’s primary motivation is to 
attempt to change aid policy directly, in accordance with their views. In contrast, indirect (Type 
II) aid salience shocks occur when the initiating political actor’s primary motivation is to use aid 
policy change as a means for achieving another political end. The approach to aid policy change 
adopted by the initiating actors in each of these cases is fundamentally different. A political actor 
initiating direct aid salience shocks asks ‘what can I do for aid?’ On the other hand, a political 
 Decider Salience Aid Salience Shock 
Definition 
The degree to which a political actor is 
personally motivated to devote serious and 
sustained attention to an issue. 
An instance of an aid policy issue 
reaching the political agenda for a 
sustained period 
Conceptual Focus Describes how aid issues reach, and stay on, the political agenda. 
Describes the passage of aid policy 
change once aid issues are on the 
political agenda, revealing which factors 
impede or enable change. 
Explanatory Focus How individual agency prompts and sustains the momentum for policy change 
How structure (social, institutional, and 
international) shapes policy change 
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actor initiating an indirect aid salience shocks asks “what can aid do for me (and my political 
cause)?” As might be expected, the ways political actors behave to effect policy change are 
different in each of these cases. Below, I elaborate on these differences as I describe the 
functioning of each type of aid salience shock in turn. 
Table 4.B: Two Types of Aid Salience Shocks 
4.3.2 Direct (Type I) Aid Salience Shocks  
I explained earlier how governments (and the political actors that comprise them) are 
incentivised to align their policy agenda with public preferences. As policymakers are 
constrained in the number of issues they can address in office (Dellis 2009, 204), there is reduced 
political motivation to act on issues that not salient to the public (Oppermann and Viehrig 2009, 
925), such as aid. Yet in many cases, individuals enter politics precisely because they desire to 
effect change in policy areas of special interest or relevance to them personally141. For this 
reason, the impact of personal motivation to act on issues that are not salient to the public 
should not be discounted.  
 
When the personal salience profiles of political actors give high priority to aid issues, these actors 
will seek opportunities to exercise agency in this policy arena. Yet just because a political 
decisionmaker is motivated to pay personal attention to aid issues does not automatically imply 
                                                          
141 It is also possible, of course, for politicians to become passionate about a particularly policy issue once elected.   
 Direct Aid Salience Shocks Indirect Aid Salience Shocks 
Classification Type I Type II 
Why initiating 
political actor/s seeks 
to put aid policy on 
political agenda 
Initiating actor is personally 
motivated to change aid policy in a 
certain direction. 
Initiating actor sees an opportunity to 
politicise aid policy. 
Posture of initiating 
political actor/s “What can I do for aid?” 
“What can aid do for me (and my political 
cause)?” 
Key means of 
influencing desired 
policy change 
Direct intervention in the aid policy 
decisionmaking process, either to 
initiate policy action or protect 
existing policy choices. 
Framing of agenda to position aid policy as a 
proxy for another more salient political policy 
or position. 
Preconditions for 
action 
A powerful political decisiomaker/s 
has the inclination and opportunity 
to intervene in aid policy 
decisionmaking to further an aid-
related policy agenda. 
When taking a position on aid policy issue 
represents a relatively low-cost way for 
initiating actor to position themselves/their 
party in a politically beneficial way in relation 
to a more salient political issue or position. 
Argument 
Page 113 
they will be capable of triggering an aid salience shock142. So, while a decisionmaker’s personal 
motivation to prioritise aid issues is a necessary condition for the formation of a direct aid 
salience shock, it is not a sufficient condition. To trigger a Type I salience shock, a political 
decisionmaker must combine their interest in aid issues with sufficient authority and or 
influence to shape the political agenda.  
 
In practice, only a handful of political players enjoy the degree of discretionary agency required 
to single-handedly place a low salience issue on the political agenda and keep it there over a 
sustained period. Likewise, only senior figures typically possess the authority to inject 
themselves (either formally or informally) into decisionmaking episodes concerning issues areas 
outside their direct responsibility, especially when these decisions are budgetary in nature143. 
Two of the three direct aid salience shocks documented in this thesis (refer Table 4.C below) 
were a consequence of the direct and ongoing discretionary agency of an Opposition Leader 
who became Prime Minister (Kevin Rudd in the case of SS1 and David Cameron in the case of 
SS3). In the remaining case (SS2), the strong support of Prime Minister Tony Blair and Chancellor 
Gordon Brown was pivotal to Clare Short’s aid policy shifting success.  
 
To further their respective goals, I found that key actors engage in aid policy decisiomaking in 
two distinct ways during direct aid salience spikes: to initiate policy reforms and to protect the 
policy reforms they initiated. By initiating aid policy reforms, powerful political actors can ‘lock 
in’ policy path dependencies that help secure aid policy trajectories that align with their personal 
visions. For example, Kevin Rudd, while Opposition Leader, committed the Labor Party to 
expanding Australia’s aid spending to 0.5% of GNI by 2015. David Cameron, upon becoming 
Opposition Leader in the UK, initiated a policy review process which saw aid become a priority 
issue and later committed to matching Labor’s 0.7% commitment. And Clare Short initiated a 
pair of White Papers which helped established DfID as a powerful, policy-oriented agency in 
Whitehall with a poverty reduction focus.  
 
Powerful political actors also work to secure aid policy reforms by protecting the reforms they 
initiated. Kevin Rudd exercised his authority to influence budget allocation processes in order to 
                                                          
142  Breuning (2013) has demonstrated, using the example of former Belgian State Secretary for Development 
Cooperation, Reginald Moreels, that it is very possible that, despite their best efforts, leaders who are passionate 
about reforming aid policy can be prevented from doing so by circumstances outside their control. Their scope of 
action can be limited by the ‘bureaucratic web’ they operate within and their domestic audience (Breuning 2013, 311) 
amongst other factors.   
143 The ‘discretionary agency’ a political decisionmaker possesses becomes even more important when the desired 
policy change involves shifts in expenditure, as major budgetary decisions require approval via party or cabinet 
processes, such as the Expenditure Review Committee (ERC) in Australia or the Public Expenditure (PEX) Committee 
in the UK. 
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keep his ‘0.5% project’ intact. Similarly, David Cameron single-handedly faced down extreme 
pressure within his own party to back down on the decision to ring-fence aid spending on at last 
two occasions. Short, on the other hand, was confident in engaging in repeated bureaucratic 
turf wars with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) because she knew she could rely on 
the support of Blair and Brown. Finally, while no such example was documented in this thesis, it 
is theoretically possible for direct aid salience shocks to lead to decreases in aid spending, should 
that be the prime motivator for a powerful individual actor to pay attention to aid policy. 
Table 4.C: Summary of Direct Aid Salience Shocks  
 SS1 SS2 SS3 
Country Australia UK UK 
Name Rudd aid salience shock Short aid salience shock Cameron-Mitchell aid salience shock 
Key Political 
Decisionmaker/s 
(position/s) 
Kevin Rudd 
(Opposition Leader, Prime 
Minister, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs 
Clare Short 
(Secretary of State for 
International 
Development) 
David Cameron 
(Opposition Leader, Prime 
Minister) 
Andrew Mitchell 
(Shadow/Secretary of State 
for International 
Development) 
Supporting Political 
Decisionmaker/s 
(position/s) 
Bob McMullen 
(Parliamentary Secretary 
for International 
Development Assistance) 
Tony Blair 
(Prime Minister) 
Gordon Brown 
(Chancellor of the 
Exchequer) 
George Osborne 
(Shadow Chancellor / 
Chancellor of the 
Exchequer) 
Aid Policy Objective Increase aid spending to 0.5% 
Establish DFID as powerful 
agency focussed on 
poverty reduction. 
Increase aid spending. 
Increase aid spending to 
0.7% 
Impact on Aid 
Spending Increase Increase Increase 
Duration 2006-2012 1997-2003 2006-2013 
4.3.3 Indirect (Type II) Aid Salience Shocks  
The key difference between direct and indirect aid salience shocks is the motivation of the 
initiating actor. Whereas a direct aid salience shock emerges because a powerful political actor 
cares deeply enough about an aid policy preference to try and effect change, an indirect aid 
salience shock is motivated primarily by political opportunism. In the case of an indirect aid 
salience shock, aid issues gain the attention of a powerful political actor when they recognise 
the potential to politicise an aid policy issue to convey a wider message.  
 
As Mintz and DeRouen (2010, 149) acknowledge, political actors have a degree of control over 
the “manner in which an issue is presented’. By actively framing how the public views, engages 
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with, or understands aid issues, political actors can “affect how the public views a particular 
situation” (Mintz and DeRouen Jr. 2010, 149). According to Entman (1993, 52), to frame is to 
“select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating 
text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.”  
 
During an indirect aid salience spike, aid policy change proceeds via a process I call salience 
attachment: an aid policy issue becomes increasingly intertwined with, or symbolically linked 
to, another more salient issue over time as a result of framing by political actors144. As this 
process salience attachment proceeds, aid gradually ‘takes on’—or ‘acquires’—the salience of 
the more salient issue to which it has become politically linked. In effect, political actors ‘send a 
message’ indirectly, using a position on aid as a signifier or indicator of their perspective or 
position on another issue. Once mature, the salience attachment process leads to an aid issue 
effectively ‘standing in’ for another issue or position. By this point, an aid issue often takes on a 
symbolic or totemic role in a public debate or political context: “[t]he frame operates as a lens 
through which the public looks at and examines the situation” (Mintz and DeRouen Jr. 2010, 
150). As Table 4.D below summarises, in the four indirect aid salience shocks uncovered during 
this research, aid issues were co-opted, or actively politicised, to convey a variety of messages.  
 
Before concluding this section, a final clarification is in order. The seven total instances of aid 
salience shocks highlighted earlier in Table 4.C and below in Table 4.D, may inadvertently 
suggest aid policy issues are almost permanently on the political agenda. This is far from the 
case in reality, for reasons I elaborate on in the forthcoming section (section 4.4). What an aid 
salience shock is designed to capture is relative changes in the degree of attention paid by 
political decisionmakers to aid issues. Precisely because aid issues occupy virtually none of the 
attention of political actors virtually all of the time (excluding whose ministerial remit includes 
aid policy), any small movement above this very low threshold of attention is significant. The 
level of attention a powerful political actor pays to aid issues during an aid salience shock, 
therefore, is not intended to be compared against any other issue area. That is, the ‘shock’ in 
salience experienced during an aid salience shock is relative to the level of attention typically 
paid to aid policy, and not calibrated against any other policy area. Even during an aid salience 
shock, then, the overall level of attention paid to aid policy by the key framers or actors, as a 
                                                          
144 Tracing political salience shocks is not as straightforward as tracing personal salience shocks. This is largely because 
the individuals who function as the progenitors and sustainers of the former are not as readily identifiable as the 
later. Moreover, the salience attachment process occurs over considerable time and is often only evident once it is 
mature, whereas the salience superseding process triggering personal salience shocks is relatively easily observed. It 
is not always clear who is framing aid for political purposes and how and why they are doing it.  
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proportion of their overall ‘attention capacity’, remains very small. (To couch this in language 
introduced earlier in subsection 4.2.3, the ‘attention salience threshold’ for aid issues is very 
low).  
Table 4.D: Summary of Indirect Aid Salience Shocks  
 
The key to an aid salience shock and its capacity to generate policy change is not only that an 
aid policy issue repeatedly gains attention from powerful decisonmakers over a sustained period 
of time but that is does so for the same reason. The fact that relatively small shifts in the 
attention of powerful political actors can trigger the policy change is itself a testament to the 
low salience of aid and the very low baseline of attention this policy issue typically receives. The 
shifts in the attention to aid policy issues captured by an aid salience shock will typically go 
unnoticed by the public and the media. And they will also often go unnoticed to many people 
working in government. Explaining why aid issues have such low salience is the subject to which 
we turn in the concluding section of this chapter.     
 
§§§ 
 
 
 SS4 SS5 SS6 SS7 
Country Australia Australia UK The Netherlands 
Name of 
indirect salience 
shock 
Budget deficit aid 
salience shock 
Liberal Party 
factionalism aid 
salience shock 
‘Tory 
modernisation’ aid 
salience shock 
‘Elite hobby’ aid 
salience shock 
How aid was 
framed / what 
it symbolised 
Cuts to aid 
spending 
demonstrated the 
Coalition was 
serious about 
‘fixing’ the budget 
deficit. 
Aid policy functioned 
as an ideological 
wedge between the 
Liberal party’s 
dominant factions. 
0.7% commitment 
demonstrated that 
the Conservative 
Party had 
modernised. It was 
no longer the ‘nasty 
party’. 
The commitment to 
spending 0.7% of GNI 
on ODA is an ‘elite 
hobby’ of an outward-
looking cultural and 
political elite 
More salient 
issue/s to which 
aid became 
attached 
Economic 
management 
Party Leadership / 
Approach to Deficit 
Reduction 
Trust / Political 
Identity 
Immigration / 
European integration 
Key Framers / 
actors 
(position) 
Tony Abbott 
(Prime Minister) 
Joe Hockey 
(Treasurer) 
Tony Abbott 
(Liberal Party Leader) 
Julie Bishop 
(Deputy Liberal Party 
Leader) 
David Cameron 
(Opposition Leader 
/ Prime Minister) 
Geert Wilders 
(Leader of the PVV) 
Impact on Aid 
Spending Decrease Decrease Increase Decrease 
Duration 2013-2014 ≈2011-2014 2006-2013 ≈2008 – 2012 
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4.4 The Characteristics of the Aid Policy Issue Area 
This section documents the permissive conditions that allow for the operation of the theory I 
have just described. By explicitly cataloguing the ‘issue area properties’ of aid policy, I build on 
the scholarship of Lundsgaarde (2013, 22)—the scholar who has done the made the most 
important contribution to systematically explaining the “characteristics of the aid issue area” 
(2013, 21)145. Like Lundsgaarde, I consider aid policy making to “display[s] a set of dynamics that 
distinguishes this issue area from other domestic and foreign policy problems…” (Lundsgaarde 
2013, 6)146.  
 
While numerous scholars have acknowledged that aid policy decisionmaking is characterised by 
the low salience of aid (Lundsgaarde 2013, 23–24; Wlezien 1995, 984; Moravcsik 2004, 360), I 
go further by contending that aid policy exhibits “a politics unto itself” (Lundsgaarde 2013, 6) 
primarily because of its low salience to political actors147. This reality singularly defines the ‘rules 
of the game’ for aid policymaking, as they relate to the involvement of political actors (see Figure 
4.B below). Rather than representing inviolable conditions, these rules should be viewed as 
‘rules of thumb’ which can reasonably be assumed to hold most of the time. 
 
In essence, this concluding section of the chapter justifies the fundamental assumption that 
underpins my theory of aid policy change. I argue that political actors devote very little attention 
to aid policy primarily because aid issues have low issue Salience (subsection 4.4.1) but also 
because aid policy is complicated (subsection 4.4.2) and there are no aid policy ‘crises’ 
(subsection 4.4.3).  
 
                                                          
145 This quotation is the title of a subheading of a section in Chapter Two of Lundsgaarde’s book The Domestic Politics 
of Foreign Aid (Lundsgaarde 2013, 21–24), a section which has heavily influenced my thinking about aid as an issue 
area. Lundsgaarde (2013, 22) draws explicitly Theodore Lowi’s (1964) work “on the relevance of issue area 
characteristics in the study of politics” in building a framework to capture the determinants of donor aid choices. 
Lundsgaarde (2013, 22) has also best articulated why delineating issue area properties is so important for aid-focused 
research engaging in comparative foreign policy analysis: “Attention to issue area properties can be useful in 
comparative foreign policy analysis in understanding convergence in policy outputs in different national settings, as 
cross-national commonalities can be understood to reflect the underlying properties of the issue. At the same time, 
taking the characteristics of the issue area as a starting point in comparisons of foreign policy choices can also ground 
explanation for cross-national policy divergence because specifying the nature of the issue area highlights similarities 
in the locus of policymaking and the types of actors involved across countries”. 
146 Otter (2003, 124) is another scholar who considers aid policy as “a unique area of public policy formulation.” 
147 Although Lundsgaarde pays considerable attention to the low salience of aid (2013, 23–24), his appraisal of aid as 
an issue area leads him to hone in examining how the impact of interest group politics and bureaucratic involvement 
shape aid policy choices. At least in part, this reflects a methodological choice to focus on understanding and 
explaining why major shifts in aid policy trajectories occur and doing so with a framework that views the individual 
decisionmaker as the locus of theoretical integration (refer Chapter Two). In contrast, Lundsgaarde (2013) and 
Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi (2015), to take two prominent examples, are more interested in explaining aid policy 
change over longer periods of time and more granular levels of policy formation. 
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Figure 4.B: Rules of the Game: Aid policy Decisionmaking Dynamics at the Strategic Level 
i. Political actors and the public usually pay negligible attention to aid policy issues. 
ii. Political actors and the public have a poor understanding of aid policy issues.  
iii. Aid policy is conducted ‘under the radar’ by elites with heavy involvement from the 
bureaucracy and the development constituency. 
iv. Incremental change typically marks aid policy, with a strong adherence to the ‘status quo’ 
bias. While a state’s aid policy is constantly evolving, abrupt changes in the trajectory of aid 
policy at the strategic level are rare.  
v. Aid policy decisionmaking does not regularly feature the active involvement of the state’s 
most powerful political actors. 
vi. For powerful political actors who are personally interested in aid issues, there exists a 
considerable scope for agency. 
4.4.1 Aid Issues have Low Issue Salience148 
The overwhelming majority of the voting public demonstrate a distinct lack of interest in, and 
understanding of, international affairs (Hill 2003, 262–63). This disinterest and lack of 
understanding is even more pronounced when it comes to aid policy. Quite simply, aid is not an 
important political issue (McLean and McMillan 2009). For reasons outlined in more detail in 
section one, because aid issues are not salient for voters, they are not prioritised by political 
actors (Martin et al. 2014, 516). McKeown argues that when U.S. President’s involve themselves 
with issues of aid spending, it is an example of micromanagement—in other words, “concern 
with administrative questions that would ordinarily be seen as much too unimportant to merit 
presidential attention” (McKeown 2005, 325). In a comment specifically relating to Canada but 
broadly applicable across Western democracies, Adam Chapnick (2012, Loc. 5975) 
acknowledges that “there is little incentive for today’s party leaders to spend significant time 
thinking about—or developing strategy to promote—effective outcomes in international 
development assistance”. The reason, in Chapnick’s (2012, Loc. 5993) reckoning, is directly 
related to the low salience of aid: “it is rare that a prime minister will strive to effect radical 
change in an area that does not produce votes”.   
 
While well established in the scholarly literature, the claim that aid issues are not salient for the 
voting public is one that demands substantiation, not least because aid advocates and 
campaigners often vigorously reject it. Typically, aid proponents will point to opinion polls 
recording high levels of absolute support for the provision of aid in Western countries as 
evidence that voters see aid as important. Indeed, in a their recent survey of the public opinion 
and aid literature, Hudson and vanHeerde-Hudson (2012b, 9) found that that absolute support 
                                                          
148 Parts of this section are drawn from Day (2016). 
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amongst voters in rich, Western countries for the provision of aid averages around 70%. And 
recent polling from Australia149, the Netherlands150 and the UK151 (albeit to a lesser extent) all 
show that the public supports the provision of development assistance.  
 
It is a mistake, however, to assume “that high levels of articulated support readily translate into 
political support…” (D. Hudson and vanHeerde-Hudson 2012b, 10, emphasis in the original). The 
reason absolute support for aid does not translate into political support for aid, according to 
Hudson and vanHeerde-Hudson (2012b, 10), stems from “a lack of salience amongst competing 
policy issues”. In other words, support for aid should not be conflated with the salience of aid 
(D. Hudson and vanHeerde-Hudson 2012b, 9). Lindstrom and Henson (2010, 4) agree, 
summarising that “[p]eople generally agree with helping the poor in development countires in 
principle, but their support for aid spending tends to be less robust, while being easily deflected 
by accusations of wastage and corruption.”   
 
Polls that ask respondents to identify the most important problem (or issue) are typically viewed 
as the best way for determining issue salience for the public (Oppermann 2010, 6; Wlezien 2005, 
556). In polls that specifically seek to capture the relative importance of issues to voters, aid 
issues do not register152. One explanation for this may be that the public just do not make sure 
fine-grained distinctions between foreign policy and aid policy153. In any case, what is clear is 
that aid issues are less salient than most other foreign policy issues, which have low salience to 
begin with (Lundsgaarde 2013, 46; D. Hudson and vanHeerde-Hudson 2012b, 10; Gyngell and 
Wesley 2007, 160).  
 
                                                          
149 In their recently published survey of omnibus Australian public opinion polls conducted between 2011 and 2015, 
Burkot and Wood (2015, 8) show that respondents consistently register a high level of general support for foreign aid 
(even though the public also registers their simultaneously strong support for cutting the aid budget). 
150 For summaries of Dutch support for development aid, see Spitz, Muskens, and van Ewijk (2013, 25–31) and 
Kamphof, Spitz, and Boonstoppel (2015, 33–41). A poll from 2011 revealed that 64% of respondents thought 
development cooperation was ‘very important’, as opposed to less than 10% who considered it ‘very unimportant’ 
(Spitz, Muskens, and van Ewijk 2013, 28). More recent polling has also found development cooperation is supported 
by around two-thirds of the Dutch public (Kamphof, Spitz, and Boonstoppel 2015, 33). 
151  The picture that emerges from the UK is somewhat more confusing the in Australia and the Netherlands, 
demonstrating the extent to which the precise rendering of survey questions determine definitions of ‘support’ in 
Australia and the UK (Rentoul 2015). While polling in 2010 suggested a growing number of voters (around 70%) 
thought aid should be cut to address the deficit (Lindstrom and Henson 2011, 2). However, a 2013 Eurobarometer 
poll found that 67% of people in the UK said that “we should keep (54%) or increase (13%) our promise to increase 
aid to development countries” (Rentoul 2015). Useful overviews of UK public opinion and aid include Glennie, Straw 
and Wild (2012) and Lindstrom and Henson (2011).  
152 During my research, I did not come across a single ‘most important issue’ issue where aid or development policy 
registered on the listed results.  
153 For example, in research requiring them to delineate ‘policy agenda codes’, Martin et al (2014, 503) chose to 
“collapse Defence and International Affairs and Foreign Aid into one category because we do not believe that the 
public makes such fine distinctions”. 
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How can the apparent discrepancy between the high levels of public support for aid found in 
polling and the low salience of aid be explained? A key finding from Hudson and vanHeerde-
Hudson’s survey is that much opinion polling on aid on aid suffers from measurement validity; 
that is, many polls fail to “measure the concepts they intend to” (2012b, 6). A particularly 
difficult problem for opinion polling to overcome is the public’s “extremely high degree of 
ignorance about what [aid] does” (Riddell 2007, 111)154. One manifestation of this ignorance is 
that most people equate official aid with humanitarian aid. This means that, when asked for 
their views on their government’s ‘aid’ program, many survey respondents likely have in mind 
what might better be termed ‘humanitarian aid’, when in fact this accounts for a relatively small 
proportion of aid budgets. Another manifestation of the public’s lack of knowledge of 
government aid programs relates to the public’s vastly inflated perceptions about the size of aid 
budgets, a phenomenon that crosses political jurisdictions (Riddell 2007, 111)155. These results 
suggest that it is very difficult to take at face value polls which seek to ask the public whether 
they would like to see the aid budget expanded or decreased156.  
 
A striking finding from my interview research was the degree to which participants and 
observers of the aid policy decisionmaking episodes I examined understood that they were 
working in an issue area characterised by low salience. “There are no votes in aid”, was a phrase 
I heard repeatedly, along with Ian Smillie’s maxim that public support for aid is “a mile wide and 
an inch deep” (quoted in D. Hudson and vanHeerde-Hudson 2012b, 5). Invariably, those 
individuals who I found to have the most sophisticated understanding of the politics of the aid 
issue area in a particular jurisdiction were the most aware of the constraints imposed (and 
opportunities created) by the low salience of aid and the incentive structure this invariably 
created; they understood the peripheral place of development policy in the political ecosystem 
and acted accordingly157.  
 
                                                          
154 Likewise, Hudson and VanHeerde-Hudson (2012b, 16) report that “[o]ne of the more robust findings from survey 
research is that the public possesses very little knowledge of development aid programmes.” See also Riddell (2007, 
Chapter 7) for an overview of public support for aid, including an account of the shallow understanding the public has 
of aid issues. 
155 Understanding of aid policy is limited in Australia, the Netherlands and the UK (Lindstrom and Henson 2011, 17). 
156 Burkot and Wood (2015, 8) acknowledge that “[o]ne of the clearest findings [of their survey of Australian public 
opinion on aid] is that Australians’ knowledge about the size of Australian ODA is limited”. See also Day (2014a) and 
Rentoul (2015). 
157 A key example was the way a series of senior former-AusAID executives related to me how the creation of an 
institutional culture of ‘going under the radar’ was a deliberately cultivated. They knew that if the organisation did 
something to gain the attention of senior political decisionmakers, there was a risk funding would be cut or the 
organisation would be dissolved. So the organisation embraced incremental change, understanding it would likely 
survive so long as political decisionmakers paid it relatively little attention.  
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The few political actors who were actively involved in aid policy decisionmaking were likewise 
cognisant of the marginal political status of aid issues158. For example, one senior political figure 
who was partly responsible for promoting their party’s development policies during a recent 
election agreed readily agreed with me when I suggested that aid had very low salience and 
would never figure as an influential election issue. While foreign policy issues do occasionally 
decide elections, I am not aware of an aid policy issue that has had a considerable influence on 
an election159. It is no surprise, therefore, that the aid policy positions are generally less well-
developed than the foreign policy positions or political parties in their election manifestos. For 
example, Robin Davies, a former senior AusAID official now working as an academic, prefaced 
his analysis on aid policy in the 2013 Australia election with the comment that “aid and 
development barely figure in federal election campaigns”, with party offerings tending to be 
“skeletal” and “vague” (R. Davies 2013b, 1).  
 
The low public and political interest in aid policy means aid policy decisionmaking proceeds 
without much scrutiny. Media attention is minimal. The consequence of the low engagement of 
the public, political parties, political actors and the media is that the bureaucracy and interest 
groups have the space to take on more importance in decisionmaking (Lundsgaarde 2013, 
24)160. While “political leaders can be expected to make the greatest efforts at minimizing the 
discretion of their bureaucratic agents on those issues which are at the top of their political 
agenda” (Oppermann 2010, 15), the opposite is the case for low salience issues. For low salience 
issues, insiders with specialised knowledge take on greater importance, notably the bureaucracy 
and the development constituency. 
                                                          
158 The behaviour of politicians also serves to intrinsically reveal the low salience of aid issues. I found a pattern of 
behaviour among politicians who were appointed to the cabinet-level position of Secretary of State for International 
Development in the UK Government to be particularly instructive in this regard, especially considering this is the 
probably the most prominent aid-related political executive position in the world. Clare Short is widely regarded as 
“probably the best secretary of state for overseas development [Britain] has had” (Sands 2004, 52), and is, according 
to Morrissey (2002, 23), “the single most important reason that DFID has become the organisation it now is.” Yet in 
her memoirs, Short admitted to being “stunned and angry” when then-Opposition Leader Tony Blair moved her from 
the Shadow Transport portfolio to Overseas Development in a pre-election cabinet reshuffle (Short 2005, 49). Only 
after talking the matter over with her staff did Short firmly decide not to resign after realising the move could prove 
an opportunity. It is also revealing of aid’s lack of political clout that the press reported Short’s change of role as a 
demotion. “She must know that politically she is in a cul-de-sac, far removed from the core concerns of a Labour 
government-in-waiting” reported The Observer (Barber 1997). Remarkably, fifteen years after Short was moved from 
Transport to Development, Justine Greening experienced the same transition. Greening’s reaction was similar to 
Short’s. Greening had served as Secretary for Transport in Cameron’s Coalition Government before being appointed 
Secretary for Development in Cameron’s 2012 reshuffle. Greening saw the move as a demotion and was reported to 
have told Cameron she didn’t come into politics to “distribute money to people in poor countries” (While Greening 
and other officials deny she said this, this rumour has persisted). Andrew Mitchell, who Greening replaced as 
Development Secretary, was passionate about the international development portfolio. Nonetheless, he sought, and 
was granted, a promotion to Chief Whip. 
159 Gyngell and Wesley (2007, 160) find that “the weight of public opinion research conducted on international affairs 
bears witness to the low relative priority attached to external affairs by the vast majority of the public, other than 
during significant foreign policy crises”.  
160 Key aid policy decisionmaking studies, including Lundsgaarde (2013), Lancaster (2007a) and Lightfoot and Szent-
Iványi (2015) have borne this out. See also Otter (2003, 116). 
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4.4.2 Aid policy is complicated 
Aid policy is complicated and requires specialised knowledge. Acquiring specialised knowledge 
takes time and commitment. “Most politicians spend much time looking over their shoulders to 
their domestic base,” observes Hill (2003, 56), “and do not wish to ‘waste’ time on cultivating 
foreign contacts from which there might be little return.” Likewise, politicians rarely wish to 
waste time on cultivating foreign policy expertise. Those relatively rare politicians do seek to 
become experts in international affairs on their own accord, perhaps motivated by personal 
interest or a moral imperative, immediately face another disincentive to their prospective 
investment: the “the international environment still presents a long and steep learning-curve 
for any politicians wishing to feel at home in it” (Hill 2003, 56). In short, the complexity of aid 
policy forms a ‘barrier to entry’ that represents another disincentive for political actors to invest 
their scarce time and attention in this issue area. Highlighting three particular dimensions of 
aid’s complexity reinforces this point. 
Understanding Aid Policy Requires Specialised Knowledge  
Christopher Hill (2003, 262) highlights how the distinction between mass and elite opinion 
becomes important if a policy issue “is remote from everyday life and... cannot even be 
conceptualized without specialized knowledge”. As the earlier discussion on public opinion and 
aid highlighted, the general public is incapable of accurately conceptualising their state’s aid 
program and its size. Non-specialists cannot conceptualise how aid programs are built, with 
funding spread across channels including multilateral development banks, UN agencies, NGOs, 
country programs and regional programs, and with each channel having a subtly different 
purpose and demanding considerably different operational and management requirements.  
 
Engaging in aid policy issues, even more than other policy areas, requires becoming familiar with 
a degree of specialised technical language. As Lundsgaarde (2013, 24) points out, the “low 
salience [of aid]... gives legislators fewer incentives to invest time specializing in questions 
related to aid policy”. While political actors readily acquire knowledge on those policy matters 
of direct import to their constituents, such as health, education and economics, there are few 
opportunities to acquire specialised aid policy knowledge outside of an aid-related appointment. 
An example illustrating the potential implications of this involves Stephen Smith, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in the first Rudd Government. Smith was appointed as Minister for Foreign Affairs 
with little prior knowledge of the aid program (he had been widely expected to be appointed to 
the Education portfolio). While acknowledged as a committed and highly competent Minister, 
Smith quickly became frustrated with the ‘aid-speak’ that littered his briefings. From the point 
of view of several senior AusAID staff at the time, Stephen Smith and AusAID never developed 
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an effective working relationship, in part because Smith found the briefings he received 
impenetrable161. 
Aid Policy Encompasses Many Objectives Simultaneously  
“Aid policy is puzzling, “explains van der Veen (2011, 2), “because it is not obvious ex ante what 
the goal of official development assistance ought to be: aid can serve goals from security (e.g. 
fighting terrorism), to financial gain (promoting exports), to humanitarianism.” For van der Veen 
(2011, 2), the ability of aid policy to pursue multiple (and often competing) objectives, 
simultaneously, makes it the the foreign policy version of a Swiss army knife: a multi-purpose 
tool of foreign policy. This multiplicity of potential purposes and applications distinguishes aid 
policy as an issue area. 
 
Precisely because “aid programmes can handle whatever policy-makers put their minds to” (van 
der Veen 2011, 2) it becomes extremely difficult for political actors, or indeed the public, to 
succinctly answer an apparently simple question: what is aid for?162 In contrast, the rationale for 
purchasing a submarine, whose basic purpose is clear, is relatively straightforward for the public 
to understand. Although the public cannot possible comprehend the complexity of the hardware 
itself, there is a base level understanding that the rationale for this investment is that it provides 
them with security. The ‘what is aid for?’ question is much more difficult to answer when it 
comes to aid, not only because aid spending is less tangible but because there are multiple, often 
conflicting, answers to the question.  
 
The multipurpose nature of aid portfolios can prove especially unnerving for political actors, 
who are generally rewarded for communicating to the public in clear, black and white terms, 
rather than shades of grey. As one long-term political journalist explained to me, a state’s 
motivation for spending on aid resists reduction to a bumper sticker slogan163. Any effort to do 
so invariably proves counterproductive: efforts which focus exclusively on highlighting the 
benefits the donor accrues from providing aid can appear callous and offend the sizeable 
constituency who believe aid should be provided  for purely altruistic reasons, whereas efforts 
to focus exclusively on the benefits that accrue to the aid recipient risk drawing criticism from 
those who argue that the state’s resources should prioritise assisting struggling individuals 
within the state.  
                                                          
161 It should be noted that the AusAID executives I spoke with also acknowledged the organisation was somewhat 
culpable in that they were not able to develop digestible briefings. 
162 Academics, too, continue to grapple with this question, as chapter 2 showed.  
163 Personal interview with Graeme Dobell, October 2015. 
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Aid Policy Straddles the Domestic and International Spheres.  
The familiar ‘charity begins at home’ argument arises from the fact that aid policy bridges the 
domestic-international divide in a unique way. Given that “[s]tates are responsible above all for 
the security and well-being of their own citizens”, asks Lancaster (2007a, 3), “why then would 
they provide their own scare public concessional resources to promote, among other things, the 
well-being of people in other countries?” This question penetrates to the core of why aid policy 
differs from other issue areas, including other realms of foreign policy. In Western states, aid 
programmes represent the most significant ongoing transfer of resources provided (at least in 
part) for the express benefit of the well-being on non-citizens. In doing so, aid policy uniquely 
straddles the domestic and international spheres, breaking the normal policy feedback loop. 
While foreign aid constitutes a form of redistributive policy (Lundsgaarde 2013, 22), it is different 
from other domestic redistributive policies in that the recipients of aid are, by definition, unable 
to vote. This not only contributes to challenges in evaluating aid spending, it alters the political 
calculus for the provision of aid.  
 
As Lundsgaarde (2013, 60–61) has argued, “[i]n contrast to the domestic redistributive 
programs, which provide compensation to voters or interest groups to secure electoral gain… 
aid directed toward poverty alleviation abroad benefits a diffuse foreign constituency that is 
unlikely to be able to directly bolster the political fortune of decision-makers in donor 
countries”164. Aspiring to be an aid policy decisionmaker offers a politician few direct electoral 
rewards. Involvement in defence policy, by way of comparison, has greater potential to realise 
electoral benefits, flowing either from the often significant defence force-related voters in 
particular electorates, via the awarding of large procurement contracts, or from basing 
decisions.    
 
The impacts realised by aid spending are indirect and intangible for domestic voters. The ‘results’ 
of aid are delivered a ‘long way from home’.  This reality reinforces the low issue salience of aid. 
“[P]eople are more likely to pay attention to issues that seem to have a more direct and 
(geographically or temporally) more proximate impact on their own lives,” explains Zahariadis  
(2016, 8). “The more direct and close the impact,” Zahariadis (2016, 8) adds, “the greater the 
attention the issue is likely to receive”.  
                                                          
164 Lancaster (2007a, 3) makes a similar point, albeit more bluntly: “States are responsible above all for the security 
and well-being of their own citizens. Why then would they provide their own scare public concessional resources to 
promote, among other things, the well-being of people in other countries?” 
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4.4.3 There Are No ‘Aid Crises’ 
Foreign policy matters are attended to by an ‘inner executive’, typically the Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister in collaboration with a handful of other trusted advisors (Hill 2003, 56; G. J. 
Evans and Grant 1991, 45–47)165. While leaders of political parties generally build their careers 
by demonstrating competency at managing domestic portfolios, once they become leaders they 
are obliged to pay attention to foreign policy, regardless of whether they have any interest or 
previous experience in international matters. Often Prime Ministers and other senior political 
figures take time to find their feed in the international realm, given the understandable lack of 
preparation after a political career typically focused on domestic concerns.  
 
The prominence of key executives in foreign policy decisionmaking is exaggerated in crisis 
situations, which are “invariably... handled at the highest levels of government power, and 
almost by definition top leaders will be involved regardless of their general level of interest in 
foreign affairs” (V. M. Hudson 2014, 40, emphasis added). When it comes to matters of high 
politics, a state’s leaders have an obligation to engage. Indeed, during foreign policy crises, their 
attention is often largely devoted to the issue for days at a time. Moreover, the public will often 
evaluate a leader’s performance based on the outcome of such an episode.   
 
In Walker’s study on agenda-setting in the U.S. Senate, he distinguishes between required and 
discretionary agenda items (Walker 1977, 425). Cohen also draws upon this helpful distinction, 
adding that for U.S. President’s, foreign affairs and the economy are required agenda items, 
whereas all others are discretionary (Cohen 1995, 91). These two issues are likewise required 
agenda items for heads of government elsewhere. Dealing with foreign affairs and the economy 
are non-negotiables. They are intrinsically the responsibility of leaders. What I am arguing here, 
however, is that aid policy is distinguished from foreign policy in that it much more dependent 
on executive discretion (Corbett 2017, 7). Leaders are not automatically obliged to pay attention 
to it. Rather, they choose to do so. And as a discretionary item, aid policy competes with other 
potential choices to reach the political agenda. As Cohen (1995, 91) says, “discretionary areas 
compete for the remainder of the agenda space”, once required agenda items have been 
addressed.   
 
Graham Allison’s groundbreaking study of the Cuban Missile Crisis reconstructed foreign policy 
decisionmaking processes during thirteen crucial days. My initial inspiration to recreate aid 
                                                          
165 “Foreign policy processes have... been distinguished from domestic policy processes”, relates Lundsgaarde (2013, 
21), “because of the prominence of executives in international statecraft and the deference of other domestic actors 
to executive dominance in this area”. 
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policy decisionmaking processes was partly an attempt to replicate Essence of Decision (Allison 
and Zelikow 1999), for aid decisionmaking. Yet it soon became very clear that the 
decisionmaking processes analysed by Allison were of an entirely different type than aid policy 
decisionmaking episodes. Quite simply, there is no equivalent to a foreign policy crisis in the aid 
policy realm. When it comes to aid policy decisionmaking, the viability of the donor state is never 
in question. Prime Ministers are not woken up in the middle of the night needing to make an 
urgent decision about whether to recalibrate aid spending. Ultimately, aid policy issues will 
remain a relatively low priority even for those politicians who are otherwise obliged to pay 
attention to foreign policy issues.  
 
The fact that aid policy does not invoke crises of the type which demand the focused attention 
of the inner executive of a government is a key reason why the FPA subdiscipline has largely 
ignored aid. FPA scholars gravitate to investigating decisionmaking in moments of crisis (Stern 
2003). “Crises tend to capture the attention of leaders and scholars alike”, observes Stern (2003, 
184)166. Aid policy decisionmaking does typically unfold in the way that foreign policy crises do 
and hence does not naturally lend itself to being examined using first image frameworks. The 
‘great men of history’ make their reputations by making (or avoiding) war, not in dispensing aid.  
 
It may bring more clarity here if I distinguish between aid crises (which I have argued do not 
exist) and what might be termed aid scandals (which do occur occasionally). Aid scandals, if they 
are serious enough, will certainly ‘get the attention’ of political leaders and may result in the can 
conceivably precipitate a political crisis where the political future of a government is 
jeopardised. However, aid scandals are best understood as domestic political issues within 
donor states which are typically fuelled predominantly by something related to the delivery or 
management of aid and not aid policy itself. In other words, the core driver of aid scandals is 
most likely to be issues such as corruption, broken promises, mismanagement or political 
infighting (as we will see in the examples of minor aid scandals discussed in chapter 5 at 
subsection 5.4.2). This is not to say such scandals cannot have impact on aid policy. Rather, the 
point is that aid is not an instrument of foreign policy that is immediately reached for when a 
                                                          
166 Numerous accounts exist, for example, of how the personality of leaders influence a states’ decision to go to war 
(for example, Bluth 2004; Renshon 2005; Dyson 2006; D. Mitchell and Massoud 2009). Likewise, studies of small 
group dynamics focus on similar topics with Janis’ (1972) Victims of Groupthink the quintessential example. This 
landmark book, which introduced the concept of Groupthink, featured a psychological study of the decisionmaking 
process which led to President Kennedy authorising the Bay of Pigs invasion, amongst a number of similar cases of 
foreign policy ‘fiascoes’ relating to: the decision to escalate the Korean War; the lack of US vigilance regarding Pearl 
Harbour; and the escalation of the Vietnam War. Such moments of crisis have typically provided the preferred 
empirical fodder for FPA scholars. 
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national security crisis emerges. This means aid is inevitably a discretionary agenda item for a 
state leader, rather than a required agenda item.   
 
§§§ 
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
One of the epigraphs commencing this chapter highlighted Charles Hermann’s (1990, 20) call for 
more to be done “to characterize the conditions that can produce decisions for dramatic 
redirection in foreign policy.” The theory of aid policy change presented in this chapter 
represents a contribution to this objective. The explanatory mechanisms of decider salience and 
aid salience shocks convey how dramatic redirections in aid policy result from a sustained 
increase in the attention powerful political actors pay to aid issues. In this sense, the theory is 
actor-centric: the agency of powerful political actors primarily determines how aid issues reach 
and stay on the political agenda, activities which create the potential for change. But at the same 
time, the explanatory mechanisms allow for the active incorporation of domestic and 
international factors, in the development of an explanation for aid policy change.  
 
To this point, I have conveyed the theory of aid policy change in largely theoretical terms. Having 
now reached the end of Part I, the thesis moves from having a theoretical focus to an empirical 
one. Having made the theoretical case for my theory of aid policy change, I now transition to 
demonstrate the theory’s plausibility empirically. The mechanisms of decider salience and aid 
salience shocks were constructed to bring order and simplicity to vast amounts of empirical 
material. They emerged out of an effort to make sense of the agenda dynamics evident during 
examples aid policy change. Most importantly for the objectives of this thesis, however, is that 
these explanatory mechanisms function as devices around which to tell the three stories of aid 
policy change presented in chapters 5, 6, and 7.  
 
§§§ 
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5 Explaining Aid Policy Change in 
Australia 
n the early 2000s, Australia’s spending on aid suddenly departed from its long-term trajectory. 
For thirty years, Australia’s ODA contributions had grown steadily but unremarkably, 
increasing by an average of just 1% per annum over this period. Yet beginning in 2003-04, 
Australia’s aid program dramatically expanded, with aid spending increasing by an average of 
7% a year over the next decade. During this period, Australia’s ODA increased by more than 80% 
in real terms, from $3 billion in 2003-04 to $5.5 billion in 2012-13167.   
 
This remarkable expansion of Australia’s aid budget was underpinned by a bipartisan 
commitment to expand Australia’s ODA to 0.5% of GNI by 2015-16, a commitment dubbed the 
‘golden consensus’ by long-term Canberra Press Gallery journalist Graeme Dobell (2010b). The 
golden consensus collapsed before the 0.5% target was achieved, however, with aid spending 
ultimately peaking at 0.34% of GNI in 2012-13. At this point, rather than recalibrating to rise at 
a more sustainable rate, plateauing, or even gently receding, Australia’s aid spending trajectory 
dived even more rapidly than it had ascended. By 2015-16—the very year of the 0.5% target was 
to be achieved, and only three years after the aid budget reached its historical peak—aid 
spending was back in line with where it was had the Golden Consensus expansion never 
happened (Howes 2015a). 
 
This chapter explains the rise and retreat of aid spending in Australia, with the objective of 
making sense of the prominent bulge in aid spending shown in Figure 5.A below. What triggered 
Australia’s aid spending ramp up? How was such a rapid expansion sustained for a decade? What 
caused the golden consensus to break down? And why was the dramatic aid expansion so rapidly 
reversed? These are the questions to which this chapter responds.  
 
The story this chapter tells unfolds in four ‘acts’. The first two sections document the influence 
of the Rudd aid salience shock in bending the path of Australia’s aid spending upwards from its 
historical trajectory. I show how Kevin Rudd’s repeated interventions into aid policy 
                                                          
167 All figures quoted in this chapter, unless otherwise indicated, are in 2016-17 Australian Dollars.  
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decisionmaking were decisive in driving Australia’s aid expansion over a long period. In February 
2012, however, this impetus was rapidly withdrawn when Rudd resigned as Foreign Minister. 
The findings presented over the first two sections of this chapter, in particular, dovetail with 
those published in Jack Corbett’s recently published history of AusAID (Corbett 2017, chapter 
5). Indeed, Corbett and I interviewed many of the same people at around the same time and he 
also concludes that “Rudd’s support for the aid program [was] the key to its growth, increase 
status and autonomy between 2007 and 2013” (Corbett 2017, 113) Nonetheless, Corbett’s 
account examines structural changes that occurred under the Rudd and Abbott governments 
(most notably the decision to abolish AusAID), while my account focuses on spending changes. 
In summary, of the ‘four S’s’ of strategy-level aid policy decisionmaking outlined in chapter 1, 
Corbett considers structure, while I consider size168.  
Figure 5.A: Australian Aid Spending, 1970-2017 ($m, 2015-16 prices)169 
 
Following my explanation of the dramatic aid expansion under Rudd (the 2nd era in Figure 5.A 
above), section three addresses why Australia’s spending trajectory made a u-turn after 2012-
13. Here I explain how the rapid reversal of Australia’s aid spending, more than merely being a 
result of the removal of the Rudd aid salience shock, is explained by the concurrent emergence 
of a countervailing ‘budget deficit’ aid salience shock. This salience shock exerted strong 
downward pressure on aid spending and was responsible for the series of cuts to aid made 
during the last half of the Gillard Government and the Abbott Government. Yet the ‘budget 
deficit’ aid salience shock alone, I argue in section four, cannot account for the extent and 
rapidity of Australia’s aid spending reversal. The Liberal Party Factionalism salience shock takes 
                                                          
168 Recently, a suite of articles have assessed change in Australia’s aid program from different perspectives (Day 
2016; Rosser 2016; Corbett and Dinnen 2016). Even more recently, Wood, Burkot and Howes (2017) compare the 
approaches taken in these articles. Corbett’s recent book and this thesis represent longer extensions to this nascent 
literature seeking to understand the reasons behind Australia’s recent aid policy changes.     
169 This figure is reproduced from Howes (2015a). Used with permission. See also Howes (2015c, 2015b). 
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effect once the Abbott Government comes to power and also exerts downward pressure on aid 
spending. It is the reinforcing effect of these two salience shocks lead to the rapid reduction in 
aid spending over the two years of the Abbott Government.  
 
§§§ 
 
 
5.1 Creating the Aid Expansion: The Rudd Aid Salience Shock 
 
[O]nce I’ve got a sense of mission that 
I’m doing the right thing for the right 
reasons, I don’t pull back.  
—Kevin Rudd170 
 
It was a personal project that he had. 
—James Batley  
 
Kevin Rudd was consumed with the mission of increasing aid spending to 0.5%. “It was a 
personal project that he had” offers James Batley, who was a Deputy Director-General at AusAID 
when Rudd was Foreign Minister171. “You could see it,” recalls Batley, referring to Rudd’s passion 
for aid. “He used to do these town hall meetings around Australia and talk about aid.”  
 
In this opening section of the Chapter, I argue that the Rudd aid salience shock provided the 
crucial impetus for the dramatic expansion of Australia’s aid spending. This salience shock 
represents the archetypal direct (type I) salience shock: for a decade, while occupying a series 
of senior political positions (see Table 5.A below), Rudd consistently and deliberately inserted 
himself into aid policy decisionmaking, driven by his personal belief that aid spending should 
increase to 0.5%. This section documents the ways in which Rudd personally supplied the 
initiative and ongoing momentum for aid policy change, focussing on the period up to and 
including the period of his first Prime Ministership (i.e. to mid-2010). In this section, I describing 
how Rudd took it on himself to act as chief aid advocate and aid’s political protector. Before 
                                                          
170 Rudd, quoted in Jackman (2008, 26) 
171 Personal Interview with James Batley, January 2016. 
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elaborating on how Rudd’s exercised his influence in undertaking these roles, however, it is 
important to understand why Rudd was motivated to do so.   
Table 5.A: Timeline of Kevin Rudd's Political Career 
TimeFrame Event / Role 
October 1998 Elected a Member of Parliament 
November 2001– December 2006 Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs 
December 2006 – December 2007 Opposition Leader 
December 2007 – June 2010 Prime Minister 
June 2010 – September 2010 Member of Parliament 
September 2010 – February 2012 Minister for Foreign Affairs 
22 February 2012 Resigns as Foreign Minister 
February 2012 – June 2013 Backbench Member of Parliament 
June 2013 – September 2013 Prime Minister 
7 September 2013 Defeated in the 2013 Australian federal election by Tony Abbott 
22 November 2013 Resigns from Parliament 
5.1.1 Rudd as ‘Aid Believer’    
The basis for Kevin Rudd’s sustained political action on aid was a genuine personal commitment 
to reducing poverty. This commitment was in turn derived from his Christian beliefs, which Rudd 
publicised surprisingly readily172. Allan Gyngell (2008, 5–6) has noted how Rudd’s “willingness to 
speak about the impact of his religious beliefs on his political views…” is something that is 
“uncommon in Australian political life.” Prior to  Rudd, the last “keen believer”, to lead a Labor 
Government was James Scullin, who became Prime Minister on the eve of the Great Depression 
in 1929 (D. Marr 2010, 56).  
 
Rudd has acknowledged how his “Christianity… shapes, as a belief system, my beliefs about the 
proper role which I play as an individual in society and the views which I hold about the proper 
allocation of the resources of society… “(Maddox 2001, 135). Rudd was especially candid about 
how his Christian beliefs underpinned his commitment to increasing aid spending (Gyngell 2008, 
6). For Rudd’s biographer David Marr (2010, 60), “Christ’s teaching on poverty is where [Rudd’s] 
politics and religion merge most comfortably”. In an influential essay in The Monthly, penned 
just months before becoming Opposition Leader, Rudd (2006) drew on the example of Dietrich 
Bonheoffer to determine “the proper relationship between Christianity and politics in the 
                                                          
172 For extended discussions on Rudd’s Christianity and his politics see Marr (2010, 56–67), Macklin (2008, Chapter 
17), Maddox (2001, 127, 135) and Warhurst (2008). 
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modern world”. On the basis that a core principle of Christian engagement is to “always take the 
side of the marginalised, the vulnerable and the oppressed”, a commitment to addressing global 
poverty was a crucial part of Rudd’s vision for Australia’s future. Rudd called out the “gaping 
silence in the national debate” in Australia on global poverty and imagined an Australia “that 
takes the lead on the Millennium Development Goals both in word and deed, and leads by 
example in dealing with the chronic poverty in our own region” (Rudd 2006).  
 
Rudd’s convictions on aid remained consistent. Almost four years after The Monthly essay, Rudd 
appeared at the Micah Challenge ‘Voices for Justice’ event. Now Prime Minister, he explained 
how his Christian beliefs underpinned his commitment to increasing aid spending to 0.5% of GNI 
(Rudd 2010a). The biblically-infused language and highly personal style of Rudd’s address was 
particularly conspicuous on this occasion because of how it compared to the conventional and 
far less passionate speech delivered at the same event by then-Opposition Leader Tony Abbott, 
who while well-known for his devout Catholicism, maintains a very different view of the role of 
faith in public life than Rudd173. Although Abbott affirmed the Coalition supported the 0.5% 
target at this event, a delegate in attendance recalled years later how pained and conflicted 
Abbott appeared in doing so174.  
 
There is no doubt that Rudd carefully cultivated the way he presented his personal beliefs in 
order to maximise his political advantage and to distinguish himself from his political 
opponents 175 . While unconventional, the manner in which Rudd related his faith publicly 
eventually became a political asset. According to Marr (2010, 58), the way Rudd “spoke and 
wrote about his faith” was effective in defining his “as a new kind of politician: soft-hearted, 
hard-headed, courageous, visionary, even pure.” As the 2007 Federal election approached, 
Rudd’s embrace of the themes of compassion, fairness and decency allowed him to “straddle a 
vast political divide” and appeal to left-wing Greens voters and conservative evangelical 
Christians (D. Marr 2010, 52). Yet to acknowledge that Rudd’s faith was leveraged for political 
advantage does not imply that that Rudd’s beliefs were not genuine. Rudd did not Rudd embrace 
Christianity and aid to extract political benefit. Rather, he sought to extract political benefit from 
                                                          
173 In a monograph published in 2001 Marion Maddox contrasts the religious motivations of Abbott and Rudd. Tony 
Abbott told Maddox that he had “never made a political decision on religious grounds. And I wouldn't” (Maddox 
2001, 133–34), while Rudd readily acknowledged that his religious convictions influence his politics (Maddox 2001, 
135).  
174 This assessment obtains additional credence in light of the transcript of this speech—along with the transcript of 
an interview in which Abbott voiced unequivocal support for the 0.5% target (C. Kenny 2013)—being removed from 
Abbott’s website and the Liberal Party website soon after Abbott became Prime Minister (B. Hall 2013). 
175 David Marr (2010, 56) has documented how “[a]fter Labor’s defeat in October 2004, Rudd took command of an 
operation to win believers back to the party”. See also Maddox (2001, 143) and an interview Rudd gave on the TV 
Show Compass in 2005 (‘Kevin Rudd: The God Factor’ 2005). 
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his embrace of Christianity and aid. The distinction is crucial and is supported by three strands 
of evidence.  
 
First, and most convincing, is the consistent testimony of individuals who engaged with Rudd 
directly on aid attesting that Rudd’s commitment was deep and genuine176. Andrew Johnson, a 
government relations official with World Vision Australia (one of Australia’s largest NGOs), told 
me he didn’t know of “any senior person in government who has even approaching [Rudd’s] 
deep moral commitment to aid”177. James Batley considered Rudd to be “personally invested” 
in aid178, a view that was widely shared among high-level former AusAID officials I spoke to who 
were active during this time. Bob McMullan, who served as Parliamentary Secretary for 
International Development in Rudd’s Government, recalled Rudd being “very passionate about” 
aid, adding that “he remains passionate about it.” 
 
Second, the political benefits that may have potentially accrued to Rudd from an ‘expedient’ 
embrace of Christianity and aid, were simply not sufficient enough to warrant such an exercise. 
Rudd’s active publicising of his Christianity was risky. As Rudd’s biographer Robert Macklin 
(2008, 148) observes, “[i]n his assertion of the political implications of his religious faith, Rudd is 
moving in a different direction from most national and international trends.” Rudd himself 
acknowledged that there were “heaps of risks” associated with bringing religion into the political 
debate, not least that “in the caucus they’ll think that you’re some slightly besotted God 
botherer” (‘Kevin Rudd: The God Factor’ 2005). There was also the chance that Labor’s secular 
voters would feel alienated” (‘Kevin Rudd: The God Factor’ 2005). While many of Rudd’s Labor 
colleagues were uneasy about how forthright Rudd was in touting his beliefs, they were 
ultimately willing to tolerate his religious convictions so long as he appeared capable of leading 
Labor out “from the political wilderness” (Macklin 2008, 148).  
 
A third strand of evidence suggesting that Rudd’s commitment to aid was genuine, and stemmed 
from deeply held personal beliefs, relates to the consistency and doggedness with which Rudd 
pursued the objective of expanding the aid program. Rudd’s commitment to expanding the aid 
program did not waver at any stage of his political career. Furthermore, since ending his political 
career, Rudd has maintained his strong interest in aid and development, most notably through 
his role as President of the Asia Society Policy Institute179. The consistency and extent of Rudd’s 
                                                          
176 The examples provided in this paragraph are representative and by no means an exhaustive. Furthermore, these 
claims are consistent with existing biographies of Rudd (Macklin 2008; D. Marr 2010; N. Stuart 2010). 
177 Personal interview with Andrew Johnson, November 2015. 
178 Personal interview with James Batley, January 2016. 
179 I acknowledge that Rudd’s role at the Asia Society is widely seen as providing a front for Rudd’s campaign to 
become UN Secretary General. 
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tangible actions, undertaken over a long period of time, most clearly point to the depth of his 
beliefs and their lasting power to motivate. It is towards documenting these tangible actions to 
which I now turn my attention.   
5.1.2 Rudd as Aid Advocate 
An important way in which Rudd’s personal commitment to aid was practically translated into 
policy action was through his role as an aid advocate. Rudd was the driving force behind the 
creation of the 0.5% target. This intervention was critical because, from the start, the 0.5% target 
framed the decade-long expansion in Australia. When Shadow Foreign Minister, Rudd personally 
sought out Bob McMullan, a Labor Party strategist, former Cabinet Minister, and development 
enthusiast, in order to collaborate on aid policy. “It was Rudd’s initiative,” McMullan told me, 
when recalling the collaboration between the pair which birthed the 0.5% target180.  According 
to McMullan, the step of agreeing on a policy to reach 0.5% by 2013 “was the key decision.” 
From this point, recalled McMullan, “most of the other aid policy elements of the period from 
the early days of opposition to 2010 were driven by the 0.5.” (Given how low Australia’s aid 
spending was at the time, McMullan and Rudd reasoned that reaching 0.7% was unachievable 
“unless we set a time period well outside the realms of credibility.” 0.5%, on the other hand, 
although a stretch, “was realistic”). Once decided on the aid target, Rudd used his authority to 
get the Opposition Expenditure Review Committee (ERC) to ‘lock in’ the spending requirements 
into their costings.  
 
In an address to the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney on 5 July 2007, Rudd 
publicly committed a future Labor government to “raising our ODA to GNI contribution from 
0.35 per cent in 2010-2011 to 0.5 per cent by 2015-16” (Rudd 2007a; see also Dobell 2010c). 
This commitment was significant because it literally ‘doubled down’ on an earlier commitment 
by Prime Minister John Howard to expand the aid program to $4 billion by 2010181. John Howard 
receives surprisingly little credit for his role in initiating the expansion of Australia’s aid spending 
in the mid-2000s182. Nonetheless, without Rudd, the sustained shift in Australia’s aid spending 
                                                          
180 Personal interview with Bob McMullan, March 2016. McMullan mentioned his aid policy discussions with Rudd in 
an appearance on ABC Radio’s Sunday Profile (‘Bob McMullan MP’ 2010), while Rudd also publicly noted 
McMullan’s input in his speech launching the Review (Rudd 2011c). 
181 At the United Nations World Summit in New York in September 2005, Howard announced that the Australian 
Government would double the aid budget by 2010 (AusAID 2006, ix). The following April, Foreign Minister 
Alexander Downer launched a White Paper—titled Australian Aid: Promoting Growth and Stability—to provide a 
long-term “strategic framework” for the planned expansion of the aid program to around $4 billion by the end of 
the decade (AusAID 2006). 
182 In the 2005-06 and 2006-07 financial years, Australia’s ODA budget increased by 16.1% and 5.8% respectively, in 
real terms. The 2005-06 increase was the 2nd largest annual increase (in percentage terms), in this history of the aid 
program. 
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trajectory was unlikely to have stuck. Rudd’s advocacy provided the ongoing fuel to stoke a fire 
that Howard may have helped light, but had little intention of flaming. This became clear during 
the 2007 federal election campaign, when Howard refused to match Labor’s commitment to 
0.5%, despite ongoing goading from Rudd and others (Doherty 2007).   
 
Rudd’s promise set Australia on a trajectory to have an $8 billion aid program by 2015. In an 
effort to distinguish the Opposition’s policy from that of the Howard Government, Rudd also 
linked the 0.5% target with Australia’s commitment to achieving the MDGs (something Howard 
had conspicuously avoided) and obligation to do “its fair share of the work” to “make poverty 
history” (Rudd 2007a). Rudd’s close identification with the Make Poverty History campaign is an 
important aspect of his advocacy. Rudd timed the 0.5% announcement to coincide with the 
Make Poverty History Zero Seven Roadtrip, a week-long national youth campaign involving 700 
volunteers designed to raise awareness of the MDGs at the midway-point of achieving those 
goals (Zero Seven 2007). Rudd spoke at the culmination of the campaign—a concert at the 
Sydney Opera House on Friday 6 July—where he reiterated his 0.5% target announced in his 
speech at the Lowy Institute the day beforehand. During this period, Rudd formed close 
connections with many of the organisations involved in Make Poverty History, for example the 
Oaktree Foundation, a youth-led anti-poverty movement and Micah Challenge. Rudd’s close 
association with the Make Poverty History campaign helped established Rudd’s pro-aid profile, 
kick-starting the ‘Ruddification’ of the 0.5% target and also offering a point of difference with 
Howard  as the 2007 federal election campaign approached.  
 
Despite aid issues receiving an unusually high level of attention during the 2007 federal election 
campaign (Wade 2007), their impact on the political agenda nonetheless remained peripheral. 
The fact that Rudd’s campaign launch speech (Rudd 2007b)—which in fact take place towards 
the end of the campaign once undecided voters are engaged—did not mention aid is reflective 
of aid’s enduring low salience, even in the 2007 climate. To the extent that aid issues influenced 
the election result at all, Rudd’s strong support of aid could be seen to have ‘fed into’ Rudd’s 
narrative that Howard had become “stuck in the past” and no longer understood “the new 
challenges that we face in the future” (Rudd 2007b). There is also evidence that Rudd’s embrace 
of aid may have contributed to voters views that Rudd was more compassionate than Howard 
(McAllister 2011, 254) and that he provided inspiring leadership (McAllister 2011, 256). The 
decisive issue for the public in the election was, as usual, economic management (Wanna 2015).  
 
Rudd’s aid advocacy role took on a different complexion after becoming Prime Minister, and 
later as Foreign Minister, as more opportunities arose on the international stage. A striking 
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example of Rudd’s consistent high-level political commitment to the 0.5% target was 
demonstrated each September between 2008 and 2011. Over four consecutive years Rudd—
twice while Prime Minister and twice as Foreign Minister—promised the United Nations General 
Assembly that Australia would double its aid and reach 0.5% by 2015 (Rudd 2008, 2009, 2010b, 
2011e). In a typical extract from Rudd’s 2011 speech, Rudd boasted that Australia had: “doubled 
our development assistance over the last 5 years. And are on track to double it again by 2015. 
Based on available data, that would make Australia's ODA budget approximately the 6th largest 
in the world” (Rudd 2011e). 
5.1.3 Rudd as Aid’s Political Protector 
The influence Rudd exercised behind the scenes in order to repeatedly protect the aid budget 
was less visible, but arguably more important, than his role as aid advocate in sustaining 
Australia’s aid expansion. I have already mentioned how, upon becoming Opposition Leader, 
Rudd was instrumental in ensuring Labor adopted the 0.5% target as Party strategy, using his 
influence get the Opposition Expenditure Review Committee (ERC) to ‘lock in’ the spending 
implications of the 0.5% policy.  
 
Once Rudd became Prime Minister, he enjoyed a greater degree of power and autonomy, even 
by the standards of that office. There were a number of reasons for this. First, Rudd accumulated 
substantial goodwill within the Labor Party with his victory in the 2007 Federal election, which 
returned Labor to Government after four consecutive federal election losses. Second, 
stratospheric public approval ratings—a Nielsen poll taken in mid-May 2008 had Rudd as 
preferred Prime Minister over Opposition Leader Brendan Nelson at 70% to 17% (Australian 
Associated Press 2010)—reinforced Rudd’s authority early in his Prime Ministership. Third, an 
inner circle of key ministers sitting as the Strategic Priorities and Budget Committee (a grouping 
which became known as the ‘gang of four’) 183  gradually usurped cabinet as the central 
decisionmaking organ of the Rudd government, particularly following the onset of the of the 
Global Financial Crisis in late 2008. While the increasing concentration of power in his office 
ultimately contributed to Rudd’s downfall, it also meant that, as Prime Minister, Rudd exercised 
singular influence over Government policy.  
 
Rudd’s desire to see aid spending increased was duly reflected in the May 2008 budget, the Rudd 
Government’s first. The nominal increase of $622 million achieved during 2008-09 ranks as the 
                                                          
183 The ‘gang of four’ comprised Rudd, Treasurer Wayne Swan, Deputy Prime Minister Gillard and Finance Minister 
Lindsay Tanner. See Marr (2010, 68–69) and Rayner and Wanna (2015, 19). 
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largest single-year increase in the history of the Australian aid program184. The foreword to the 
‘Blue Book’—the traditional Ministerial Statement on aid accompanying the budget 
documents—explained how the budget laid “the foundation for implementing the 
Government’s election commitment to increase Australia’s official development assistance 
(ODA) to 0.5 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI) by 2015-16” (Stephen Smith and McMullan 
2008, iii). In a tangible demonstration of the influence of the 0.5% target in framing aid policy, 
the 2008 budget papers projected ODA levels for the current year and next three years (i.e. the 
period of the forward estimates): 0.32 per cent in 2008-09; 0.35 in 2009-10; 0.37 in 2010-11; 
and 0.38 in 2011-12 (Stephen Smith and McMullan 2008, iii). That the large increases in aid 
spending were achieved despite Rudd’s Foreign Minister, Stephen Smith, preferring to see the 
aid program stay “as flat… and as below the radar as possible” (in the words of a senior 
government official), indicates the degree of Rudd’s influence.  
 
The onset of the GFC in late 2008 immediately compromised the achievement of the stepped 
targets laid out in the 2008 budget as the Government shifted spending priorities to stimulating 
the domestic economy (Rayner and Wanna 2015, 18). To save money in both the 2009 and 2010 
budgets, the aid spending trajectory was back-ended by pushing expenditure closer to 2015, 
implying a steeper trajectory for reaching 0.5% of GNI. Nonetheless, aid spending still increased 
by 2.7% and 4.6% (in real terms) respectively during these years. Without Rudd’s advocacy, it is 
difficult to imagine that aid spending would have expanded by even these relatively modest 
amounts, given the environment of dramatically increased fiscal pressure in the immediate 
aftermath of the GFC. 
 
Rudd’s embrace of aid while he was Prime Minister was tolerated in Cabinet rather than 
supported. Apart from Rudd, there were no aid champions in Cabinet185. Richard Moore, who 
served as a Deputy Director-General in AusAID during Rudd’s Prime Ministership, recalled 
McMullan telling him that “every Prime Minister is allowed their indulgence. This [i.e. the 0.5% 
target] is seen as Kevin’s”186. Rudd himself appeared to be aware of the thin level of support 
amongst his senior colleagues. Just two days before Deputy Prime Minister Julia Gillard 
announced she would challenge him for the Labor leadership, Rudd warned a  Micah Challenge 
Voices for Justice event that “[e]very Finance Minister and every Treasurer of the country will 
rail against this [0.5% target]” (Rudd 2010a). 
                                                          
184 The nominal increase of $622 million achieved during 2008-09 ranks as the largest nominal single-year increase 
in the history of the Australian aid program (with the 14% real increase equating to the third largest percentage 
increase in history). 
185 Bob McMullan, as a Parliamentary Secretary, was not a member of cabinet. 
186 When I asked McMullan whether this this quote attributed to him was accurate, he confirmed it was.  
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Rudd resigned as Prime Minister on 24 June once it became apparent that he would lose the 
looming leadership ballot instigated by Gillard. The shockwaves from this seminal event 
continue to disturb Australia’s political culture, and instantly created irredeemable fissures in 
Rudd and Gillard’s political careers and the respective Government’s they subsequently led. In 
the aftermath of his resignation, it was widely assumed Rudd’s political career—and, by 
extension, his influence over aid policy—was over. Yet an unusual sequence of events led to a 
situation where, surprisingly, Rudd enjoyed more direct influence over Australia’s aid policy, at 
least temporarily.  
 
§§§ 
 
 
5.2 Securing the Aid Expansion: Rudd’s Independent Review 
 
I am the Australian government—when 
it comes to AusAID  
—Kevin Rudd 
 
Rudd was sworn in as Foreign Minister on 14 September 2010. Later that day, he addressed staff 
at AusAID. The very next day Rudd jetted to Pakistan, which was experiencing calamitous 
flooding (Massola and Kelly 2010; Stewart 2010). While in Pakistan, the new Foreign Minister 
was asked by reporters about the prospects of additional Australian assistance, to which Rudd 
responded, “[w]ell, we'll see because I am the Australian government—when it comes to 
AusAID” (AAP 2010). A striking number of interviewees pointed me to this moment, convinced 
it was deeply revealing of Rudd’s attitude. Rudd considered the aid program his program. Now, 
as Foreign Minister, Rudd’s interest in aid and his direct responsibilities aligned. The Rudd aid 
salience shock intensified during this period, as Rudd proved repeatedly willing and able to inject 
himself into decisionmaking in order to ensure the ongoing health and viability of his 0.5% 
project.  
Chapter 5 
Page 144 
5.2.1 Revitalising the 0.5% Project 
Rudd announced the establishment of an Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness (the 
Independent Review) soon after his trip to Pakistan (Rudd 2010c). The Independent Review 
represented only the fourth major review of Australia’s aid program in its history187 and each of 
the previous reviews had been “pivotal in setting a clear direction and rationale for the program 
well into the future” (O’Keeffe 2010b). Why did Rudd initiate the Independent Review? The 
short answer is this: to embed the planned aid expansion more securely. For Rudd, the 0.5% 
target was the lodestar for the aid program. He was heavily personally and politically invested 
in the target. Accordingly, he strongly resisted any potential departure from the expansionary 
policy trajectory he had initiated and fostered. Ahead of initiating the Independent Review, 
despite the apparent robustness of ‘Golden Consensus’ during the 2010 election campaign, 
Rudd would have been keenly attuned to the need to counter two emerging threats that had 
the potential to jeopardise his 0.5% project. The Independent Review was initiated, in part, to 
respond to these concerns.  
 
The first concern was process-related and concerned the absence of an over-arching 
government policy to guide the aid expansion. Labor did not produce its own substantial policy 
blueprint to guide this process during its first term in Government, something which became a 
source of consternation amongst senior AusAID staff during this period. Only a month prior to 
Rudd’s announcement of the formation of the Review, Annmaree O’Keeffe, who had recently 
departed from her role as a Deputy Director-General at AusAID for a role with the Lowy Institute, 
published an op-ed in The Australian warning about the “huge” administration challenges of the 
rapid expansion and lamented “the absence of a comprehensive aid policy” to direct this task 
(O’Keeffe 2010a).  
 
The second threat was much more pervasive. It related to a lingering unease within the 
bureaucracy about the sustainability of AusAID’s rapid growth trajectory, both in terms of 
funding and staff. AusAID’s rapid spending growth from the mid-2000s, along with further 
projected expansion led the Auditor General to conduct an audit of AusAID in 2009. While the 
audit found AusAID had managed the aid program effectively, it concluded that the organisation 
faced “considerable management challenges amidst ongoing program growth” (Australian 
National Audit Office 2009, 16). The incoming government briefing the Treasury prepared ahead 
                                                          
187 The Independent Review (Hollway et al. 2011) follows in the tradition of the ‘The Jackson Report’ (Jackson and 
Committee to Review the Australian Overseas Aid Program 1984), ‘The Simons Report’ (Simons, Hart, and Walsh 
1997) and the 2006 White Paper (AusAID 2006). The White Paper’s position in this lineage is disputed, as it was not 
technically an ‘independent review’. It was dismissed by Labor on this basis.  
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of the 2010 election for the Labour Government (the ‘red book’) warned that “the increase in 
the ODA budget, if not handled well, will result in less effective delivery and public criticism of 
the aid program” (Department of Treasury 2010, 11). The Department of Finance and 
Deregulation’s briefing (2010b) issued a similar warning188. 
 
The staffing increases AusAID was absorbing during this period were even more dramatic than 
the spending increases. In the seven years between 2005 and 2012, AusAID expanded by an 
average of a division a year—a remarkable rate considering the agency had consisted of just two 
divisions until the mid-1980s189 and then just three until 2005. The expansion of AusAID was 
especially rapid when contrasted with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, an agency 
known to be chronically underfunded (see Table 5.B below)190. Moreover, the rapid growth of 
AusAID attracted staff “in search of opportunity and promotions”, including many from DFAT 
(Day 2016, 645). DFAT’s relative neglect reinforced a growing notion in Canberra that AusAID’s 
growth was unbalanced. This exacerbated tensions between AusAID and its ‘parent’ agency, 
with implications when AusAID was later absorbed into DFAT (Dobell 2015a, 2015b). 
Table 5.B: Comparing DFAT and AusAID Staffing Increases, 2007-2013 
 DFAT AusAID 
Staff Levels      
30 June ‘07  
Staff Levels      
30 June ‘13  % Increase  
Staff Levels      
30 June ‘07  
Staff Levels      
30 June ‘13  % Increase  
Australia-based Staff 1617 1858 15 515 1458 183 
Overseas-based Staff 2039 2422 19 68 869 1178 
TOTAL STAFF 3656 4820 17 583 2327 298 
of which SES191 204 215 5 21 69 229 
 
Perhaps most damaging for the prospects of the aid expansion was the scepticism of AusAID’s 
senior staff at the time about the sustainability of the ramp up. Andrew Johnson, team leader 
of government relations for World Vision Australia, a leading NGO, remembers that, “you could 
never find anyone in AusAID who thought they could spend the scale up.” When I canvassed this 
                                                          
188 It is worth noting that this warning was redacted in the initial version of the Department of Finance and 
Deregulation’s briefing (2010a) released under Freedom of Information laws. The redaction was removed in a later, 
updated version (2010b) issued by the Department.  
189 The Jackson Review tentatively suggested expanding AusAID (or ADAB, as it was then) from two to three 
divisions. 
190 A pair of reports published by the Lowy Institute in 2009 and 2011 succeeded in shining a spotlight on Australia’s 
‘diplomatic deficit’, which had grown out of long-term underinvestment in diplomacy, and especially in consular 
representation (Gyngell et al. 2009; Oliver and Shearer 2011). A Parliamentary Inquiry into Australia’s overseas 
representation was initiated in 2012 (Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 2012). See also 
Dobell (2010a). 
191 SES staff are the ‘Senior Executive Service’ of the Australian Public Service, the most senior bureaucrats. 
Chapter 5 
Page 146 
with senior AusAID staff from the time, I was taken aback by their admissions of an almost 
complete lack of belief in the feasibility of the Rudd scale up. Consider these reflections: 
“I regard [the Rudd doubling] as madness, the timeframe. It was ill-
considered but, you know, when you’re handed that, you get on and you go 
for it”192. 
“Nobody sitting inside AusAID thought that we would [achieve the planned 
expansion]... we thought we were building for something that would never 
happen. And every year it was postponed and every year it became 
harder…”193. 
“I don’t know if anyone believed in the sustainability of the ramp up”194. 
By 2010, voices in the media were telegraphing the lack of confidence amongst Canberra’s 
mandarins to the public195. For example, in February 2011 Greg Sheridan (2011a) argued in his 
column in The Australian that the “aid budget is expanding beyond our ability to spend it 
properly. It has acquired a wholly fraudulent sacred cow status that puts it beyond sensible 
scrutiny”.  
 
The Independent Review, and the new government aid policy that emerged from it, were 
designed to respond to the above concerns by reframing the rationale for ongoing aid spending 
increases and generating confidence that the planned spending increases were sustainable196. 
However, multiple informants I spoke with contend that another important dynamic was also 
operating. Rudd’s decision to abandon his emissions trading scheme (ETS) in April 2010, after 
presenting it as Australia’s greatest moral and economic challenge, triggered a “loss of face” that 
was the proximate cause of spiralling approval ratings and his downfall as Prime Minister 
(Megalogenis 2010, 4)197. Rudd, who harboured ambitions to return to the Prime Ministership, 
could not afford to break another high-profile promise. Rudd’s personal and political credibility 
was now so closely linked to the 0.5% target that he could not countenance any alteration to 
the scale of the aid expansion he had set in place. 
5.2.2 Rudd as Aid Policymaker 
A feature of Rudd’s time as Foreign Minister was the extent of his engagement in the aid 
policymaking process. The manner of his engagement, however, was distinctly different during 
each of the two major phases of the decisionmaking episode that began with the establishment 
                                                          
192 Personal interview with Richard Moore, January 2016. 
193 Personal interview with a senior official. 
194 Personal interview with a senior official. 
195 For example, Shearer (2010). 
196 Rudd (2012) acknowledged in a speech delivered in March 2012 that the Independent Review of Aid 
Effectiveness “reframed our aid strategy”. 
197 For an overview of the dynamics of Rudd’s backdown on climate change, see McDonald (2012, 2013a). 
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of an Independent Review and resulted in a new Australian aid policy—An Effective Aid Program 
for Australia: Making a real difference-Delivering real result (AusAID 2012). During the five 
months the five-member Review Team was conducting the Independent Review, Rudd’s direct 
involvement was limited. He exercised his influence during this phase by adeptly framing the 
parameters of the Independent Review. Once the Review Panel’s report had been handed down, 
however, Rudd engaged in the policy process in an entirely different way, becoming 
extraordinarily practically involved in developing the Government response.   
 
In the first part of this section of the chapter, I highlighted the reasons why Rudd’s 0.5% project 
required strategic reinforcement. Here I explain how Rudd delivered this reinforcement. My 
contention is that Rudd’s framing of the Independent Review process curtailed any serious 
examination of an alternative to the ongoing expansion of Australia’s aid policy in accordance 
with the 0.5% target (c.f. Janis and Mann 1977, Chapter 11)198. The single most persuasive piece 
of evidence I uncovered to support this claim concerns a letter Prime Minister Gillard sent to 
Rudd. Eight days prior to formally announcing the Independent Review, Rudd formally wrote 
Gillard seeking agreement to conduct an ‘Aid Effectiveness Study’. Gillard responded in a letter 
dated 12 November199. This correspondence included the following critical passage: “I note that 
the Government’s overall funding for ODA is set by the commitment to increase the aid budget 
to 0.5% of GNI by 2015-16 and is outside the scope of the Study (emphasis added).” 
  
While the language in the Independent Review’s terms of reference was not this blunt, a close 
reading likewise suggests the Review Team’s scope of enquiry was circumscribed. The terms of 
reference indicate that the Review was initiated not to inform whether to reach the 0.5% target, 
but how to reach it (Hollway et al. 2011, 319–21). This message also permeated the public 
communications concerning the Independent Review. For example, Rudd’s press release 
initiating the Independent Review explained that the Independent Review was “design to 
maximise the effectiveness of the aid program, as Australia increases its Official Development 
Assistance to 0.5 per cent of Gross National Income by 2015-16” (Rudd 2010c, emphasis added).  
 
I am not suggesting that the Independent Review was not of the highest quality, or only 
nominally independent. On the contrary, the consensus view of those I spoke with who were 
involved in the decisionmaking episode uniformly affirmed Rudd’s own recollections of the 
                                                          
198 I acknowledge that this claim is not supported by all of those I spoke with. One interviewee suggested to me that 
he believed Hollway, the Chair of the Independent Review, was free to report back to Rudd that the expansion was 
proceeding too rapidly. Nonetheless, the balance of the evidence I uncovered, suggested that Hollway and his team 
were circumscribed in what they could feasibly recommend.   
199 I obtained a photocopy of this letter. 
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process as being a “first class exercise in Australian public policy” (Rudd 2012). My claim is that 
the Review Panel were unavoidably working within parameters that were deliberately 
circumscribed by Rudd. The Review Panel would need to feel extremely uncomfortable about 
the wisdom and feasibility of the 0.5% target to even consider recommending against it, and 
there was almost no chance of this.  
 
Professor Stephen Howes200 was a member of the Review Panel and widely seen as providing 
the intellectual carriage of the Review, along with Hollway. Howes specifically raised with me 
the implausibility of reporting back to Rudd that his target was “wrong”. Howes conceded that 
Review Team did sometimes discussed the merits of the 0.5% target and its timing, but 
confirmed that “we put those discussions to one side” in preparing the report201. Another 
interviewee I spoke with remembered an occasion when Sandy Hollway, who chaired the Review 
Panel, pondered aloud the merits of such a large aid program in front of senior AusAID officials. 
Nonetheless, while the Review Panel duly noted in their report that that “the aid program is 
already complex and large and ramping it up to 0.5 per cent of GNI poses significant challenge” 
(Hollway 2011, 26), the overriding message emerging from the Independent Review was that 
the aid program was fundamentally sound. This was how it was interpreted in both the media 
(Gartrell 2011) and within AusAID at the time202.  
 
Once the Review Team handed down their Report in late April 2011, the decisionmaking episode 
transitioned to a distinct second phase. A new secretariat was formed within AusAID to prepare 
the government’s response to the Independent Review, which was published in July as An 
Effective Aid Program for Australia: Making a real difference—Delivering Real Results (AusAID 
2011). Rudd’s desire to see these two documents issued simultaneously meant that the 
secretariat had to prepare An Effective Aid Program in a compressed timeframe. To commence 
the process, the secretariat produced an initial draft policy. Then, over an intense two-month 
period, this draft was continually refined and updated, chiefly in response to Rudd’s direction. 
Despite travelling extensively during this period, Rudd would often write the team from far-flung 
locations with his feedback on the latest draft. He would litter the margins of the latest iteration 
of the drafts with mark-ups to be fed into the next iteration of the policy. Rudd’s chief of staff, 
Philip Green, was also highly involved, reflecting the priority his boss placed on the process. 
                                                          
200 Howes is a Professor of economics at the Australian National University and the founding (and current) director 
of the ANU’s Development Policy Centre. 
201 Personal interview with Stephen Howes, January 2016. 
202 Richard Moore, who was the head of the Asia Division (First Assistant Director General) at AusAID at the time of 
the Independent Review, and who had earlier been involved in preparing The Simons Report in 1997, cautioned me 
that “nobody reads those reports. There’s a headline out of them. And so the headline out of [the Independent 
Review] was: ‘the place is reasonably sound”.    
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Green and James Batley, the Deputy Director General at AusAID who was taken offline to 
oversee the secretariat, would meet regularly over coffee to discuss the status of the latest draft 
and iron out messaging in a difficult section. Batley explained to me how Rudd would personally 
draft and refine detailed sections of the document203. For example, Rudd would specify how to 
re-number strategic goals, rearrange how diagrams were to be displayed, and tinker with 
important phrases (the reworked versions of which would often end up in his speeches). In 
short, Rudd digested and approved of every word in An Effective Aid Program. The policy was, 
in a way that is rare for such documents, uniquely Rudd’s.  
 
Finally, it was also Rudd who directed the AusAID team to find a way to essentially agree with 
all of the Independent Review’s 39 recommendations. He was eager to be able to convey a 
simple and clear message in the document: that the Government was in agreement with the 
Review Panel. As Annex A of An Effective Aid Program documents, Rudd’s wish was granted204 
(AusAID 2011, 59–65). Once again, we see evidence here of Rudd’s willingness to intervene 
directly and decisively in aid policy decisionmaking in order to sustain and promote his personal 
0.5% project.  
5.2.3 The Cresting of the Rudd Aid Salience Shock 
Rudd’s influence over Australian aid policy peaked during 2011 as his multitasking reached new 
levels. In addition to stepping up his duties in aid policymaking, Rudd maintained his twin roles 
as the chief advocate, and chief political protector, of Australia’s aid expansion. In early July 
2011, Rudd delivered a pair of speeches launching the Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness 
and the Government’s response. After addressing the public launch in the morning (Rudd 
2011b), Rudd tabled the Independent Review in Parliament in the afternoon, making the case 
that the expansion of the aid program was sustainable and exhorting his Parliamentary 
colleagues that “our belief in a fair go does not stop at the Australian continental shelf” (Rudd 
2011d). Rudd also made his now customary journey to the United Nations General Assembly in 
September, suggesting that Australia’s aid expansion would soon make its “ODA budget 
approximately the 6th largest in the world” (Rudd 2011e).   
 
Behind the scenes, Rudd retained his iron grip on the aid budget. Preparation for the first Gillard 
Government’ budget occurred at the same time as the Independent Review was being 
                                                          
203 Personal interview with James Batley, January 2016. 
204 Only recommendation 29 was challenged, on the basis that renaming the title of the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
was a matter for the Prime Minister. 
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conducted. The 2011-12 budget allocated an additional $474 million in funding over the coming 
financial year, projecting a real increase of 8.4% in the Australia’s total ODA (Rudd 2011a, 3). 
Ultimately, the realised increase in the aid budget during 2011-12 represented the second 
largest nominal year-to-year increase in the aid budget in its history205, behind only the 2008-09 
budget—Rudd’s first as Prime Minister (Howes 2015b).  
 
Rudd ensured the 2011-12 budget gelled with the recommendations of the Review and resisted 
mounting political pressure to cut the aid budget. In a post-2011-12 budget analysis, Daniel 
Flitton (2011) reported how spending on the aid program was “untouchable”, despite “green 
eyes” within the bureaucracy being directed at AusAID. Flitton observed that “politically the aid 
budget ranks as a protected species” and could not be touched by the Expenditure Review 
Committee (ERC). Triangulating other reporting from the period reveals it was Rudd who was 
crucial to upholding the aid budget. In November 2011, against the background of the ERC 
reconvening to commence preparations ahead of the 2012-13 budget, Steve Lewis (2011) 
reported that it was Rudd who was preventing any reduction of the aid budget: “[s]ome 
Government ministers say aid spending is “out of control” but admit any decision to slow the 
rate of growth will be fiercely resisted by Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd”. In this story, Lewis 
(2011) quotes a Government source acknowledging that, while some members of the ERC were 
looking to cut aid, “some view it as off limits, because of Rudd.” Greg Sheridan (2013) later 
confirmed that Rudd “controlled the aid budget in obsessive detail when he was foreign 
minister.”  
 
How was Rudd able to retain such influence over the ERC, given he was no longer the leader of 
his party? Rudd enjoyed an unusual level of autonomy while Foreign Minister for two main 
reasons. First, the 2010 election resulted in a hung parliament. The Gillard government 
depended on the support of the Australian Greens and a trio of independents to obtain a razor-
thin majority in the House of Representatives. The prospect of Rudd resigning, and thereby 
triggering a by election in what would become a marginal seat in the absence of Rudd, had the 
potential to bring down the Gillard Government. Second, during the 2010 election campaign 
Rudd reportedly demanded to be appointed Foreign Minister in exchange for ending damaging 
leaking which was jeopardising Labor’s chances for re-election206. Rudd, for his part, denies any 
deal was made. Whatever the truth, Gillard (2014, 169), was adamant that “after the 2010 
                                                          
205 In percentage terms, the 2008-09 and 2011-12 budgets delivered, respectively, 14% and 10% real increases over 
the previous year’s budget (constant 2015-16 prices), representing the third and fifth largest real increases in the 
aid budget since 1972-73. 
206 Gillard recounts how “during the campaign Kevin had extorted his appointment” (Gillard 2014, 170). While Rudd 
denies extorting the appointment, Kelly (2014, Chapter 23) assembles compelling evidence, including from 
interviews undertaken with senior Ministers Swan and Smith and others, that this is what transpired.  
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election, I never had a Foreign Minister I could rely on” as “Kevin used [the foreign minister] role 
as a platform for leadership games”207. So, for a variety of reinforcing personal and political 
reasons, Rudd operated at arm’s length from Gillard while Foreign Minister—an arrangement 
that temporarily suited both parties.  
 
After only 17 months as Foreign Minister, Rudd manufactured a leadership challenge by 
resigning his cabinet post in February 2012 while abroad in the United States. Rudd lost this 
challenge and returned to the backbench for the first time since 2001. For seven years, Rudd 
had consistently provided the forward momentum for the aid expansion; his sudden departure 
from cabinet left his 0.5% project vulnerable. While none of the other key Gillard Government 
figures were actively opposed to the 0.5% target, neither were they personally and politically 
invested in it to the extent Rudd was208. Rudd was the lone champion of the 0.5% target on 
Labor’s frontbench209.   
 
Rudd’s departure from cabinet immediately triggered speculation that aid would be cut in the 
forthcoming 2012-13 budget. Stephen Howes suggested a delay of the target by up to five years 
was likely, conceding that “with Kevin Rudd gone, there’s no longer a champion for this aid 
expansion” (quoted in Chandler 2012). World Vision Australia’s Andrew Johnson, remembers 
that from the “moment [Rudd] was gone, it was on for young and old, and up to five years push 
out [of the 0.5% target], from 2015 to 2020, was what was on the table.”  
 
In retrospect, it is clear the 2012-13 budget was a watershed moment for the Australian aid 
expansion. At the time, however, its lasting significance was much less obvious. After all, the 
date for achieving the 0.5% target had only pushed back by one year—a decision that, while 
shocking to the development sector as a whole, was considered a substantial win by those aid 
advocates who were politically engaged. Looking back, what cements the 2012-13 budget as a 
critical juncture in the trajectory of Australian aid policy—quite aside from the fact that it is the 
historical peak of Australia’s ODA to GNI ratio—is that this was when the new currents driving 
Australia’s aid policy were first detectable. The removal of the Rudd aid salience shock as a 
propellant driving aid spending upwards coincided almost exactly with the emergence of a 
                                                          
207 This latter accusation is supported in most detail by a book length investigation by journalist Kerry-Anne Walsh 
(2013). See also a long article in The Monthly by Erik Jenson (2013). 
208 Personal interview with Amanda Robbins, February 2016.  
209 Although it didn’t specifically use the term, the Independent Review had acknowledged the importance of a 
political champion in Government to maintain momentum for the scale up: “The aid program is already complex and 
large, and ramping it up to 0.5 per cent of GNI poses a significant challenge. It will require high levels of leadership, 
planning, resourcing and implementation. The direction and the framework need to be set from the top level of 
government” (Hollway et al. 2011, 26).  
Chapter 5 
Page 152 
powerful countervailing salience shock—the politicisation of the budget deficit. The combined 
effect led to a dramatic change in the trajectory of aid spending in Australia.  
 
§§§ 
 
 
5.3 Reversing the Aid Expansion: The Politicisation of the Budget Deficit 
I erred in making the budget surplus for 
a nominated year the symbol of 
everything about our economic 
management. 
—Julia Gillard 
 
For some reason, the Australian 
government kept repeating the mantra 
that we would return to a budget 
surplus in year ‘X’.  
—P.N. Junankar 
 
 
The Australian economy proved remarkably resilient in response to the Global Financial Crisis 
(Junankar 2013). Yet despite Australia’s rude economic health when compared to other OECD 
countries—particularly the UK and the Netherlands—a sequence of factors combined to mean 
that the budget deficit came to dominate post-GFC political debate in Australia (Garnaut 2013, 
84). A political environment emerged in which the credibility and thus electability of Australia’s 
political leaders became intimately tied to the state of the budget deficit, with the projected 
budget balance becoming the most important proxy for evaluating the economic management 
credentials of the Government of the day.  
 
In this climate, the aid budget acquired an elevated status. Especially because the Rudd aid 
salience shock had pushed aid spending to historically high levels, reducing aid spending 
represented a relatively politically painless way for the Gillard and Abbott Governments to 
demonstrate they were taking the task of ‘budget repair’ seriously. In begin this section by 
tracing the development of the budget deficit aid salience shock before recounting two 
important examples of how this salience shock led to aid policy change during the early stages 
of the Abbott Government.     
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5.3.1 The Emergence of the Budget Deficit Aid Salience Shock 
The politicisation of the budget deficit in Australia has its roots in the decisions taken by the 
Rudd Government in the immediate aftermath of the GFC. Between October 2008 and February 
2009, the Rudd Government enacted a series of economic stimulus packages to prime the 
Australian economy and ward off a recession, a policy response that was widely lauded210 
(Wanna 2015, 313; Rayner and Wanna 2015, 18). While the Coalition supported the initial 
stimulus measures, it withdrew its support for enacting further stimulus measures in early 2009 
(Swan 2014, 272). Instead, the Coalition began to characterise Labor’s ongoing intervention in 
the economy as excessive, highlighting “the Government’s supposed profligacy and 
irresponsibility in implementing the stimulus programs.” (Rayner and Wanna 2015, 18).  
 
A critical juncture in the politicisation of the budget deficit occurred when Tony Abbott replaced 
Malcolm Turnbull as Opposition Leader in December 2009. Abbott immediately intensified the 
Opposition’s attacks on the Government’s economic management. While Abbott was unpopular 
with the public, his “simple and hostile” (D. Marr 2012, 83) political message was “ruthlessly 
effective” (Strangio and Walter 2015, 53; D. Marr 2012). In an attempt to nullify Abbott’s attacks, 
Labor promised during the 2010 federal election campaign that they would return the budget 
to surplus by 2013 (Gillard 2014, 337). However, from late 2011 onwards, the release of the 
official forward estimates repeatedly “involved a large downward revision of revenue—for the 
current year and the several years beyond” (Garnaut 2013, 112) and Gillard and Swan soon 
found themselves boxed in by their “firm and unqualified commitments to securing a budget 
surplus” (Garnaut 2013, 112). As the epigraph commencing this section reflects, Gillard 
regretted her role in politicising the budget deficit (Gillard 2014, 354). So did her Deputy and 
Treasurer Wayne Swan, who recalled in his memoirs how “[i]n the hands of our opponents, the 
gap between [the objective of returning the Budget to surplus] and the continuing fiscal deficit 
became the benchmark of our performance” (Swan 2014, 264). To a ludicrous extent, the budget 
deficit had become the proxy for economic management credibility in Australian politics 
(Kudelka 2011).  
 
The politicisation of the budget deficit had direct implications for the aid budget. As I alluded to 
in the previous section, the 2012-13 Budget represented the tipping point for the aid expansion. 
It was handed down on 8 May 2012, just three months after Rudd’s resignation. “As we set about 
formulating the 2012-13 Budget,” Swan (2014, 293) recounted in his memoirs “our 
                                                          
210 Treasurer Wayne Swan was later named world finance minister of the year, while many considered Rudd’s 
response to the GFC as his defining achievement as Prime Minister, including Julia Gillard (2014, 10). See also 
Megalogenis (2010, 11). 
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overwhelming aim was to put in place the funding for our big schemes [the Gonski education 
reforms and the National Disability Insurance Scheme], while mapping out a path to surplus”. 
With these spending imperatives framing the budget, aid spending became squeezed. In his 
press release issued the day the 2012-13 budget was handed down, Senator Bob Carr (2012b)—
who had replaced Rudd as Foreign Minister—made it clear that the “tight fiscal environment” 
was to blame for deferring the 0.5% target by a year, a measure which saved $2.9 billion from 
the budget’s bottom line over the forward estimates period. 
 
Amanda Robbins is uniquely placed to comment on the forces that caused the Golden Consensus 
to buckle, given she is one of the few individuals in the Australian context who worked as both 
a political insider (as a senior adviser to Swan) and a development insider (as a senior adviser 
for World Vision Australia) during the period when the politicisation of the budget deficit 
intensified211. Robbins hypothesised that, “first and foremost... the consensus broke down [due 
to] domestic fiscal pressures.” Yet, in a crucial admission, she also noted that the pressure to 
find budget savings during this period was “arguably more important politically than 
economically...” Robbins stressed that senior Labor figures took no delight in cutting aid and 
were particularly conscious that their decision had the potential to “fuel the cause for more 
cuts”, by undermining the credibility of the 0.5% target. Nonetheless, the decision to push back 
the date for achieving 0.5% ultimately became “a choice that politically and economically they 
decided needed to be taken.” Furthermore, there was a concern about the ability of AusAID to 
maintain the quality of aid given the pace of growth in the aid budget—a concern that was 
shared by senior AusAID staff (as was highlighted in subsection 5.2.1).   
 
The 2012-13 budget represents the inflection point in Australia’s aid policy spending trajectory. 
It served as a clarify moment, at least for unsentimental observers, of how the political power 
dynamics around aid spending had irreversibly changed. Aid policy had suddenly became salient, 
and relevant for political decisionmakers because cutting aid was an easy target for expedient 
shot term cuts to address the budget deficit, the most pressing political concern of the period. 
And Rudd was unavailable to play his role as aid’s political protector. The lack of a broad-based 
public reaction to Labor’s aid cuts in the 2012-13 budget only served to reinforce the logic of the 
new political cost-benefit analysis surrounding aid spending212. After May 2012, the 0.5% target 
                                                          
211 Robbins worked as a senior adviser to Treasurer Swan for two years from January 2009, before moving to a role 
as a senior adviser to the CEO and manager of government relations for World Vision. Robbins returned to Swan’s 
office after being appointed Deputy Chief of Staff in December 2012, the position she held during the formulation of 
the 2013-14 budget. 
212 Moreover, delaying the target in the 2012-13 budget created a future spending trajectory that was entirely 
unrealistic, requiring record increases 4 years in a row (Howes 2012a). 
  Australia 
Page 155  
was no longer taboo: the genie was out of the bottle and the new forces driving aid spending 
were uncorked.  
 
Labor enacted three additional cuts to aid spending in the fifteen months following the 2012-13 
budget cuts213, including delaying the achieving the 0.5% target by another year in the 2013-14 
budget (i.e. backdating the date for achievement to 2017-18) (see Table 5.C below). While cuts 
to aid generated a total of $5.8 billion in savings over the second half of the Gillard Government 
(ABC News 2015), Labor maintained an ostensible commitment to the 0.5% target. So, too, did 
the Coalition. Indeed, in the lead up to the Federal Election in September 2013, both parties 
appeared to “maintain a general commitment to aid growth” (R. Davies 2013c). In reality, 
however, Abbott and key members of the Coalition were keenly aware of the new political 
calculus governing aid spending. 
Table 5.C: Published Estimates of the Trajectory of Australia's ODA to GNI Ration over the 
Forward Estimates Period (2008-09 to 2013-14)214 
 Forward Estimates (i.e. planned future spending) 
Occasion Type of Cut Savings215 09
-1
0 
10
-1
1 
11
-1
2 
12
-1
3 
13
-1
4 
14
-1
5 
15
-1
6 
16
-1
7 
17
-1
8 
2008-09 Budget   0.35 0.37 0.38    0.5   
2009-10 Budget Back-end Target   0.35 0.37 0.40   0.5   
2010-11 Budget Back-end Target    0.35 0.38 0.42  0.5   
2011-12 Budget      0.38 0.42 0.46 0.5   
2012-13 Budget216 Delay Target $2.9b     0.37 0.41 0.45 0.5  
2013-14 Budget Delay Target $1.9b      0.39 0.41 0.45 0.5 
Aug 13 Statement Back-end Target  $0.97b      0.40 0.41 0.41 0.5 
5.3.2 Exhibit A: The Coalition’s pre-election Aid Cuts 
At 2:30pm on 5 September 2013, less than 42 hours before polls were scheduled to open in the 
Australian Federal Election, Shadow Treasurer Joe Hockey and Shadow Minister for Finance, 
Deregulation and Debt Reduction Andrew Robb conducted a joint press conference in 
Melbourne to announce the Coalition’s intention to cut foreign aid spending by $4.5 billion 
(Hockey and Robb 2013b). Hockey and Robb’s last-minute unveiling of new savings measures, 
of which the cut to aid was the largest, was calculated to bring the politicisation of the budget 
                                                          
213 I am including Carr’s ‘ODA diversion’ of 2012 as a cut. See footnotes from Table 5.A. 
214 Table 5.C draws from the following sources (Stephen Smith and McMullan 2008, 2009, 2010; Rudd 2011a; B. Carr 
2012a, 2013; Howes 2013c; ABC News 2015). 
215 Nominal savings generated over the four-year forward estimates period. 
216 In December 2012, Foreign Minister Carr (2012c) announced a $0.375b ‘diversion’ of ODA to finance asylum 
seeker costs, which in practice, reduced the aid budget although not Australia’s official ODA contribution (see also 
Howes 2012b, 2013a). 
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deficit to the boil just as voters were maximally involved in the campaign. The savings generated 
from cuts to aid allowed the Coalition to claim their policies would result in an “improved budget 
bottom line” (Hockey and Robb 2013a). Aid policy had become salient, yet it featured at a critical 
point in the election campaign not because of any inherent prominence, but because it had 
become such a valuable tool for ‘fixing the budget’.   
 
While the Coalition’s cuts to aid were announced at last minute, and took the development 
constituency by surprise (Coutts 2013), an overwhelming degree of corroborating evidence 
allows me to conclude that this decision was both well planned and politically astute. To begin 
with, because responding to the ‘budget emergency’ was the defining issue of the 2013 federal 
election campaign217, the Coalition were extraordinarily deliberate in the way they approached 
costings. “Joe knew costings were the biggest risk to a Coalition victory”, records Hockey’s 
biographer, Madonna King, “and he knew he couldn’t afford to stuff up” (M. King 2014a, Loc 
3437)218. Hockey had begun working with a trio of independent costings experts at the beginning 
of 2013 to ensure the Coalitions election policy proposals were verified. Hockey and Robb219 
were responsible for overseeing a detailed costings process for the Coalition ahead of the 2013 
election220. The Coalition also decided ahead of time to use the Parliamentary Budget Office 
(PBO) to confirm the budget impact of its policies (Reece 2015, 113). In a key piece of evidence 
suggesting the aid cuts were part of a closely worked through strategy, Reece (2015, 117) relates 
despite having the PBO cost many policies, the Coalition ultimately opted to release only a small 
number of their policies it had drafted “because it had a commanding lead in the polls and opted 
for a small target strategy”.  
 
The Coalition ran a ruthlessly disciplined campaign (Rayner and Wanna 2015, 17). At the centre 
of the campaign were a small group ultimately responsible for coordinating the campaign (and 
policy and costings), who assembled for dinner together at Melbourne’s Park Hyatt Hotel on the 
night of Rudd’s ‘black hole’ allegations221. I consider it highly likely that the ‘Park Hyatt Group’—
which included Hockey, Abbott, Robb (who was absent from the dinner), Liberal Party Federal 
Director and Coalition Campaign Director Brian Loughnane and Abbott and Hockey’s chiefs of 
                                                          
217 Internal Liberal Party polling conducted during this period confirmed that, “[e]conomic management, broadly 
defined… was by far the most significant issue” (Loughnane 2015, 199). See also Wanna (2015). 
218 Grattan (2013) and Oakes (2013, 317–19) confirm Hockey’s personal investment in the veracity of the costings 
process.  
219 Andrew Robb’s appointment to this role is significant. He is a substantial figure in the Liberal party; a known 
powerbroker and former Federal Director of the Liberal Party. 
220 In his post-election account, Federal Director of the Liberal Party and Coalition Campaign Director Brian 
Loughnane (2015, 199) confirmed that “Joe Hockey and Andrew Robb oversaw a rigorous, detailed process that 
gave us great confidence in the viability of the policies we announced.”  
221 An account of this dinner and surrounding events is provided by Hockey’s Biographer Madonna King (2014a, 
Chapter 21). 
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staffs, Peta Credlin and Grant Lovett respectively—reached final agreement on cutting aid 
during this dinner. While confident of victory by this stage, this inner circle reaffirmed their small 
target strategy and, I believe, likely war-gamed how to choreograph the aid cut announcement 
to elicit maximum political advantage in the media.  
 
Hockey and Robb’s announcement took place one hour after Kevin Rudd’s final set piece of the 
campaign. Rudd had briefly returned as Prime Minister in the last days of the Labour 
Government, after Julia Gillard’s colleagues ousted her as their electoral prospects nosedived. 
Hockey and Robb’s move ensured Rudd would not be able to respond and that the cuts would 
get maximum media exposure (Grattan 2013; Ireland and Hall 2013). Coalition strategists knew 
that the Coalition’s ‘surprise’ cuts to the aid budget would dominate the evening news a few 
hours later and would be front page news across Australia on the final day before the election222. 
Senior Coalition figures were scrupulously ‘on message’, regarding the cuts, both in how they 
went about ‘selling’ the cuts and defending them in the 24 hours following the aid cut 
announcement. Three talking points appear to have been agreed. First, Coalition figures were 
at pains to emphasise that they were choosing to prioritising infrastructure spending over aid 
spending (Hockey and Robb 2013b; Gordon 2013; Errington and van Onselen 2015, 39). Second, 
senior Coalition figures repeatedly emphasised that the cuts were merely ‘reducing the rate of 
growth’ in the aid budget (Hockey and Robb 2013b, 2013a)223. Finally, Coalition figures repeated 
the claim that borrowing from overseas to fund aid commitments was unsustainable224 (Bishop 
2013). This line helped the Coalition to demonstrate it was taking action on ‘paying back the 
debt’, while chiming with the instincts of numerous conservative voters who tended to believe 
“charity begins at home”. In a doorstop interview only hours after Hockey and Robb’s costing 
announcement, the first two question directed at Abbott were about the cuts to aid. Abbott’s 
responses contained all three of the talking points above (Abbott 2013a). 
  
The decision to highlight the cut to aid was a politically effectively strategy. The Park Hyatt Group 
understood that aid was a politically “soft target”, as a number of journalists immediately noted 
(Grattan 2013; Jericho 2013; Gordon 2013). “The issue is not a mass vote changer” reported 
Grattan (2013); “most people just don’t care enough.” The bottom line for raiding the aid 
budget, Grattan suggested, was obvious: “raiding foreign aid has made it easier to avoid cuts in 
areas such as health and education, which can be vote changer.” Aid’s low salience meant it was 
                                                          
222 A front page headline on 6 September in The Australian, one of Australia’s two national newspapers, read 
‘Aid cuts, `stop the boats' dividend underpin Hockey's $42bn savings’ (Crowe 2013). 
223 Based on the figures the Coalition provided, this claim appeared to be untrue. An analysis by Stephen Howes 
(2013d) concluded that “[t]he cuts… imply $656 million being taken from the aid budget in the current year.”  
224 This claim too, was shown to be misleading. Media watchdog website Politifact Australia rated the claim as 
‘mostly false’ (E. Harvey and Pash 2013).  
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easily sacrificed. In fact, aid spending was doubly dispensable because the public understood 
that the aid budget had grown rapidly under Rudd, meaning cutting aid became a more potent 
symbol for the Coalition to demonstrate it was ‘serious’ about repairing the budget.  
 
The Park Hyatt Group knew the cuts would not provoke a public backlash. They had already 
witnessed how little effective pushback Labor had received from the development constituency 
or the broader electorate for cutting aid under Gillard. Furthermore, they could surmise from 
both public and private polling and focus group research that Australian’s were growing 
increasingly concerned with the growing deficit (Loughnane 2015, 193) and that reducing aid 
was welcomed by three-quarters of voters who believed spending cuts were necessary225 . 
Ultimately, however, the most compelling demonstration of the irresistible political logic of 
cutting the aid budget at a time of hyper-politicisation of the budget deficit was the fact that the 
Coalition repeatedly ‘went back to the well’ returning twice more during the Abbott 
Government to derive savings from this “soft target” (Wade 2016), making for three major cuts 
in just fifteen months (see Table 5.D below). (Although it is outside the time period for this study, 
it is also notable that the Turnbull Government, which succeeded the Abbott Government, made 
an additional cut to aid spending in the in the 2016-17 budget (Dornan 2017)). 
Table 5.D: Abbott Government Cuts to Aid, 2013-2016 
Cut # Name Date Announced 
Total Savings over Forward Estimates 
($ billion)226 
1 Pre-Election Aid Cuts 5 Sep 2013 4.60 
2 2014-15 Budget Cuts 13 May 2014 7.60227 
3 2014-15 Mid-year Economic Update Cuts (MYEFO) 15 Dec 2014 3.70 
5.3.3 Exhibit B: The 2014-15 Budget Cuts 
In May 2014, eight months after the Coalition’s surprising pre-election aid cut, Hockey 
announced aid would be cut by a further $7.6 billion (Hockey 2014). The way the Coalition 
presented these cuts in the 2014-15 budget is a key piece of evidence supporting my argument 
that the politicisation of the budget deficit provided a key the impetus to change aid policy.  
                                                          
225 An opinion poll conducted by Essential Vision on 13 August, midway through the campaign, asked voters 
whether the government should raise taxes, cut spending or combination to reduce the national debt. 76% of 
respondents who favoured some form of spending cuts indicated that “foreign aid was an area where government 
spending should be reduced” (Burkot and Wood 2015, 6–7). This was the highest percentage of the 15 areas 
surveyed. 
226 Total savings over the forward estimates period (i.e. current year plus three future years) 
227 The forward estimates quote in this budget included an additional (fourth) future year. 
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After assuming office, Abbott and Hockey found the financial situation to be worse than they 
had expected. Having campaigned on “addressing the ‘budget emergency’” (M. King 2014a, Loc 
3574) the pair found themselves in a dilemma: “they could keep their [pre-election] promises or 
address the broken budget. But they could not do both satisfactorily” (Kelly 2014, Loc 10506). 
Hockey’s budget speech left no doubt as to the chosen course: “[w]ithout change, the Budget 
would never get to surplus and the debt would never be repaid” Hockey (2014) declared: “[s]o 
the time to fix the budget is now.” Cuts to aid spending were singled-out as prime evidence that 
the Coalition was taking appropriate measures to achieve this imperative: “Since coming to 
office, we have carefully and methodically looked at all areas of government spending” 
continued Hockey (2014), before immediately adding: “The government has decided to reduce 
the growth in our foreign aid budget to save $7.9 billion [sic] over five years228.” 
 
The cuts to the aid budget were the largest single saving in the budget—an outcome that was 
deliberately choreographed. Contrary to convention, the Coalition’s reference to cuts in the aid 
budget incorporated an additional future year into the forward estimates; they announced 
savings accrued over four future years, rather than the conventional three229. This was especially 
significant because in this fourth out-year (2017-18), the aid budget, on existing projections, was 
scheduled to increase by $3.5 billion (or close to half of the total savings resultant from the aid 
cut) in a single year. This forecasted ramp up in expenditure of $3.5 billion in 2017-18 was simply 
not credible. 
 
Nonetheless, incorporating  this proposed future expenditure into their scheduled savings 
allowed the Government to present the cuts to aid as the single largest saving measure in the 
budget—a detail that was highlighted in the budget summary (Commonwealth of Australia 
2014, 33). Normally, because the fourth out-year is not published, it cannot be included in the 
forward estimates and thus cannot be ‘counted’ as a saving. But the Coalition appeared to 
deliberately change this convention in order to be able to demonstrate that aid savings were in 
fact larger than they would have otherwise been, giving the impression of doing more to fix the 
                                                          
228 This reference to $7.9 billion in the Treasurer’s speech was a typo. The actual figure, as the budget documents 
specified, was $7.6 billion. 
229 A budget guide developed by the Parliamentary Library (R. Webb 2001) gave the following explanation for 
‘forward estimates’: “Forward Estimates are rolling three-year estimates of what would be appropriated assuming 
that government policy is on-going. Forward Estimates therefore do not include new programs, the expansion of 
existing programs that the government has not agreed to, or programs that are expected to end (emphasis added)”. 
Based on this explanation, the 2014-15 budget appears to contravene the conventions in two respects; extending 
the estimates period by a year, and including the expansion of a program (i.e. the aid program) that they clearly not 
agreed to in light of the pre-election cuts.  
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budget, as well as providing political cover because cuts to aid, and not a domestic cut, was 
doing most of this ‘heavy lifting’230.   
 
The Coalition was confident they would not be harmed politically when emphasising the cuts to 
aid in order to reinforce their message of fixing the budget. In fact, pre-budget polling suggested 
they would benefit from this decision. An Essential Media poll taken on 5 March, suggested that 
by far the most respondents preferred the government to cut spending rather than raise taxes 
in order to reduce national debt (47% to 6%, with 19% preferring both, 20% neither and 8% 
‘don’t know). Of those who preferred reducing spending, or enacting both spending cuts and tax 
increases, 79% said that the government should reduce foreign aid spending (Burkot and Wood 
2015, 28). Those preparing the budget would have been well aware of these results and almost 
certainly would have conducted focus groups to further understand these preferences231. In a 
post-budget poll published by Essential Media, 64% of voters supported the decision to freeze 
aid spending. 83% of Coalition voters were in agreement with the freeze to aid spending, while 
Labor voters—traditionally more supportive of aid spending that Coalition voters—also 
overwhelmingly supported the freeze (Day 2014a; Burkot and Wood 2015, 27). As McDonald 
(2015, 663) summarises, “resources committed to a tool of Australian foreign policy were 
viewed as mechanisms for off-setting domestic funding cuts—an approach that was enabled by 
Australian domestic political opinion.”  
 
The ‘budget deficit’ aid salience shock was a product of the Abbott government framing cuts to 
aid as ‘evidence’ that were taking the task of ‘budget repair’ seriously. As a political tactic, it 
appears to have been successful. “It is clear that the Coalition… singled out foreign aid for cuts” 
argues Matt Dornan (2017), citing figures showing that government spending since the Coalition 
took power has climbed over 10% after inflation, while aid spending declined by more than 30% 
over that period. Wade (2016) agrees. “While aid is only about 1 per cent of budget 
expenditure”, he points out, “it has made up around 25 per cent of all budget cuts announced 
by the government for the period 2013-14 to 2018-19.232” “Aid has been singled out for cuts that 
are disproportionate relative to other areas of spending”, continues Dornan, before concluding 
                                                          
230The Coalition’s move surprised those in the aid sector who watched the budget closely. Andrew Johnson, team 
leader for government relations for World Vision at the time, explained it to me this way: “They folded in a nominal 
jump that was never real [thereby] inflat[ing] the figure that was cut to make it sound even bigger than it was...” 
Johnson was in no doubt as to the reason for this: they [Hockey and Abbott] were keen for it to be the biggest budget 
saving.” Amanda Robbins reacted similarly: “the Government appears to have inflated the size of that save to make 
it [the] number one save because they didn’t want to make any of the domestic saves the top save...” 
231 Madonna King has documented how polling on the issue of the introduction of a deficit levy directly influenced 
decision-making during the budget process (M. King 2014a, Loc 3773). Andrew Johnson, of World Vision Australia, 
also revealed to me that he had focus group research done around this time showing that the “debt and deficit 
disaster outdid every other rational argument about aid.”   
232 Wade’s figures include current projected expenditure on aid. 
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that, “[c]learly cutting the aid budget is about priorities for the Coalition, not about fiscal 
restraint”. In this section, I have shown that cutting was indeed about “other priorities” for the 
Coalition. Cutting aid was not so much about achieving fiscal restraint as generating the 
impression of fiscal restraint. But the cuts to aid spending were also part of another dynamic 
entirely, as I now move to explain. 
 
§§§ 
 
 
5.4 Removing the Aid Expansion: Liberal Party Factionalism and Aid 
 
[T]he only issue in recent times that 
might have split the Liberal Party was 
the decision to cut into foreign aid 
spending  
—Peter van Onselen, 2011 
 
The rapid reversal of Australia’s aid spending trajectory is not explained by the budget deficit 
aid salience shock alone. Another salience shock, generated by intra-party divisions within the 
Liberal Party, also emerged during this period to exert downward pressure on aid spending. 
These two salience shocks reinforced each other, generating irresistible momentum for aid 
policy change. Their powerful combined effect ensured that that Australia’s aid expansion was 
not simply paused, or even wound back, but—in the space of the two-year lifespan of the Abbott 
Government—entirely reversed. In this section, I trace the emergence of the Liberal Party 
factionalism aid salience shock, showing how aid policy became a touchstone issue in a broader 
internal party conflict between the liberal (or moderate) and conservative wings of the Liberal 
Party. 
5.4.1 The Emergence of the Liberal Party Factionalism Aid Salience Shock 
The Liberal Party of Australia is regularly described as a ‘broad church’, the “political custodian 
of both the liberal and the conservative traditions” (Abbott 2009, 59). Many observers, including 
Tony Abbott (2009, 59), cite John Howard’s ability to “manage the tensions inside these two 
different orientations but also to reconcile each to the other” as a key factor explaining Howard’s 
long tenure as Prime Minister. In late 2009, however, the Party’s liberal and conservative wings 
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proved unable to reconcile when it came to the issue of climate change, with Abbott himself 
playing a leading role in the “struggle for internal unity” (Kelly 2014, Loc 820) that engulfed the 
party from this point, and which still overshadow the Party (A. Crabb 2016, Chapter 9).  
 
The “late 2009 Liberal Party showdown”, as veteran Australian journalist Paul Kelly (2014, Loc 
820) has called it, was the starting point of this intra-party struggle and provides “the key to the 
politics of the period”, including the politics of aid policy233. The showdown was triggered when 
then-Party leader and noted moderate Malcolm Turnbull resolved to support the passage of 
Rudd’s proposed Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) legislation. The conservative wing was strongly 
opposed to this decision, for ideological as well as political strategy reasons (see also van 
Onselen 2011). As Turnbull continued to negotiate with the Government, the right-wing of his 
party became increasing agitated. Key figures began to resign. Eventually, a decisive leadership 
ballot was held on 1 December 2009, contested by Tony Abbott, Malcolm Turnbull and Joe 
Hockey (Kelly 2014, Loc 815). Hockey was considered the pre-vote favourite but, after 
equivocating on his position on climate change, was eliminated in the first round of balloting. In 
the second round, Abbott defeated Turnbull for the leadership of the Liberal Party by the 
narrowest of margins, 42 to 41—underscoring just how divided the Party was.  
 
It is broadly accurate, but overly simplistic, to characterise the division in the Liberal Party as 
pitting ‘climate believers’ (the moderates) against ‘climate sceptics’ (the conservatives) (A. 
Crabb 2016, Loc 1871). Yet the split was more fundamental than this. “This issue transcended 
climate change and went to identity and values,” argues Paul Kelly (2014, Loc 905). Climate 
change became an “ideological wedge” (Kelly 2014, Loc 918), a totemic issue which split open 
the contrasting beliefs and values of the Party’s dominant factions. Abbott would later tell 
journalist Paul Kelly that the reason he stood in the leadership challenge was because the 
climate issue “threatened to split our party and it threatened to break the Coalition” (Kelly 2014, 
Loc 820). And while the issue of aid policy was not as central to the intraparty divisions in the 
Liberal Party as climate change during this period, the dynamics played out in a similar fashion.  
 
Aid, too, became a touchstone in the ongoing contest within the party “about policy and 
ultimately about belief” (Kelly 2014, Loc 791), with pro and anti-aid positions more or less 
mapping directly with the moderate and conservative factions, respectively. The moderate wing 
of the Liberal Party, with its internationalist strain, viewed aid spending more favourably than 
                                                          
233 For detailed accounts of the 2009 Liberal Party leadership spill, see Crabb (2016), Chapter Seven – ‘Convictions’, 
and Kelly (2014), Chapter 2 – ‘The Making of An Opposition’. Crabb (2016, 1541) characterises the 2009 Liberal 
Party leadership spill as “a mighty fulcrum in the affairs of the Liberal Party, and indeed the country.”  
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the conservative wing and especially the Nationals, the Liberal Party’s long-term coalition 
partners. Moderates were less inclined to have ideological objections to wealth transfer (more 
broadly) and with government-funded-and-operated aid delivery (more specifically). Yet 
perhaps even more importantly for the fate of aid spending, the conservative wing prioritised a 
more rapid return to surplus than their moderate counterparts. Because the conservatives were 
far more inclined to cut aid to further this objective, aid spending became particularly vulnerable 
in the emerging environment where the conservative wing held sway over the Liberal Party and 
the budget deficit aid salience shock was already placing downward pressure on aid spending.  
 
The Liberal Party’s conservative wing dominated while Abbott was leader (A. Crabb 2016, Loc 
1867), a dominance that was revealed in the ideological composition of key decisionmaking units 
during this period. For example, conservatives dominated the Park Hyatt Group, which—as 
discussed in subsection 5.3.2 earlier in this chapter—directed Coalition strategy ahead of the 
2013 election and oversaw the pre-election aid cuts. After winning Government, the 
Expenditure Review Committee (ERC) of Cabinet became the authoritative decision unit 
responsible for establishing budget priorities and coordinating and producing the federal 
budget. This group’s membership was also exclusively derived from the conservative wing of the 
party, with the notable exception of Hockey, who was from the moderate faction. However, 
while Shadow Treasurer, Hockey came to the firm view that an ‘entitlement culture’ had 
infected Western democracies (Kelly 2014, Loc. 10603). Hockey’s biographer Madonna King 
believes Hockey was genuinely motivated to fix the budget (M. King 2014a, Loc. 7382) and 
documents how his desire to ‘end of the age of entitlement’ permeated the Treasurer’s 
approach to preparing the 2014-15 budget (M. King 2014a, Loc. 3763)234. According to King, 
Hockey was even more aggressive in wanting to trim the budget than Abbott. With Hockey’s 
economic priorities aligning so closely with his conservative colleagues, the ERC functioned as 
an ideologically homogenous group.  
 
Another similarity Hockey and his conservative colleagues on the ERC (and in the Park Hyatt 
Group, for that matter) shared was a distinct lack of political or personal commitment to 
expanding aid235. The unwillingness of these politicians, particularly Abbott and Hockey, to voice 
                                                          
234 According to Errington and Van Onselen (2015, 90), Hockey’s ‘The End of the Age of Entitlement’ speech, 
delivered in London in April 2012 (Hockey 2012), represented “a transparent attempt to provide an ideological edge 
to [Hockey’s] cuddly persona.” See also Kelly (2014, Loc. 10198). 
235 A possible exception is Scott Morrison, an evangelical Christian who expressed, in his maiden speech to 
Parliament, a desire to see aid spending increased. In any case, Morrison was only appointed to the ERC ahead of 
the 2015-16 budget (i.e. after the decisions to make the first two aid cuts had already been made) and, later, as 
Treasurer, oversaw the fourth aid cut. 
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their full-throated support for the ostensibly bipartisan 0.5% target didn’t go unnoticed236. The 
ERC members shared an ideological proclivity towards cutting aid, especially given the 
prominence the expanding aid budget had received during the Golden Consensus expansion237. 
The ERC prioritised ‘small government’ and had philosophical misgivings about the 
Government’s role in aid delivery. This is not to say these men were entirely uninterested in 
addressing poverty; just that they were sceptical that aid, especially government delivered aid, 
could fix it. Moreover, the careers of the ERC members had focussed on domestic political issues; 
none could be classified as internationalist in orientation. They men were wary of international 
agreements and were united in viewing Australia’s standing in the world as deriving more from 
its economic security than from fulfilling its international obligations. Abbott made this clear in 
a speech in late 2013, in which he argued that:  “Australia’s international clout does not rest on 
the size of our aid budget but on the size of our economy and the weight it gives us in the wider 
world” (Abbott 2013b). 
  
The shared ideology uniting the ERC was reinforced by existing relationships among the group’s 
key members. Relationships between the “small group of ministers and staffers” that were 
“responsible for structuring the Abbott government’s first budget” (Tingle 2014) were “marked 
by a lack of acrimony” (M. King 2014a, Loc. 3763). Yet these group dynamics also meant the 
views of moderates were excluded. The existence of strong friendships—particularly between 
Hockey and Cormann, who were flatmates in Canberra, and Hockey and Dutton—meant that 
“much of the horse-trading over cuts was done outside meetings, and by staff, before being 
brought to the expenditure review committee for public airing” (M. King 2014a, Loc. 3780). Julie 
Bishop was not party to this horse-trading. Despite being the Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party, 
Bishop was not a member of the ERC and was unable to exert significant influence over 
budgetary matters, including within her own portfolio. Even if she had wanted to, Bishop was 
not able to act as a ‘political protector’ of aid during the Abbott Government in the way that 
Rudd had and (as we will see in chapter 6) David Cameron did.  
  
                                                          
236 For example, after conducting a wide-ranging interview with Abbott in 2011, when he was Opposition Leader, 
The Australian newspaper’s foreign editor Greg Sheridan (2011c), a friend of Abbott’s, concluded that the 
Opposition were “notionally” committed to 0.5 target. Sheridan didn’t believe Abbott’s notably qualified assurances 
around the 0.5% target and predicated that the pledge would be abandoned following the conclusion Australia’s UN 
Security Council seat bid.   
237 For an encapsulation of the views of the conservative wing of the Liberal Party regarding aid spending, numerous 
interviewees referred me to a letter to the editor published in The Australian on 7 March 2013 by former Senator 
and long serving Howard-government Finance Minister Nick Minchin, a conservative powerbroker. Minchin (2013) 
argued that “Australia's foreign aid budget is in urgent need of reconsideration”, adding that the Australian 
government was “in the ludicrous position of borrowing money overseas to send it back overseas as foreign aid”. 
He suggested the aid budget be frozen at “least until the federal budget was back in surplus”. 
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In fact, as the forthcoming examples documented in the remaining two parts of this section of 
the chapter demonstrate, Bishop was repeatedly shut out from decisions relating to aid 
spending, despite their direct relevance to her portfolio responsibilities. Errington and van 
Onselen (2015, 90) agree that Bishop’s sidelining had a direct impact on aid spending:   
Much to Julie Bishop’s annoyance, aid was both an easy target and another 
issue scorned by the party’s social conservative and free marketeers. In spite 
of being deputy leader, Bishop was not on the ERC, and was therefore unable 
to save her department from cuts238. 
5.4.2 Exhibit A: The 2011 Flood Levy Precedent 
The reason I have chosen to relate an episode I have labelled ‘The Flood Levy Precedent’ in this 
part of this chapter is because of how it foreshadows, in a remarkably accurate way, how aid 
policy decisionmaking would operate during the life of the future Abbott Government. This 
episode established a pattern that was repeated on each on each of three occasions that the 
future Abbott Government decided to cut aid (refer Table 5.D). It therefore serves to reveal the 
remarkably uniform way in which the Liberal Party Factionalism salience shock provided the 
impetus to reduce aid spending in Australia over the duration of the Abbot Government. The 
flood levy precedent vividly illustrates how the Liberal Party factionalism aid salience shock 
operates. Aid stays on the political agenda because of its role of an ideological wedge, splitting 
the party into moderate and conservative camps and igniting leadership tensions involving a 
familiar cast of characters in a familiar aid spending story: Abbott and the conservatives prevail 
over Bishop and the moderates.  
 
In late January 2011, the Gillard government announced the imposition of a flood levy to 
generate $1.8 billion to help fund reconstruction efforts following devastating flooding in South-
East Queensland. Abbott quickly rejected the notion of a temporary levy, pledging to find savings 
elsewhere. However, an initial package of cuts drafted by Opposition Finance Spokesman 
Andrew Robb triggered serious disagreements within the shadow cabinet, with proposed cuts 
to aid being one of the most contentious elements and “fiercely opposed by some in the shadow 
cabinet” (Probyn 2011). In response, a revised package of cuts was drafted by the offices of 
Abbott, Hockey and Robb (R. Peake 2011; Probyn 2011; Grattan and Oakes 2011) was 
subsequently considered, and essentially agreed to, by a hastily convened shadow cabinet 
meeting in Sydney on 4 February. The revised package retained cuts to aid to Africa (Probyn 
                                                          
238 Bishop’s disdain for the ERC was most powerfully expressed in the ‘eye-roll incident’ in early 2015, in which Bishop 
was clearly captured on camera in Parliament rolling her eyes at the precise moment Hockey mentioned the ERC 
(Ireland 2015). The incident made national headlines for a couple of days and contributed to the ongoing leadership 
tensions which would eventually see Abbott deposed and replaced by Turnbull (M. Kenny 2015a, 2015b).  
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2011). Crucially, Julie Bishop, who was the Deputy Leader and Shadow Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, as well as a moderate, was not present at the 4 February meeting.  
 
When shadow cabinet met again in Canberra a few days later, Bishop argued “fiercely and 
passionately” against the proposed cuts to aid to Africa (R. Peake 2011)239. While the “aid issue 
sharply divided the frontbenchers” (Grattan and Oakes 2011), Bishop was the senior moderate 
who took up the fight. In a front-page article in The Age newspaper the following day, Grattan 
and Oakes (2011) reported that Bishop had told her colleagues that “the push to cut African aid 
flew in the face of Mr Abbott’s election promise to raise foreign aid to 0.5 per cent of gross 
national income by 2015.” Another source claimed Bishop had “argued forcefully that Abbott 
was about to trash his solemn pledge last year [i.e in 2010] to church groups to lift Australia’s 
foreign aid” (R. Peake 2011)240. Bishop also rejected a suggestion to defer the 0.5% aid target 
(Grattan and Oakes 2011). This meeting of shadow cabinet reportedly closed with Bishop 
succeeding in stopping the proposed $373 million in cuts to the aid program by agreeing to 
identifying cuts elsewhere (R. Peake 2011). 
 
The next day, Abbott and Hockey held a press conference to unveil $2 billion worth of proposed 
cuts in lieu of imposing a flood levy. Here they announced that around a quarter of these savings 
($448 million) would be generated by deferring an aid program in education to Indonesia 
(Abbott and Hockey 2011). Bishop was blindsided by the announcement of the cut to aid to 
Indonesia. She was not consulted and “was especially angry because she believe she had 
successfully defeated an earlier proposal in the shadow ministry meeting to cut the aid budget 
to Africa” (Dodson 2011).  
 
Bishop was further enraged by a column published the following day in The Australian by its 
foreign affairs editor Greg Sheridan, a friend of Tony Abbott’s and a fellow conservative. 
Sheridan praised the decision to “take the axe to Australia’s wildly ballooning aid budget” 
(Sheridan 2011a) and sharply criticised Bishop for fighting the cuts to aid in Africa241. With 
leadership tensions already running high—Robb was reportedly campaigning to acquire the 
deputy leadership from Bishop (Probyn 2011)—Bishop confronted Abbott about the piece, 
which she presumably assumed reflected Abbott’s own views (Grattan 10 February; Callick and 
Alford 2011; Sheridan 2011b).  
                                                          
239 This formal meeting of shadow cabinet took place on Monday 7th February.  
240 Bishop was referencing Abbott’s pledge to uphold the 0.5% target at the Micah Challenge Voices for Justice 
Event on 21 June 2010.  
241 Sheridan wrote that Bishop’s behaviour this showed “what a hopeless, hopeless foreign affairs spokeswomen 
she is”. 
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The next day, the front page headline of The Australian read ‘Bishop Fury at Abbott Aid Savings’ 
(Callick and Alford 2011). This particular article encapsulates the essence of a story that 
dominated the news cycle in Australia for two weeks. It reveals the rapid salience attachment 
process whereby aid spending became intertwined with Liberal Part factionalism to the point 
where a salience shock emerged. Aid spending was suddenly a vitally important issue to Liberal 
politicians, and by extension the media, because it had become a touchstone issue dividing the 
Liberal Party and driving leadership speculation. The story dominated the media not because it 
was about aid, but because of the party’s leadership was divided.  
 
One would have suspected that senior Liberals would have desired to put this bitter public row 
behind them in the interests of demonstrating unity, given the story dominated the news for a 
fortnight. Yet a few months later, in a live television interview on the evening the 2012-12 
budget was handed down, Hockey (2011) was unable to hide his frustration at Labor’s record-
setting increases to aid spending. (Recall that this was just after the handing down of the 
Independent Review, at the peak of Rudd’s influence on the aid expansion). “If you want to know 
what will rile Australians families” suggested Hockey, “the foreign aid budget is increasing by $6 
billion over the next four years”. When the interviewer responded by asking Hockey if he would 
seek to overturn to aid increase, Hockey responded by saying that “from our perspective, it’s 
not the major priority at the moment” and explicitly prioritising a rapid return to surplus above 
achieving the 0.5% target.” Bishop felt the need to respond by issuing a press release the next 
morning clarifying that the Coalition remained committed to the 0.5% target (Coorey and Oakes 
2011). 
5.4.3 Exhibit B: The December 2014 MYEFO Aid Cuts  
The same parameters established by the Flood Levy precedent characterised the decisionmaking 
processes leading to the Abbot Government’s first and second cuts to aid (refer Table 5.D). Space 
doesn’t allow a recounting of these two cuts. Instead, I fast-forward here to examine in detail 
how the Liberal Party factionalism aid salience shock contributed to the Abbott Government’s 
third aid cut. The divisions in the Coalition over the third cut to aid played out much more 
publicly than the previous two, making this episode a more relevant and instructive one to focus 
on.  
 
On October 2 2014, David Crowe reported in The Australian that another cut to the aid budget 
was the “leading option” to cover the cost of the military deployment to fight ISIS (Crowe 2014a). 
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Cabinet ministers were “canvassing an extension to the freeze in the annual aid increase, 
perhaps for another two years, so that outlays would start growing again only from 2018-19.” 
(Crowe 2014a). Bishop responded swiftly, emphatically telling ABC Radio National later that 
morning that there had been “no discussion in Cabinet along those lines”, adding that “we will 
abide by the commitments we made in relation to foreign aid” (Hurst 2014; Bishop 2014a). To 
ensure her message was transmitted, Bishop then conducted a doorstop interview in the Press 
Gallery at Parliament House where she repeated her earlier line—there “has been no such 
discussion in Cabinet along those lines”—twice (Bishop 2014b). Following this second interview, 
Bishop attended a leadership meeting where other senior Cabinet figures were present 
(Uhlmann 2014). She was reported to have asked “which Minister was talking to the media 
about her portfolio without consulting her” and “made it clear to her senior colleagues she 
[would] fight any attempt to cut the foreign aid budget” (Uhlmann 2014).  
 
Bishop was able to repeatedly assert that the prospective aid cuts had not raised in cabinet 
because, as she well knew, they were first being considered by the ERC (or a subgroup of it)242. 
This decision unit was now considering the budget at is prepared the Mid-Year Economic and 
Financial Outlook (MYEFO)243. Bishop was once again marginalised from the ERC. What made 
the decisionmaking process leading up to the third cut to aid different to the earlier two was 
that Bishop was alerted of the potential cuts well ahead of time and decided to fight them. This 
meant that the friction between Bishop and the ERC—and, by extension, between the 
conservative and moderate wings of the Liberal Party—played out more publicly than during the 
first two cuts.  
 
Despite increasing pressures on the budget, including an uncooperative Senate and further 
declining commodity prices, Abbott and Hockey recommitted to their existing political strategy 
ahead of announcing the MYEFO in December. The Coalition would return the budget to surplus 
in four years. As Hockey made clear, this required the Coalition to demonstrate savings in the 
MYEFO that could offset new expenditure commitments (Crowe 2014b). In an appearance on 
Sky News Australia’s Australian Agenda program on 5 October, Cormann was asked whether 
there was capacity to find savings from the aid budget. The Finance Minister refused to rule out 
more cuts to aid, highlighting that “our commitment is not to add to the deficit, not to add to 
debt...” (Cormann 2014) A couple of days later, Hockey warned from New York, where he was 
                                                          
242 Crowe confirmed this afterwards when he reported that ministers were “examining the foreign aid option and 
others in meetings of the expenditure review committee of cabinet before the MYEFO changes go to cabinet” 
(Crowe 2014b). 
243 The MYEFO is a process mandated under Charter of Budget Honesty legislation which “updates the economic 
and fiscal outlook from the previous budget” (Australian Government 2014).  
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attending meetings, that lower commodity prices would impact that budget and that “we’ll have 
more to say in MYEFO” (Crowe 2014b).  
 
For a time, the ERC negotiations played out behind closed doors. The ERC worked through 
spending proposals with relevant ministers. Then, on 1 December, The Australian Financial 
Review reported that “foreign aid cuts are back in the government’s sights as it spends the next 
two weeks looking for more savings to tackle a budget deficit worsened by plunging revenues 
and the Senate blocking measures” (Coorey and Greber 2014). The article cited ‘senior sources’ 
as confirming the aid budget would “be trimmed again, despite the internal protests of Foreign 
Affairs Minister Julie Bishop.” A couple of days later, Davie Wroe (2014), in The Age, reported 
that Hockey and Cormann were behind the push to cut aid. 
 
By now, Bishop was resigned to her portfolio’s budget being cut once again244. This was revealed 
by a marked change in approach. On the morning Wroe’s article appeared, Bishop conducted a 
combative interview on ABC radio where she abandoned her public advocacy for maintaining 
aid spending and attacked Labor. “If there are savings from the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade [in the MYEFO] because we cannot get our budget reforms through the Senate,” 
Bishop vented, “I will blame Labor” (Bishop 2014c). Becoming more personal, Bishop added: “I 
hope the message is loud and clear: if there are cuts to my department, if there are cuts to the 
foreign aid budget, it will be [senior Labor figures] Tanya Plibersek, Bill Shorten, Chris Bowne, 
Tony Burke–their responsibility” (Bishop 2014c). These previous Cabinet Ministers had 
“vandalised the budget” said Bishop, leaving it in a “state of utter disrepair”. Bishop’s parting 
promise was to hang any savings found from her department “around the neck of Tanya 
Plibersek each and every day until the next election”. Bishop’s comments were widely broadcast 
on radio and repeated in print over the following days (Rajca 2014). 
 
This visceral reaction from Bishop was uncharacteristic. She is renowned as very disciplined and 
measured politician (M. King 2014b; Mayes 2007; Snow 2013; Callick 2013; Wallace 2015). The 
outburst was more than Bishop attempting to pre-emptively absolve herself of responsibility for 
the aid cuts (Benson 2014; S. McDonald 2014); it was the culmination of her deep personal 
frustration at being continually sidelined by the ERC. To have the aid budget cut again, after 
she’d repeatedly publicly staked her credibility on maintaining it at $5 billion, was now becoming 
politically damaging. It was patently clear Bishop had lost an internal power struggle. She 
                                                          
244 Later, it emerged that Bishop and Cormann had Julie Bishop, had been “involved in a row… at an expenditure 
review committee meeting two weeks ago when the proposal [to cut aid] was raised.” This places the date of this 
pivotal ERC meeting at around 1 December. 
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effectively admitted as much to aid agencies by instructing her staff to tell them to “take up their 
concern” about the pending aid cuts with Hockey and Abbott (Benson 2014).  
 
On December 15 2014, Hockey and Cormann conducted a joint press conference to announce 
the release of the MYEFO245. Just as in the 2014-15 budget, the Coalition were happy to highlight 
the substantial nature of the cuts to aid; Hockey made it clear that cuts to aid were enacted in 
order to continue the task of ‘budget repair’. Furthermore, the Coalition repeated their strategy 
from the 2014-15 budget of making aid cuts the largest saving and thus likely the top media 
story. While taking questions after delivering his address, Hockey volunteered that “the cut in 
foreign aid is by far the largest reduction [announced in the MYEFO]” (Hockey and Cormann 
2014). The 2014-15 MYEFO established that the 2015-16 aid budget would be cut by 20% in a 
single year, reducing the size of the aid program to $4 billion—half the size it was projected to 
be just several years earlier. Analysis by Howes and Pyrke (2014) showed that the Coalition’s 
third cut represented the single largest single-year cut in the history of the Australia aid program. 
Unlike the earlier two cuts, which generated savings mostly by trimming projected expenditure 
from future years, the 2014-15 MYEFO cuts stripped away funding from the forthcoming budget 
(Day 2014b).  
 
Close watchers of the aid sector knew this decision involved more than just ‘fixing the budget’. 
After the cuts had been announced, World Vision Australia’s CEO Tim Costello was quoted in a 
column by Michael Gordon as saying “Julie was in there fighting. She was rolled. Her new aid 
paradigm [the name Bishop gave to her aid reforms] is in tatters.” As he is a personal friend of 
Bishop’s, this was an especially frank admission from Costello, and one that he later regretted 
having been made public. While the aid sector saw Bishop as their only friend in cabinet, they 
also gradually came to understand that she was not able to wield influence in the ERC. Reflecting 
on this incident, one development insider told me how:  
 
“The only person who was central to the leadership group who was an ally 
ours [i.e .the aid sector] was [Bishop], really. [But] we knew, privately, that 
we were on a hiding to nothing… This was about the internal dynamics within 
the Liberal Party and within the very senior leadership of the Liberal Party.”  
 
§§§ 
                                                          
245 Bishop made sure she was in Papua New Guinea at the time of the announcement. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has explained the major changes in Australia’s aid spending trajectory over the past 
decade as the result of three aid salience shocks.  The decade long aid expansion, beginning in 
2003-04, was the product of the Rudd aid salience shock. Rudd’s belief in the 0.5% target drove 
him to intervene repeatedly in aid policy decisionmaking episodes to further this policy goal, his 
considerably authority affording him this privilege. Yet the sudden withdrawal of the upward 
impetus on aid spending provided by this aid salience shock once Rudd resigned coincided 
closely with the emergence of two other aid salience shocks, which placed pressure on aid 
spending in the opposite direction. The intertwining influence of this pair of indirect (type II) aid 
salience shocks—the budget deficit and Liberal party factionalism aid salience shocks—help 
explain why the downturn in Australia’s aid spending, after cresting at a historical high, was so 
rapid.  
 
What this account also revealed was how factors from all levels of analysis impacted aid policy 
decisions. Rudd’s championing of the 0.5% target clearly sprang from personal motivation, but 
his ‘doubling down’ on John Howards’s own aid expansion was also the product of domestic 
political delineation that also relied on the symbolism of the MDGs. Likewise, the budget deficit 
aid salience shock could not have emerged without the international backdrop of the global 
financial crisis and the domestic impact of Tony Abbott’s disciplined and ruthless political tactics 
employed while Opposition leader. We also saw how the dominance of the conservative wing 
of the Liberal party on the Expenditure Review Committee (ERC) meant that small group 
dynamics played a crucial role in reducing Australia’s aid spending more rapidly than would 
otherwise have been the case.  These examples, and many others besides, show how actor-
specific theory can provide a multilevel perspective on aid policy change. The same is true when 
examining what transpired in the UK, which is the country to which we now turn our attention. 
 
§§§ 
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6 Explaining Aid Policy Change in 
the United Kingdom 
hen Tony Blair led the Labour Party to victory in the 1997 election, the UK’s spending 
on ODA was 0.26% of GNI. Sixteen years later, in 2013, it reached 0.7% under a 
Conservative-led Coalition Government. During this expansion period, British ODA spending 
almost quadrupled in real terms, growing from USD5billon in 1997 to USD19 billion in 2013 (see 
Figure 6.A below)246. This dramatic increase in aid spending is even more remarkable when 
viewed in historical context. “Historically, British aid policy has been incremental” explains 
Morrissey (2002, 14) “with no major changes in the allocation or composition of aid following 
changes of government since the 1960s…” What caused the recent aid spending policy trajectory 
to veer so decidedly away from its long-term path?  
 Figure 6.A: UK ODA Spending, 1960-2015247 
 
                                                          
246 To put the expansion into context, UK spending on ODA in 1997 was around half of that contributed by France, 
which has a similar-sized economy. By 2013, the UK contributed one-and-a-half times the ODA that France did. 
247 Data for Figure 6.A is from the OECD Query Wizard for International Development Statistics (QWIDS). 
W
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I argue in this chapter that aid policy change in the UK can be explained by the emergence of 
three interlocking and reinforcing aid salience shocks. Over time, the forces acted in concert, 
generating a virtuous cycle of commitment that propelled the UK towards achieving the 0.7% 
target. Following the pattern established in chapter 5, I tell this story in four ‘acts’. Overall, the 
narrative charts what I have called the ‘issue-ownership’ spiral—a unique political dynamic 
where the UK’s political commitment to the 0.7% target was ratcheted up over time as Labour 
and the Conservatives tried to ‘out do’ each other on aid as they competed to ‘own’ international 
development issues (see Table 6.A below). 
Table 6.A: The International Development 'Issue-Ownership Spiral' Towards 0.7%, 1997-2013 
Date Issue Ownership ‘play’ Policy Commitment / Action 
May 1997 Labour advance DFID is established as an independent Ministry with its own Cabinet. 
July 2004 Labour advance Gordon Brown commits the UK to spending 0.7% of GNI on ODA by 2013. 
July 2005 Labour advance Labour reaffirms its commitment to spend 0.7% of GNI by 2013 at the G8 Summit at Gleneagles. 
June 2006 Conservative response David Cameron, as Opposition Leader, commits a future Conservative Government to achieving the 0.7% target by 2013. 
Jan 2009 Conservative advance David Cameron commits to ‘ringfencing’ the aid budget, despite calling for deep spending cuts elsewhere. 
Sep 2009 Labour response Gordon Brown promises to enshrine the 0.7% target in law in his speech at the 2009 Labour Party Conference. 
Apr 2010 Conservative response The Conservative Manifesto promises to enshrine the 0.7% target in law. 
Mar 2013 Conservative advance George Osborne confirms that the UK will achieve the 0.7% target in 2013. 
 
I begin the chapter by documenting the emergence and impact of the Short aid salience shock, 
a direct (type I) aid salience shock named for Secretary of State for International Development 
Clare Short. This aid salience shock set in motion a series of path dependencies that played out 
over the ensuing decade, most importantly securing the status of the Department for 
International Development (DFID) and beginning an aid spending ramp up. Part two documents 
the Tory modernisation aid salience shock, an indirect (type II) aid salience shock that 
accompanied David Cameron’s elevation to the Conservative Party leadership in 2005 whereby 
the Tory commitment to 0.7% became a symbol of ‘Tory modernisation’. The next section charts 
the emergence of the complementary Cameron-Mitchell direct (type I) aid salience shock, 
named for Cameron and Andrew Mitchell, Secretary of State for International Development 
from 2010-2012. The story reaches its climax in the chapter’s final section, where I demonstrate 
how the interaction of these three aid salience shocks produced an environment in which the 
0.7% target was achieved, despite the presence of very strong countervailing political forces.  
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6.1 Foundations for 0.7%:  Clare Short, DFID and New Labour  
 
Clare Short was a total powerhouse. 
[Establishing DFID] was a visionary piece 
of engineering. 
—Duncan Green, 2015248 
 
In three years [Short] has transformed 
overseas development from a 
backwater, firmly in the grip of the 
Foreign Office, to an independent 
department, with its own (expanding) 
budget, pursuing its own agenda firmly 
focused on the poorest people in the 
poorest countries.  
—Chris Mullin, 2001                                                      
 
Clare Short is the single most important 
reason that DFID has become the 
organisation it now is… 
—Oliver Morrisey, 2002 
 
The creation of the Department for International Development (DFID) was announced (Hall 
2013, 230) on 3 June 1997, just 2 days after ‘New Labour’ was swept to power in the 1997 
election249 under Tony Blair’s leadership250. Within several years, this new institution was widely 
considered the world’s leading development agency, a standing it maintains (Easterly and 
Williamson 2011). Much of the credit for this rapid transformation is apportioned to Clare Short, 
whom Blair appointed as Secretary of State for International Development. A striking feature of 
the interview research I conducted with those involved in contemporary UK aid policymaking 
was how, almost without exception, they would inevitably draw my attention to the ‘Short years’ 
when offering an explanation for why the UK was able to achieve the 0.7%.  
 
                                                          
248 Personal interview with Duncan Green, December 2015. 
249 The Labour Party won 419 seats at the 1997 election, giving them a parliamentary majority of 177 (Pattie 2004, 
17) and returning Labour to government for the first time eighteen years (Casey 2009, 1). 
250 The establishment of DFID fulfilled Labour’s election promise to establish an independent development agency. 
It also extended a trend, unbroken since 1964, whereby under each successive Labour and Conservative 
governments, the agency responsible for administering aid would be afforded more or less autonomy respectively. 
Killick (2005, 670) provides an excellent overview of how the pendulum of administrative autonomy swung between 
Labour and the Conservatives between 1964 and 1997. “In essence,” summarises Killick (2005, 675), “Labour has 
stood for a relatively strong and independent aid ministry, the Conservatives for a weaker department formally 
located within the FCO.”  
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An appreciation of the lasting impact of Short’s leadership is essential to understanding how 
future UK development policy decisions unfolded. This section of the chapter documents the 
impact of the Short salience spike. First, I show how Short’s vision and personal drive was 
essential to establishing DFID’s institutional identity within Whitehall. Second, I explain how 
Short ensured DFID was instilled with an independent policy identity. Finally, I foreshadow the 
lasting implications of these twin changes by describing how they ‘locked-in’ an elevated 
presence for development issues on the UK’s political agenda, establishing path dependencies 
which ultimately led to achievement of the 0.7% target. 
6.1.1 Clare Short and the emergence of DFID  
As the epigraphs commencing this section suggest, Clare Short’s role as a driving force in the 
establishment of DFID is readily acknowledged251. Far less appreciated is how unlikely it was that 
Short found herself at the helm of the international development portfolio at in the first place.  
In a reshuffle of his shadow cabinet in 1996, Blair demoted Short from the Transport portfolio 
to shadow minister for international development. In her memoirs, Short (2005, 49) recalls 
feeling “stunned and angry” at this decision. Blair rang Short to try and calm her down, as did 
Blair’s staff (Short 2005, 49; Campbell 2007, 128). But it was only after sitting down with her 
own staff that Short decided to accept the position252. Once Short came to grips with the 
unexpected change of role, she characteristically threw herself into her new responsibilities.  
 
A commitment to establishing a new department for international development was included 
in Labour’s 1997 election manifesto. However, as Owen Barder (2007, 290) points out, this 
commitment had “hardened into party policy” without much discussion253. Yet once it became 
increasingly clear that Labour would win the forthcoming election, officials at the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO), the department that stood to lose the most from the proposed 
reforms, began to lobby Blair and Robin Cook—then Shadow Foreign Secretary—to reverse the 
policy254.  Blair evidently began doubting “the wisdom of the policy”, and upon appointing Short 
                                                          
251 My intention in drawing these epigraphs from an academic (Morrissey 2002, 23), a member of the UK 
development constituency (Green) and a politician (Mullin), is to demonstrate to extent to which Short is personally 
credited with establishing DFID. For more detailed accounts of Short’s influence during this period, see Vereker 
(2002), Killick (2005) and Barder (2007). 
252 For a contemporary account of Short’s demotion, see Murphy and Clare (1996). 
253 Earlier in Blair’s tenure as Opposition leader, a policy commission had been established to review the Labour 
Party’s international policy. The Britain in the World Policy Commission was chaired by Robin Cook and, in 
formulating its recommendations relating to international development, responded to an emerging international 
aid reform agenda (Barder 2007, 290), which DFID would shortly become the standard bearer for. Most notably, the 
Commission “recommended the creation of a separate government department responsible for the broad range of 
international development issues across government…” (Barder 2007, 290). 
254Short (2007, 1) recalls how, in the six month period before the 1997 election, “the Foreign Office did their best to 
persuade both Blair and Cook that the commitment [to establish an independent international development 
agency] was a mistake].” See also Short (2005, 51). 
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Shadow International Development Secretary, asked her to conduct a review “to look at the 
experience of other countries” (Short 2007, 1)255. During this period, Short engaged heavily with 
staff in DFID’s predecessor agency, the Overseas Development Administration—including its 
head, John Vereker, who would become DFID’s first permanent secretary—and agreed a 
roadmap for the new agency (Vereker 2002, 137)256. 
 
By the time the election was held, Short was comfortable she had done enough to convince Blair 
that he should follow through on Labour’s promise to establish a new international development 
ministry257. On the other hand, she was less sure whether she would get the opportunity to lead 
it258. Following Labour’s landslide victory, the British media began to speculate about the shape 
of Blair’s first cabinet. Prior to the election, the media speculated that Short could be left out 
(Short 2005, 55). The very real possibility that somebody other than Short could been appointed 
Development Secretary (and indeed Shadow Development Secretary, as described above) 
invites active engagement with the counterfactual; what if somebody else had been appointed 
International Development Secretary? My conclusion is that, without Short’s presence, it would 
be extremely unlikely that DFID would enjoy the status, and indeed even the independence, it 
enjoys today. As with the progenitors of the two other direct (type I) aid salience shocks 
examined in this thesis—Rudd and Cameron—I found that Clare Short combined a strong desire 
to enact change in a particularly direction with a high capability for doing so. In this case, as I 
document below, Short married her strong personal belief that an independent agency was 
required to reduce global poverty with the requisite political skills and connections to fight for 
DFID’s independence. 
 
Despite Labour explicitly introducing an ‘ethical dimension’ into British foreign policy (Wheeler 
and Dunne 1998, 2004; B. White 2013, 44)259, DFID was particularly vulnerable during the early 
period of its existence. As the Vereker (2002, 136) has acknowledged, “DFID threatened an order 
which had been established since 1979”. Only a few months after DFID’s establishment, the 
Economist (1997) reported that “two of the mightiest Whitehall departments [the FCO and 
Treasury] are trying to ensure [Short’s] new ministry is stillborn,” predicting that she would 
                                                          
255 In her memoirs, Short (2005, 51) records that “Tony asked me whether it was right that we should retain the 
commitment in our policy document to the establishment of a new Ministry for International Development headed 
by a Cabinet minister”. Short also reconfirmed this during my interview with her.  
256 For more detail of Short’s activities during this period, see Vereker (2002) and Short (2005, 51–54). 
257 Personal interview with Clare Short, December 2016.  
258 Personal interview with Clare Short, December 2016.  
259 Blair envisioned a role for Britain as a ‘pivotal power’ (Wheeler and Dunne 2004, 7), which maximised its influence 
by building on the strengths of its history and by developing new influence and building new alliances (Blair 1998). 
According to Short, the realisation that international development represented a domain in which Britain could 
exercise a pivotal role was only truly impressed upon Tony Blair and Gordon Brown a considerable time into Labour’s 
period in government. (See more at footnote 269).  
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“need all her indomitable spirit to keep it independent.” Short (2007, 1) recalls the Foreign Office 
being “profoundly hostile”, with DFID facing “a barrage of hostile press briefing” emanating from 
its erstwhile overseer260. The institutional animus between DFID and the FCO, particularly acute 
at the highest echelons of the FCO, was reflected in the testy personal relationship between 
Short and Foreign Secretary Robin Cook261.   
 
Short was uniquely equipped to weather the bureaucratic and political backlash to DFID’s 
establishment, for a number of reasons. First, Short’s appointment, because of who she was, 
afforded her new department an immediate status (Honeyman 2009b, 91). Short was an 
experienced politician known for her candour (Versi 1997; Richards 1997, 14). She had twice 
resigned from the Labour frontbench, in 1988 and again in 1991 (Wintour 1996; Richards 1997, 
16) and had a penchant for “rugged honesty” (The Economist 1997) that endeared her Party’s 
grass-roots supporters (if not always its leaders262). Short, as Blair well knew when appointing 
her, would “play an activist role in exercising her responsibilities” (Young 2001, 247) as Secretary 
of State for International Development.    
 
Second, Short was fully committed to DFID’s independence. Once she decided that “[o]nly a 
separate department has the authority to challenge policy across Whitehall” (Short 2007, 1)263, 
Short made it very clear she would actively “fight her Department’s corner” (Killick 2005, 676) 
to secure this objective264. Third, Short was fuelled by a unique type of political ambition. While 
determined “to make my new ministry an exemplary player” (Short 2005, 54), Short would not 
led herself become beholden to party leadership in the way many politicians do, as evidenced 
by her numerous cabinet resignations. Especially at this stage of her career, Short was unusually 
willing to ruffle the political feathers of powerful colleagues, not least Robin Cook. Fourth, Short 
                                                          
260 For an example of the animosity between DFID and the FCO during this period playing out in the press, see 
Vallely (1997) and the discussion about this article in Richards (Richards 1997) 
261 The strained relations between DFID and the FCO, and Short and Cook, during the late 1990s and early 2000s are 
reflected in numerous published accounts of politicians, advisers and journalists active during this period. See, for 
example, Campbell Diaries (Campbell 2007, 57–59), Short’s own memoirs (Short 2005, 51) and various news 
reports, including from The Economist (1997), New Statesman (Richards 1997) and even African Business (Versi 
1997). John Battle, who was Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs between 1999 and 2001 and 
later served on the International Development Selection Committee from 2001 to 2010, recalls regularly acting as 
an intermediary between Cook and Short during this period as a consequence of the pair’s disagreeableness 
(Personal Interview, October 2014). 
262 Short’s tendency to speak her mind partly explains Blair’s decision to demote her from Shadow Transport 
Secretary to international development. 
263 This quote from Short refers is taken from reflections she published upon DFID’s tenth anniversary and refers to 
a key lesson she took on board during consultations with Overseas Development Administration (ODA) staff 
undertaken prior to the 1997 election.  
264 Young (2001, 248) agrees that Short made it “clear from the outset that she would be both an initiator and a 
fighter”. For example, soon after taking office, Short declared; “[b]efore the elections, we said we would hammer 
poverty world-wide. Now that we have won, we’re going to do it. It can be done—mark my words” (Versi 1997, 6). 
Short herself repeatedly uses the language of battle when recounting this period in her memoirs (e.g. Short 2005, 
78). 
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was well-versed in how the bureaucracy operated, having been a civil servant in the Home Office 
prior to entering politics (Young 2001). Moreover, Short’s preparatory work with Vereker and 
other development specialists while in Opposition ensured she was well prepared upon entering 
Government265.  
 
Fifth, Short was a “powerful advocate of development policy within the government” (Morrissey 
2002, 1) and particularly inside cabinet (Dickie 2004, 226), where she proved capable of directly 
influencing cabinet decisions even in areas outside her portfolio266. Sixth, Short engendered 
extreme loyalty amongst her staff, helping to foster an attractive and enthusiastic culture within 
DFID. Blair, in his memoirs, recalls how “people just queued up to work in [DFID]” (Blair 2010, 
24). Seventh, Short was a politician who had the ability to command attention and was capable 
of generating media attention for a low-profile issue. “As Secretary of State for International 
Development, Short may be at the bottom in terms of cabinet status,” wrote Steve Richards 
(1997, 14) in a 1997 profile for New Statesman, “but measured by column inches in newspapers 
she competes with the big boys.”  
  
Yet even armed with this impressive array of qualities, Short would likely not have been capable 
of leading lasting change in Whitehall had she not enjoyed the active backing of the two 
dominant figures of the New Labour era; Blair267 and his long-time Chancellor of the Exchequer 
(and eventual successor), Gordon Brown. Blair and Brown268 shared (or at the very least, came 
to share269) Short’s prioritisation of development. As Hulme (2009, 22) has pointed out, this 
meant Short “found herself in an unusual position, for an international development minister, 
                                                          
265 Vereker’s account of this preparatory work, especially the eight-point plan that the pair agreed to implement 
(Vereker 2002, 137–38), demonstrates the extent of this effort and how deliberately the policy change was 
approached. For Short’s account of DFID’s establishment, see Short (Short 2005, 77–80) 
266 Owen Barder (2005, 21) relays one particular incident where Short exerted her influence in Cabinet, despite the 
opposition of the Home Office and Downing Street advisers. Amidst a push to cut asylum numbers, Cabinet 
considered a Home Office proposal to make aid to some recipients “conditional on accepting the return of asylum 
seekers” (Barder 2005, 21). Short’s arguments against the proposal, prosecuted both in cabinet and in the press, 
saw the proposal passed over.  
267 Although often exasperated by Short’s refusal to be constricted by the centrally controlled communications 
strategy overseen by Alistair Campbell (Seldon and Lodge 2011a, Loc 891; Campbell 2007, 128, 201), Blair was 
nonetheless indebted to Short for her early support when he became Labour leader. Short’s status as a prominent 
left-winger who appealed to the party’s grassroots members remained valuable to Blair once he became Prime 
Minister and helped him to present his cabinet as one that was ideologically diverse. 
268 Brown’s personal dedication to poverty reduction was such that advisers recognised this policy area as his 
‘hinterland’, which he retired to when the pressures of governing burdened him (Seldon and Lodge 2011b, Loc 
9241). Seldon and Lodge (2011b, Loc 1750), in their account of Brown’s premiership, note that international 
development was “the topic most dear to his heart”.   
269 Short noted in her memoirs how Blair’s interest in foreign policy was minimal before becoming leader of the 
Labour Party (Short 2005, 76), adding that “Blair’s interest in development started to rise as he travelled and heard 
compliments for DfID’s work” (Short 2005, 91). On the other hand, Short acknowledges that Brown “always had 
sympathy for development” but did not initially understand the ambition of DfID’s agenda (Short 2005, 90). In my 
interview with her, Short essentially reiterated these positions.  
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of being treated as a budget priority rather than being placed at the back of the queue”270. The 
alliances Short enjoyed with Brown and Blair, based on their shared prioritisation of 
development, gave DFID a degree of political protection across Whitehall271. Further helping 
Short was the fact Brown also had a difficult relationship with Robin Cook and “was suspicious 
of the FCO” (I. Hall 2013, 228).   
 
While admitting that “[t]he going was rough in the early days”, Short was confident DFID’s 
institutional independence was secure after a couple of years (Short 2007). Short’s strong, 
purposeful and effective leadership, reinforced by the backing of Blair and Brown, was critical in 
rapidly establishing DFID’s place within Whitehall. Yet perhaps an even more important legacy 
of the Short aid salience shock was what this new Department stood for in policy terms. Short’s 
success in inuring DFID with a driving sense of purpose is the subject to which we now turn.  
6.1.2 Poverty reduction: DFID’s raison d'être 
In Oliver Morrissey’s view, the most important change in the first five years of DFID’s existence 
was its success in redefining the guiding purpose of aid (Morrissey 2002, 20). Vereker attributes 
much of DFID’s early success to the “power of a single, uncluttered purpose” (Vereker 2002, 
140). Under Short’s leadership, poverty reduction became DFID’s raison d'être (Short 2005, 85). 
And because DFID understood its identity—“what it is for”, in Vereker’s (2002, 140) language—
it was able to develop effective policies, motivate staff, and garner a profile within Whitehall 
and beyond. As Barder (2005, 3) notes, DFID’s reputation as global leader in development policy 
was secured extremely rapidly.  
 
Short settled firmly on having poverty reduction as DFID’s overriding objective during her period 
as Shadow Minister, later explaining that: 
“The reshaping of our development programme on the reduction of poverty 
might sound obvious, but there was such a muddle of motives and 
programmes in the international development system that the UK’s clarity of 
focus became influential and helped to lead to significant improvement in 
international development efforts” (Short 2005, 67).  
To this end, a White Paper, titled Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century, 
was published in November 1997, barely six months following DFID’s formation (DFID 1997). 
                                                          
270 “It’s part of the secret of Clare’s success that she gets on so well with Gordon [Brown]”, noted Chris Mullin in his 
diary (Mullin 2009a, 184). Among the many other sources citing Short’s strong relationship with Brown 
includeKeegan (2003, 295) and Dickie (2004, 226) 
271 This is not to suggest that DFID’s survival was by any means assured. Short (2007, 1) remembers DFID working 
“tenaciously across Whitehall at both official and Ministerial level to shift inherited attitudes.”  
  The United Kingdom 
 
Page 181  
This was Britain’s first white paper in 22 years272 and, as its title clearly indicates, was designed 
to signal that the new Department’s core mission was to reduce poverty (Killick 2005, 675)273.  
 
The 1997 White Paper served notice that the UK’s development assistance was now divorced 
from self-interested foreign policy or commercial objectives (The Economist 1999), not only in 
organisational terms but in policy terms as well. It is important to understand, however, that the 
impact of the latter change was facilitated by broader changes within in the international 
system274. As Vereker (2002, 134) acknowledged when reflecting on DFID’s early success, “by 
the early 1990s the international development system was overdue for a fundamental change.” 
The end of the Cold War had prompted a reappraisal of the role of aid and, by the middle of the 
decade, instead of asking “how best to use… [aid] budgets”, development experts had started 
to wonder “what would have to happen to eliminate poverty” (Vereker 2002, 135). At times of 
flux in the international strategic order, and when international norms are shifting, the scope 
for individual agency is amplified (Schafer and Walker 2006, 5)275. 
 
For this reason, a crucial enabler of the Short aid salience shock was that fact that “DFID came 
into existence at a time of considerable change in international thinking about development” 
(Barder 2005, 14). Upon becoming Minister, Short rapidly acquainted herself with the emerging 
development paradigm. Short was especially conscious of the “muddle of motives and 
programmes in the international development system” and her personality was such that she 
naturally sought to shape the agenda. The establishment of DFID provided Short with the 
platform, at precisely the right moment, to effect change. Under Short’s leadership, the UK 
played a leading role in defining the dynamics of the new international development (Japan 
International Cooperation Agency, UK Office 2009), largely via supporting the emergence of the 
MDG’s as the centre of gravity around which a reframed international aid regime developed276. 
 
Short became enamoured with the International Development Targets, the predecessors to the 
MDGs, while still shadow Minister. Once in Government, Short “refocused the whole of [UK 
development] policy around the achievement of the International Development Targets” (Short 
2007). “Short was looking for a device to focus DFID” agrees Hulme (2009, 23) and the 
                                                          
272 The previous white paper, Overseas Development: The Changing Emphasis in British Aid Policies: More Help for 
the Poorest, had been published in 1975 by the Labour government of Harold Wilson (Killick 2005, 670).   
273 For contemporary reviews of the 1997 White Paper, see Whaites (1998) and White (1998).  
274 According to Killick (2005, 673), “the end of the Cold War [reduced] the weight attached to foreign policy 
considerations in British aid allocations”. 
275 Schafter and Walker (2006, 5) argue that the “role for beliefs is particularly likely when the environment is 
uncertain, that is, when information is scare, ambiguous, contradictory, or so abundant that it is difficult for leaders 
to organize and process”.  
276 For a more detailed overview of Short’s pivotal role in promoting the MDGs, see Hulme (2009). 
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International Development Targets were “exactly what she wanted”, especially as they also 
functioned to “mobilise public support in the UK and drive the international system forward.” (I 
explain this temporary rise in public support in a moment). During this period, Short collaborated 
closely with a group of likeminded development ministers known as the ‘Utstein Group’ 
(Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2009, 8, 11; Vereker 2002, 136; Short 2005, 82–83). This group of four 
female development ministers277 functioned as norm entrepreneurs, “energetically us[ing] the 
IDGs to advocate increased aid commitments, reforms to make aid more effective and a 
refocusing of aid on human development and poverty reduction” (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2009, 
11).  
 
In December 2000, DFID published a second white paper—Eliminating world poverty; making 
globalisation work for the poor (DFID 2000). Short was instrumental in this process278 . As 
indicated by its title, this policy document was self-consciously a sequel to the earlier White 
Paper. The Paper pushed DFID’s poverty reduction agenda forward and highlighted the 
importance of economic growth in achieving poverty reduction (Barder 2005, 15). Making 
globalisation ‘work for the poor’, argued the White Paper, entailed working collaborating to 
achieve results.  It was this embrace of collaboration with others, according to Barder (2005, 
16), that “helped DFID to become extremely influential throughout the development community 
after 1997.” This influence was pivotal in ensuring poverty reduction became the centrepiece of 
aid efforts in the MDG era.  
 
A capstone to Short’s stewardship of DFID’s early life was the passing of International 
Development Act in 2002. This piece of legislation had been “foreshadowed in the 2000 White 
Paper” and “enshrined in law the single purpose of aid spending: every development assistance 
project or program must by law either further sustainable development or promote the welfare 
of people and be likely to contribute to the reduction of poverty” (Barder 2005, 17). In just five 
years, Short had not only fashioned a new ministry DFID around a single, uncluttered purpose, 
she had also managed to legislate that poverty reduction was its raison d'être. 
                                                          
277 The informal ‘Utstein Group’ was formed of Short (UK), Evelyn Herfkens (Netherlands), Hilde Johnson (Norway) 
and Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul (Germany) (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2009, 11) 
278 Chris Mullin, who was Parliamentary Under-Secretary for DFID for six months in 2001, recorded in his diary that 
“[t]he recent White Paper on globalisation is written with beautiful clarity. Quite unlike any other I have seen. That’s 
mainly down to Clare, too. Apparently the early drafts were risible.” (Mullin 2009b, 163). 
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6.1.3 The Legacy of the Short Aid Salience Shock 
In a January 1997 profile of Short for The Observer, journalist Lynn Barber observed of the freshly 
demoted Minister for Overseas Development that “[s]he must know that politically she is in a 
cul-de-sac, far removed from the core concerns of a Labour government-in-waiting.” (Barber 
1997). By the time Short resigned from Labour’s front bench over Blair’s Iraq Policy six years 
later, on 12 May 2003, the Short aid salience shock had driven development issues firmly out of 
this political cul-de-sac and into the mainstream of New Labour priorities. Chris Mullin, who 
served briefly as Short’s deputy at DFID as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (the lowest 
ranking of government minister in the UK), agrees that Short had  “succeeded in moving 
overseas aid up the political agenda” (2009b, 184). 
 
Yet rather than ascending the political agenda as a result of bottom up, publicly driven demand, 
the prioritisation of development issues within the New Labour elite was primarily driven by the 
personal priorities of Short, empowered by the support of Brown and Blair. As I have illustrated 
above, to imagine to imagine such a strong platform being laid without Short’s leadership is very 
difficult. The diary entries recorded by Chris Mullin are remarkable in their praise of Short.  At 
the end of his first month on the job as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for DFID, Mullin 
begins to “realise what a formidable politician Clare is” and notices the “real sense of loyalty” to 
her in DFID (Mullin 2009b, 163). A week later, Mullin wrote: “Clare in action is a sight to behold”, 
lamenting that “[w]atching her I feel so inadequate” (Mullin 2009b, 167)279.  
 
Short’s leadership contributed to DFID prevailing in its bureaucratic turf war with the FCO280. 
The foremost demonstration of this was DFID’s success in securing funding increases in each of 
the 1998, 2000 and 2002 spending reviews—budgeting processes introduced by Labour to 
allocate spending limits for government agencies over future years overseen by the Treasury. 
By the 2000-01 financial year, DFID’s budget was almost two-and-a-half times the size of the 
FCO’s (HM Treasury 2000), thanks in part to Short’s relationship with Brown (Short 2005, 91). As 
Owen Barder (2005, 29) highlighted in his article documenting the reform lessons from 
                                                          
279 I heard a similar recollection from a former DFID official: “what Clare Short did was quite remarkable; the risks 
she took, the battles she fought, her own understanding of international development and what she wanted to do 
was quite astonishing.” 
280 Whitman (2010, 838) has documented how “the FCO was seen to lose, in terms of influence and budget, to the 
Department for International Development (DFID)”. Likewise, Hall (2013, 241) concludes that, in relation to DFID 
and the Prime Minister’s office,  the FCO “emerged from the New Labour era smaller, poorer, and marginalised, at 
least from high-level decision-making on major foreign policy issues. For an in-depth account of how these dynamics 
played out in the FCO during the early New Labour period is provided by John Dickie in his book The New 
Mandarins: How British Foreign Policy Works (Dickie 2004). 
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development policy in the UK, “it requires powerful political leadership to prevent aid budgets 
being diverted to other priorities”281.  
 
The political battles Short fought and won during this period have had lasting significance. As 
this chapter continues to unfold, it will become increasingly evident that the Short aid salience 
shock initiated and embedded institutional, policy and political path-dependencies that 
functioned as the platform from which future political decisionmakers were obliged to operate 
from, not least David Cameron. The Short aid salience shock also initiated the spending 
expansion that peaked with the achievement of 0.7%.   
 
By the time of Short’s resignation from cabinet in May 2003 over the Government’s conduct of 
the Iraq War, the aid salience shock she created had pushed the UK’s development policy 
trajectory in a new direction firmly enough, and for long enough, that it would have been difficult 
to reverse, at least without a concerted effort. In any case, there was no appetite for such a 
reversal at the top of the New Labour hierarchy. In the years following Short’s departure from 
cabinet, Blair and Brown, despite being at loggerheads over almost every other aspect of 
government policy, were in agreement in prioritising development, in part because each saw it 
as personally politically beneficial (Harrison 2010, 400; Honeyman 2009b, 91).  
 
Before concluding this discussion on the foundations that made 0.7% possible, I need to 
highlight the influence of the Make Poverty History (MPH) campaign. Alongside Short’s role, 
almost every interviewee I spoke with remarked on the importance of this campaign, especially 
its timing. The MPH campaign occurred at precisely the optimum time to further embed the 
policy trajectory established by the Short aid salience shock. MPH was a “broad-based campaign 
coalition” (Harrison 2010, 391) which formed in late 2003 and mobilised around the objective 
of making the G8 summit held in Gleneagles, Scotland, in July 2005, a “development summit” 
(Harrison 2010, 393)282. From early 2004, “both Blair and Brown… engaged with the campaign, 
conceiving of it as a political resource and integrating it into their own political strategies”283. 
This political buy in helped spawn a suite of associated initiatives, including The Africa 
Commission (which would hand down its report at the Gleneagles summit and was often 
                                                          
281 Short understood the political significance of DFID’s burgeoning budget, telling delegates to the 2000 Labour 
Party Conference in Brighton that DFID had secured a 50% increase in its budget since its inception, from 2.2 billion 
in 1997 to a promised 3.6 billion in 2003 (Short 2000). 
282 See Payne (2006) for an overview of the Gleneagles Summit from a development perspective.  
283 For a detailed account of these dynamics, admittedly from an unapologetically pro-Brown perspective, see 
Chapter 22 of Brown’s special adviser Damian McBride’s memoirs (McBride 2014, 150–58). Although McBride 
details numerous instances of how he used development issues to enhance Brown’s image—including by leaking 
details of the Live 8 concert and surrounding his boss with celebrities—McBride insists that, ultimately, Brown’s 
“passion for international development issues was not some affectation to soften his image…” (McBride 2014, 150–
51).  
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mistakenly referred to as the Blair Commission) and the Live 8 concert in London organised by 
Bob Geldof (which aligned with the twentieth anniversary of Live Aid, also organised and 
headlined by Geldof). These events, and the advocacy of ‘celebrity campaigners’, including 
Geldof, but also Bono and Richard Curtis (co-founder of Comic Relief with Lenny Henry), made 
2005 “a vintage year for coverage of aid and development issues in the British media” (Moore 
and Unsworth 2006, 707; see also Nash 2008, 170; and McBride 2014, 156)284.  
 
MPH marked the point at which UK development policy crossed-over from being an inside-
Whitehall issue to something capable of piquing the general public’s interest. Across each of the 
countries examined in this thesis, MPH is undoubtedly the point at which development policy 
came closest to crossing into the realm of achieving issue salience. Follow up research revealed 
that “[n]early 90% of the public were aware of MPH in July 2005” (Darnton 2006, 6)—a 
remarkable level. Yet even if it aid policy did momentarily breach the threshold at which political 
decisionmakers were somewhat politically incentivised to pay attention to international 
development issues on their own merits, this point was short-lived.  
 
Follow up public opinion research carried out by Andrew Darton (2006, 5) found some members 
of the public who participated in MPH activities rapidly forgot they participated. This research 
also demonstrated that “few people understand what MPH was, what it was about, or who was 
behind it” (Darnton 2006, 9). Harrison (2010, 391) contends that, “in retrospect, MPH was not a 
straightforward success: it is generally recognized that the goals of the campaign (never fully 
clear) were not achieved; there existed significant tensions within the coalition; and the legacy 
of MPH has proved to be rather slender.”  
 
While MPH has a complicated legacy (Harrison 2010; Nash 2008) and its direct impact on public 
opinion on development in the UK is difficult to assess285, a key finding from subsequent research 
is that “a vast amount of effort was required to deliver relatively small shifts in public 
perceptions” (Darnton 2006, 10–11). MPH therefore represents compelling evidence that aid 
issues are extremely unlikely, on their own, to cross the aid salience threshold via a rise in issue 
salience. To get on the political agenda, aid issues require a powerful individual actor to put 
them there. This is why it was especially notable that David Cameron was among the more 
recognisable figures amongst the 200,000-strong crowd attending Live 8 in Hyde Park in July 
                                                          
284 In its peer review of the UK aid program published in early 2006, the OECD DAC reported that “[t]t is widely felt 
that UK development co-operation is at an historic high point of political and public support” (OECD DAC 2006a, 11).   
285 As Andrew Darnton (2006, 10), who is one of the UK’s foremost experts on public opinion and aid, has argued, 
“[m]aking a direct causal link between MPH and public perceptions of poverty is especially difficult given the 
amount of related activity and media ‘noise’ around the G8 Summit in 2005”   
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2005 (Cameron 2011b; Wintour 2011). Three months later, he was elected the leader of the 
Conservative Party. In documenting the story of the UK’s journey to 0.7%, our next step is to 
examine the impact of Cameron’s leadership on aid policy.    
 
§§§ 
 
 
6.2 Towards Consensus on 0.7%: International Development and Tory 
Modernisation 
 
I want people to feel good about being a 
Conservative again. 
—David Cameron, 4 October 2005 
 
Conservatives used to regard [global 
poverty] as a second-order subject. 
—David Cameron, 29 June 2006 
 
David Cameron’s election as leader of the Conservative Party in 2005 was a critical juncture in 
the UK’s journey to achieving the 0.7%. While Cameron was personally committed to increasing 
aid spending (as I make clear below, in subsection 6.3.1), in this section I explain how Cameron’s 
elevation to the party leadership saw the Conservatives embrace a modernising agenda to a far 
greater extent than would have been the case had another leader been elected and the 
implications of this for aid spending. Cameron’s ‘modernisation project’—a political strategy 
designed to detoxify the ‘Tory brand’ and thus broaden the Conservative Party’s appeal in 
response to New Labour’s electoral dominance—elevated the relevance and importance 
international development policy for Cameron and the modernisers. Under Cameron, 
demonstrating a commitment to international development became one of the key ways that 
the new Tory leadership attempted to demonstrate that the Conservative party had changed. 
The ‘Tory modernisation’ aid salience shock emerged because the commitment to 0.7% helped 
the Conservatives shed the ‘nasty party’ gained under former Conservative Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher. 
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In documenting the ‘Tory modernisation’ aid salience shock, this section of the chapter begins 
with an account of Cameron’s ascension to the Tory leadership in 2005. Here I demonstrate that, 
had Cameron not unexpectedly been elected leader, the strategic direction the Conservative 
Party embarked upon would have been much different. I then demonstrate the way in which a 
focus on international development served as a key pillar of Cameron’s ‘modernisation project’. 
In the final subsection, I chart how Cameron’s controversial trip to Rwanda in the summer of 
2007 hastened the end of what scholars have identified as the ‘high period’ of this period of Tory 
modernisation. I argue that Cameron’s continued prioritisation of international development 
issues is an indicator of after his personal commitment to the 0.7% target.  
6.2.1 David Cameron: ‘reform candidate’ 
David Cameron’s ascension to the Tory leadership is a classic example of a change in the political 
agenda resulting “from a change in party control… brought about by elections” (Kingdon 1995, 
16). In order to be granted ‘permission to be heard’ (Bale 2008a, 277), Cameron emphasised 
policies that simultaneously marked his as a ‘modern Conservative’, differentiated the 
Conservatives from their Thatcherite past (Heppell and Seawright 2012, 227; Kerr 2007, 49) and 
encroached onto policy territory ‘owned‘ by Labour (Bale 2008a, 273; Kavanagh and Cowley 
2010, 79), including international development. The political logic behind Cameron’s 
modernisation drive was to “‘detoxify’ the Conservative brand so that the electorate would once 
again give the party serious consideration as a party of government” (Hayton 2012, 142). 
Examining the internal Conservative party politics from this period illustrates serves to illustrate 
the extent to which the identity of the individual who prevails in these political contests 
determines the degree of attention international development issues receive.  
 
The Conservative Party leadership election that culminated in Cameron’s ascension took place 
against a backdrop of internal debate over the future direction of the party. After three 
consecutive electoral defeats to Tony Blair’s ‘New Labour’, the imperative for the party to 
reform their image was undeniable (J. Green 2010, 668–69). In what was intended as a post-
election wake-up call to his party, Lord Ashcroft, published Smell the Coffee, a collation of polling 
data that made it clear that “[t]he Conservative Party's problem is its brand” (Ashcroft 2005, 4). 
Yet while there was broad agreement that there was a problem, there was genuine split in about 
how to rectify it (J. Green 2010, 669). In short, the party was grappling with its identity (Kerr and 
Hayton 2015, 117).  
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In practice, the real question the Tories faced was not whether to ‘modernise’, but the extent 
which the party should ‘modernise’286. In response to this question, the Conservative Party split 
into two broad camps. Traditionalists emphasised traditional Tory values and were relatively 
comfortable building on the Thatcherite legacy. Modernisers, on the other hand, envisioned a 
more wholesale transformation, seeking to actively de-emphasise “the issues it traditionally 
‘owns’”(Bale 2008a, 3). This split into traditionalists and modernisers was not a new 
phenomenon; membership in these groups correlated closely with the more familiar cleavage 
in the party around the right wingers and centrists (a factional divide very similar to that in the 
Australia’s Liberal Party and discussed earlier in section 5.4). 
 
When Michael Howard announced his intention to step down after leading the Conservatives to 
defeat in the 2005 general election, David Davis—Howard’s shadow Home Secretary—was the 
strong favourite to replace him287. Other contenders were Kenneth Clarke, who had held various 
positions in Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s cabinet and served as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in John Major’s government, and Liam Fox, a right-winger who had served as 
Chairman of the Conservative Party during Howard’s leadership. In contrast to these 
frontrunners, Cameron was widely considered too young and inexperienced for the job (Dorey, 
Garnett, and Denham 2011, 58)288. Yet once Cameron seriously committed to contesting the 
leadership, he turned his youth into an advantage, running as the change candidate who was 
capable of reenergising and reinventing the Conservative Party. “I want people to feel good 
about being a conservative again”, Cameron (2005a) declared at the Conservative Party 
Conference in October 2005, during a speech that played a key role in generating momentum 
for his eventual victory.  
 
When Clarke and then Fox were eliminated from the in the first289 and second290 rounds of the 
leadership contest, respectively, the race crystallised as a referendum on the future direction of 
the Conservative Party and its comfort with the contrasting options before it. Davis represented 
incremental reform. Cameron promised a more fundamental transformation. Helped by a slick 
                                                          
286 The term ‘modernising’ is notoriously elusive to define—one of the reasons it is embraced by politicians. As 
Byrne, Foster and Kerr (2012, 23) point out “modernisation is one of those rare political terms which manages to 
appear to be a credible basis for a governing strategy, but which is also sufficiently vague so as to be able to man 
almost anything.” 
287 This paragraph draws on the following accounts of the 2005 Conservative Party leadership election: Ashcroft and 
Oakeshott (2015, chapter 20), Elliott and Hanning (2009, chapter 15) and Jane Green (2010, 669–71). 
288 Cameron was just 38 years old and had only served one term as an MP at the point Howard announced his 
intention to step down—factors that led Cameron himself to question the wisdom of entering the race. 
289 The Parliamentary Party voted on the first round on Tuesday 18 October 2005, with results as follows: Cameron 
(56 votes), Clarke (38), Davis (62), and Fox (42).  
290 The second round of Parliamentary Party voting was held on Thursday 20 October 2005, with Cameron (90 
votes) beating Davis (57) and Fox (51).  
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and well-organised campaign, which amplified the notion that Cameron himself personified the 
idea of ‘new conservative’ (Bale 2016, Loc. 7069). Cameron was elected Leader of the 
Conservative Party on the 6 December 2005. In his acceptance speech, Cameron (2005b) 
promised to deliver a “modern compassionate Conservatism that is right for our times and right 
for our country.”  
 
During the ‘high period’ of modernisation (roughly coinciding with the first eighteen months of 
his leadership), Cameron’s focus on the environment was the most high profile and symbolic of 
these policy issues. Photos of Cameron posing with huskies while visiting a glacier in the Arctic 
Circle to raise awareness about climate change are widely remembered as defining images of 
this period of Cameronism (Heppell 2012, 224) 291 . Other elements of this environmental 
makeover included redesigning the Conservative Party logo from the “Torch of Liberty” to a 
“breezy blue-trunked, green-leaved oak tree” (Bale 2016, Loc 7481) and adopting a new 
campaign slogan—‘Vote Blue, Go Green’. While international development was a highly visible 
element of Cameron’s modernisation, the scholarly literature has paid scant attention to the 
nature and role of international development policy in Cameron’s modernisation project292. 
Even assessments of Cameron’s approach to foreign policy pay relatively little attention to 
development (e.g. Honeyman 2009a, 2012). The next two subsections begin to atone for this 
curious shortcoming in the literature.  
6.2.2 International Development as a pillar of Cameron’s Modernisation Project 
Cameron wasted little time in demonstrating his intent to make a focus on international 
development a pillar of his modernisation strategy. On 28 December, just three weeks after 
becoming leader, Cameron announced the formation of the Globalisation and Global Poverty 
Policy Group (GGPPG), one of six policy groups that Cameron commissioned in priority areas. 
This policy renewal process, overseen by Oliver Letwin, was designed to inform the next 
Conservative manifesto (Cameron 2005c), but served a variety of useful purposes, not least 
                                                          
291 For an assessment of the role of environmental policy in modernisation, see Carter and Clements (2015) and 
Connelly (2009a). 
292 Cameron’s modernisation project is the subject of a large and growing literature (Heppell 2013, 340). Accounts of 
Cameron’s modernising project include those by Heppell (2012), d’Ancona (2013b), Elliott and Hanning (2009, 298–
361) and Ashcroft and Oakeshott (2015, Part Four). For a comprehensive recent retrospective of Cameron-era Tory 
modernisation, see the 2015 special issue of British Politics (Volume 10, Issue 2). Numerous scholars have 
contemplated the degree to which the modernisation of the Tories under Cameron exhibited continuity with previous 
Conservative repositioning efforts (S. Evans 2008; Dorey and Garnett 2012). Others have noted how Cameron’s 
approach exhibited many similarities with Blair’s ‘Third Way’ strategy during New Labour’s own modernising 
approach implemented a decade earlier (Heppell and Lightfoot 2012, 133; McAnulla 2010; Kavanagh and Cowley 
2010, 79; Kerr 2007). The role of international development in Tory modernisation, however, is surprisingly neglected. 
The work of Dunne, Hall-Matthews and Lightfoot (2011), Heppell and Lightfoot (2012) and Mawdsley (2015) are 
notable exceptions. 
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demonstrating to the electorate that, under Cameron, “every inherited policy position was up 
for renegotiation” (S. Evans 2008, 296). It reinforced the notion that Cameron was leading an 
intellectual renewal of Conservativism, providing him with regular opportunities to talk about 
his vision of a modern conservatism (Cameron 2006a, 2006b). It also meaningfully engaged 
senior party figures who had been overlooked for shadow cabinet positions—including former 
leaders—in his modernisation project (Kavanagh and Cowley 2010, 75).  
 
Cameron tapped Peter Lilley to chair the GGPPG. While Lilley’s status as a former Deputy Leader 
of the party, alongside his professional background working in international development, 
clearly commended him to the role, a decisive factor in Cameron’s choice to appoint Lilley was 
his status as a prominent right-winger—a reality Lilley opening acknowledged when I asked him 
about it293. While Lilley’s leadership of the group would prove much more important in the long 
term (as we will see), press coverage of the establishment of the GGPPG was dominated, as 
Cameron and his advisers undoubtedly intended it to be, by the coup of securing the 
involvement of the rock star and iconic anti-poverty campaigner Sir Bob Geldof294.  
 
Tim Bale characterises Geldof’s involvement as a ‘brand signifier’: “[h]is involvement suggested 
that Cameron’s Conservatives (as the Party’s instantly revamped website now billed them) 
weren’t the same old Tories” (Bale, Loc 7054). Geldof’s recruitment was an ‘announceable’ 
capable of cutting through with ordinary voters, instantly building the credibility of the 
Conservatives on a policy issue that was seen as ‘owned’ by Labour (McAnulla 2010: 295). Bob 
Geldof was synonymous with the Make Poverty History campaign in 2005, just as he had been 
with Live Aid a generation earlier295. In securing Geldof’s participation in the GGPPG, Cameron 
symbolically connected the Conservatives to the Make Poverty History movement and, by 
extension, the 0.7% target.  
 
Focusing on international development issues gave Cameron an opportunity to “demonstrate 
both his connection with contemporary society and his concern with social issues” (Hayton 2012, 
142). In particular, the demographic most engaged in the campaign to tackle global poverty—
                                                          
293 When I asked Lilley if he was surprised by the appointment, he responded: “It didn’t occur to me that [Cameron] 
would invite me to chair [the GGPPG], but when he did—I was probably the only conservative who had ever worked 
professionally in the development business—it seemed quite a logical choice.” When I enquired as to whether his 
being on the right wing of the party was a factor, Lilley acknowledged that  
294 To maximise media coverage of his appointment, Geldof’s involvement was announced in a post-Christmas 
media lull and following the pre-Christmas “blizzard or announcements and blaze of publicity” accompanying 
Cameron’s election (Bale 2016 Loc 7054). ‘Geldof helps Tory poverty policy’ (BBC 2005) was an example of the 
headlines it generated.  
295 “Geldof’s public profile and his popularity with the media”, argues Harrison (2010, 404), “lent him an immense 
presence in 2005”. Focus group research found that the most common “‘top of mind’ associations from MPH were 
the links between MPH and Live8 concerts and Bob Geldof (Darnton 2006, 9). 
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broadly young people, but especially women and those who tended to be socially active—was 
a demographic the new Conservatives were conscious they needed to reach. Cameron 
reinforced the Conservative Party’s support of the Make Poverty History movement in Built to 
Last (Conservative Party 2006), a statement of his aims and values launched in February 2006 
(Cameron 2006c)296. The section of Built to Last titled ‘What we’re fighting for’, included this 
resolution: “[t]t is our moral obligation to make poverty history” (Conservative Party 2006, 5).  
 
Cameron’s speech at Oxford University on ‘Fighting Global Poverty’, delivered in June 2006, 
remains his defining speech on international development. The speech is remarkable not just 
for its bold policy stance but for the fact that each of the policy commitments Cameron 
announced were ultimately delivered upon once he became Prime Minister. Cameron (2006d) 
began by acknowledging that the “Conservatives used to regard [global poverty] as a significant, 
but second-order subject.” From the outset, it was clear that the purpose of this speech was to 
demonstrate how, under Cameron, international development was now a first order issue for 
his new Conservatives. Cameron reasserted his claim that global poverty was “first and 
foremost” a “moral challenge”, while noting that the provision of international development 
was also a “question of hard-headed political and economic reality… a question of enlightened 
self-interest.”  
 
Cameron’s Oxford speech is a prime example of a common tactic deployed by Cameron during 
his early modernising period, whereby the Conservatives sought to establish credibility on issues 
dominated by political opponents by explicitly adopting their policy positions (Heppell and 
Lightfoot 2012, 132). Rather than point out failings in existing international development policy, 
Cameron instead acknowledged the “personal commitment and leadership of Tony Blair and 
Gordon Brown” in raising the significant of global poverty issues. Cameron then moved to cover 
off a trio policy positions that what were seen as crucial differentiators of Labour’s international 
policy by committing his party to: “achieving the target of spending 0.7% of national income on 
aid by 2013”; keeping DFID as an independent department; and maintaining the existing 
approach on tied aid (the later commitment functioning, in reality, as a proxy for an approach 
to development spending that prioritised poverty reduction).  
 
These three key crucial policy issues remained those that international development activists 
feared a Conservative Government would most likely abandon. And while activists, in particular, 
may not have trusted Cameron, or believed he would be capable of resisting the strong anti-aid 
                                                          
296 ”It is morally unacceptable” argued Cameron (2006d) “for billions of people to live in dire and degrading poverty 
when we now know the secret of wealth creation.”  
Chapter 6 
Page 192 
sentiment on the right of his Party over the long term, his speech meant that there could be no 
disputing that, on paper at least, there was little between the headline development policy 
positions of Labour and the Tories. Mitchell made a point of emphasising this new reality at the 
2006 Party conference, held three months after Cameron’s Oxford speech. “You know, there are 
some who say this is a Labour issue” acknowledged Mitchell (2006). “But I say that international 
development is not a Labour issue or a Conservative issue but a British issue”. By now, Cameron 
and Mitchell’s political strategy was clear; they were intent on wresting issue ownership of 
international development back from Labour.  
6.2.3 International Development Survives the Tory ‘Rebalancing’ 
In the northern spring of 2007, Andrew Mitchell sent letters to Conservative MPs inviting them 
to participate in Project Umubano297, a new social action program in Rwanda (Kite 2007a). Tory 
volunteers would travel to Africa at their own expense for two weeks over summer in order to 
contribute to a variety of development projects. Coming after the GGPPG and Cameron and 
Mitchell’s policy pronouncements, Umubano represented a more tangible, grassroots-
orientated manifestation of the emerging Conservative approach to international development 
issues. Over time, the influence of Umubano would prove decisive in developing and connected 
a cadre of Tory supporters of international development (a phenomenon I examine in more 
detail below during subsection 6.3.2). In early 2007, however, prospective Tory volunteers were 
encouraged to journey to Africa by the news that Cameron would also be participating, and was 
planning to use the trip as a backdrop to launch the GGPPG’s report.    
 
As Cameron’s trip to Rwanda approached, however, the political headwinds he had navigated 
with considerable success to this point intensified significantly. The Conservative base had never 
been comfortable with his modernisation program, but were happy to go along with it so long 
as Cameron’s leadership seemed likely to pay electoral dividends. Yet now, after an 18-month 
extended ‘honeymoon’ (Dale 2007) a series of political setbacks intensified discontentment with 
Cameron amongst the Tory right-wing (Bale 2016, Loc 8066), forcing him to reconsider the scope 
and shape of his modernising project.  
 
First, in May, Cameron had to weather the ‘grammar gate’ controversy298. Soon after, the 
Conservative MP Quentin Davies defected to Labour (Elliott and Hanning 2009, 317). In the 
                                                          
297 Project Umubano was named after the kinyarwanda word for friendship. 
298 This controversy erupted in May, after Shadow education secretary David Willetts gave a speech in which he said 
the Tories would not open any new grammar (i.e. selective) schools, a stance which infuriated a number of senior 
Tory MPs (Wilson 2007). For a detailed discussion of this controversy, see Bale (2016, chapter 10.2). 
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resignation letter he gave Cameron and subsequently posted on ConservativeHome, Davies 
wrote “[u]nder your leadership the Conservative Party appears to me to have ceased collectively 
to believe in anything, or to stand for anything” (Q. Davies 2007), adding that he thought 
Cameron’s “superficiality, unreliability and apparent lack of any clear convictions” disqualified 
him from leadership. Davies’ action was damaging not so much for the defection itself, but for 
the fact that it again brought to the fore the question of Cameron’s motivations: was his 
commitment to modernisation genuine or was it merely political expediency? 
 
Then, in late June, Gordon Brown became Prime Minister after Tony Blair resigned. The polling 
honeymoon that resulted for Labour raised the prospects of a snap election (Elliott and Hanning 
2009, 321; d’Ancona 2013b, 17), piling further pressure on Cameron. In late July 2007, the 
Conservatives placed third (in each case behind Labour and the Liberal Democrats) in two by-
elections (Watt and Revill 2007) that were held just days before Cameron was scheduled to jet 
off to Rwanda to launch the GGPPG report. The day Cameron was due to depart, the Sunday 
papers carried stories that a number of Tory MPs were seeking to initiate a no-confidence vote 
in their leader (Elliott and Hanning 2009, 319; Watt and Revill 2007).  
 
Clearly, Cameron’s involvement in Project Umubano came at a challenging political moment for 
the Tory leader. And that was before Cameron’s constituency was suddenly hit by flooding which 
inundated 3000 homes in Witney, the largest town in Cameron’s eponymously-named 
electorate. Cameron managed to tour his electorate just hours ahead of his scheduled departure 
overseas, yet evidence for this visit was not captured by the broadcast photographers, meaning 
there would be no pictures on the evening news to prove Cameron’s presence in his electorate. 
This exacerbated the political conundrum facing Cameron and his advisers299: if Cameron went 
to Africa “he would be portrayed as abandoning his core supporters for the sake of a cynical 
media stunt” (Elliott and Hanning 2009, 321); if he stayed it would reinforce the widespread 
suspicion that Cameron (lacked conviction and would readily discard his professed commitment 
to international development (in particular) and modernisation (in general) once there was any 
real political pain to endure. Cameron’s inner circle of advisers was genuinely split on the action 
their boss should take and, according to some accounts, remain so today300.  
 
                                                          
299 As the journalist Melissa Kite (2007b) quote one ‘senior aide’ to Cameron as saying, “if he goes to Rwanda it’s a 
stunt. If he cancels Rwanda to stay at home because of the floods it’s a stunt. He can’t win. That is the problem he 
has got to deal with.”   
300 According to multiple sources, Cameron’s aides remain split on this issue to this day (Elliott and Hanning 2009, 
321; Seldon and Snowdon 2015, Loc 5879).  
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Ultimately Cameron decided to go to Rwanda. In response to Dylan Jones’ question asking why 
he was still going, Cameron responded: “Because I think it’s a good idea. Because I think it’s the 
right thing to do… I think it is absolutely true that international poverty is a mainstream issue…” 
(Cameron in D. Jones 2010, 87). Before departing, Cameron insisted that he would not “retreat 
to the comfort zone” (Bale 2016, Loc 8057). On the other hand, the populist press didn’t think 
the trip was such a good idea. “Cam deserts Brit victims” headlined the Star on 24 July (Bale 
2016 Loc 8057)—the day Cameron (2007) launched the GGPPG report in the Rwandan 
Parliament alongside Mitchell, a handful of other MPs, and Rwandan President Paul Kagame. 
Peter Lilley conducted a simultaneous launch in London (Lilley 2007). 
 
The timing and circumstances of the Rwanda meant it became a lightning rod moment for those 
with reservations about Cameron’s electoral strategy and of his Modernisation project itself 
(Watt and Revill 2007; Kite 2007b). Ann Widdecombe, a long-serving MP from the right of the 
Conservative Party who criticised Cameron publicly for his decision to go to Rwanda, spoke for 
many in the party when she offered this assessment to the Daily Mail: ‘[Cameron] has been very 
successful in getting support from people who previously would not have looked at us. But he 
must now pay a great deal of attention to shoring up our traditional vote” (Walters 2007). 
Cameron and his advisers took heed. The summer of 2007 is widely recognised as an inflexion 
point of Cameron’s modernisation project301. From this point, a self-conscious ‘rebalancing’ 
began to take place with previously downplayed issues such as crime, immigration and tax 
reform suddenly appearing on the agenda (Elliott and Hanning 2009, 322).  
 
Cameron’s decision to go to Rwanda, despite how clearly fraught it was politically, was routinely 
cited by individuals I spoke with as evidence of Cameron’s personal commitment to 
development. For them, it signalled Cameron’s willingness to defy public opinion, the press and 
unsupportive elements in the Conservative Party. Despite delivering Cameron “his first serious 
taste of adverse publicity on his development priority” (Seldon and Snowdon 2015, Loc 7845), 
he refused to allow it to prevent him from keeping this issue on the political agenda. The 
question is why not? Part of the explanation is that, by now, development had become one of 
the “signature issues pushed by David Cameron in [his] bid to ‘detoxify’ the Tory brand” (Alex 
Evans 2013). Yet plainly this cannot be the only reason, as other symbols of Tory repositioning, 
most notably the focus on the environment, also functioned as symbols of Tory repositioning, 
and these gradually faded from view from this point. Why did international development not 
also fall by the wayside? My answer is that the Tory commitment to the 0.7% target was more 
                                                          
301 For accounts of the politics of this ‘inflection period’ see Bale (2008b, 2016, chapter 10.3) and Elliott and Hanning 
(2009, chapter 16).  
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than just a symbolic gesture. As I move to argue in the next section, Cameron and Mitchell were 
both deeply personally committed to seeing the 0.7% target realised.  
 
§§§ 
 
 
6.3 Building for 0.7%: The Issue-ownership Spiral Gathers Momentum 
 
It’s a personal priority for me…  
—David Cameron (referring to international 
development), 2006.  
 
It’s really insulting to say this 
[commitment to International 
Development] is just about detoxifying 
the Conservative Party. 
—Andrew Mitchell, 2012302. 
 
The great success, which isn’t 
understood, is that we have turned 
development now into a centre-right 
issue… 
—Andrew Mitchell, 2014303. 
 
In this section, I show how the personal commitment of David Cameron and Andrew Mitchell to 
international development and the 0.7% target was central to the story of the UK’s aid spending 
expansion. I demonstrate how Cameron and Mitchell prioritised aid policy and kept it on the 
political agenda. And I document how both men actively and repeatedly intervened in aid policy 
decisionmaking to further their shared aid policy objectives. My priority, in carrying out these 
tasks, is to convey how a confluence of forces were working together at this time to ‘push’ the 
UK towards the 0.7% target. The momentum generated by the Cameron-Mitchell direct (type I) 
aid salience shock towards the 0.7% target reinforces the momentum supplied by the Tory 
modernisation aid salience shock. And as we will see, this generates a response from Labour, 
                                                          
302 Quoted in Behr (2012). 
303 Personal Interview, October 2014. 
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eager to demonstrate they still maintain ‘issue ownership’ of aid policy. In short, this section 
charts a ratcheting up of the issue-ownership spiral that formed in the UK around aid policy.   
 
In the first subsection below, I supply evidence that Cameron and Mitchell’s personal 
commitment to international development is genuine. I then move to demonstrated how this 
this personal commitment was powerfully manifested in a commitment to building pro-
development institutions and structures within the Conservative Party. Finally, the third 
subsection documents the decisionmaking episode resulting in the 2009 White Paper—Labour’s 
most definitive response to ongoing Tory efforts to ‘own’ the international development issue 
area.  
6.3.1 The Cameron-Mitchell Aid Salience Shock 
In this subsection, I present four key ‘clusters’ of evidence to support the argument that David 
Cameron and Andrew Mitchell paid sustained attention to aid policy issues because they both 
genuinely cared about aid issues and reaching the 0.7% target. The first cluster of evidence to 
examine is the public statements made by these men. Cameron concluded his first major 
address on international development issues—his ‘Fighting Global Poverty’ speech at Oxford—
by assuring his listeners that international development “is my personal priority” (Cameron 
2006d). “I believe that effective aid is essential for economic empowerment,” Cameron (2006d) 
explained, “and that is why a Conservative government would spend more on aid”. A decade 
later, in a short farewell speech upon leaving Number 10 in July 2016, Cameron cited the 
“decision to keep our aid promises to the poorest people and the poorest countries” as a key 
achievement of his Government (Cameron 2016). In the decade in-between these speeches, 
while Cameron was Tory leader, he regularly and repeatedly voiced his commitment to reducing 
poverty and achieving the 0.7% target including to his own ‘tribe’ at Conservative Party 
Conferences304. (I return to this in more detail below, during subsection 6.4.2). 
 
Mitchell, for his part, regularly proclaimed his good fortune that, in giving him charge over the 
international development portfolio in Opposition and in Government, Cameron saved him the 
best and most exiting job in cabinet (A. Mitchell 2006, 2010b; Sparrow 2012). Reflecting on his 
political career to date in a public forum in late 2015, Mitchell (2015b, 7) recalled the role of 
Secretary of State for International Development as the “job of my dreams”. Mitchell also 
                                                          
304 Interview with Andrew Palmer, November 2016. In a typical declaration made during the Leader’s speech at the  
Conservative Party Conference in 2009, Cameron (2009d) declared that he was “proud that we’ve ring-fenced the 
budget for international development”. 
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acknowledged regretting relinquishing the role305—Cameron appointed him as Chief Whip in a 
reshuffle in 2012—but explained how his passion for the issue remained undiminished: “I feel 
passionately about international development and about doing something to end these colossal 
discrepancies of opportunity and wealth, which exist in our world today and disfigure it (Mitchell 
2015).” Following his tenure as Development Secretary, Mitchell has remained an active 
advocate, publishing position papers (A. Mitchell 2013, 2014), contributing numerous op-eds 
(e.g. A. Mitchell 2015c, 2016) and giving countless talks on development policy issues. He also 
remains heavily involved in Project Umubano and is a Patron of the Conservative Friends of 
International Development (key party institutions which I discuss further below, in subsection 
6.3.2, below).   
 
The second cluster of evidence concerns the testimony of close associates and observers of 
Cameron and Mitchell about the source of their motivation. Seldon and Snowdon’s book 
detailing Cameron’s premiership concludes that the 0.7% target was “a cause close to the prime 
minister’s heart” (Seldon and Snowdon 2015, Loc 4246), a conclusion that is significant given 
that this account is distinguished by the level of access the authors had to insiders306. “One of 
the rare issues on which Cameron will lose his temper” Snowdon and Seldon (2015, Loc 7845) 
quote one aide as saying, “is if they try challenging him over development spending.” Even 
political opponents who considered Cameron to be a politically expedient chameleon 
begrudgingly acknowledged his consistent prioritisation of international development 307 . 
Mitchell’s passion for the international development brief has been noted in various profiles 
(Sparrow 2012; Watt and Wintour 2010; Behr 2012)308 and is widely acknowledged within the 
development constituency. For example, Simon Maxwell, the Director of the Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI) during Mitchell’s time as Shadow Secretary of State, does not doubt 
that Mitchell is “somebody who actually does believe in development”309  
 
A third source of evidence concerns how Cameron and Mitchell enjoyed a highly effective 
partnership over a long period based on their shared beliefs on international development. 
                                                          
305 During this forum, at the UK Institute for Government, Mitchell (2015b, 3) stated that Chief Whip was “not a job I 
wanted” and that he told Cameron “I wasn’t the right person”, but nonetheless “out of loyalty to the Prime Minister 
and because I think on the whole you should do what you’ve asked by the Prime Minister if you possibly can, I 
agreed to move.”  
306 Cameron at 10 is based on over 300 interviews, including with the most senior members of Government and 
Cameron’s staff.  
307 Consider these comments from Lord Lipsey (n.d., Column 1648), offered during a debate in the House of Lords: 
“Mr Cameron was—how shall I put this in “lordly” language?—not known for his strong beliefs. But one belief that 
he did adhere to was giving a higher priority to aid”.  
308 The journalist Andrew Sparrow (2012), in a preface to an interview with Mitchell published in 2012, observed 
that “he's obviously quite passionate about his job.” 
309 Personal interview with Simon Maxwell, November 2014. See also Evans (2012).  
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During the 2005 leadership election, Mitchell had run the leadership campaign of David Davis, 
Cameron’s chief opponent. As Mitchell acknowledged to me in an interview in October 2014, 
this meant that: 
 [I]t wasn’t always written in the stars that [Cameron] and I would get on 
particularly well; [Cameron] could well have had a bit of a grievance. The 
thing was that we absolutely shared the same view on international 
development – completely. And that was a sort of bonding exercise, really. 
This comment naturally leads to a consideration of the following counterfactual: would the 
trajectory of UK development policy have been different if Davis emerged as Tory leader in 2006, 
rather than Cameron? Mitchell was Davis’ campaign manager during the 2006 leadership 
election, making him very well placed to assess this hypothetical. When I posed this question to 
Mitchell, he offered a measured but instructive response. “David Davis understands why 
international development is so important, but I think David Davis would agree that his 
commitment was less strong than David Cameron’s...310”  
 
Mitchell’s comment serves to reinforce the central argument of this thesis; that the priorities of 
individual political leaders are crucial in determining whether international development 
reaches the political agenda. This is especially likely to be the case in the Conservative party, a 
top-down organisation where a change of leadership is akin to a regime change (Bale 2016, Loc 
837)311. Once elected party leader, Cameron possessed some leeway in realigning the party’s 
political agenda to reflect his own, as long as he was “seen as a winner” (Bale 2016, Loc 859). 
And because international development had high decider salience for Cameron, this issue 
featured on the Conservative’s policy agenda.  
 
A fourth reason to believe that Cameron’s and Mitchell’s consistent support for international 
development issues derived from a legitimate personal commitment, is because it is very 
difficult to explain their positions as a product of pure politically expediency. Numerous insiders 
I spoke with remain baffled as to why the Tories would take the trouble to embrace and publicise 
a policy position that quite clearly was “not a vote winner”312 and also faced growing opposition 
from the right wing of the Conservative Party (Grice 2011), the right wing media (Mawdsley 
2011) and the public (Gettleson 2011). (I discuss the extent of these opposing forces in more 
detail below, during subsection 6.4.2). That said, Cameron and Mitchell clearly did believe (or 
were at least were willing to make the case to sceptical colleagues) that there were positive 
                                                          
310 Personal Interview with Andrew Mitchell, October 2014. 
311 As a senior Tory politician told Tim Bale, “[t]he leader is everything in the Conservative Party” (Bale 2016, Loc 
837). 
312 The idea that adhering to the 0.7% target was “not a vote winner” was repeated to be by a number of 
interviewees, including Victoria Honeyman and Duncan Green, and is supported by public opinion polling (see more, 
during subsection 6.4.2). 
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electoral benefits to supporting international development, even if these benefits accrued to 
the Tories in nuanced and indirect ways. During my interview with Mitchell, I was struck by his 
ability to recall, without notes or prompting, the specific details of what was evidently private 
internal polling313. Mitchell, Cameron and their pro-development supporters viewed the Tory 
prioritisation of international development as a sort of ‘gateway drug’ (my metaphor) for 
potential Conservative voters. Mitchell would later explain how the “principled success and 
achievement” of the Conservative-led government in reaching the 0.7% target was something 
that “gives permission to a group of people who have not always considered themselves to be 
Conservatives to give us their support” (A. Mitchell 2014, 154).  
 
In summary, I have argued in this subsection that Cameron and Mitchell’s ongoing support the 
0.7% target does not make sense unless it is accepted that reaching the target was something 
they each personally wanted to see happen. Moreover, accepting this does not negate that 
these men did not also see the political value in framing a commitment to 0.7% as a symbol of 
Tory modernisation. Much speculation regarding why the UK was able to achieve this target 
treat these personal and political motivations as mutually exclusive. The reality, I believe is that 
both motivations were present at the same time, reinforcing each other. Both the Cameron-
Mitchell aid salience shock and the Tory modernisation aid salience shock needed to be present 
to generate the ‘force’ required to change the trajectory of UK aid spending. To further this 
argument, I now turn to examine the deliberate steps Cameron and Mitchell took to realise their 
development policy objectives.  
6.3.2 Making development a centre-right issue 
“[T]he great success, which isn’t understood,” Mitchell explained to me as he reflected on his 
seven years overseeing Tory development policy, is that “we have turned development now into 
a centre-right issue.”314 The success of Cameron and especially Mitchell in fostering a powerful 
                                                          
313 Mitchell told me that he took comfort in early tracking polls showing Conservative support for international 
development policy amongst women (a group he acknowledged the Conservatives had “a perceived problem with”) 
and young voters313—demographics that tended to favour Labour. Likewise, Andrew Grice’s article previewing the 
2011 Conservative Party Conference also proves how Mitchell relied on internal polling to shore up support for 
international development amongst his colleagues. Drawing on information apparently passed to him by Mitchell or 
Mitchell’s office with the intention of sending a message ahead of the 2011 Party conference, Grice (2011) writes 
that “[t]he Tories' latest private polling found that the number of people who agree that ‘even as we deal with our 
deficit, we should be proud of our aid commitments’ has risen from 48 per cent three months ago to 51 per cent, 
while 38 per cent disagree.” 
314 This is a claim Mitchell, and others, have advanced elsewhere. For example, In an introduction to his pamphlet 
on international development for the Legatum Institute (A. Mitchell 2013), Gregory Barker, a minister of state for 
climate change in Cameron’s first government, credits Mitchell as “the Conservative politician who, more than any 
other, first in opposition and then in government, was responsible for developing and implementing a new, 
ambitious and authentic centre-right approach to development, which is now being rolled out around the world” 
(Barker in A. Mitchell 2013, 2). 
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and committed constituency for international development within the Conservative Party while 
in Opposition remains the most underappreciated reason why the Tories realised their promise 
to reach the 0.7% target once in Government, despite significant opposition. 
 
The first major initiative of the Cameron-Mitchell project to make development a centre-right 
issue was the establishment of the aforementioned Globalisation and Global Poverty Policy 
Group’s (GGPPG). Lisa Hayley-Jones, who as the director of the secretariat for the GGPPG315 
attended numerous meetings with Cameron, Mitchell and Lilley during the early days of Tory 
modernisation, was left in no doubt that the commitment to development was “impregnated 
into the top” of the Tory leadership: “[t]here’s always been, right from the top, a real buy in that 
this is the right thing to do…”316 One indicator of the priority Cameron placed on international 
development, according to Hayley-Jones, was how carefully the Group’s nineteen-strong 
membership was constructed317. The most important of these appointments was that of Peter 
Lilley—a senior figure on the Tory right and a former Deputy Leader and Shadow Treasurer—to 
co-chair the GGPPG alongside Geldof318.  
 
Lilley’s appointment shows how Cameron was keenly aware that he would need to temper 
opposition from the Tory right-wing if his desire to increase international development spending 
was to be realised. Lilley appreciated this, explaining to me how:   
[T]he fact I’m seen as a right wing Tory probably helped keep the more right-
wing Tories on board and made them less critical than they otherwise would 
have been, I think was [Cameron’s] reasoning with that. And I think it 
probably did help achieve that objective319. 
Lilley was similarly pragmatic in exercising his leadership of the GGPPG. Although he was 
“uneasy with the target to spend money”, Lilley understood that the role of the group was not 
to question the 0.7% target so much as to examine how this commitment could be made most 
effective320. “Given the target [was party policy], I was happy to work on how to make it as 
effective as possible”, Lilley explained to me. This is an example of how Cameron, by virtue of 
                                                          
315 Hayley-Jones led a half-dozen strong secretariat that actively supported the nineteen GGPPG members over a 
year-long period. The quality of the secretariat is also an indicator of the seriousness with which the GGPPG was 
approach. For example, Hayley-Jones was seconded from KPMG and had previously been a political adviser, while 
Martin Le Jeune, the Group’s communications adviser was, at the time, the Director of Public Affairs at BSkyB.  
316 Personal interview with Lisa Hayley-Jones, November 2014. 
317 Not only did the Group include development sector luminaries such as Bob Geldof and Professor Paul Collier 
alongside former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Rubin, it also featured a number of up-and-coming Tories 
who would go on to become key pro-development Tory MPs, such as Jeremy Lefroy and Alan Mak. 
318 While nominally named a co-chair, the reality is that Lilley chaired the Group in practice.  
319 Personal interview with Peter Lilley, October 2016. 
320 “Personally, as a former Treasury Minister [you] feel uneasy with the target to spend money,” Lilley explained to 
me. “You have a target to achieve objectives, normally, and you try and do them as efficiently as possible. There’s a 
danger that once you have a target to spend money, that you just, that becomes the objective. It’s just shovelling 
the money out of the door, as we said in the book… But, given the target, I was happy to work on how to make it as 
effective as possible.” 
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staking out and publicising his personal commitment to 0.7%, aligned Tory policy with his 
personal preferences by effectively ‘cutting off’ alternative policy choices in much the same way 
as Rudd did ahead of the IRAE process in Australia. 
  
The GGPPG established a policy blueprint that was adhered to for the remainder of Cameron’s 
leadership of the Conservative Party. Essentially, the Conservatives co-opted Labour’s top-level 
policy commitments—adherence to the 0.7%321, a commitment to DFID’s independence and the 
prioritisation of poverty reduction—while adding a distinctive emphasis on value for money, by 
focusing on enterprise, accountability and transparency (A. Mitchell 2009b). This blueprint was 
evident in One World Conservatism: A Conservative Agenda for International Development, one 
of a series of Green Papers commissioned by Conservative party and published on 13 July 2009. 
Mitchell drove the production of the Green Paper. However, in a reflection of his prioritisation 
and understanding of development issues, Cameron left his imprint on the document by 
suggesting a catalogue of changes after closely reading the initial draft322.  
 
Alongside the policy renewal process, Cameron and especially Mitchell were conscious of 
fostering a committed cadre of development supporters within the Party. To this end, Project 
Umubano rapidly usurped the GGPPG as the crucial incubator of Tory interest, awareness and 
policy engagement in international development issues once it launched in 2007. After 
attracting 43 volunteers to pay their own way to spend two weeks of their summer in Africa in 
its inaugural year, Umubano rapidly scaled, both in numbers of volunteers and locations, largely 
through word of mouth (see Table 6.B below)323.  
 
Mitchell established Umubano with the objective of fostering a pro-international development 
policy constituency within the Conservative Party. In a published diary entry from the 2009 
edition of Umubano, Mitchell (2009c) explained how “[w]ithin the Conservative Party our 
project helps ensure there are even more people passionate about international development 
who have tasted the reality of life in a developing country and are determined to tackle global 
poverty”. Likewise, Stephen Crabb, who inherited the leadership of Umubano from Mitchell in 
                                                          
321 In fact, the GGPPG went even further than Labour on the 0.7% target, recommending that the Government 
“should consider whether the target of 0.7% of GNI could be met sooner - by 2010 if possible” (Globalisation and 
Global Poverty Policy Group 2007, 14). In conjunction with this public-facing message, the weighty analysis 
contained within In it together—the report ran to almost five hundred pages, including seven working papers and 
contained 76 recommendations—satisfied development policy wonks that the Tories were serious about engaging 
with development policy. 
322 Mitchell told Ashcroft and Oakeshott (2015, 283–84) that Cameron “read [the draft] in a way a lot of others 
hadn’t, because he knows so much about it, and cares. His changes were very sensible. It showed he was on the 
ball, really interested.” 
323 Personal interview with Andrew Palmer, November 2016. 
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2011, explained in an email to the BBC’s Andrew Harding, that the project had “helped to create 
a critical mass of people who are not only interested in development but have seen the lasting 
difference it can make first hand” (Stephen Crabb, in Harding 2010)324. 
Table 6.B: Project Umubano as an Incubator of Tory Support for Development, 2007-2012325 
 
Umubano connected like-minded individuals and exposed volunteers to development issues in 
a meaningful way. “Getting out there and seeing” poverty was what made a lasting difference, 
according to Andrew Palmer, who volunteered on Umubano in 2008, 2009 (in Rwanda) and 2011 
(in Sierra Leone). The project generated a “unique camaraderie” among attendees, who felt a 
“shared sense of purpose”326. Palmer was among a group of Umubano veterans who sought to 
build on this momentum and the latent interest in the part in development issues by helping to 
establish Conservative Friends for International Development (CFID) in 2011, and becoming its 
inaugural director327.  
 
Examining the career trajectories of Umubano alumni demonstrates the influence of the project. 
When the Conservative party was returned to government in 2010, almost 10% of the 
Conservative caucus in the House of Commons (30 of 306) had taken part in Umubano (A. 
Mitchell 2010a). Umubano representation was even higher amongst Cameron’s first cabinet, 
with four of the eighteen Conservative members of Cabinet (22%)—Andrew Mitchell, David 
Mundell, Jeremy Hunt and Cameron himself—having been volunteers. (Furthermore, two 
                                                          
324 Crabb added that “[t]here is no question that Umubano has helped to generate a new level of positive interest 
and experience of development within the Conservative Party”. 
325 Table 6.B was compiled using data from the following sources: (Cameron 2007; S. Crabb 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 
2012; McClarkin 2011; A. Mitchell 2008a, 2008b, 2009c, 2009a, 2010a; Watt and Revill 2007). 
326 Personal interview with Andrew Palmer, November 2016. 
327 As Palmer put it to me, while Umubano ensured sustained engagement of Tory members on international 
development issues for two weeks every year, “what about the other fifty?” To this end, CFID “creates a 
constructive space” for regular discussions about international development within the Conservative Party. “The 
conversation tries to move past ‘is this good or bad?’”, explained Palmer, “to ‘how can it be better?’”. With 
Umubano adopting a much lower profile after 2012, partly because of the difficulties of operating such an initiative 
while in government, CFID has become the chief institutional expression of the pro-development bloc of the 
Conservative party. 
Year Volunteers Comments 
2007 43 The Umubano team includes David Cameron and eight other MPs. 
2008 104 The Umubano team includes ten MPs and eleven prospective parliamentary candidates. 
2009 ≈100 Umubano expands beyond Rwanda, with David Mundell MP leading a half-dozen strong team focusing on the justice sector to Sierra Leone.  
2010 65 Stephen Crabb MP inherits the leadership of the Umubano team from Mitchell. Volunteer numbers were down in the aftermath of the 2010 election.  
2011 >120 The largest Umubano team. 
2012 >100 Involved the largest group of supporters travelling to Sierra Leone. 
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additional Umubano alumni would later be appointed to cabinet—Justine Greening (as 
International Development Secretary) and Stephen Crabb328. Another alumni, Desmond Swayne, 
became Minister of State for International Development in 2014). Perhaps the most impressive 
legacy of Umubano is that four of the six conservative members elected in 2015 to the 
International Development Committee—an eleven-strong House of Commons committee that 
oversees DFID—were Umubano alumni: Fiona Bruce, Pauline Latham, Jeremy Lefroy (who had 
earlier served on the GGDDP) and Wendy Morton. 
 
While it is often believe that Cameron’s embrace of international development left him entirely 
isolated within the Conservative Party, the reality is that Umubano helped create and, connect 
a cohort of pro-development Tories, giving Cameron and extra degree of confidence to pursue 
the 0.7% target than would have otherwise have been the case. Credit for this goes largely to 
Mitchell. “Umubano was Andrew Mitchell’s baby”, Peter Lilley explained to me329. The initial 
idea for Umubano was Mitchell’s (A. Mitchell 2010a). He secured Cameron’s personal support 
for it. He led the team to Rwanda each year while the Tories were in Opposition, taking along 
his wife (who is a GP) and two daughters. And Mitchell was relentless in promoting Umubano 
within Conservative circles, including posting regularly bout it on popular conservative blogs 
such as ConservativeHome (for example A. Mitchell 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2009a). In retrospect, 
however, one of the more significant signs of the growing influence of Mitchell’s project was the 
way in which it prompted a response from Labour. Explaining the nature of this response is the 
task to which I now turn my attention towards.      
6.3.3 Labour’s Response: The 2009 White Paper 
The impressive Tory efforts to turn international development into a centre-right issue drew a 
response from Labour, the traditional ‘issue owners’ of international development. Douglas 
Alexander, who was Brown’s Secretary of State for International Development from 2007 to 
2010, knew that commissioning a White Paper provided an opportunity to publicly differentiate 
                                                          
328 Examining the career trajectories of the 21 MPs and prospective parliamentary candidates (PPCs) included in the 
2008 Umubano cohort is especially instructive. Of the ten conservative MPs that volunteered in 2008, five would go 
on to become Cabinet Ministers during Cameron’s premiership (including both Andrew Mitchell and Justine 
Greening serving as Secretary of State for International Development). Francis Maude, as Minister for the Cabinet 
office, attended cabinet. A further three of the ten MPs—David Mundell, Tobias Ellwood and Brooks Newmark—
served as junior Ministers during Cameron’s first term, while the remaining two MPs—Desmond Swayne and Mark 
Lancaster—served as Parliamentary Private Secretaries to David Cameron and Andrew Mitchell, respectively. 
Additionally, of the eleven PPCs Umubano in 2008, six were elected to the House of Commons in 2010, with an 
additional two elected in 2015.  
329 Personal interview with Peter Lilley, October 2016. Likewise, Andrew Palmer told me he views Mitchell’s 
personal commitment to Umubano as “huge”. 
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Labour’s approach330. Published on 6 July 2009, Eliminating World Poverty: Building our Common 
Future (DFID 2009c) was the fourth international development White Paper published by New 
Labour. Although a well-regarded document, Building our Common Future did not 
fundamentally change the trajectory of UK aid spending. Rather, its ultimate impact was to 
strengthen the existing consensus on reaching 0.7%. The decisionmaking episode leading to 
Building our Common Future is best viewed as an important ‘ratcheting up’ point along the 
virtuous circle of events and circumstances that ultimately made achieving the 0.7% target 
possible.   
 
Douglas Alexander was appointed Development Secretary in June 2007, when his mentor 
Gordon Brown became Prime Minister. According to Seldon and Lodge (2011b, Loc 787), 
Alexander’s appointment as Development Secretary signalled “the critical importance of the 
area to Brown”331. Like Brown, Alexander is a Scottish ‘Son of the Manse’, a background that 
Alexander readily acknowledges informs his own politics and worldview and his emphasis on 
serving others (Hasan and Macintyre 2009; Keegan 2003) 332 . Moreover, an individual who 
worked closely with Alexander for a number of years was convinced that that Alexander, as 
Secretary of State for International Development, was ultimately motivated by his strong 
personal commitment to reducing poverty. At the same time, Alexander is acknowledged as 
extremely intelligent and a gifted political strategist (Alexander coordinated Labour’s General 
election campaigns in 2001, 2010 and 2015). He harboured a personal ambition to orchestrate 
a White Paper process and was conscious of distinguishing himself from his predecessor.  
 
In mid-2008, Alexander approached the DFID leadership and expressed his desire to publish a 
White Paper. Arrangements were made to produce a concept paper. A White Paper team was 
then rapidly established within DFID to build on this concept paper. In March, DFID published a 
consultation document calling for submissions (DFID 2009b) and framing the White Paper with 
                                                          
330 Roy Trivedy, who led DFID’s White Paper team, acknowledged to me that Alexander was conscious that, “a 
[White Paper] would signal to the electorate, whenever the election was called, the difference in the different 
approaches between political parties and so on.” Likewise, Simon Maxwell, who was an adviser during the White 
Paper process, later wrote that the White Paper incorporated an unspoken challenge: “to position international 
development politically for the election expected in 2010” (Maxwell 2009, 768). 
331 According to Seldon and Lodge (2011b, Loc 787), Alexander’s appointment as Development Secretary signalled 
“the critical importance of the area to Brown.” As Douglas had been Blair’s last Secretary for Transport, the move to 
Development would typically be seen as a demotion. However, because they were understood to be such close 
allies—Alexander was an aide to Brown in the early 1990s and remained one Brown’s closest advisers by the time 
Brown became Prime Minister (Seldon and Lodge 2011b, Loc 794)—Douglas’ move to Secretary of State for 
International Development was seen as a reflection of the pair’s interest in this issue area. For an indication of how 
Brown depended on Alexander for strategic political advice—at least until Alexander was blamed by Brown and Ed 
Balls for the aborted 2007 election campaign—see Seldon and Lodge (2011b, chapter 2).    
332 In an appearance on David Axelrod’s podcast The Axe Files (episode 97, November 2016), Alexander 
acknowledged that his parents “had a powerful sense of—I think inspired by their Christian values—a powerful 
sense of service which they gave to their children, of which I was one.” (Axelrod n.d.). 
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five questions333. In another demonstration of how consistent Alexander’s priorities were, four 
of these questions correlated exactly with the four priorities Alexander had outlined in speeches 
at the outset of his tenure (the final question was a general one contemplating how to address 
emerging challenges). Alexander (2009b) reiterated these four priorities once more in his speech 
to the DFID Annual Conference in London, also held in March and designed as a forum to feed 
into the White Paper process334. As you would expect, these themes featured heavily in Building 
our Common Future when it was published in July. The priorities Alexander had been articulating 
since the beginning of his tenure were translated directly into the pages of the White Paper. 
 
The period during which the White Paper was being development coincided with a remarkable 
confluence of international events which created their own domestic pressures. By the end of 
2008, as the GFC deepened, “Britain was plunging into a deep recession” (figures would later 
record that the British economy had contracted by 2% in the final quarter of 2008, alone) (Seldon 
and Lodge 2011b, Loc 6637). Dealing with the economic crisis, and preparing for the London G20 
summit preoccupied Gordon Brown and Number 10 during this period. Meanwhile, DFID and its 
ministers—two ministers and a parliamentary secretary supported Alexander oversee DFID335—
were preoccupied with responding to the humanitarian emergency brought on by Operation 
Cast Lead, a 22-day Israeli attack on Gaza (Weizman 2010, 11)336.  
 
By January, when Alexander publicly announced DFID would published a new White Paper 
(Douglas Alexander 2009a), “it was officially confirmed Britain was in… a recession” (Seldon and 
Lodge 2011b, Loc 6879). According to John Battle, who introduced Alexander’s speech at the 
meeting of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Overseas Development (APGOOD), where the 
Secretary of State announced the White Paper would be published in the Summer, Alexander 
chose this venue because it “gave him a platform [to] reach out to the cognoscenti… which he 
couldn’t do through the newspapers because they won’t cover development” 337 . Battle’s 
observation therefore serves as a valuable reminder that, while development issues remained 
particularly salient for the development constituency and a key cast of powerful individual 
                                                          
333 DFID received over 2500 submissions (DFID 2009a). 
334 An indicator of the standing of this conference, and of the importance the Labour leadership placed on 
international development issues, is that it was also addressed by Brown (2009) and Foreign Secretary David 
Milliband (2009).  
335 From October 2008 to July 2009, Gareth Thomas and Ivan Lewis served as Ministers of State for International 
Development, while Michael Foster served as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for International 
Development.  
336 Personal interview with Richard Darlington, November 2014. 
337 Personal interview with John Battle, October 2014. As it happened, Alexander’s speech was delivered on the 
same day a second ‘bailout’ package for British banks was announced.  
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political actors—Brown, Douglas, Cameron and Mitchel foremost among them—the general 
public, as always, remained more concerned economic issues directly affecting their daily lives.  
 
Pro-development politicians were acutely of this. “[T]he GFC had changed a lot in politics”, one 
of Alexander’s advisors from the time told me338. And because Alexander personally supported 
the development spending ramp up, he knew he needed to repackage and reinforce the 
rationale for providing development spending given worsening domestic economic conditions. 
Roy Trivedy, who led DFID’s White Paper team, relayed to me how a much of the focus and of 
those working on the White Paper was related to building what the team called the ‘theory of 
the case’; a narrative of what change was required in response to global change 339 . “Our 
narrative, broadly,” recalled Richard Darlington, “was 'we had a big job to do before the financial 
crisis, and actually it's only got bigger’"340. Yet as the budget came under more pressure, and as 
the public began to feel the effects of the recession, the tendency was to focus attention on 
pressing needs at home, rather than abroad. As the 2010 general election approached, the 
decisionmaking dynamics of international development grew evermore closely connected with 
managing the size of the growing budget deficit. These dynamics are the subject we now turn 
to in the final section of this chapter.  
 
§§§ 
  
                                                          
338 Personal interview with Richard Darlington, November 2014. 
339 Personal interview with Roy Trivedy, October 2014 
340 To convey this message, Alexander (2009d) made repeated use of World Bank statistics which estimated that, 
“as a result of the financial crisis as many as 100 million more people across the development world will be trapped 
in extreme poverty by the end of next year [i.e. 2010].”  
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6.4 Achieving 0.7%: The ‘Quad’ and the Aid ‘Ringfence’  
We will not balance the books on the 
backs of the world’s poorest.  
—Andrew Mitchell, 2011 
 
One of the more bizarre mysteries of 
contemporary British politics is the 
ironclad, almost fanatical intensity of 
the government's commitment to 
foreign aid spending and the activities of 
DFID, the Department for International 
Development.                                           
 —Jonathan Foreman, The Spectator, 2013 
 
The preceding three sections of this chapter have tracked the emergence and influence of three 
aid salience shocks in turn: the Short aid salience shock (type I), the Tory modernisation aid 
salience shock (type II) and the Cameron-Mitchell aid salience shock (type I). This concluding 
section of the chapter documents the climax of the story of aid policy change in the UK—
achieving the 0.7% target. The argument I mount in this section is that this ‘bizarre mystery of 
contemporary British politics’, to paraphrase Jonathan Foreman, can only be solved by 
understanding how the combined influence of three aid salience shocks contribute to creating 
an environment whereby the 0.7% spending target was protected in an arrangement known as 
the ‘aid ringfence’, despite exceedingly strong political opposition.  
 
In this section, I hone in on the decisionmaking activities of a small group called ‘the Quad’, the 
name of the four-member decision unit that functioned akin to the inner cabinet of the 
Cameron-Clegg Government (Laws 2016, Loc 1005). The 2010 elections had resulted in the 
formation of a Coalition Government between Cameron’s Conservative Party and Nick Clegg’s 
Liberal Democrats, the first coalition government in the UK in 60 years341. From the very start, 
                                                          
341 While Conservatives won a plurality of 306 seats at the 2010 elections held on May 6, they fell twenty seats short 
of forming a majority (For a detailed account of this period, see Seldon and Snowdon (2015, chapter 3)). Five days of 
high political drama ensued, as the Conservatives and Labour courted the Liberal Democrats in ongoing coalition 
talks.. The Conservative’s prior strategic planning for such an eventually ultimately proved decisive and they 
reached an agreement with the Lib Dems on 11 May (d’Ancona 2013a, 14–22). The next day, the first coalition 
government in the UK in 60 years was consummated when Cameron and Liberal Democrats leader Nick Clegg held a 
joint press conference in the Downing Street Rose Garden. For a detailed account of the context of the Rose Garden 
press conference and its political significance, see d’Ancona (2013a, chapter 2). The press conference is 
remembered for the easy-going rapport between the two leaders. For example, d’Ancona (2013a, 33) recalls how 
Cameron and Clegg projected the “impression that the Coalition was the ideal outcome for the nation [and] all they 
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the Cameron-Clegg government made it clear that its priority was to reduce the budget deficit, 
with the difficult funding decisions ultimately falling to the Quad, including relating to upholding 
the 0.7% target. The prioritisation of reducing the budget deficit was itself a response to the 
impact of the global financial crisis. I begin this concluding section of the story of UK aid policy 
change by examining Cameron’s political response to this event.   
6.4.1 The Politics of the Aid Ringfence 
The politics of the aid ringfence has its roots in a keynote speech David Cameron delivered at 
the height of the global financial crisis342. On 18 November 2008, a month after the collapse of 
investment bank Lehman Brothers, Cameron announced that the Conservatives would abandon 
an earlier pledge to match Labour’s spending plans to 2010-11 (Seldon and Snowdon 2015, Loc 
720; Summers 2008). Andrew Sparrow (2008), the Guardian’s political editor, recognised that, 
while not technically amounting to much, Cameron's announcement was highly significant “in 
party positioning terms”. By ruling out funding further economic stimulus through borrowing, 
Cameron demarcated the Tories approach to managing the recession from Labour’s. This move 
marked the beginning of ‘Plan A’, a political blueprint which placed “deficit reduction at the very 
heart of [the Conservative Party’s] economic strategy” (Seldon and Snowdon 2015, Loc 659)343. 
From this point, it became inevitable that a future Cameron premiership would be defined by 
austerity.  
 
Cameron and Osborne were highly alert that implementing ‘Plan A’ made the Conservatives 
vulnerable to the familiar charge that they were the ‘party of cuts’ (Seldon and Snowdon 2015, 
Loc 746). To evade this political trap, Cameron and Osborne assiduously avoided specifying 
where future spending cuts would fall, despite clearly and regularly intimating the eventual need 
for them344. On the other hand, in order to preserve their hard-won moderniser credentials, and 
fend off impressions of a return of the ‘nasty party’, they promised to protect a number of 
sensitive policy areas from cuts.  
                                                          
had hoped for personally”. This impression would have political ramifications for both men in terms of how they 
managed the expectations of their respective parties of Coalition Government. 
342 This speech took place just a month after the collapse of U.S investment bank Lehman Brothers. 
343 For a detailed account of this strategy, see Seldon and Snowdon (2015, chapter 2). 
344 By early 2009, “Cameron and Osborne had… committed themselves against spending their way out of recession” 
observe Seldon and Snowdow (2015, Loc 746). To specify where cuts would fall, however, was too politically risky. 
Instead, Cameron alluded to the need for them. For example in his ‘Age of Austerity’ speech to the Conservative 
Party Spring Forum (Cameron 2009b) Cameron acknowledged “we will have to take some incredibly tough decisions 
on taxation, spending, borrowing – things that really affect people’s lives.” As the 2010 election approached Labour 
and the Liberal Democrats were no more forthcoming about their own spending plans. This ensured that the core 
question of the 2010 election campaign related to the speed at which deficit reduction should occur; the 
Conservatives “were committed to immediate deficit reduction measures” (Hay 2010, 395), while  Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats espoused more Keynesian policies and advocated delayed fiscal rebalancing (Hay 2010, 395).  
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In a speech on Britain’s economic future delivered in early January 2009, Cameron promised to 
maintain spending plans for the National Health Service (NHS), schools, defence and 
international development (Cameron 2009a). The first instance of the term ‘ring fence’ being 
directly applied to development spending came during Cameron’s appearance on the BBC’s 
Andrew Marr Show on 11 January (A. Marr 2009)345. The term soon acquired widespread use in 
the political debate (e.g. Wintour 2009; Hasan and Macintyre 2009). By the time Cameron 
delivered his leader’s speech at the Conservative Party conference in October 2009, the future 
Prime Minister was deploying this language himself, telling delegates he was “proud that we’ve 
ring-fenced the budget for international development” (Cameron 2009d). Yet despite Cameron 
repeatedly promising to ring fence the development budget (e.g. Cameron 2009c, 2009d), most 
observers remained sceptical this commitment would hold (e.g. Hasan and Macintyre 2009).  
 
The political logic of protecting the National Health Service (NHS) from cuts was straightforward, 
as Healthcare was a highly salient issue for the electorate346. The Tories made their health 
spending promise the feature of the pre-election campaign launched in early 2010 (Ganesh 
2014, Loc 3139). On the other hand, cutting aid would have been politically expedient, as 
development issues were considered a very low priority for voters generally, but even more so 
for those inclined to vote Conservative347. The ringfence was also loathed by the Tory right wing, 
who objected to it not just because of their aversion to aid spending but because they believed 
all spending areas should equally share any fiscal pain. For these reasons, the question for many 
political observers was not if Cameron would adjust his commitment to the 0.7% target, but 
when.  
 
Those close to Cameron, however, remained confident he would keep his promise. Chris Mullin, 
who briefly served as Minister for International Development under Clare Short, recalls walking 
across St James’s Park with Mitchell after listening to him address a Royal Africa Society 
breakfast about Tory development policy in late September 2009. As the two headed toward 
Westminster, Mitchell assured Mullin that David Cameron “is entirely signed up to protecting 
the aid budget” (Mullin 2011, 393–94).    
 
                                                          
345 When Marr asked Cameron to clarify whether the Conservatives were “going to try and ring fence health, 
education and international development,” Cameron agreed. 
346 Ahead of the 2010 election, healthcare was the most salient issue for 26% of British voters, behind only 
management of the economy (32%) (Dorey 2010, 412).  
347 Ahead of the 2010 election, international development issues did not register in an Ipsos MORI poll of salience 
issues. The closest proxy that registered in the survey was defence issues, which were most important for just 3% of 
voters (Dorey 2010, 412). 
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The aid ringfence survived as Tory policy through to the 2010 election before readily finding its 
way into the initial Coalition Agreement (Conservative Party and Liberal Democrats 2010, 1). 
Given the commitment to spend 0.7% of GNI on development had been included in the election 
manifestos of the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats (it was also in Labour’s) 348, the 
inclusion of the pledge to ringfence aid spending in the Coalition agreement was, in one sense, 
unremarkable. Yet, at the same time, considered alongside the serious actions the Coalition 
proposed to address to the scale of the “urgent” fiscal challenge, its stance on aid spending—
highlighted on the Coalition agreement’s first page, no less349—stood out.  
 
To commence the task of budget repair, the Coalition Agreement specified that an emergency 
budget would be handed down within fifty days, with a full Spending Review reporting in the 
autumn (Conservative Party and Liberal Democrats 2010, 1). The emergency budget would set 
the total envelope for government spending, after which the Spending Review would set out the 
spending limits of each Whitehall department over the coming four financial years (2011-12 
through and 2014-15)350.  
 
The emergency budget handed down on 22 June was “ferociously political” (d’Ancona 2013a). 
It sought to convey the political message of the Coalition standing up to responsibly ‘rescue’ the 
British economy in the aftermath of Labour’s compulsive prolificacy (Gamble 2015, 47). While 
the Conservatives had pledged “to cut the deficit by half over the next Parliament” (Gamble 
2015, 47) during the election campaign, Osborne used his emergency budget speech to outline 
an even more aggressive approach; the Coalition had decided it would eliminate the budget 
deficit in the life of the Parliament and do so primarily through spending cuts (Gamble 2015, 48). 
 
This decision immediately reduced the envelope of spending available for distribution during 
the spending review. It meant that, once the pledges on the NHS and international aid were 
taken into account, acknowledged Osborne in his emergency budget speech, “other 
departments will face an average real cut of around 25 per cent over four years” (Osborne 
2010)351. In light of this news, the decision to protect aid spending became an even more visible 
                                                          
348 In a demonstration of the extent of consensus on high-level development policy in the UK, each of the major 
parties explicitly included a commitment to reaching the 0.7% target in 2013 in their 2010 election manifestos 
(Liberal Democrats 2010, 62; Conservative Party 2010, 117; Labour Party 2010, 70). 
349 The first page of the initial coalition agreement established that “[t]he target of spending 0.7% of GNI on 
overseas aid will also remain in place” (Conservative Party and Liberal Democrats 2010, 1). An expanded coalition 
agreement published ten days later featured even more favourable terms for aid spending, promising not only to 
honour the 0.7% commitment by 2013, but to “enshrine this commitment in law” (HM Government 2010, 22). 
350 First established during Blair’s premiership, Sending Reviews are initiated periodically and operate as medium 
term financial management tools which “set departmental spending limits for a number of years ahead” (D. Webb 
and Allen 2010, 4). 
351 Further details are set out in the budget documents (H. M. Treasury 2010a, 17). 
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target of opposition, as reaching the 0.7% target required a substantial real increase in the 
international development budget. In public, senior Coalition figures promised repeatedly 
during the spending review process that the 0.7% ringfence would be maintained. But as we will 
see, behind the scenes, within the ‘Quad’, the wisdom of upholding the target was questioned. 
6.4.2 The Aid Ringfence is tested: the 2010 Spending Review and its aftermath 
The Quad formed organically as part of preparations for the 2010 emergency budget (Laws 2016, 
Loc 1005; Seldon and Snowdon 2015, Loc 1105). The members of this small group were Prime 
Minister David Cameron; Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne (Conservative); Deputy 
Prime Minister Nick Clegg (Liberal Democrat); and Treasury Secretary Danny Alexander (Liberal 
Democrat). This body subsequently became the ultimate decision unit not only for the 
subsequent 2010 Spending Review352, but for key economic policy decisions over the life of the 
Coalition Government (Forsyth 2012) 353 . While a Public Expenditure (PEX) Committee was 
established to oversee the Spending Review process, taking responsibility for liaising with 
departments and the Treasury and reporting to cabinet at key intervals354, the Quad remained 
the final arbiter of where spending cuts would fall. It was the Quad that had the final say on 
whether or not to abandon 0.7%.  
 
The 2010 Spending Review process was the subject of intense media scrutiny and pitted cabinet 
ministers against each other in departmental turf wars. It was exceedingly political. In the 
process of reconstructing this episode, I became increasing convinced that, at the very least, 
delaying the date for achieving the 0.7% target must have been countenanced at the highest 
levels. When I had the opportunity to press Andrew Mitchell on this, he confirmed my 
suspicions. He acknowledged a delay in achieving 0.7% had been considered, conceding that 
“[t]here was discussion about it and the argument went backwards and forwards but I was very 
much opposed to change in all of this and indeed so was the Prime Minister”355.  
 
                                                          
352 Reflecting in 2012 on the Quad’s role in the 2010 Spending Review, Danny Alexander noted that the 
”combination of intensive bilateral negotiations, with a small, central decision making body, ensured that decisions 
made through the Spending Review were consistent with the coalition agreement and had the authority of the 
leaders of both parties within the Government. Where necessary, it could also focus on sensitive areas of public 
spending (Danny Alexander 2012)”. 
353 David Laws, a senior figure in the Liberal Democrats throughout the period of Coalition Government who was 
involved in negotiating the Coalition Agreement and briefly held the post of Chief Secretary to the Treasury before 
resigning due to an expenses scandal, recalls that the Quad would generally meed four or five times “over the 
course of the eight-week run-ins to” Autumn Statements and Budgets (Laws 2016, Loc 1344). 
354 To guide the development of the 2010 Spending Review, a Spending Review Framework was published on 8 June 
(H.M. Treasury 2010). It set out the process and explained the role of the PEX Committee (H.M. Treasury 2010, 18). 
355 Personal interview with Andrew Mitchell, November 2014. 
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Since conducting this interview, further evidence has emerged confirming Mitchell’s account. In 
their behind-the-scenes account of Cameron’s Prime Ministership, Seldon and Snowden (2015, 
Loc 7864) report that Danny Alexander—who was integral in overseeing the details of the 
Spending Review 356 —oversaw “a debate about whether the [0.7%] figure should apply 
immediately or be delayed until 2015”. Alexander recalled that “in the end we [i.e. the Quad] 
decided that it should be met by 2013, which secured broad agreement” (Alexander in Seldon 
and Snowdon 2015, Loc 7862). Seldon and Snowden (2015, Loc 1154) also confirm Mitchell’s 
report that the protection of international development spending was “primarily at the 
instigation of Cameron himself.” In short, Cameron and the power to personally intervene in the 
Quad to protect aid spending.  
 
The decision to protect the aid budget in the 2010 spending review actually increased the 
pressure on the aid ringfence by driving up the political stakes for Cameron’s ongoing support357. 
In the final reckoning, the 2010 Spending Review cut departmental budgets other than health 
and international development by an average of 19% over four years (H. M. Treasury 2010b, 
5)358, with real decreases in total departmental spending of 11.5% over four years. In stark 
contrast to the bleak overall picture, the Department for International Development’s budget 
was slated to receive a real increase in funds of almost 38% (see Figure 6.B below) 359 . 
Furthermore, by this point, public opinion polls tracking support for aid spending had been 
moving discernibly since the onset of the financial crisis. The dual impact of constant media 
speculation about where pending spending cuts would fall, and repeated references to 
‘protecting’ the aid budget, combined to reduce public support for aid spending (Lindstrom and 
Henson 2010, 8)360.  
                                                          
356 According to Seldon and Snowdon (2015, Loc 1154) the 2010 Spending Review was “tightly controlled operation: 
besides Treasury officials, and the voices of Osborne and his aides, the other heavyweight input comes from Danny 
Alexander, who oversees much of the detail.”  
357 Writing in The Guardian in the aftermath of the publication of the 2010 Spending Review, Nilima Gulrajan (2010) 
worried that “[s]ingling DFID out for special treatment is sacrificing public support for aid that has been so critical 
for DFID's past successes”. 
358 This was less than the initially-forecast 25% because of additional savings identified from savings on welfare and 
public sector pension contributions (d’Ancona 2013a, 56). 
359 Total spending on ODA (i.e. including ODA eligible spending by non-DFID departments), was slated to increase 
from £8.4b in 2010 to £12.0 in 2013. It is also important to note that while the volume of funds to be administered 
by DFID rose dramatically, the envelope for DFID’s administrative costs (i.e. those to actually run the department) 
were actually halved by the Spending Review. The 38% figure I quote (for change in the Departmental expenditure 
limited (DEL) for DFID) is derived from figures published in the Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses 2011 (HM 
Treasury 2011, Table 1.9, page 28) showing spending for international development increasing from £7,473m in 
2010-11 to £10,299m in 2014-15, representing a real increase of £2,826m, or 37.8%. 
360 A report published by the Institute for Development Studies summarising trends in UK public opinion in the late 
2000s and published in 2010 found that “support for aid spending has declined as the scale of the UK’s budget 
deficit has become apparent and actual cuts in spending have begun” (Lindstrom and Henson 2010, 9). DFID’s own 
tracking surveys showed that 55% of respondents thought the UK should spend more on aid in September 2007. By 
February 2010, this number had declined to 40% (Lindstrom and Henson 2010, 4). Overviews of UK public opinion 
and aid from this period include those by BritainThinks (2010), Lindstrom and Henson (2010, 2011) and Glennie, 
Straw and Wild (2012).  
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Figure 6.B: Real Changes in Departmental Expenditure Limit by Department (2010-11 to 
2014-15)361 
 
 
Opinion polling specifically addressing the aid ring fence was even more definitive. A YouGov 
poll conducted in July 2010 that asked respondents about their views on dealing with the budget 
deficit revealed that, while the ring fencing of the NHS was popular (58% of respondents 
supported exempting health from spending cuts), only 15% thought international development 
should be exempted from cuts. On the other hand, 60% were opposed to maintaining the aid 
ring fence (BritainThinks 2010, 4, 14)362. A series of other polls yielded similar insights363.  
 
                                                          
361 Figure 6.B is adapted from a chart included in a brief published by the institute of fiscal studies in 2011 (Crawford 
and Johnson 2011, 8). The 37.8% figure (for change in the Departmental expenditure limited (DEL for DFID) is 
derived from figures published in the Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses 2011 (HM Treasury 2011, Table 1.9, 
page 28) showing spending for international development increasing from £7,473m in 2010-11 to £10,299m in 
2014-15, representing a real increase of £2,826m, or 37.8%. 
362 This data is drawn from a YouGov poll commissioned by BritainThinks for PricewaterhouseCoopers which 
surveyed 1788 members of the general public in the UK in an online questionnaires on 27 and 28 July 2010 
(BritainThinks 2010, 4, 14).  
363 A Harris Interactive poll from the same period revealed that 64% of voters thought “aid to developing countries 
should bear the biggest part of cuts in government spending” (Lindstrom and Henson 2010, 4, emphasis added). 
Similarly, results from a series of UK Public Opinion Monitor surveys conducted in mid-2010 showed 63% of 
respondents thought aid spending “should be reduced as part of efforts to address the UK budget deficit” 
(Lindstrom and Henson 2010, 8), while only 8% advocated increasing aid spending363. 
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For supporters of his party, Cameron’s commitment to aid spending was even more 
anachronistic. Results from the Public Opinion Monitor showed that “Conservative voters were 
12 per cent more likely to support cutting the aid budget than Labour voters” (Lindstrom and 
Henson 2010, 11). In an online poll hosted by the website ConservativeHome, 32% of Tory 
members nominated international development as their lowest priority for public spending, 
marginally exceeded only by the number who thought ‘culture, media and sport’ should receive 
less priority (34%)) (Montgomerie 2009)364. A similar survey overseen by ConservativeHome in 
late 2012 asked members to respond to how they felt about a range of deficit reduction 
measures. 84% of respondents said they would find a reduction in the aid reduction acceptable, 
versus only 13% against (Montgomerie 2012)365.  
 
Cameron also faced heated opposition in the press and from prominent right-wing Tories such 
as Defence Minister Liam Fox (Wintour 2011). “Hardly a day passes” observed influential 
conservative blogger Tim Montgomerie366 in September 2011, “without someone in the centre 
right press suggesting that we should cut the aid budget in order to reduce the deficit…” 
(Montgomerie 2011). Montgomerie provided seven excerpts from recent critical articles, 
including four from the centre-right tabloid the Daily Mail, which made opposition to the UK’s 
expanding aid spending a cause célèbre (Mawdsley 2015)367. The Spectator suggested in an 
editorial that maintaining the aid ringfence was politically insane368.   
 
It is a testament to the depth of Cameron’s personal and political commitment to the 0.7% 
spending target that, in the face of such broad opposition, he refused to let the issue slide from 
the political agenda. On the contrary, following the 2010 Spending Review, Cameron 
“continue[d] to invest time and political capital in [international development], going far beyond 
                                                          
364 This online survey attracted 1812 respondents (Montgomerie 2009).  
365 Support for reducing aid spending was second only to reducing Britain’s contribution to the EU, a measure 
acceptable to 95% of respondents (Montgomerie 2012). Furthermore, the commitment to aid spending was not 
only failing to win the Tories any new adherents—a 2011 Yougov poll showed that the aid ring fence was not 
winning any voters over to the conservative party, with only 7% of voters saying “the decision to increase the aid 
budget makes them more favourable towards the Conservatives, while 37 per cent say it makes them less 
favourable” (J. Jones 2011). 
366 Montgomerie’s status as an influential blogger is acknowledged by Ganesh (2014, Loc 3933) and also Bale—one 
of the foremost academic experts on the Conservative Party, who regularly cites ConservativeHome (e.g. Bale 2016, 
Loc 7125). 
367 “Most of the attacks on the coalition’s aid policy are to be found in the press and particularly the Daily Mail” 
argues Magee (2014, 5). The paper’s sister paper, The Mail on Sunday, would later launch a campaign in early 2016 
to gather 100,000 signatures for a petition that would force a Commons debate on the 0.7% law—a campaign that 
succeeded. Ian Birrell, who worked as a speechwriter for Cameron during the 2010 campaign, was another vocal 
critic of Cameron’s aid commitment who was often published in the Daily Mail. While Birrell agreed with Cameron 
“on many things” and admired the Prime Minister as a politician, Birrell did not hide his “abhorrence for 
[Cameron]’s blinkered, backfiring and bovine obsession with foreign aid” (Birrell 2016).   
368 “The decision to ring-fence Health and Education is, of course, raw politics,” editorialised The Spectator in 2013, 
before adding, “[a]s for international development, that’s a trickier ring-fence to understand. Why would any sane 
government in so much debt be so determined to waste money abroad” (The Spectator 2013). 
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support for the 0.7% figure” (Seldon and Snowdon 2015, Loc 7867).  In May 2011, for example, 
Cameron chose to directly confront the Daily Mail and its readers after the newspaper published 
an article critical of Britain’s aid spending to coincide with the G8 summit in Deauville, France. 
In a follow up press conference, Cameron deliberately called on a Daily Mail journalist and 
delivered an impassioned and highly personal defence of the UK’s aid spending (Wintour 2011; 
Seldon and Snowdon 2015, Loc 7863)369.  
 
A month later, Cameron published an op-ed titled ‘Why we’re right to ringfence the aid budget’ 
in The Guardian (Cameron 2011a)370. He then told delegates gathered at the Global Alliance for 
Vaccines and Immunisation conference the following day that“[w]hen you make a promise to 
the poorest people in the world you should keep it” (Cameron 2011b). In July 2011, Cameron 
used the occasion of a visit to Lagos, Nigeria, to confront aid sceptics once more. “There are 
some people back at home who don’t like Britain’s aid commitment,” Cameron acknowledged. 
“They see us make painful cuts to budgets at home and wonder why we are increasing our 
spending abroad” (Cameron 2011c). Then, in April 2012, Cameron accepted an invitation by the 
UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon to co-chair a UN Committee charged with developing 
successor goals to the MDGs, a role Mitchell persuaded him to accept (Wintour 2012; Seldon 
and Snowdon 2015, Loc 7890). 
 
Why was Cameron willing to spend his limited time and political capital to ensure a discretionary 
policy like international development remained on the political agenda, given how unpopular 
his 0.7% commitment was?  My answer has been advanced in the preceding two sections of the 
chapter; Cameron was both personally committed to international development issues and 
firmly believed that a modern Conservative party should be too. It is also true that, by this time, 
Cameron’s personal political credibility was closely entwined with his 0.7% promise. In any case, 
the political pressure for him to abandon his 0.7% promise continued to ratchet up, reaching 
critical levels again during preparations for the 2012 Autumn Statement. 
6.4.3 The Aid Ringfence is tested again: the 2012 Autumn Statement  
The Autumn Statement, also known as the ‘mini-budget’, is one of two public statements Her 
Majesty’s Treasury makes annually updating economic forecasts. By the time the Quad began 
                                                          
369 “Of course it’s difficult when we’re making difficult decisions at home,” acknowledged Cameron, ‘but I don’t 
think that 0.7 per cent of our gross national income, I don’t think that is too high a price to pay for trying to save 
lives” (Cameron in Wintour 2011). 
370 While acknowledging that “our decision to protect our aid budget abroad is a controversial one” Cameron 
(2011a) explained that he remained “convinced” his stance was right for both moral and national interest reasons. 
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to prepare for the 2012 autumn statement, due in December, the state of the British economy 
was increasingly parlous. Economic data released in June 2012 had confirmed that the UK was 
in the midst of a ‘double-dip’ recession (Ganesh 2014, Loc 4018; O’Conner 2012), triggering 
prompting “[i]ntense conversations” in the Treasury over the summer as it became evident the 
government would fall behind targets it had outlined in 2010 (Seldon and Snowdon 2015, Loc 
4336). Osborne in particular was under “tremendous pressure” ahead of the 2012 Autumn 
Statement (Seldon and Snowdon 2015, Loc 4336) given the negative public reaction to what 
became known as the ‘Omnishambles’ budget he handed down in March371.  
 
As the Quad sat down to an informal dinner at the beginning of August and began to consider 
options for improving the economy (Laws 2016, Loc 3703), the aid ringfence was vulnerable 
given the imperative to find further budget savings. Yet two additional factors, beyond the 
ongoing opposition from the public, the media and the Tory right wing, greatly raised 
expectations that the 0.7% target would be abandoned, or at least pushed back. First, the 
spending schedule set out in the 2010 Spending Review had kept spending relatively constant 
across 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 before building in a large jump in 2013-14 in order to  
reach the 0.7% spending target by 2013. The back-ended trajectory agreed in the Spending 
Review meant that a decision to halt aid spending prior to the ramp up would generate 
approximately £3 billion in savings (Pryke 2011) in the coming fiscal year alone, not to mentioned 
the compounding yearly savings into the future. Keenly aware of this potential, Treasury officials 
advocated delaying the achievement of 0.7% target (Laws 2016, Loc 3795).  
 
The second reason development insiders thought the aid ringfence was especially vulnerable at 
this time related to the cabinet reshuffle Cameron announced in early September, which 
included Andrew Mitchell moving from International Development Secretary to Chief Whip372. 
On hearing of her demotion from Secretary of Transport to International Development 
Secretary, Justine Greening, was reported to have told Cameron she had not come into 
                                                          
371 Osborne’s budget had undermined the Government’s “reputation for prudence and sensible economic 
management” (Ashcroft and Oakeshott 2015, 392) and distracted from the Coalition’s key message of deficit 
reduction (Laws 2016, Loc 2092; d’Ancona 2013a, 233). David Laws (2016, Loc 3819) records in his memoirs that 
“[a]fter the Omnishambles Budget, George Osborne desperately needs to have a good, solid Autumn Statement.” 
Likewise, Ashcroft and Oakeshott (2015, 391) acknowledge Osborne received most of the blame for the “politically 
disastrous” budget. In particular, the decision in the budget to reduce the 50% rate of tax on incomes over £150,000 
to 45% was controversial, given the prevailing economic climate. For detailed accounts of the ‘Omnishambles’ 
budget, see Ashcroft and Oakeshott (2015, chapter 32), Seldon and Snowdon (2015, chapter 17) and d’Ancona 
(2013a, chapter 12).  
372 Mitchell’s ongoing commitment to the International Development portfolio meant he moved on reluctantly, 
according to Ashcroft and Oakeshott (2015, 420). Indeed, Mitchell himself would later talk about his regret at 
moving from DFID (A. Mitchell 2015b, 7). 
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government to distribute money to poor people (Coffey 2013; Daily Mail 2012). There was 
speculation that Greening’s appointment signalled a pending aid cut.  
 
Against this backdrop, the Quad and a handful of close advisers met at Chequers on 17 
September to calibrate strategy at the outset of the political year (Laws 2016, Loc 3191). David 
Laws, who, was present at the meeting, recalls the Autumn Statement being the first item on 
the agenda that morning373. After Osborne opened by explaining that borrowing figures were 
suffering because of sluggish growth, Cameron proposed cutting funding to the NHS to deal with 
the deficit. Laws objective to this idea. According to Laws’ account, Osborne then countered by 
raising “the possibility of delaying the delivery of our commitment to achieving 0.7 per cent of 
national income on development assistance” (Laws 2016, Loc 3231).  
 
Cameron knocked this suggestion down, just as he had in the 2010 Spending Review. “Is it really 
worth all the political hassle of being seen to go back on a very clear pledge?” Laws recalls 
Cameron replying. “I’m not keen—the NGOs would be really angry and they would mount a 
huge campaign against us” (Laws 2016, Loc 3250). While Cameron publicly ruled out backing 
away from the target nine days later, when he reiterated the UK’s commitment to 0.7% in a 
speech at the UN (Cameron 2012), it appears that various members of the Quad continued to 
contemplate cutting aid as the Autumn Statement neared.  This is not surprising, as an increased 
need to find savings to counter “massive upward revisions expected on government borrowing” 
(Laws 2016, Loc 3790) coincided with a political scandal that loaded further pressure on the 0.7% 
target.  
 
Andrew Mitchell resigned from his post as Chief Whip on 19 October, after being unable to 
weather the political fall-out from a month-long scandal that came to be known as ‘Plebgate’. 
The scandal was triggered when The Sun, in a front page splash on 21 September, alleged 
Mitchell had called a police officer a ‘pleb’ after the officer refused to let Mitchell exit the main 
Downing Street gate on his bicycle—an account Mitchell continues to deny (d’Ancona 2013a, 
296) 374 . The politically-loaded connotations of the ‘pleb’ pejorative powered the scandal, 
tapping into ingrained stereotypes of Tories as ‘born to rule’ toffs who considered themselves 
above reproach375. As Mitchell remained closely associated with the 0.7% target, the episode 
                                                          
373 Laws, who resigned his post as Chief Secretary to the Treasury just three weeks after the Coalition formation due 
to an expenses scandal, had returned to cabinet in the reshuffle announced on 3 September 2012. Laws had 
remained a pivotal figure in the Liberal Democrats and was especially close to Clegg. 
374 For detailed accounts of the ‘plebgate’ affair see d’Ancona (2013a, chapter 16) and Seldon and Snowdon (2015, 
chapter 20).  
375 “At the heart of the whole [plebgate] story”, argues d’Ancona (2013a, 301), “was the Cameron Government’s 
neuralgic relationship with class”. 
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likely reinforced the notion that aid was a pet project of an aloof and out-of-touch elite incapable 
of understanding the economic travails felt by middle-Britain. On the back of this scandal, a 
ComRes poll from mid-October showed the Tories not only trailing Labour by nine points (41% 
to 33%) but having lost four points since to Labour since September (Seldon and Snowdon 2015, 
Loc 4354).  
 
While from this point the precise sequencing of Quad decisionmaking in the lead up to the 2012 
Autumn Statement is unclear, my research uncovered that, of the four Quad members, only 
Cameron remain steadfastly committed to keeping 0.7%. Each of the other three members, at 
some point, demonstrated a willingness to cut aid spending. David Law’s account of this period 
recounts a meeting on 11 October of the senior trio of Lib Dems—Clegg, Alexander and Laws—
in the Cabinet Office, during which Laws indicates cuts to international development were 
considered (Laws 2016, Loc 3790). Laws notes that the Quad was divided on the issue of 0.7% 
target. “The view of both George Osborne and Danny Alexander was that there was a strong 
economic case for postponing the target until 2018, which would produce huge savings”, Laws 
recalls. “But both Nick Clegg and David Cameron took the view that they had made a pledge on 
the overseas aid target and that they both wanted to keep it” (Laws 2016, Loc 3790).  
 
While Laws’ account records that Clegg wanted to uphold the 0.7% target at this particular point 
in time, multiple others sources suggest that Clegg was willing to abandon his stance, perhaps 
at other points in the process. An article published in the Daily Mail in September 2015 reported 
that Clegg “offered to delay the Government’s controversial foreign aid target but was turned 
down by David Cameron” in 2012 (Groves 2015). The article quoted a source who suggested 
that “there was a feeling that it might be easier all round if we pushed back the target” (Groves 
2015). Seldon and Snowden (2015, Loc 7874), more reliable that the Daily Mail, make a similar 
claim, reporting that “within the Quad, even Clegg begins to say, ‘You know, it would make our 
lives much easier if we push back the 0.7%’”376. 
 
Clegg and Osborne agreed on the final shape of the Autumn Statement in a meeting at Clegg’s 
house on Sunday 25 November. Various accounts, including a report in the Financial Times 
(Bounds 2012) support the idea that that aid cuts were still being considered well into 
November. It was only as Osborne rose to deliver the Autumn Statement to the House of 
                                                          
376 While not offering specific timing, this account suggests Clegg backed away from this target in early 2013, 
perhaps during preparations for the 2013 budget. Although I cannot prove exactly when Clegg made this 
suggestion, I suspect it was around late October or November 2012, perhaps at the meetings of the Quad on 19 and 
20 November (Laws 2016, Loc 3815). Of this period David Laws (2016, Loc 3797) recalls “we [i.e. senior Lib Dems] 
spent most of October and November focused on the contents of the Autumn Statement. This was a tough time for 
Nick.” 
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Commons on 5 December that it became 100% clear the aid ringfence had remained protected. 
“We made a promise as a country that we would spend 0.7% of our gross national income on 
international Development” Osborne reminded his colleagues, “and I am proud to be part of the 
first British Government in history which will honour that commitment, and honour it as 
promised next year [i.e. 2013]” (Osborne 2012).  
 
While reconstructing the precise activities of the Quad proved impossible, my point in relaying 
the details of these above is to demonstrate that this decision unit seriously considered delaying 
or abandoning the 0.7% target on at least two occasions—during preparation for the 2010 
Spending Review and ahead of the 2012 Autumn Statement 377 . And only David Cameron 
remained steadfastly commitment to the 0.7% target. This finding challenges the commonly 
held view that the Liberal Democrats functioned as a ‘human shield’ for Cameron (Bennister and 
Heffernan 2012, 796)378. It was not the Liberal Democrats doing the protecting of the aid budget, 
but David Cameron. At the pivotal moment, Cameron directly and personally intervened in aid 
policy decisionmaking process to protect the 0.7% target.  
 
§§§ 
 
 
6.5   Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that aid policy change in the UK was a result of three interlocking and 
reinforcing aid salience shocks. The Short aid salience shock laid the platform for an ‘issue-
ownership’ spiral to emerge, a dynamic which saw Labour and the Conservatives competed to 
‘own’ development issues. The momentum from the Conservative side was provided by the Tory 
modernisation and Cameron-Mitchell aid salience shocks. These two salience shocks 
intertwined like a double-helix, with the personal and political logics of the respective salience 
shocks reinforcing each other. The unusual strength of these forces ‘pushing’ aid spending 
                                                          
377 While it is highly likely abandoning or delaying the 0.7% target was considered by the Quad (or some of its 
members individually) on other occasions, I can only conclusively verify that it was actively considered and rejected 
at two meetings of the Quad. However, there are also strong grounds to suggest that the Quad again considered 
dropping the target ahead of the of the handing down of the 2012 ‘Omnishambles’ budget, potentially at the Quad 
meeting of Monday 12 March (Seldon and Snowdon 2015, Loc 3652). Evidence for this includes Seldon and 
Snowdon’s (2015, Loc 7863) account, which relies heavily on interviews with Andrew Mitchell, suggesting that 
“[t]he critical point on the 0.7% commitment comes in early 2012”. These authors report that Mitchell approaches 
Osborne “to persuade Treasury to stick to the 0.7% commitment, recognising that 2013 is the year in which the 
government had agreed to reach it.” Media reports from the same period also indicate this to be a possibility.  
378 This is not to say that Cameron did not use the fact of the Coalition as an explanation to the Tory right wing as to 
why dropping the 0.7% commitment was difficult for him. 
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towards the 0.7% target meant that, despite very significant opposition—from within the 
Conservative Party, its supporter-base and the media—the UK realised its promise to reach the 
0.7% target and, to this point, has kept it. At the same time, the concluding section 
demonstrated how Cameron’s repeated interventions to protect the aid ringfence, were 
decisive in achieving this outcome. (Furthermore, in Chapter 9, I also document how the UK’s 
large and well connected development constituency contributed to reinforcing the upward 
momentum of UK aid spending). 
 
Viewing aid policy change in the UK with an actor-specific perspective not only reveals the 
influence of key individual actors such as Clare Short, Andrew Mitchell and David Cameron, but 
again underscores how factors from all levels of analysis are constantly interacting to exert 
influence on aid policy decisionmaking. For example, we have seen how a benign international 
environment contributed to the prospect of articulating a new development agenda, and how 
Short used the Millennium Development Goals to mobilise public support poverty reduction and 
the DFID’s role (subsection 6.1.2). We have also seen how Cameron’s initial election as leader of 
the Conservative Party has a referendum on party positioning, opening the way for ‘Tory 
modernisation’ and increasing the symbolic utility the 0.7% target (subsection 6.2.1). We have 
seen how Douglas Alexander’s distinct views on the role of aid in an increasingly interdependent 
world shaped Labour’s 2009 White Paper. And we have also seen how the economic impacts 
wrought by the global financial crisis recast the domestic political debate, and the implications 
this had for the prospects of aid policy change. 
 
As we now shift our attention to explaining aid policy change in the Netherlands, many of these 
same broad dynamics are apparent. One major difference, however, is that unlike in the UK and 
Australia, where aid policy change was the product of three interacting aid salience shocks, 
Dutch abandonment of the 0.7% target was the product of a single, long-acting aid salience 
shock.  
 
§§§ 
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7 Explaining Aid Policy Change in 
the Netherlands 
or almost forty years, beginning in 1975, the Netherlands prided itself on meeting, and 
usually exceeding, the 0.7% of GNI target. Then, following parliamentary elections in 2012, 
the coalition agreement negotiated by the centre-right People’s Party for Freedom and 
Democracy and the centre-left Labour Party signalled that the longstanding spending trajectory 
would be abandoned. This decision was confirmed and detailed in A World to Gain, published in 
April 2013. Like so many other realms of Dutch society and politics over the past generation, 
Dutch development spending would also experience a decisive and unexpected departure from 
what had long been considered ‘normal’ behaviour.  
 
I argue in this chapter that the decision to abandon the longstanding Dutch aid spending 
trajectory can be explained by the ‘elite hobby’ aid salience shock. This indirect (type II) aid 
salience shock was triggered and sustained by Geert Wilders, the populist leader of the far-right 
Party for Freedom. Wilders’ capacity to shape the political agenda allowed him to reframe what 
0.7% symbolised to Dutch society by casting development spending as an ‘elite hobby’ of an 
internationally orientated and self-absorbed Dutch cultural and political elite. The ‘elite hobby’ 
aid salience shock was a source of consistent and sustained pressure on the 0.7% target, 
gradually eroding political support for the existing aid spending consensus until it disintegrated.  
 
This chapter is structured to demonstrate this process of disintegration. In order to do so 
effectively, I dedicate part one to describing the conditions which led to the questioning of the 
existing development consensus. It is impossible to understand the ‘elite hobby’ aid salience 
shock without a knowledge of the dramatic changes that occurred within Dutch society in the 
early 2000s. In part two, I document how, partly in response to the ongoing pressure supplied 
by Wilders, the ongoing relevance of the 0.7% target begins to be challenged from a range of 
different perspectives.  
 
In part three, I track how the question of whether to adhere to the 0.7% target split the Christian 
Democrats. This split had direct implications for development policymaking during the 2010-
2012 period and was exploited by Wilders to the point where it played a role in the downfall of 
F 
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the Rutte I government. Finally, in part four, I document the circumstances which lead to the 
final abandonment of the 0.7% target and the related attempts to establish a new development 
consensus. 
 
To many outside observers (including myself, prior to conducting this research) Dutch 
abandonment of the 0.7% target appeared remarkably sudden. The reality this chapter 
documents is quite the opposite. The way the long-held consensus on Dutch development 
spending was progressively challenged before being suddenly overturned is quite typical of how 
policy change occurs in the Netherlands. The viscous, slow moving quality of Dutch policymaking 
is referred to as stroperigheid—literally syrupiness (Kaarbo 2013, Loc 1629). What I relate in the 
account that follows is how Wilders’ persistent and powerful efforts to reframe what 0.7% 
symbolised gradually changed the parameters of the political debate, ultimately leading to the 
abandonment of the 0.7% target.  
 
§§§ 
 
7.1 The Context for Questioning the Development Consensus: 
Development Aid and Dutch National Identity 
 
The Dutchman does not exist.  
—Princess Maxima, 2007 
 
The political elite in the Netherlands 
systematically ignores the interests and 
problems of the citizen.  
—PVV Election Manifesto, 2006 
 
 I don't love Wilders. He's a pig, but he 
says what many people think.                                    
—Maria Kuhlman, 2011379 
 
This opening section of the chapter establishes the context for understanding how and why the 
‘elite hobby’ aid salience shock emerged. While Wilders’ skill in controlling the political agenda 
                                                          
379 Maria Kulman, who lives in a majority immigrant neighbourhood in southwestern Amsterdam, was quoted in a 
New York Times article by Steven Erlanger (2011). 
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undoubtedly accounts for his political influence, there is also no doubt that this influence is, to 
some extent, a product of dramatically changed political environment in the Netherlands. 
Acknowledging this, my account begins by returning to events of the ‘long year of 2002’, which 
is widely accepted as an inflection point in Dutch political history. From this point on, a distinctly 
different political culture emerged in the Netherlands. In the second subsection below, I turn to 
examine how the changed political culture and the emergence of new social cleavages 
challenged the traditional consensus-seeking mode of Dutch decisionmaking. In the third 
subsection, I bring together these threads by looking at how this new political environment 
provided the opportunity for Wilders to reframe the symbolism of the 0.7% target in the Dutch 
context.  
7.1.1 The Long Shadow of ‘the Long Year of 2002’ 
2002 has emerged as a dividing line in Dutch political history, the point at which the predictable 
old order was replaced by something unfamiliar and disruptive 380 . The critical moment 
transpired during the evening of 6 May, when Pim Fortuyn was assassinated by an animal rights 
activist just nine days before the national election he was contesting. Fortuyn’s death “provoked 
an extraordinary outburst of shock, grief, anger and quasi-religious hysteria” (Buruma 2006, 37). 
It was, argues Ian Buruma (2006, 38), “the most sensational murder in the Netherlands since 
1672,” when Johan de Witt was lynched at the height of the Dutch Golden Age381.  
 
Fortuyn had burst onto the Dutch political scene in late 2001, his policies and personality 
completely at odds with the typical Dutch politician. Fortuyn was a divisive character—a 
maverick who defied easy categorisation. He was highly charismatic, outspoken, openly 
homosexual, stridently anti-Islam, a libertarian, a populist and a “spectacular loner” (Simpson 
2002). While many believed Fortuyn’s views and approach were “giving rise to hatred” (Simpson 
2002), his message resonated with a portion of the electorate who “felt that their views were 
being ignored, particularly on questions related to immigration and the integration of 
immigrants into Dutch society” (Andeweg and Irwin 2014, 71). In the aftermath of his 
assassination, Fortuyn’s eponymous party, the Pim Fortuyn List (LPF)382, achieved spectacular 
                                                          
380 For an account of ‘The Long Year of 2002’, the period of “political confusion and shock” between autumn 2001 
and spring 2003, see Andeweg and Irwin (2014, 28–30). 
381 Chapter two of Buruma’s Murder in Amsterdam reflects on how Fortuyn’s murder impacted Dutch culture and 
society, and considers and the ways this event was mirrored by the subsequent murder, of Fortuyn’s friend and 
‘kindred spirit’, Theo Van Gogh. Kees van Kersbergen (2008) also identifies Fortuyn’s murder as a turning point in 
the political history of the Netherlands, recalling that, “the popular reaction to the murder was unprecedented: the 
centre–right in the Netherlands hit the streets in a massive display of days of public mourning and anger” (2008, 
271). 
382 LPF is the Dutch acronym for Lijst Pim Fortuyn. 
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results in the 2002 election, despite having been formed only three months earlier. By securing 
17% of the vote, and winning 26 seats, the LPF instantly became the second largest party in the 
Tweede Kamer (the Dutch House of Representatives).  
 
Dutch politics was suddenly transformed. Before Fortuyn, post-War Dutch politics had been 
dominated by the three traditional parties: the centre-right People’s Party for Freedom and 
Democracy (VVD)383; the centrist Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)384, which formed as a result 
of a merger between three confessional parties; and the centre-left Labour Party (PvdA)385. For 
most of the Twentieth Century, the ‘Big Three’ parties (including, in the case of the CDA, its 
antecedent parties) continuously received between 75 per cent and 90 per cent of the vote” 
(Vossen 2011, 179). Yet the Dutch proportional voting system helped ensure no single party ever 
won enough seats to form government in its own right (Andeweg and Irwin 2014, 27). This 
meant that, as a rule of thumb, the centrist CDA would form a Coalition with either the PvdA or 
the VVD, depending on whether the electorate had shifted left or right respectively386.  
 
While the LPF soon flamed-out as a political force without its charismatic leader, its 2002 
campaign provided a blueprint for how to mobilise a portion of the electorate that felt ignored 
by the political elite. Fortuyn’s lasting legacy was in ushering in a ‘populist upsurge’ that has 
dramatically altered the Dutch political landscape (Spitz, Muskens, and van Ewijk 2013, 7)387. 
Since 2002, the approach pioneered by Fortuyn has been embraced by a sequence of 
iconoclastic political figures on the right, each of whom have tapped into a growing sense of 
disaffection and uneasiness within Dutch society. Figures including include Theo van Gogh 
(assassinated in 2004), Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Rita Verdonk388 and, most relevant to the subject at hand, 
Geert Wilders, have championed ‘anti-establishment’ views, most prominently by questioning 
the role of Islam in Dutch society.   
 
Wilders is considered the populist heir of Pim Fortuyn. Wilders’ brash style and disdain for 
political correctness have garnered him a profile beyond the Netherlands as a right-wing, anti-
                                                          
383 VVD is the Dutch acronym for Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie. 
384 CDA is the Dutch acronym for Christen-Democratisch Appèl. 
385 PvdA is the Dutch acronym for Partij van de Arbeid. 
386 Aside from the period between 1994 and 2002, when a ‘purple’ coalition ruled the Netherlands, since 1917, “it 
was the CDA who would decide to govern with the left (PvdA) or with the right (VVD)” (Becker and Cuperus 2010, 
7). 
387 For an account of “the rise of populist parties in contemporary Dutch politics”, see van Kessel (2010b).  
388 Rita Verdonk was previously a member of the VVD and was a former minister of integration affairs between 
2003 and 2006. After the 2006 parliamentary election, she duelled with Mark Rutte for control of the Party (Vossen 
2010, 32). Ultimately, Rutte prevailed in the internal power struggle and Verdonk left to start her own movement, 
in October 2007, called Proud of the Netherlands and known by its Dutch acronym, TON (Trots op Nederland).  
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Islam populist389. During the 2010 election campaign, for example, Wilders and his Party for 
Freedom (PVV) 390  campaigned on policies including implementing a tax on head scarves, 
banning the Koran and halting the construction of mosques (Castle 2010; Erk 2011, 110; Hecking 
2010). He publicly derided Islam as a “fascist ideology”. Koen Vossen (2011, 187), an expert on 
the ideological development of Wilders391, identifies the PVV leader as a champion of “strident 
and conspiracist Islamophobia.”  
 
Numerous scholars have noted how the common characterisation of Wilders as a right-wing 
populist is not entirely satisfying, however392. Contrary to what might be expected from a typical 
far-right party, the PVV maintains libertarian positions on numerous ethical issues, including the 
right to abortion, euthanasia and embryo selection (Vossen 2011, 186–87). Wilders’ is also an 
outspoken proponent of gay rights. To highlight this position, the PVV introduced a resolution 
in parliament “to allow gay soldiers to wear their military outfit in a gay parade” (Vossen 2011, 
187). The PVV is also not as reliably fiscally conservative as might be expected for a ‘right-wing’ 
party. For example, in its 2010 election platform, the PVV refused to generate savings by raising 
the minimum age for the pension by two years (Lucardie and Voerman 2011, 1075), despite this 
policy position being adopted by the three established parties393. 
 
Wilders’ eclectic policy positions cohere only if they are seen through an anti-establishment lens. 
This is the key to understanding Wilders, his political priorities, the dynamics of the post-2002 
political environment and, most relevant of all, the decline of the Dutch consensus on spending 
at least 0.7% of GNI on development. As this chapter proceeds, I will progressively elaborate on 
how Wilders reframed the symbolism of the 0.7% to further his political ends. To do so 
effectively, however, requires first explaining what is was about the Dutch context that allowed 
Wilders’ anti-establishment message to resonate in the first place. 
                                                          
389 In coverage of the 2010 Dutch elections, for example, journalists writing for foreign newspapers variously 
labelled Wilders as “the bogeyman of Dutch politics” (Cendrowicz 2010a), “the nation’s most controversial 
politician” (Castle and Erlanger 2010), a “Muslim-baiting maverick” (Traynor 2010c) and a “populist firebrand” 
(Beaumont 2010), a “blond-mulleted Islamophobe” (Beaumont 2010) and an “anti-establishment maverick” 
(Traynor n.d.). 
390 PVA is the Dutch acronym for Partij voor de Vrijheid. 
391 For English language work on Wilders’ ideological development see Vossen (2010, 2011; 2013a) 
392 Vossen (2011) examines this question in depth by tracing Wilders’ ideological development. See also Vossen 
(2010), Andeweg and Irwin (2014, 78–79) and van Kessel (2011, 2010a). 
393 The far-left Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij in Dutch) also refused to increase the pension age. Hence this 
policy position is a particularly good example of how the PVV sometimes confounds the generic ‘far-right populist’ 
label often affixed to it, especially by the international media.  
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7.1.2 Consociational Democracy and its Discontents394 
The political culture of the Netherlands differs markedly from Australia and the United Kingdom. 
Key domestic political differences, including proportional voting, coalition government and 
consensus-based decisionmaking, are institutional manifestations of a politics of 
accommodation designed to respond to a singular challenge; successfully governing “a country 
of minorities” (Andeweg and Irwin 2014, 27)395. Dutch politics therefore operates substantially 
differently to the Westminster systems that operate in Australia and the UK (Andeweg and Irwin 
2014, 43).  
 
Arend Lijphart’s contribution to political science and comparative politics was triggered by his 
desire to explain how his native country, despite being characterised by its “extraordinary 
degree of social cleavage” (1968, 1) was nonetheless able to function “as a stable, effective, and 
legitimate parliamentary democracy” (1968, 2). His answer was that the Netherlands, alongside 
and a handful of other similar states, was best defined a ‘consociational democracy’. Lijphart 
(1969, 216) defined this new term as describing “government by elite cartel designed to turn a 
democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy”. The existence of 
numerous distinct social cleavages—Dutch society has traditionally been organised into pillars 
based on religious affiliation in an arrangement known as pillarization—could be compensated 
at the elite level via consensual decisionmaking (Andeweg and Irwin 2014, 39). A ‘politics of 
accommodation’ emerged—to use another phrase coined by Lijphart (1968, 1975). This 
consensual mode of governing evolved into what became widely known as the polder model 
from the 1980s396.  
 
Consociational Democracy delivered peace, prosperity and stability to the Netherlands for a long 
period (Van Gorp 2012, 184). Indeed, the reflex to negotiate, to seek consensus, and to 
compromise has become ingrained in Dutch identity (van der Horst 2016, chapter 3).  Outsides 
have long marvelled at the famous ‘Dutch tolerance’. Ian Buruma, a journalist and author who 
grew up in the Netherlands, has written about the sense of smugness that was once attached to 
                                                          
394 An extended discussion of the themes that are covered in this subsection of the thesis can be found in chapter 5 
of Van Gorp’s (2012) doctoral thesis, which examines the implications of the collapse of consociationalism for the 
traditional Dutch political parties.  
395 This is the title of the second chapter of Andeweg and Irwin’s book Governance and Politics of the Netherlands. 
These authors (Andeweg and Irwin 2014, 27) argue that the Netherlands being a “country of minorities… is without 
doubt the single most important characteristic of Dutch politics.”  
396 Andeweg and Irwin (2014, 194) consider the polder model to be a “more informal variety” of the more 
pronounced ‘corporatism’ that existed in the 1970s and earlier. These authors (2014, 188) define corporatism as 
“an empirical relationship between interests groups and the government that is based on exchange (influence for 
support) and cooperation rather than competition.” In this system, “organized interests are incorporate into the 
policy-making process and define the outcomes to their members” (2014, 189). 
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the Dutch identity. He describes a “self-congratulatory notion” the Dutch once maintained “of 
living in the finest, freest, most progressive, most decent, most perfectly evolved playground of 
multicultural utopianism” (Buruma 2006, 11).  
 
Events of the ‘Long Year of 2002’397 and the subsequent populist upsurge, shattered the notion 
of the Netherlands as utopia. Characteristic traits of Dutch national identity—tolerance, 
openness, accommodation, steadiness, stability—were no longer such apt descriptions for the 
conduct of Dutch national life. Many observers, including several interviewees I spoke with, 
agree that something in the national psyche was irredeemably altered around this time. For 
example, Kitty van der Heijden left the Netherlands in 1996 and lived abroad as a diplomat until 
2009, when she returned to take up a senior role in the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs398. “I 
came back and honestly didn’t recognise my own country,” van der Heijden told me399. One 
aspect of the “huge shift in society” she observed related to the changed views on development 
cooperation. It was “no longer seen as something worthy to contribute your taxpayers’ money 
to.” 
 
Monique Kramer (2013) has documented how the key demarcations in Dutch society changed 
around the turn of the Millennium. In the aftermath of World War II, “[t]he organization of 
politics and daily life was built on religious pillarization’’ (Kremer 2013, 3), with religious 
distinctions the dominant social cleavages. While the consociational tradition begun to break 
down in the 1960s, and accelerated across future decades, nothing had conclusively replaced it 
as the organising principle of Dutch political life. Beginning in the early 2000s, however, “the 
twin concepts of allochtoon (not from the Netherlands; literally “not from here” 400 ) and 
autohtoon (from the Netherlands) came to be perceived as the crucial distinction” (Kremer 
2013, 3) in Dutch politics.  
 
A number of factors contributed to the allochtoon-autohtoon divide becoming the dominant 
social cleavage in the Netherlands, at least in political discourse. First, pillarization had been 
receding for a considerable time. As the Netherlands became increasingly secular, the Dutch 
population grew increasingly less likely to identify strongly with the previously dominant 
religious pillars. Second, while the number of persons with a Dutch background has remained 
                                                          
397 For an account of ‘The Long Year of 2002’, the period of “political confusion and shock” between autumn 2001 
and spring 2003 see Andeweg and Irwin (2014, 28–30). 
398 Amongst various diplomatic postings, van der Heijden spent four years at the Permanent Mission of the 
Netherlands to the UN (2001-2005) and UN Resident Coordinator in Vietnam (2006-2009).   
399 Personal interview, February 2016. 
400 Kremer (2013, 3) adds the important caveat that “[t]he concept of allochtoon also applies to children born in the 
Netherlands to foreign-born parents”.  
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steady since 2000, the number of persons with a foreign background has increased by almost 
40% to 2017401. The growth of the Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turk communities garnered 
particular attention, with these groups now comprising close to 5% of the total population. 
Third, a dramatic sequence of events in the early to mid-2000s kept Islamic terrorism at the 
forefront of Dutch national consciousness. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks initially 
sparked a dramatic increase in the issue attention paid to migration in the Netherlands402. Then, 
only eight months after the Madrid train bombings of March 2004, Theo Van Gogh—“an avid 
supporter of Pim Fortuyn” (van der Horst 2016, 281)—was shot and stabbed while on his way 
work to work after producing a short film with Ayaan Hirsi Ali that was critical of Islam403. Then, 
on 7 July 2005, the London bombings claimed the lives of 54 people (including the four 
assailants). 
 
In this fluid and uncertain environment, many began to feel that the Dutch way of life was 
threatened. ‘Government by elite cartel’ was no longer delivering stability. “Citizens who no 
longer feel ‘at home’ in the Netherlands” explains Kremer (2013, 2), began to voice “their 
anxieties and [demand] acknowledgement of their concerns from politicians”. For them, the ‘old 
system’ of Consociational democracy seemed out-of-date, unable to grapple with the fast-
moving pace of the globalised world or deal with the new cleavages in Dutch society.  
 
Fortuyn’s great insight was in understanding that many felt the elite establishment was either 
not listening to their concerns, or too readily dismissed them. His slogan, “At Your Service!” 
transmitted this understanding by insinuating that the major parties, and the elite generally, 
were not serving the interests of the ordinary Dutch people, whereas he would. Wilders’ readily 
embraced this theme. “The political elite in the Netherlands systematically ignores the interests 
and problems of the citizen,” began the Party for Freedom’s manifesto for the 2006 elections, 
the first national elections Wilders’ new party contested404. This statement remains at the core 
of Wilders’ ongoing appeal, even for voters who do not agree with some of his policies.  
 
One of the crucial issues that the elite systematically ignored, according to Wilders and the PVV, 
was the impact of non-Western immigration. The PVV’s 2006 manifesto called for a moratorium 
on “non-Western immigrants (Moroccans and Turks) for 5 years” (note that ‘non-Western 
                                                          
401 These statistics are drawn from the Statistics Netherlands (2017) online StatLine database.  
402 According to research by Vliegenthart and Roggeband (2007, 307), September 11 had a strong impact on the 
attention the Dutch media paid to immigration, caused “a 115 percent increase in issue attention”.   
403 See van der Horst (2016, 280–83). 
404 This manifesto was accessed through the Manifesto Corpus (The Manifesto Project Data Collection (version 
2016-6) 2016) and translated from Dutch using Google translate. Unless otherwise noted, all other references to 
party manifestos in this chapter are from the same source. 
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immigrants’ is the English translation for Dutch the term allochtoon). This policy resonated 
politically. As Andeweg and Irwin (2014, 28) recognise, “the greatest discontent waiting to be 
mobilized… was anxiety over the development of the Netherlands as a multicultural society”. 
What was increasingly stake here, as Wilders was at pains to point out, was the question of 
Dutch identity. 
7.1.3 Who are we? Dutch Identity and the New Symbolism of 0.7% 
“National identity has become a highly politicized issue in the Netherlands in the past decade,” 
explains Kremer (2013, 1), “with many public figures voicing different opinions on what it means 
to be ‘Dutch’”. Wilders’ political success derives from his having such a clear and 
uncompromising answer to this question. Precisely because the ‘Big Three’ parties were each 
internally divided on issues of Dutch identity (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel 2008; Van Gorp 2012, 
chapter 8), Wilders’ decisiveness worked to set him apart from the ‘elite’. This dynamic is well 
illustrated by recounting an episode that is regularly cited as an example of how contested and 
politicised the notion of Dutch identity has become405.   
 
In September 2007, then-Princess (now Queen) Maxima gave a speech launching a new report 
by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) 406 , a prestigious and influential 
independent advisory body to the Dutch government. Maxima was asked to launch 
Identification with the Netherlands 407  because her personal journey of ‘becoming Dutch’ 
appeared to lend an ideal backstory to such an event. An Argentine by birth, Maxima had 
married then-Prince (now King) Willem-Alexander in 2002. 
 
Maxima’s speech faithfully conveyed the report’s conclusions (Andeweg and Irwin 2014, 14). A 
key paragraph of the speech relayed how, over the course of her personal journey, Maxima had 
not uncovered a unique Dutch identity. The Netherlands is “too multifaceted to summarize in 
one cliché”, she said408. With a rhetorical flourish, Maxime concluded the paragraph by claiming 
“The Dutchman does not exist”. This comment instantly become a lightning rod for criticism409.  
 
                                                          
405 The portion of this chapter recounting Maxima’s speech draws from Andeweg and Irwin (2014, 14–15) and the 
opening chapter of Van Gorp (2012), both of whom use this example to illustrate change in Dutch identity.  
406 WRR is the Dutch acronym for Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid. The WRR is an independent 
advisory body to the Dutch government whose task is to “advise the government on issues that are of great 
importance for society.” 
407 The Dutch title of this report was Identificatie met Nederland (Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) 
2007). 
408 This quote is taken from Van Gorp’s (2012, 1) translation of Maxima’s speech.  
409 According to Van Gorp (2012, 2), the intense reaction to Maxima’s speech demonstrated the extent to which 
“questions of national identity, immigration, and immigrant integration” had become politicised in the Netherlands.  
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Wilders seized the moment with a typically direct and divisive intervention. Maxima’s speech 
was “well-meant politically correct mumbo-jumbo”, he said 410 . Wilders’ response framed 
Maxima’s comment as another example of the elite being incapable of giving a common-sense 
response to a straightforward question. On the other hand, political figures from the ‘Big Three’ 
parties unwittingly reinforced Wilders’ framing of the issue by offering nuanced interpretations 
(Van Gorp 2012, 2). While these more considered responses might have been more responsible, 
they offered less political ‘cut through’.  
 
The inability of the Big Three parties to stake out a clear position on Maxima’s comment 
foreshadowed a broader failing411. As Van Gorp (2012) had demonstrated, the reason the Big 
Three parties have been unable to stake out clear positions on issues related to the emerging 
social-cultural cleavage in the Netherlands is because they were internally divided about how to 
respond to it (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel 2008). These internal divisions, especially within the 
CDA especially, would have direct implications for the breakdown of the 0.7% consensus 
(documented in detail in section 7.3). 
 
While the Big Three parties tended to dismiss discussions of socio-cultural issues as ‘symbol 
politics’ (Van Gorp 2012, 370), Wilders embraced this approach. Like Fortuyn, Wilders was 
willing to brazenly call out these anxieties and propose concrete—if improbable—measures to 
address them. In fact, Wilder’s key policy measures functioned as anti-establishment symbols. 
A key example is Wilders’ policy proposal of banning the wearing of headscarfs. This instantly 
communicated a very clear political position—that is, Wilders and the PVV opposed the 
Islamization of Dutch society—while also serving as a reminder of elite inaction on key issues. 
Another example was Wilders repeated references to ‘Henk and Ingrid’—his shorthand for the 
‘ordinary Dutch’ citizens the elite ignored and he was ‘fighting for’ (Ploumen 2013a, chapter 5). 
Wilders saw that he could use the 0.7% target in the same way. Once he recognised this 
potential, he paid more attention to getting aid policy on the political agenda, thereby triggering 
the ‘elite hobby’ aid salience shock.  
 
The 0.7% target was liable to being reframed because it already existed as a collective symbol 
of Dutch identity (Van Gorp 2012, 2–3). Achieving (and regularly exceeding) this target since 
1975 had come to say something important about who the Netherlands was as a nation. 
                                                          
410 This quote is taken from Van Gorp’s (2012, 1) translation of Wilders’ response to Maxima’s speech. 
411 Four years after Maxima’s speech, Van Gorp (2012, 327, 333) asked 51 Dutch politicians whether they agreed 
with Maxima’s statement “The Dutchman does not exist’. Reponses to this question show how PVV politicians were 
unified in their opposition to the statement, while politicians from centre-right parties (VVD and CDA) gave variable 
responses, ranging from full agreement to full disagreement (Van Gorp 2012, 369–70).  
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Domestically, it testified to the Netherlands’ sense of international responsibility, its 
commitment to global engagement, its ascension to international norms and its standing as an 
international ‘citizen’. Achieving the 0.7% target also symbolised Dutch leadership in 
development policy internationally412. It was for this reason that the Dutch abandonment of 
0.7% in 2013 shocked the international development community in a way that the 
contemporaneous aid spending changes in Australia and the UK did not.  
 
Wilders saw the symbolic potential of reframing the 0.7% target relatively late in his political 
rise. While the PVV had proposed cuts to development cooperation in its 2006 manifesto, it 
wasn’t until after the impact of the Global Financial Crisis that Wilders really began to focus on 
actively recasting the 0.7% as a symbol of an unresponsive elite consensus. Wilders’ critique of 
the elite began to feature attacks on what he saw as the establishment’s misdirected spending 
priorities, regularly chiding foreign aid as an “expensive left-wing hobby” (van Kessel 2011, 75). 
Before Parliament he made speeches demanding “the development aid spigot” be “turned off 
tight” and for the Netherlands to stop “this crazy development aid” (Wilders 2009). The PVV 
platform ahead of the 2010 parliamentary elections codified Wilders’ now definitive position on 
development policy: Dutch development aid should be scrapped entirely, with only 
humanitarian aid spared (DutchNews 2010a).  
 
At this point, it needs to be acknowledged that Wilders’ stance on development policy was less 
potent than his anti-Islam and anti-EU policies were, in terms of influencing voter behaviour.  
Wilders messaging around the 0.7% target is best seen as a factor that reinforces his core 
political message rather than defines it. That said, Wilders’ reframing of 0.7% was vitally 
important for the direction of development policy in the Netherlands. Wilders’ attacks put aid 
on the agenda in a new way and ensured that, by the end of the 2000s, the 0.7% target was no 
longer sacrosanct (Kranenburg 2010b). In this sense, Wilders’ motivation to ‘put aid on the 
agenda’ conformed to a classic Type II (indirect) aid salience shock, in which the initiating actor 
sees an opportunity to politicise aid policy to advance a broader political cause. 
                                                          
412 Upholding the 0.7% norm when so few other states were willing to do so gave the Netherlands credibility in the 
development world. Dutch leadership in development was reinforced by its being at the vanguard of policy 
innovation (Spitz, Muskens, and van Ewijk 2013, 16). The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), in a 
2006 peer review of Dutch development assistance, acknowledged that “[t]he Netherlands is viewed within the 
international donor community as a frontrunner with regard to its ability to adapt to new challenges and to test 
innovative operational approaches” (OECD DAC 2006b, 11). The Netherlands was at the forefront of the ‘good 
governance’ and ‘ownership’ movements in the 1990s, through the leadership of Jan Pronk (van Gastel and Nuijten 
2005). In the 2000s, as the role of development in fragile states became more prominent, the Dutch implemented 
the 3D approach, which recognised the need for coherence between defence, diplomacy and development policies 
(Spitz, Muskens, and van Ewijk 2013, 12). The Netherlands was also an early adopter of the MDGs and by 2003 had 
aligned its development policy to achieving them (OECD DAC 2006b, 11; MFA 2003). 
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Yet while I consider Wilders’ personal influence to be a necessary cause of the downfall of the 
0.7% target, it was not sufficient, by itself, to cause the Netherlands to finally abandon it. The 
erosion of what had long appeared to be an inviolable consensus on development spending was 
also the product of increased questioning of the 0.7% target by key groups amongst the Dutch 
elite for a range of other reasons. The shift in views amongst key groups of the elite regarding 
development spending is the focus of the forthcoming section. 
   
§§§ 
 
 
7.2 Cracks Emerge in the Development Consensus: Questioning the 
Relevance of 0.7% 
 
In the Netherlands, giving aid has always 
been such a self-evident thing. It was 
just something we did. There was no 
question about it. We just did it.  
—Gabi Spitz, 2014413 
 
[T]he broad consensus regarding foreign 
aid spending has been upended. 
—Mark Kranenburg, NRC Handelsbald, 2010 
 
The domestic, political and social cross-currents that buffeted Dutch politics from the early 
2000s took some time to begin to noticeably impact Dutch development policy. This testifies to 
the strength of the historical hold of the 0.7% norm. The notion that the Netherlands would 
spend 0.7% or more on development was so ingrained that it took some time before this position 
was seriously questioned. “It was just something we did”, Gabi Spitz told me. Yet as Dutch 
society and the international environment changed rapidly, the self-evidence of meeting and 
exceeding the 0.7% target began to be questioned.   
 
                                                          
413 Personal interview, November 2014.  
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This section of the chapter charts how, in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, pressure 
began to mount on the longstanding Dutch ‘development consensus’. Specifically, serious 
questions began to be asked about how defensible the ongoing pursuit of the 0.7% target was 
from three important and interlinked perspectives: a development perspective; a foreign policy 
orientation perspective; and a political strategy perspective. The three subsections that follow 
address each of these perspectives in turn.  
7.2.1 Elite questions: The Impact of ‘Less Pretension, More Ambition’ 
By the middle of the 2000s, there was growing recognition within the Dutch development sector 
that the dramatic post-Fortuyn changes in society would irreversibly alter the development 
landscape414. Much less obvious was how best to respond. Rather than prompting a coordinated 
response from the sector, the imminent threat generated a sense of paralysis. According to 
Spitz, Muskens, and van Ewijk (2013, 13), “[t]he fear that there was nothing to gain and much 
to lose… prevented a fundamental debate on the future of Dutch aid”.   
 
Pieter van Lieshout had a different view. A council member of the Scientific Council (WRR), van 
Lieshout believed that the circumstances in the mid-2000s made actively discussing and 
debating the future of the development consensus imperative415. He began lobbying his WRR 
council colleagues about the need to thoroughly examine Dutch development policy, with a view 
to publishing a substantial report to decisively influence the debate. It took 18 months for van 
Lieshout to persuade his council colleagues. Once they acquiesced, a project group was formed, 
led by van Lieshout and also including Robert Went and Monique Kremer.  
 
The group’s final report, Less Pretension, More Ambition: Development Policy in Times of 
Globalization (van Lieshout, Went, and Kremer 2010) was published in Dutch in January 2010416. 
The report was explicitly framed as a response to the breakdown of the development consensus 
in the Netherlands. “[T]the self-evidence of development aid— about which there had long been 
broad political and social consensus [in the Netherlands]—seemed to have come to a definite 
end” (van Lieshout, Went, and Kremer 2010, 7). While domestic considerations weighed heavily 
                                                          
414 For example, CDA MP Kathleen Ferrier was keenly aware of the imperative to reform Dutch development 
cooperation, even writing a book on development cooperation in 2006, “to convince my party that a new 
perspective on development cooperation” was needed (Personal interview with Kathleen Ferrier, October 2016). 
415 Robert Went recalled van Lieshout as saying, around this time, that: “I see more and more and I hear more and 
more that there’s no consensus on [the role of development aid]. Development aid is breaking down and we never 
discuss that and that’s a bad sign because it means that people, they don’t really express anymore what they think 
about it.” 
416 In November 2010, an expanded and updated English version was published. All references are from the English 
version. 
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in the minds of the project group, the report was also framed as a response to two shifts at the 
international level: the changes underway in the international aid regime; and the intensification 
of the globalisation process. For the WRR team, the dual impetus of the breakdown in domestic 
consensus and the rapidly changing international environment meant that it was crucial “to 
thoroughly reflect on the future of development aid” (van Lieshout, Went, and Kremer 2010, 
13). 
 
The publication of Less Pretension, More Ambition was highly anticipated417. Quite apart from 
the depth and scope of the report’s analysis418, the fact that the report was published by the 
WRR lent it instant credibility and authority419. But the key reason why Less Pretension, More 
Ambition “succeeded in shaking up the aid debate” (Bieckmann 2010, 4) was because it 
challenged the prevailing orthodoxy. Most provocatively, it questioned the ongoing relevance 
of the 0.7% target.  
 
Less Pretension, More Ambition’s questioning of the ongoing relevance of the 0.7% target 
derived from the project teams’ underlying assessment that the “classical approach to aid was 
nearing the end of its lifecycle” (van Lieshout, Went, and Kremer 2010, 264) 420. The report 
argued that the 0.7% standard “suits an isolated system of aid while development in an 
increasingly interdependent world depends more and more on other issues” (van Lieshout, 
Went, and Kremer 2010, 271). The WRR recommended that the Netherlands work at 
formulating a new, more relevant, replacement for the 0.7% standard, thus challenging 
relevance of the 0.7% target not just for the Netherlands, but for the DAC itself (this issue is 
discussed further in chapter 8). In summary, the WRR presented a nuanced and sophisticated 
argument that Dutch development assistance needed to needed to adapt to new realities in the 
                                                          
417 Writing in December 2009, following Boekestijn’s book launch, Kranenburg (2009) recorded that “[a]ll parties 
involved are nervously awaiting a report that government think tank WRR will be publishing halfway through next 
month. Not only will it contain an appraisal of Dutch development aid policy, the WRR will also weigh in on the 
fundamental international discussion regarding the principals supporting development aid.”  
418 As well as conducting an exhaustive review of the literature, commissioning a series of studies about the impact 
of globalisation on development policy (Kremer, Lieshout, and Went 2009), hosting a number of conferences and 
completing a series of seven country studies and an extensive program of international working visits, the small 
WRR team also interviewed over 300 specialists during a two-year period (van Lieshout, Went, and Kremer 2010, 7–
8). Including interlocutors from international visits, the team canvassed the views of around 600 individuals. For 
contemporary reviews of Less Pretension, More Ambition, see Hoebink (2011) and Bremen (2011). 
419 Professor Paul Hoebink, writing in The Netherlands Yearbook on International Cooperation 2008 (published in the 
autumn of 2009), acknowledged this point when, in looking forward to the potential for “promising debates” in 
2010, he reasoned that “Development cooperation will draw special attention [in 2010], because the most 
important advisory bodies of the Dutch government [i.e. SER and WRR] will study and advice [sic] on it” (Hoebink 
2009, 15–16) 
420 It was now clear, argued the authors, that “development only depends on aid to a very limited extent” and that 
contributions to the development process can only ever be modest (van Lieshout, Went, and Kremer 2010, 273). 
They counselled further embrace of the ‘beyond aid agenda’. Development policy should address global problems 
that are not only borderless, but ultimately will have profound and outsized impacts on those living in poverty. 
Instead of bilateral arrangements focused on poverty reduction projects, the focus of national policy should be in 
contribution to transnational issues (van Lieshout, Went, and Kremer 2010, 260). 
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aid regime and its less influential role in the world. And a key part of that adaptation was to put 
less emphasis on the volume of aid spending421.  
 
While the Dutch ‘elite’ could shrug off Wilders’ rejection of the 0.7% target as opportunistic 
populism, the WRR’s conclusion was much less easily rebuffed. The WRR’s challenge to the 
development consensus transformed the debate precisely because it was a message delivered 
to the elite by the elite422. While the WRR’s rationale for questioning the 0.7% was much more 
sophisticated and evidence-based than Wilders’, this distinction was entirely lost on the ordinary 
voter. The symbolism the 0.7% target recently acquired through Wilders’ reframing efforts 
meant that, in the political moment the report was published in, questioning the 0.7% target 
was akin to questioning validity of development cooperation itself. 
 
The media understood that Less Pretension, More Ambition had let the 0.7% genie out of the 
bottle. News coverage surrounding the report’s publication speculated on the impact it would 
have on the future of the 0.7% target. For example, Kranenburg (2010a) saw that the future of 
the “sacrosanct 0.7 percent figure” was under threat, given how “the WRR considers the [0.7% 
target to be] of limited significance but most political parties in the Netherlands have long 
decided living up to this promise is a matter of civilisation.” Kranenburg presciently observed 
that “[t]he fallout from the report will undoubtedly concern mainly this question.” Numerous 
interviewees I spoke with were critical of the WRR for what they viewed as their naivety in how 
their questioning of the 0.7% target would be interpreted by the media and leveraged by Wilders 
and other anti-development figures423.  
 
Yet Robert Went, one of the report’s authors, relayed to me how WRR Council was aware of 
how controversial their position on the 0.7% target would be and agonised about it internally 
before approving publication of Less Pretension, More Ambition. Right up until the day before 
                                                          
421 “It is not the quantity but the quality of our contribution to a world in which people and countries are self-
sufficient and in which international public goods are adequately safeguarded, that should be the point of 
departure for what we now still refer to as ‘development aid’, but perhaps later ‘global development’” (van 
Lieshout, Went, and Kremer 2010, 273). 
422 According to Professor Rolph van der Hoeven, then chair of the Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs’ 
(AIV) working group responsible for drafting the response to the WRR report, Less Pretension, More Ambition “hit a 
nerve” because it “came [from] outside the normal world; the normal development world that everybody knows. 
They saw that this was the Scientific Council, and so that’s why it hit a special nerve” (Personal interview, November 
2014). 
423 In an observation that chimed with observations of others, Professor Rolph van der Hoeven suggested that 
“people could take things out of [the report] that suited themselves” (Personal interview, November 2014). 
Professor Wil Hout had a similar reaction, noting that these reports are always “used for a political purpose” 
(Personal interview, November 2014). Frans Bieckmann went a little further, suggesting that it wasn’t the WRR’s 
purpose to ‘open it up [the debate] in [the] way” that ultimately transpired (Personal interview, November 2014). In 
Bieckmann’s view, the WRR erred in not being aware of how powerful interests would interpret parts from their 
report. Partly, this was because the WRR was more concerned with being an agenda setter and that it likes to be 
seen in that way. Their fundamental objective, recounted Bieckmann, was “in creating debate.” 
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the decision to publish the report was made, Went explained, “there [were WRR] Council 
members who said that ‘this cannot be published like this because if we don’t defend the 0.7%, 
we’re out’. So that was the big strategic decision.” The fact the publication of the report was in 
the balance indicates just how politically loaded the symbolism of the 0.7% target had become. 
Went had commenced the project convinced in his own mind that the final report would 
recommend raising development spending beyond the 0.7% target. But as he digested the 
evidence over time, he began to change his mind. At one point in the project, Went recalls 
reaching a turning point: 
 I couldn’t sleep for several nights... because I began to agree with something 
that I was totally different about and I always voted differently about it so I 
really—that’s one of the things that you have to learn here, you have to be 
able to change your mind on things because... and I really tried because that 
was one of the things I was assigned to do—to go figure out what do we really 
know about the effects of the 0.7%... And I read everything that existed 
throughout the world and I could not find a real rationale for this [target].424” 
 
The traumatic nature of Went’s ‘loss of faith’ testifies to the powerful hold of the 0.7% target425. 
Went’s personal story also pre-empts the journey his country would take. Both Went and the 
Netherlands began from a starting point of unquestioned belief in 0.7%. Both then experienced 
a ‘crisis of faith’ involving repeated questioning of the target’s relevance. And both ultimately 
came to reject the 0.7%. At the time Less Pretension, More Ambition was published in early 2010, 
however, Dutch commitment to the 0.7% target still appeared relatively secure—the decision 
to abandon 0.7% was still more than two years away. In retrospect, however, closely related 
questions about Dutch identity that would also undermine the development consensus were 
also gnawing at the body politic. One of these questions involved the orientation of Dutch 
foreign policy.  
7.2.2 Foreign Policy Questions: ‘The Struggle against the Water’  
A defining paradox of Dutch national identity pairs the strong internationalist strain in Dutch 
political and social history with a countervailing instinct to withdraw from the world at times. 
The ‘struggle against the water’ is the phrase sometimes used to illustrate this core conundrum 
of Dutch foreign policy (Andeweg and Irwin 2014, 3–5) 426 . Holland’s famous dikes are 
representative of the Dutch skill in managing its interactions with the outside world to its 
                                                          
424 Personal interview with Robert Went, November 2014. 
425 Went’s personal journey infused the report with something of a convert’s zeal. His earlier beliefs gave him 
insight as to how to pitch the argument to those sceptical that the 0.7% target should be abandoned. 
426 For a more general perspective on the Dutch ‘struggle against the water’ see van der Horst (2016, chapter 2). For 
a contemporary overview of Dutch foreign policy since World War II, see Kaarbo (2013, chapter 4) 
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advantage, but they also serve as constant reminders of the vigilance that is necessary to ensure 
it is never overwhelmed, unexpectedly, by forces outside its borders.   
 
Throughout history, the Dutch have been keenly aware that the world beyond their borders is 
both the source of their prosperity and their vulnerability. The Dutch Golden Age during the 17th 
century was built by cultivating the conditions and institutions that were conducive for open 
trade and finance (Andeweg and Irwin 2014, 12). These same conditions were also conducive to 
intellectual flourishing, with Hugo Grotius, one of the fathers of international law, the most 
famous beneficiary. The legacy of the Dutch Golden Age has decisively shaped the Netherlands 
of the present. Amsterdam remains a symbol of Dutch tolerance and is a global financial centre. 
The Hague is the leading centre for international law, while Rotterdam is Europe’s largest port.  
 
Yet while the Netherlands remains one of the most connected countries in the world427, the urge 
to ‘retreat behind the dikes’ has intensified since the early 2000s. This impulse has been 
especially evident in a segment of the population Kremer (2013, 4) refers to as “voters from the 
periphery”, a group that comprises the core constituency of the PVV (and, earlier, the LPF). The 
stereotypical ‘voter from the periphery’ is male, has a relatively low level of education, is aged 
over 55, and lives outside of the “economic, cultural and governmental heart of the 
Netherlands” (Kremer 2013, 4). The sense of dislocation this group experiences has been 
exacerbated by the rapid pace of global change. According to Kremer (2013, 8), globalisation has 
“opened up a new demarcation line between those who feel they are not in control and do not 
have a ‘grip’ over their lives, and those who are able to cope with diversity”428.  
 
Wilders politicised these fault lines. His anti-immigration, anti-Islam and anti-EU positions 
appealed to voters for whom ‘retreating behind the dikes’ appeared the safest option. The 
impact of the global financial crisis served to render the demarcating line between 
internationalists and nationalists even more starkly. The ‘credit crunch’ following the GFC 
resulted in a four per cent contraction in the Dutch economy during 2009 (CPB and PBL 2010, 
2), reinforcing the notion that the Netherlands was being overwhelmed by uncontrollable 
outside forces. The ensuing Greek debt crisis only heightened these anxieties (Traynor 2010b). 
In response, Wilder’s positioned himself as capable of ‘taking back control’.  
 
                                                          
427 Knapen et al (2011, 16) argue that “virtually no other country in the world it as reliant on its international 
connections as the Netherlands.” 
428 Likewise, the Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV), in their 2009 Annual Report, observed that “a 
schism seems to have developed in Dutch society between the long-established group that supports active 
internationalism and other groups in society that believe the Netherlands should keep out of international 
entanglements as much as possible” (AIV 2009, 5). 
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The ratcheting up of domestic political competition increased the incentives for Dutch political 
parties to stake out positions that differed from the ‘establishment’ view—a dynamic that was 
particularly evident in the 2010 election campaign (see subsection 7.2.3)429 . The emerging 
breakdown of the Dutch foreign policy consensus drew the attention of the WRR, just as the 
breakdown in the development consensus had. Once again, an internal project group was 
formed within the WRR, this time led by Professor Ben Knapen. As we will discover later, this 
was significant, as Knapen would later be appointed as State Secretary (junior minister) for 
European Affairs and International Cooperation. 
 
The Dutch version of Attached to the World: On the Anchoring and Strategy of Dutch Foreign 
Policy was published on 30 November 2010430. Like its sister publication Less Pretension, More 
Ambition, it was framed as a response to the break-down of a previously self-evident 
consensus431. Attached to the World recognised the “growing tension between [the] feeling of 
being threatened by the outside world and the need to nurture the relationship with that same 
world” (Knapen et al. 2011, 7). Nonetheless, the WRR comes down emphatically on the side of 
‘engagement’ in its recommendations, concluding that the Netherlands’ “international 
orientation is and remains a crucial source of prosperity and well-being” (Knapen et al. 2011, 
107). The report is also unambiguously pro-Europe, arguing that “it should be accepted across 
the board that, for the Netherlands, Europe is the most important international arena for taking 
initiatives and agenda-setting” (Knapen et al. 2011, 59). 
 
It reflects the strikingly deliberate and consensual nature of Dutch policymaking that Attached 
to the World was merely one of a suite of investigations devoted to understanding how the 
Netherlands should best respond to the rapidly changing global environment432 . Yet these 
                                                          
429 Verbeek and Van Der Vleuten (2008, 375) have demonstrated how the “character of Dutch foreign policy-making 
has changed” as “the Dutch political elite is increasing divided over foreign policy issues” as “more domestic actors 
with more diverging opinions have to be satisfied” (2008, 375). 
430 An English version was published in May 2011, and is the version which I reference.  
431 The report explained how “[Dutch] foreign policy was predominantly founded on a basis of permissive 
consensus. Government elites could develop and implement foreign policy, knowing that there was a general 
consensus about the direction of foreign policy. This consensus, however, is no longer self-evident” (Knapen et al. 
2011, 111). 
432 In a position paper attached to the proceedings of an important conference titled Power Shifts in a Changing 
World Order (The Dutch Senate et al. 2011), the then head of strategic research at Clingendael Institute, Jan Rood, 
observed that “The debate on the impact of these global power shifts and of the emerging international agenda has 
already started in the Netherlands.” For example, the Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands—SER, or 
Sociaal-Economische Raad is the “best known and most important” (Andeweg and Irwin 2014, 191) of the policy 
advisory organisations in the Netherlands—published On Sustainable globalisation: a world to be won in 2008. This 
report was also very pro-Europe, arguing that “the Netherlands needs the European Union if it is to operate from a 
position of strength in the globalisation process” (SER 2008, 20). The WRR considered the need to revise the 
strategic orientation of Dutch foreign policy (WRR 2010). On 4 February 2011, a conference called Power shifts in a 
changing world order, was jointly convened by the Dutch Senate, WRR, the Advisory Council on International Affairs 
(AIV), and the Clingendael Institute of International Relations. This quadrumvirate of organisations essentially 
equates to the Netherlands’ foreign policy establishment. Their joint hosting of such a conference not only provides 
a demonstration of the consensual, elite-dominated nature of Dutch decisionmaking, it also reveals just how central 
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studies all reached the same broad conclusion that Attached to the World did: the Netherlands 
needed to double-down on its outward looking orientation to navigate the rapid external 
challenges it presently faced. The coalescence of the policy establishment around this view 
reinforced the feeling that a schism had formed in Dutch society concerning how to interact with 
the outside world.  
 
The 2010 election campaign illustrated the extent to which two distinct camps with two distinct 
visions for the future of the Netherlands had emerged. A speech by then Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, and future CDA leader, Maxime Verhagen at Radboud University, Nijmegen, during the 
2010 election campaign illustrates this. Verhagen’s long speech433 was a response to a letter 
written by Edward Gebuis (quoted in Verhagen 2010) that was published in Metro, a free 
newspaper: 
“Maxime Verhagen shows why populism has won such a huge following. Mr 
Verhagen says we should maintain our international orientation. But the 
people, who, after all, should have the final say in a democracy, want us to 
straighten things out in our own country before turning our focus back to the 
EU, development cooperation and peace missions. Parties like the Freedom 
Party (PVV) arise out of dissatisfaction with the present course. Stubbornly 
sticking to that course only breeds more dissatisfaction, and thus greater 
support for the populists.” 
Verhagen responded by making case for the Netherlands to “stay internationally active”. 
“Retreating behind the dikes will not help” he argued (Verhagen 2010), stressing that   
“defending wider Dutch interests… requires an internationalist outlook.” Verhagen’s speech 
distils the essence of the practical political impact Wilders was having on Dutch policy. Here was 
the Dutch Foreign Minister, in the middle of an election campaign, feeling obliged explicitly 
counter Wilders’ ‘behind the dikes’ strategy. Wilders, it is clear, was driving the political and 
media agenda.  
 
Yet this episode also shows how the tradition of adhering to the 0.7% target had also become 
an intrinsic component of the Dutch internationalist vision. The cleavages that emerged around 
whether to ‘retreat behind the dikes’, meant the 0.7% target acquired another layer of 
symbolism. Not only could Wilders frame maintaining high levels of aid spending as an expensive 
                                                          
the issue of the Netherlands response to the changing world order had become for this group. It is notable that a 
summary of Attached to the World is included as an appendix to the conference proceedings. Also notable is the 
address from former Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende, a quintessential establishment figure and member of the 
CDA. The conclusion to his address perfectly distils the strongly held policy preferences, and prevailing concerns, of 
the Dutch foreign policy elite: “The Netherlands is an active international player and must remain so. Turning 
inward would be a very risky strategy for a country like the Netherlands. We cannot live without Europe. Our future 
lies in Europe. Our future lies abroad. A global approach is the only way we can tackle the issues of today: climate 
change, free trade, energy, and so forth. It is the only way we can address difficult issues like human rights. And the 
only way we can deal with power shifts in a changing world order” (The Dutch Senate et al. 2011, 30–31). 
433 The speech was over 4000 words. 
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elite hobby, but 0.7% also now functioned as a symbol of the elite’s reflexive internationalist 
orientation, an orientation that Wilders characterised as taking control away from ordinary 
Dutch citizens. The implications of bearing this extra symbolic weight became evident as the 
2010 election campaign progressed, as the coming subsection discusses.   
7.2.3 Political Questions: Development Cooperation in the 2010 election campaign 
The 2010 election campaign represents a critical juncture in the history of Dutch development 
policy. Whereas in previous elections, the ‘0.7% figure’, had been “sacrosanct” for the major 
parties (Kranenburg 2010b), 2010 marked the first time the manifesto of a major traditional 
party did not support the 0.7% target434. Here was the most tangible evidence yet that “the 
broad consensus regarding foreign aid spending [had] been upended” (Kranenburg 2010b). 
 
It was not a surprise that it was the VVD that was the first of the ‘Big Three’ to abandon 0.7% 
orthodoxy. The right-wing constituency of the VVD was the most ideologically opposed to 
development cooperation and key party figures had periodically questioned the Dutch position.   
For example Frits Bolkestein, the VVD leader from 1990-98, “enjoyed drawing attention to 
taboos” (Ploumen 2013a, 25), including the effectiveness of development cooperation. 
Bolkestein was a mentor to Wilders when he first entered politics and there are clear parallels 
between the iconoclastic styles of the two men. (Wilders was originally elected to parliament as 
a member of the VVD in 1998 and for eight years prior to this worked as a party official alongside 
Bolkestein)435. In the early 2000s, another activist VVD politician, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, also criticised 
development cooperation.  
 
The telling precursor to the VVD decision to abandon the 0.7% target in their 2010 manifesto 
came in September 2008, when, for the “first time in decades” (van Os 2008), the volume of 
money set aside for development cooperation was publicly questioned during parliamentary 
debate on the 2009 budget. The questioning was led by the aid-sceptic VVD parliamentarian 
Arend Jan Boekestijn. He was credited with ‘masterminding’ his party’s new approach to 
development policy (van Os 2008), which maintained that the development cooperation budget 
should be lowered in line with the European average, implying around a 50% cut to expenditure 
(van Os 2008).  
 
                                                          
434 Elsewhere, Kranenburg (2010a) has written that 0.7 is a “holy number” and that “most political parties in the 
Netherlands have long decided living up to this promise is a matter of civilisation.” 
435 For more details on this period, see Vossen (2013a, 24–27). See also Van Gorp (2012, 44) on how Bolkestein’s 
framing of immigrant integration was a precursor to Wilders’ approach.  
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Crucially, Boekestijn’s’s questioning was backed up in public by VVD leader (and future Prime 
Minister) Mark Rutte. Responding to press questions about his Party’s new position on 
development cooperation, Rutte argued that “we’re buying off a guilty conscience and it has to 
stop” (van Os 2008). The timing of the VVD’s departure from orthodoxy is instructive. 
Boekestijn’s initial intervention in parliamentary debate came just after Lehman Brothers 
collapsed, sending global financial markets into panic, and increasing the incentives for political 
parties, especially those on the right, to demonstrate how they would cut spending.  
 
Boekestijn continued to argue for less aid spending throughout 2009, culminating with the 
publication of his anti-aid treatise in December436. The launch of  Boekestijn’s The Price of a Bad 
Conscience provided journalist Mark Kranenburg (2009), a columnist for the daily newspaper 
NRC Handelsblad, with the opportunity to reflect on the rapidly change status of the 
development policy debate in the Netherlands:  
“[T]the position of development aid in the Dutch political landscape… seemed 
unassailable until recently. For decades, the subject was taboo. Development 
aid was simply the civilised thing to do, or so a stable majority in Dutch politics 
thought. This moral tenet has been laid down in the budgetary rule that 0.8 
per cent of annual GDP is to be spent on development aid. The consensus over 
this matter has been steadily deteriorating in recent years however. Starting 
with the populist right PVV, more and more political parties have started to 
voice criticism of development aid.”  
 
Wilders opposition to development spending had initially seemed outrageous. Yet in clearly and 
repeatedly voicing his opposition to 0.7%, he lay the groundwork for others, like Boekestijn, to 
join him. Once the impact of the ‘credit crunch’ following the GFC began to be bite—the Dutch 
economy contracted by four per cent in 2009 (CPB and PBL 2010, 2)—it became even more 
politically acceptable to question the high levels of Dutch aid spending. In this way, the impact 
of international level factors were translating in aid policy decisionmaking.  
 
The election campaign triggered by the fall of Balkenende IV government in February 2010437, 
starkly demonstrated the new political calculus around the 0.7%. The 2010 campaign was 
dominated by how the major parties responded to two major questions: how rapidly to institute 
                                                          
436 Boekestijn resigned from parliament weeks prior to his book being launched after sharing details of a closed 
meeting between the Dutch queen and selected members of parliament” (Kranenburg 2010a). Boekestijn declined 
to be interviewed for this research.  
437 On 20 February 2010, Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende called Queen Beatrix to tender his coalition 
government’s resignation (Batty 2010). The two major parties comprising the fourth Balkenende coalition – 
Balkenenden’s CDA and the PvdA - had been unable to agree about extending Dutch troop deployments in 
Afghanistan, leading Labour Minister’s to resign (Batty 2010; Aarts and van der Kolk 2011, 577–78). For an overview 
of these events, see Kaarbo (2013, Loc 1996-2166). Upon the PvdA’s withdrawal from Balkenende IV, a caretaker 
government comprising the CDA and its remaining coalition partner, the Christian Union (CU), was installed and a 
General Election scheduled for 9 June (van Kessel 2010b, 2). 
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austerity measures438; and how to respond to the controversial policies of Geert Wilders. With 
international affairs playing a limited role in the election, development cooperation was not a 
salient issue (Kranenburg 2010b; Lucardie and Voerman 2011, 1073). Nonetheless, we can 
detect in the shifting development policies of the major parties the growing influence of the 
PVV. Wilders’ appeal to right-wing voters was pressuring the centre-right parties to adjust their 
policies, especially on issues where the PVV had generated considerable issue ownership (Van 
Kersbergen and Krouwel 2008).  
 
The VVD’s manifesto called for the development budget to be cut in half, from 0.8% to 0.4% of 
GNP (DutchNews 2012b). On the other hand, the centre-left PvdA, unambiguously advocated 
for the development cooperation budget to be held steady at 0.8%. Most revealing of the fragile 
state of the consensus on development spending, however, were the policy positions of the 
CDA. The equivocation detectable in the development policy sections of the CDA manifesto 
suggested the CDA was wavering in its longstanding commitment to spending 0.8% of GNI on 
development cooperation.  
 
In a pre-election column for NRC Handelsblad, Mark Kranenburg (2010b) highlighted 
discrepancies in the CDA’s election documents. Some appeared to be promising a development 
cooperation budget of 0.7%, while others pointed to maintaining 0.8%. In any case, the 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CBP)439, analysis of the platforms of the parties 
contesting the election, calculated that that implementing the CDA platform would reduce 
expenditure on development cooperation (CPB and PBL 2010, 22). But it was not only on 
development spending where the CDA manifesto deviated from tradition. During the campaign, 
the CDA also advocated moving away from the longstanding policy of having a standalone 
cabinet-level post for Development Cooperation. During his foreign policy speech at Radboud 
University highlighted in the previous subsection (7.2.2), Maxime Verhagen argued that a more 
integrated approach to foreign policy was needed. He suggested that “a single minister who 
                                                          
438 While all the major political parties - with the exception of the Socialist Party (SP) - agreed that austerity 
measures were necessary, they argued about the speed at which spending cuts should be implemented (Kickert 
2012, 442; van Holsteyn 2011, 415; van Kessel 2010b, 3–4). The positions of the parties on cost cutting generally 
reflected their position on the political spectrum, with these differences fuelling the campaign. While “the parties of 
the right generally aimed at quicker and bigger steps towards restoring the state’s finances”, those on the left 
“tended to prioritize economic recovery” (Aarts and van der Kolk 2011, 579). Of the three major established parties, 
the right-liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) supported relatively severe cuts over a short 
timeframe to revive the economy. The VVD’s package of proposed cuts amounted to €20 billion over four years, 
generating the majority of these savings via €12 billion in cuts to social security (CPB and PBL 2010, 17–18). The 
socio-democratic PvdA was conscious of ensuring cuts would not affect lower income groups, with its program 
forecasted to deliver €11 billion in savings over the coming electoral cycle. For example, the PvdA supported 
reducing the tax deductions of mortgage payments, which the other established parties opposed (Lucardie and 
Voerman 2011, 1073). The CDA positioned itself between the VVD and the PvdA, striving to present “themselves as 
the ‘reasonable’ alternative” to the other major parties (van Kessel 2010b, 8).  
439 CBP is the Dutch acronym for Centraal Planbureau. 
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would be able to shape our foreign policy (including development cooperation) could be the 
way forward” (Verhagen 2010). Ultimately, the CDA’s platform—like the VVD’s—argued for 
establishing a single ministerial post for international relations (Kranenburg 2010b). This move 
signalled that the CDA saw the need to reform Dutch development cooperation, even if it sought 
to hold onto the 0.7% spending target. 
 
As the 2010 election date neared, it was clear the Dutch development consensus was 
significantly weaker than it had been at the previous election in 2006, when Wilders’ PVV first 
won representation in the Tweede Kamer. This section of the chapter has shown how the 
ongoing validity of the 0.7% target was being questioned not only on political grounds, but also 
from a development perspective and a foreign policy orientation perspective. While other 
factors were playing a role, the ‘elite hobby’ aid salience shock was central to the ongoing 
erosion of support for maintaining the longstanding aid spending trajectory at 0.7%. As we now 
shift our focus to examining aid policy-related events during the Rutte I Government, the 
political ramifications of this constant erosion of support begin to manifest themselves more 
clearly.  
 
7.3 The Development Consensus (Barely) Holds: The Disappearing 
Political Centre and the divided Christian Democrats  
 
What you see in this country is two 
things: a fragmentation of the political 
landscape and at the same time an 
erosion of the political centre where 
compromises are made.  
—Ben Knapen, 2016440 
 
This consensus building way of 
conducting politics is completely gone.  
—Kathleen Ferrier, 2016441 
 
In this section, I examine the “erosion of the political centre” (in the words of the Knapen 
epigraph above) and the implications this had for the future of maintaining the 0.7% target. I do 
                                                          
440 Personal Interview, October 2016. 
441 Personal Interview, October 2016. 
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this by examining the factional discord in the CDA over three subsections. First, I trace how the 
prospect of partnering with Wilders’ PVV split the CDA. I then show how the uncertainty in the 
CDA about how to respond to the new political environment was reflected in how development 
policy was enacted during the Rutte I period.  Finally, I chart how internal divisions in the CDA 
around the 0.7% target contributed to the collapse of the Rutte I government. Charting these 
developments illustrates the ever-increasing pressure placed on 0.7% by the ‘elite hobby’ aid 
salience shock.  
7.3.1 Forced to Choose: Wilders splits the CDA 
The results of the 2010 election reflected how the Dutch political landscape had been 
transformed in the space of a decade. The elections were a disaster for the CDA, who recorded 
its worst performance since the Party’s founding in 1977. By receiving just 13.6% of the national 
vote, the CDA saw its representation in the Tweede Kamer reduced from 41 to just 21, relegating 
them to being only the fourth largest party. With 24 seats (15.5% of the vote), Wilders’ PVV 
gained 15 seats to suddenly become the third largest party. By adding 9 seats to its 2006 result, 
the VVD became the largest party, eclipsing the PvdA by just one seat (30 to 31). These results 
not only showed a rightward shift in the electorate, but also how fragmentary Dutch politics had 
become442.  
 
The unusual electoral realities set the stage for a challenging coalition formation process443. 
Suddenly, the all-consuming political question was whether the major parties would 
countenance entering into a coalition agreement with Wilders’ PVV. While all the all major 
parties were internally divided on this question, the CDA was the most conflicted (Van Gorp 
2012, 319)444. “After the 2010 parliamentary elections”, observed Van Gorp (2012, 328), “it 
became clear for all to see how internally divided the CDA was over the socio-cultural 
dimension.” The rise of the far-right was making it exceedingly difficult for the CDA to navigate 
its usual terrain in the ‘pivotal centre’445 of Dutch politics. 
 
                                                          
442 First, the three traditional parties together obtained only a 55.6 per cent of the vote, the lowest level in history 
at that point. Second, the largest party (the VVD) had never before won such a small share of the national vote—the 
VVD obtained 20.5% of votes, pipping the PvdA, with 19.6% (Aarts and van der Kolk 2011, 580). Finally, seven 
parties won ten or more seats, adding further layers of complexity to prospective coalition arrangements. 
443 “At the time of the fall of Cabinet Balkenende IV”, recalled van Holsteyn (2011, 416) “no one would have 
predicted the results of 9 June” One major newspaper, the day after the election, ran the headline ‘Fragmented 
country makes formation complicated’ (van Holsteyn 2011, 417). 
444 Rutte also faced opposition within the VVD as a result of his proposed partnership with the PVV. For example, 
senior VVD leaders, including former cabinet ministers Frits Korthals Altes and Pieter Winsemius, criticised the 
intended cooperation with Wilders at a party meeting around the time the Coalition Agreement was published 
(RNW 2010). 
445 This term is borrowed from Dutch electoral expert Andrew Krouwel (2012). 
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The CDA’s disastrous electoral performance led long-serving Prime Minister Jan Peter 
Balkenende to resign as party leader on election night (van Holsteyn 2011, 416). Balkenende’s 
successor, Maxime Verhagen, struggled to establish his authority over deeply divided party 
during the long government formation process that stretched across the summer and into 
autumn. Three months into the coalition-forming negotiations, the CDA’s internal divisions 
spilled prominently into the public domain in late August, as press reports emerged in late 
August that Ab Klink—Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport in the previous Cabinet (Balkenende 
IV) and Verhagen’s offsider in the coalition-forming negotiations—would not accept partnering 
with Wilders (DutchNews 2010b). After a week of intrigue, Klink announced his decision to 
resign on 6 September (DutchNews 2010c; Van Gorp 2012, 310). 
 
"You legitimize the PVV-vision and give it support [by governing with them]” explained Klink in 
an interview with de Volkskrant following his decision. Klink expressed his concern that the PVV’s 
stances “against mass-immigration, against Islam, and against Muslims” was systematically 
excluding Muslims from Dutch society. “Due to repetition”, worried Klink, Muslims were being 
“given the stigma of being a risk factor" (Ab Klink, quoted in Van Gorp 2012, 310). Klink’s decision 
to resign, and his explanation for it, are another powerful testament as to how divisive, yet 
politically powerful, Wilders’ framing of Dutch political debate had become.   
 
Despite the defection of his number two, Verhagen persevered with cabinet forming 
negotiations. The political settlement that eventually emerged in late September—the 
government formation process took 127 days, the longest since the first Van Agt Coalition in 
1977 (Andeweg and Irwin 2014, 147)446—was “a new phenomenon in Dutch politics” (van 
Holsteyn 2011, 417)447. Essentially, the VVD and CDA agreed to form a minority government, 
with support in parliament from the PVV (Castle 2010)448. This configuration gave the coalition 
the slimmest possible majority in the Tweede Kamer—76 members in the 150 seat Parliament.  
                                                          
446 During the summer of 2010, a sequence of informatuers—senior political figures appointed to conduct 
negotiations between potential coalition partners—tried and failed to assemble a coalition (Aarts and van der Kolk 
2011, 580). The impasse was broken in early August when the VVD and CDA began serious discussions on forming a 
minority government, to be supported in parliament by the PVV (Castle 2010). For more detail on the sequence of 
informatuers appointed to explore potential coalition options, see Lucardie and Voerman (2011, 1075). Until 2010, 
the Monarch was responsible for appointing informateurs. A new procedure was approved by Parliament in 2012 
which reduced the Monarch’s role (Andeweg and Irwin 2014, 142–43). For further details on the Procedures of 
Cabinet Formation in the Netherlands, see Andeweg and Irwin (2014, 141–46) and The Dutch Political System in a 
Nutshell, a joint publication of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) and Instituut voor Publiek 
en Politiek (2008, chapter 5). 
447 The political settlement that emerged challenged existing definitions of government in the Netherlands. Not only 
was this the first Liberal-led government since 1918 (Pignal 2010), it was first minority administration since the 
Second World War (Cendrowicz 2010b). 
448 Dutch political scientist Joop van Holsteyn (2011, 417) has described the outcome as follows. “The VVD and CDA 
reached agreement to form a government while the PVV agreed to support this government on a number of major 
points, but the PVV did not contribute ministers to the cabinet. The cabinet is therefore either a minority 
Chapter 7 
Page 246 
 
Despite the publication of a VVD-CDA Coalition Agreement, Freedom and Responsibility (VVD 
and CDA 2010)449  on 30 September, the involvement of the CDA was provisional until the 
decision of the party leadership was approved by CDA members. To this end, a party conference 
was scheduled for 2 October in Arnhem (van Holsteyn 2011, 418)450. Numerous prominent CDA 
members voiced their opposition to the partnership with the PVV in the lead up to the 
conference. Most importantly, given the Coalition’s prospective one seat majority, two CDA 
parliamentarians—Kathleen Ferrier and Ad Koppejan–remained staunchly opposed to 
governing with the PVV. One of the reasons Ferrier was opposed was Wilder’s rejection of the 
0.7% target.  
 
Ferrier believed that upholding international commitments was “part of our identity as Christian 
Democrats.” The reason this view was especially significant was because Ferrier was the CDA’s 
spokesperson on development issues—a position she’d held since 2002—and had been 
instrumental in drafting the section on development cooperation in Freedom and 
Responsibility451 (discussed further in subsection 7.3.2, below). Ferrier believes that the 2010 
election “changed the whole political landscape of the Netherlands”, a development she puts 
down to Wilders. “[W]ith the growing populist movement in the Netherlands, it was becoming 
more and more difficult to keep this vision on… what our role should be, what our new Dutch 
identity should be in this fast-changing world,” she told me452.  
 
At the Arnhem conference, the CDA found itself backed into a corner. The party’s identity was 
in question, but it was not able to process this on its own terms. Wilders’ polarising rhetoric 
meant that, in terms of political positioning, on policy issues meant that, you were either with 
him or against him. The CDA membership was now was now obliged to answer the ‘Wilders 
question’ in totality, risking its historical occupation of the ‘pivotal centre’ because of the need 
to provide a definitive ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to the coalition agreement. In this context, internal 
views on the imperative to maintain the 0.7% target began to function as a proxy for a member’s 
                                                          
government with majority support on major issues in Parliament, or a majority government in which one partner 
has no cabinet ministers.”  
449 The unique nature of this settlement meant that, in addition to the coalition agreement, an additional 
‘parliamentary support agreement’ was agreed between the PVV and the VVD and CDA. This document detailed the 
terms of the PVV’s ongoing parliamentary support for the minority government.  
450 The conference generated a huge amount of public and press attention, with more than three times as many 
CDA members attended the Arnhem conference than the previous conference record (Van Gorp 2012, 311) (Van 
GORP 311).For a more detailed account of this conference and its broader political meaning, see Van Gorp (2012, 
308–14), from whom my account draws heavily upon. 
451 Ferrier had a strong background as a development practitioner whose previous roles including advising former 
Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation, Jan Pronk. 
452 Personal interview with Kathleen Ferrier, October 2016. 
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identification with the ‘pragmatist wing’ of the Party, which favoured partnering with the PVV 
for sake of participating in Government, and the ‘principles’ wing, which did not. 
 
Ultimately, the pragmatists prevailed, with membership heeding Verhagen’s emotional plea to 
support the coalition agreement he had negotiated. “We should not let our fear for the PVV 
guide us,” Verhagen implored delegates prior to the vote “but the power of the CDA” (Verhagen, 
quoted in Van Gorp 2012, 313). Nonetheless, 32% of the 4000 CDA voters registered their 
opposition to cooperating with the PVV. Following the vote, Ferrier and Koppejan relented, 
agreeing to provide their support for the government453. This paved the way for Freedom and 
Responsibility, the VVD-CDA Coalition Agreement, to direct the Government’s policy agenda 
over the coming years.  
 
Coalition Agreements454 are uniquely important within the Dutch political system. They function 
as “a kind of political contract that holds the coalition together” (Andeweg and Irwin 2014, 
145)—a public record of the consensus reached by the coalition parties on the policy priorities 
of the government. Coalition Agreements can function as critical junctures for the trajectory of 
development policy in the Netherlands and often have significant implications for foreign policy 
(Kaarbo 2013, chapter 4). At the same time, however, the place of development in these 
negotiations in coalition forming negotiations is always marginal. As Frans Bieckmann explained 
to me, while Coalition Agreements are “very important” for development policy, development 
policy is “not important at all” in the negotiations that lead to the Coalition Agreements—a 
reflection of the low salience of aid amongst powerful political actors who negotiate these 
agreements 455 . As I continue to trace the gradual disintegration of the hold of the 0.7% 
consensus in Dutch politics, I now turn my focus to the development section of Freedom and 
Responsibility and to the politician whose responsibility it became to deliver the policy 
commitments it contained. 
7.3.2 Ben Knapen and 0.7%: Implementing Freedom and Responsibility 
The Rutte-Verhagen cabinet, installed by Queen Beatrix on 14 October 2010, contained twelve 
ministers, six apiece from the VVD and the CDA (including Prime Minister Rutte)456. A further 
                                                          
453 Ferrier remembers the “debates on Coalition Formation [as being] very tough”. She also remains firm in her 
conviction that the deal with the PVV was “a historic mistake”. The agreement “meant the end of my truly Christian 
democratic party”, she told me. 
454 In Dutch, Regeerakkoord. 
455 Personal interview with Frans Bieckmann, November 2014. 
456 Although Dutch cabinets are usually quite small, this was “the smallest cabinet for many years” (Andeweg and 
Irwin 2014, 157). 
Chapter 7 
Page 248 
eight state secretaries457—junior ministers who did not routinely attend cabinet—were named. 
One of these was the CDA’s Dr Ben Knapen, who was appointed State Secretary for European 
Affairs and International Cooperation. Development cooperation has traditionally been a 
cabinet post in the Netherlands458, so many considered this arrangement to be an institutional 
downgrading of development cooperation reflecting the pressure the Dutch development 
consensus was under459. The appointment of Knapen also surprised the Dutch development 
sector. Yet while Knapen had not previously held elected office, his appointment was not 
entirely atypical in the Netherlands, where there is a strong tradition of ministers being 
appointed “for their expertise in the policy area for which they were to assume responsibility” 
(Andeweg and Irwin 2014, 158).  
 
Knapen had begun his career as a foreign correspondent, completing posts in Indonesia, the 
United States and Germany, before becoming the editor-in-chief at NRC Handelsblad, a Dutch 
daily. In the mid-2000s, Knapen worked for a period in the private sector as Senior Director of 
Corporate Communication, Marketing and Institutional Affairs at Philips. Knapen had also held 
a chair as Professor of Media Quality and Ethics at Radboud University, Nijmegen 460 . As 
highlighted earlier (subsection 7.2.2), Knapen was a Council Member of the WRR at the time of 
becoming State Secretary, and had recently overseen the publication of Attached to the World, 
which proposed a series of reforms for Dutch foreign policy (Knapen et al. 2011). With his 
appointment as State Secretary, Knapen had an opportunity to enact some of his policy 
proposals.  
 
Freedom and Responsibility established the policy parameters for aid policy during the Rutte I 
cabinet by promising three key changes. First, the agreement promised that “development 
policy will be fundamentally reviewed and modernised,” adding the important qualifier that the 
WRR’s Less Pretension, More Ambition would serving as the guideline for doing so (VVD and CDA 
2010, 10). Second, it promised to rationalise the scope of aid activity by reducing the number of 
countries receiving Dutch development aid and the number of sectors it would operate in. Third, 
the Coalition Agreement announced that there would be a decrease in the development 
                                                          
457 In Dutch, staatssecretarissen. 
458 The ‘Development Minister’ was typically formally appointed as minister without portfolio (Kaarbo 2013, Loc 
1576). 
459 “It was a political message if you downgrade a minister to a state secretary”, Kitty van der Heijden told me, for 
example (Personal Interview, February 2016). “It’s a very clear message because state secretaries don’t meet in 
senior cabinet meetings.” Yet alongside this the VVD-CDA Coalition Agreement not only gave responsibility for 
development cooperation to a state secretary, but also combined made this post responsible for European Affairs—
an exceedingly demanding set of responsibilities.  
460 Most of the details from this biographical sketch are drawn from the profile included in Hemerijck, Knapen, and 
Doorne (2009, 282). 
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cooperation budget from 0.8% to 0.7% of GNI over the coming two years461, a more minor 
reduction than many development insiders were expecting.  
 
In essence, Freedom and Responsibility promised to reform development cooperation and 
uphold the 0.7% commitment, a position which clearly bore Kathleen Ferrier’s imprint462. Thanks 
to Wilders’ framing, however, these two objectives had become politically incompatible in the 
increasingly zero-sum world of Dutch political discourse. The dynamics of the ‘elite hobby’ aid 
salience shock meant that an explicit commitment to upholding the 0.7% commitment was now 
taken to signal a preference for preserving the status quo. Politically speaking, it simply did not 
matter how ambitious any other simultaneously pursed reform efforts might be. The symbolic 
misalignment of the coalition agreement was encapsulated in the document’s desire to reform 
development policy according to Less Pretension, More Ambition, when the take home message 
from this report, as I discussed earlier (subsection 7.2.1), was that the elite consensus on the 
0.7% target had broken. From the perspective of political symbolism, the internal inconsistency 
of the development section of Freedom and Responsibility demonstrates the direct impact 
Wilders’ framing had on policy choices.  
 
As State Secretary, Knapen’s strategy was, he told me, to look “for a middle ground where I 
could redevelop legitimacy in society for development cooperation”463. Just six weeks after his 
appointment as Secretary of State, Knapen stood before the Tweede Kamer to present his 26 
November Letter464—an important initial bureaucratic step in carrying out the commitments in 
the Coalition Agreement—and spoke of the need “to maintain or restore public support” (MFA 
2010b, 1) given how “many Dutch people fear the consequences of globalisation and are 
sceptical about the usefulness of development cooperation—for their own country and for the 
world as a whole” (MFA 2010b, 4). Yet Knapen was boxed in by the contradictions inherent in 
the Coalition Agreement. 
 
Charting a middle ground, was virtually impossible in the prevailing political environment, for 
four key reasons. First, as the 2010 election results so clearly revealed, the middle ground in 
                                                          
461 The financial annex to the Coalition Agreement specified that this measure would generate savings of €400 
million. 
462 Ferrier was a firm believer in upholding the 0.7% target but also had a history as a reformer. She agreed with 
most of the recommendations of Less Pretension, More Ambition. 
463 This stance is also evident in Knapen’s 26 November Letter, which acknowledges the need “to maintain or 
restore public support” (MFA 2010b, 1) and concludes by emphasising the imperative to generate “fresh support for 
international cooperation funded by the taxpayer" (MFA 2010b, 14). 
464 In the Dutch system, the cabinet is responsible to the States-General. However, as cabinet members cannot be 
members of the States-General, the presentations of Letters to Parliament is the key means of informing the States-
General and its committees of changes in policy.    
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Dutch politics was rapidly receding. The political space available for rehabilitating the legitimacy 
for development cooperation was almost non-existent given Wilders’ framing of the 0.7% target 
in such black-and-white terms. This had created an environment where the 0.7% target was 
‘sacrosanct’ (Knapen’s words) not only for development supporters, but increasingly for anti-
development supporters.  
 
The second reason Knapen was unlikely to successfully chart a middle ground on development 
relates to his limited political presence. Many I spoke with described how Knapen was “not really 
a politician”. It is a characterisation I suspect Knapen would agree with. “I never had the 
ambition to go into government,” Knapen conceded to me when I asked him to recount how he 
first heard about his prospective appointment as Secretary of State. “The first time they called 
me, I never called them back, because I wasn’t very interested in doing that job.”  
 
Knapen, a journalist and academic, is analytically driven. By background as well as temperament, 
he was deeply reluctant to engage in the sort of rhetorical gamesmanship required to ‘cut-
though’ and shake-up the debate. As Korteweg (2013, 765) has observed, Wilders’ success is a 
function of his “capacity to manipulate the press and set the tone of the debate by making the 
most quotable interventions in such debates”. Knapen, on the other hand, had little concern for 
generating media attention or garnering a political profile. As a reluctant political appointee, 
Knapen had no electoral base he was obliged to court.  
 
The final reason why Knapen was unlikely to successfully forge a middle ground on aid relates 
to his lack of personal enthusiasm in the 0.7% target. “I have defended the 0.7%—and I even 
managed to keep it to that—although I never believed very much in it,” Knapen conceded to 
me. Nonetheless, Knapen saw the value of adhering to the 0.7% target for “reputational reasons 
and leverage with the outside world” after such a long period of investment. For this reason, 
Knapen was a consistent public advocate for maintaining 0.7% during his tenure465, but his 
personal reticence towards the target meant his advocacy lacked any real dynamism. He viewed 
                                                          
465 At almost every opportunity he got, Knapen reinforced this message. In the 26 November Letter, Knapen 
reminded Parliamentarians that, “with an ODA budget of 0.7% of GNP, the Netherlands will maintain its position 
among leading donor countries, and meet its international commitments” (Reference 26 November Letter). The 
accompanying Press Release on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website also reiterated that “by maintaining its 
development budget at 0.7% of GNP, the Netherlands will remain a leading donor country and still keep to 
international agreements” (MFA 2010a). During a speech in The Hague on 2 December 2010, Knapen essentially 
repeated the line from the 26 November Letter; “[a]n aid budget of 0.7 GNP keeps my country among the 
international front runners and enables me to invest in my priorities.” Early in the New Year, in a speech to an 
audience which included Princess Maxima, Knapen again highlighted that “with an aid budget of 0.7% of GNP, the 
Netherlands remains a leader in international cooperation.” In a speech in Amsterdam on 31 March, Knapen again 
repeated this refrain verbatim (Knapen 2011a). On 6 April, in The Hague, Knapen did so again, adding that 
“[maintaining] 0.7% keeps us in the realm of being a reliable partner as that is the international norm” (Knapen 
2011b).  
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the target as an “old fashioned concept” and was eager to see it revised and rethought “within 
an international framework of change”. “I never was very much excited by the 0.7%,” Knapen 
told me. Rather, he was excited about “development policy coherence in a globalized world” 466.  
 
For each of the four reasons list above, Knapen was unable to fundamentally recast the 
overarching politic dynamics of Dutch aid policy. The relentless downward pressure on the 0.7% 
consensus exerted by the ‘elite hobby’ aid salience shock continued uninterrupted. Yet despite 
this, Knapen did succeed in bringing greater focus to Dutch development policy, a goal he had 
voiced in his project with the WRR (Knapen et al. 2011). Knapen’s Letter to the House of 
Representatives presenting the spearheads of development cooperation policy, presented on 18 
March 2011, formalised a reduction of partner countries from 33 to 15 and a reduction of 
priority themes from 11 to four ‘spearhead’ sectors: security and the legal order; food security; 
water; and sexual and reproductive health and rights (MFA 2011, 2). 
 
In retrospect, Knapen’s tenure is emblematic of the CDAs travails during the period. With his 
conflicted private and public views on the 0.7%, Knapen was stuck in the very same bind as the 
party he represented. Like Knapen, the CDA sought to chart a centrist course, but the political 
ground was shifting beneath them. In attempting to chart a nuanced position between ‘old’ and 
‘new’ approaches to development cooperation, the CDA’s stance on aid, rather than appearing 
sensible, appeared vacillating in the turbulent Dutch political environment. The reason it did so 
was because Wilder’s framing of the 0.7% target had polarised the debate, reducing the 
operative political question to an inescapable binary: do you support 0.7% or not? As we will see 
in the next subsection, the split in the CDA over this question was directly exploited by Wilders, 
ultimately leading to the downfall of the Rutte I government.   
7.3.3 Wilders, 0.7% and the Collapse of the Rutte I 
The Netherlands plunged into a fresh political crisis in the spring of 2012. Amidst a broader 
European debt and deficit crisis, forecasts released by the Bureau for Economic Analysis (CBR), 
projected the Netherlands budget deficit would balloon to 4.6% on the back of slower than 
expected economic growth (Steinglass 2012b; Geitner 2007; Traynor 2012). This deficit 
projection exceeded the Europeans Union’s 3% mandate and required the coalition partners to 
                                                          
466 Knapen’s reticence around 0.7% was something that close observers noticed during his relatively short tenure. It 
frustrated the development constituency, who felt that Knapen was not only more interested in the European 
Affairs component of his portfolio, but also paid more attention to it.  
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find €9 billion in savings before April 30 (Cluskey 2012a). As the Netherlands was instrumental 
in drafting the EU rules, it risked embarrassment if it did not adhere to them. Furthermore, 
having been a vocal critique of non-adherents during the prolonged European debt and deficit 
crisis, the Netherlands found itself “in a fix”, in the words of political scientist Paul Niewenburg. 
“Having such a big mouth on Greece and seizing the moral high ground, [Dutch political leaders] 
are now morally obliged to stick to the rules” (Niewenburg quoted in Traynor 2012). The bottom 
line, politically, was that “without a new round of austerity, the Dutch would still be above the 
eurozone deficit limit by 2015” (Traynor 2012).The Netherlands’ triple-A credit rating was also 
at risk if savings could not be found (Steinglass 2012a).  
 
Rutte responded by gathering his coalition parties together for a three-week summit, beginning 
on 5 March 2012. The summit became known as the ‘Catshuis negotiations’, after the name of 
the Prime Minister’s official residence, where the talks took place. During these negotiations, 
the aid budget was the PVV’s key target for generating savings, despite Knapen’s earlier vows to 
“hold the line at 0.7 percent” (Steinglass 2012b). Matt Steinglass (2012a), reporting on the talks 
for The Financial Times, observed that “the only area in which Mr Wilders has shown an appetite 
for cuts is the foreign aid budget, whose size… was long a source of national pride. But cuts to 
foreign aid are opposed by the other coalition partner, the Christian Democrats [CDA]”.  
 
The prospect of Dutch abandonment of the 0.7% target prompted the intervention of two global 
figures, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Microsoft founder and philanthropist Bill Gates. Both 
men publicly urged the Netherlands to maintain their longstanding commitment to the 0.7% 
target (Cluskey 2012b; DutchNews 2012a). Gates had earlier contacted Ferrier, who had advised 
him to appear on television and argue that the Netherlands was “losing its identity”467. Gates 
was also interviewed by De Volkskrant (DutchNews 2012a).  
 
On Thursday 29 March, in closed talks, the leadership of the VVD, CDA and PVV agreed to cut 
the aid budget by €1 billion (down from €4.6 billion) (Cluskey 2012a). These details were leaked 
and the following day two daily newspapers—De Volkskrant and De Telegraaf—reported that 
cuts to aid were imminent (DutchNews 2012a). By the afternoon of 30 March, the political stakes 
were raised further when six influential members of the CDA, including former Prime Minister 
Ruud Lubbers along with three former foreign ministers and two former aid ministers, sent Rutte 
a letter urging him to personally intervene to maintain aid levels at 0.7% of GNI (DutchNews 
2012a; Cluskey 2012a). 
                                                          
467 Personal interview with Kathleen Ferrier, October 2016. 
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This letter publicly reopened the fissures within the CDA that had been so evident at the time of 
the coalition formation. Two of the CDA politicians who had been most critical of the party’s 
proposed cooperation with Wilders’ PVV—Kathleen Ferrier and Ad Koppejan—both voiced 
immediately voiced their public support for the sentiments expressed in the letter (Cluskey 
2012a)468. The 0.7% target once again acted as the fulcrum for intraparty conflict, driving a 
wedge between the ‘principles’ focused left wing and then more pragmatic right wing, led by 
Verhagen469. Overall, senior CDA figures were more concerned about aid effectiveness than aid 
quantity, but this priority was much more difficult to communicate effectively. Knapen laments 
that a commitment to 0.7% became a “litmus test” within the CDA, particularly because he 
“didn’t care too much about 0.7%”. Nonetheless, the letter achieved its intended purpose in the 
short-run, forcing those conducting the Catshuis negotiations to search elsewhere for savings.  
 
Then, suddenly, on Saturday 21 April, after the Catshuis negotiations had dragged on for seven 
weeks, “Wilders surprised both his friends and enemies with the news that he could not accept 
the budget agreement” (van Holsteyn 2014). Two days later, on Monday 23, Rutte visited Queen 
Beatrix to hand in his government’s resignation (The Economist 2012a)470. Ostensibly, therefore, 
the Rutte I fell over a disagreement over the 0.7% target. In reality, of course, the failure of the 
Cathuis negotiations reflected more fundamental divisions about the direction of the country. 
The 0.7% target had become a proxy for debates around austerity, the influence of the European 
Union, Dutch identity and the internationalist orientation of the Dutch elite. As Tom van der Lee, 
a representative of Dutch civil society organisation Oxfam NOVIB, shrewdly observed at the 
time, “Development assistance used to be something that united people across party lines in 
the Netherlands. Now it’s being used to exploit political polarisation” (van der Lee, quote in Giles 
2012). 
 
                                                          
468 In her interview with me, Ferrier acknowledged playing a leading role in organising the drafting and publication 
of this letter. She was also being briefed on the progress of the Catshuis negotiations. 
469 “The prospect of cutting aid has split Mr Knapen’s party, the Christian Democrats”, reported Chris Giles (Giles 
2012), in an article for the Financial Times. 
470 Rutte—now acting in a caretaker capacity—along with finance minister Jan Kees de Jager redoubled their efforts 
to find a solution to the budget crisis ahead of the 30 April deadline. Now unencumbered by Wilders and his PVV, 
the pair found that other parties were suddenly more willing to negotiate. One minister was quoted by The 
Economist as feeling relieved because “[p]eople no longer assume we are working in the shadow of Wilders” (The 
Economist 2012b). Remarkably, an emergency budget package was agreed “with astonishing speed” (Jolly 2012). 
On 26 April 2012, five parties—the VVD, CDA, D66, GL and the CU—reached an agreement to pass a 2013 austerity 
budget. Tellingly, the development cooperation budget—the focal point of austerity previous negotiations to this 
point—was not affected. For a second time, an agreement orchestrated by CDA Minister of Finance Jan Kees de 
Jager had managed to spare the development cooperation budget, despite seemingly high odds against this 
outcome. The removal of the PVV from the negotiating table rapidly changed the dynamics around the 
development cooperation budget. Nonetheless, as we will see, the signatories to this document were not 
particularly wedded to it during the upcoming election campaign (van Kessel and Hollander 2012, 2, 7-8). 
 
Chapter 7 
Page 254 
The fact that Wilders’ chose to stake his involvement in the negotiations on the maintenance of 
the 0.7% target says a great deal about the symbolic value it had acquired in Dutch politics. At 
the same time, it also speaks to the declining importance of aid that the major parties had 
become so willing to play politics with aid. By now, the political reality was that cutting aid 
represented one of the most politically expedient steps to reduce the budget deficit. There had 
been a “sharp drop in public support for foreign aid” (Giles 2012), and polling showed that cuts 
to aid “evoked less opposition than most other potential cuts, such as in unemployment 
payments” (Giles 2012)  
 
Politically, these developments hurt the CDA most of all. The CDA’s ownership of the 0.7% target 
had been publicly reinforced by the pro-0.7% Catshuis letter. But, as the previous three 
subsections have illustrated, the 0.7% target sparked deep divisions within the CDA itself, 
revealing a party that was fundamentally divided on how to navigate the terrain of 
contemporary Dutch politics. This inability to project a coherent identity would continue to have 
political ramifications for the CDA in the upcoming 2012 parliamentary elections, where the 
ongoing influence of the ‘elite hobby’ aid salience shock would reach its ultimate conclusion. 
 
§§§ 
 
 
7.4 The Development Consensus Disintegrates: Abandoning 0.7%  
 
[W]e had to break this 0.7% to get a 
debate on what’s really important.  
—Ingrid de Caluwé, 2014471 
 
Public discourse around development 
spending has changed radically in recent 
years. 
—Fic, Kennan, and te Velde, 2014 
 
The failed Catshuis negotiations provided a vivid reminder of how fragmented and unstable 
Dutch politics had become. When Prime Minister Rutte visited Queen Beatrix to hand her his 
                                                          
471 Personal interview with Ingrid de Caluwé, November 2014. 
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government’s resignation on Monday 23 April 2012, it marked the fifth time in succession that 
a Cabinet was unable to see out its term. The Catshuis negotiations also revealed just how 
uncertain and unstable the politics around the 0.7% target had become. 
 
The section below concludes my account of aid policy change in the Netherlands by 
documenting the ultimate result of the path dependency initiated and sustained by Wilders’ 
persistent framing of the 0.7% target. The persistent downward force on aid spending supplied 
by the ‘elite hobby’ aid salience shock eventually led to a rupture of the Dutch development 
consensus during coalition negotiations following the 2012 parliamentary elections.  As we will 
see, however, this rupture created the space for the beginnings of a new consensus to emerge. 
7.4.1 All or Nothing: Development Cooperation in the 2012 Dutch Election  
The budget crisis that had triggered the Catshuis negotiations remained the key issue on the 
Dutch political agenda through the 2012 election campaign (van Holsteyn 2014)472. The titles 
chosen by the traditional parties for their manifestos are instructive in encapsulating their pitch 
to voters around how they would approach dealing with the budget deficit (van Holsteyn 2014, 
323). The VVD emphasised their commitment to meeting the EU’s 3% target by choosing ‘Don’t 
postpone, But Take Action’473. The PvdA selected ‘The Netherlands stronger and fairer’, to 
highlight their belief that budget cuts should be implemented in a way which doesn’t not 
exacerbate inequality (van Holsteyn 2014, 323) 474 . The CDA’s manifesto was titled 
‘Everybody’ 475 , a title that conveyed, albeit unintentionally, the party’s overriding political 
problem—an inability to identify a core constituency as forces operating at both fringes of the 
political spectrum tore apart the ‘pivotal centre’ (Krouwel 2012). As van Kessel and Holland 
(2012, 10) would later conclude, the new CDA leader, Sybrand van Haersma Buma, “was unable 
to clarify what truly distinguished his party from the rest…”during the 2012 campaign. This same 
problem, as we will see, would also plague the CDA’s development policy. 
 
                                                          
472 For detailed reviews of the 2012 Dutch Parliamentary election, see and Voerman (2013), van Kessel and 
Hollander (2012) and Van Holsteyn (2014). This section draws on information from a number of election manifestos 
from the 2012 campaign. These manifestos were all sourced from the Manifesto Project Data Dashboard (The 
Manifesto Project Data Collection (version 2016-6) 2016). 
473 Accordingly, the VVD’s manifesto was the most aggressive in reducing the deficit. According to the CBP’s election 
modelling, the VVD’s policies would reduce the budget deficit by €16 billion by 2017, the most of all the parties (CPB 
and PBL 2012, 7). 
474 During the campaign, financial spokesperson Ronald Plasterk underlined the PvdA’s core message when quote as 
saying “[the PvdA] think it’s unwise to take drastic measures just to meet the 2013 target [of a budget deficit of 
below 3%]” (Plasterk quoted in Mock and Tartwijk 2012). While the PvdA’s policies were projected to reduce the 
budget deficit by 2017 by almost of much as the VVD (€15 billion), under their plan the deficit would not begin to 
reduce until 2014 (CPB and PBL 2012, 6).   
475 Ledereen in Dutch.  
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The PPV’s manifesto was titled ‘Their Brussels, our Netherlands’476 and advanced policies that 
would see the Netherlands leave the EU and abandon the Euro477. Wilders’ strategy in 2012 was 
to use extreme positioning on Europe in the way same way he had used extreme positioning on 
Islam to such great political effect in 2010, building on his repudiation of the 3% target during 
the Catshuis negotiations. Wilders’ had explained his departure from the Catshuis negotiations 
as rejecting diktats from Brussels, a refrain he regularly repeated during the campaign (The 
Economist 2012b).  
 
Most relevant to our discussion here, however, is the way in which the PVV’s policy on 
development cooperation had been boiled down to a single word: niet (none). Wilders’ was 
clearly intent on framing he aid debate by using extreme positioning. Yet the real power of the 
‘elite hobby’ aid salience shock is demonstrated in the way in which Wilders’ extreme 
positioning led other parties to respond. This is best illustrated by recounting the decisive 
moment for development policy in the 2012 campaign.    
 
On Saturday 16 June (DutchNews 2012b), two VVD politicians—Parliamentary Group Leader Stef 
Blok and spokesperson for development cooperation Ingrid de Caluwé—published a provocative 
opinion column in de Volkskrant in which they called for a €3 billion cut in the development 
cooperation budget. This represented a much more hard-line stance on the development 
budget than the VVD had proposed in 2010, when it called for development assistance to be 
halved. Blok and de Caluwé’s argued that in many instances development aid was a ‘drastic flop’ 
and questioned the relevance of the 0.7% target to the Netherlands given only four other 
countries adhered to it (DutchNews 2012b).  
 
This column signalled just how far Dutch cultural and political conventions around 0.7% had 
moved in such a brief period. For the three traditional parties, questioning the 0.7% target had 
been taboo until the 2010 election478. Now, just one electoral cycle later, aggressively opposing 
0.7% was seen as an electoral advantageous political strategy for a mainstream party. And this 
provocation was not supplied by a relatively fringe figure like Arend Jan Boekestijn. Rather, the 
column was published in a centrist national newspaper and contributed by a leading VVD 
politician, alongside the party’s spokesperson on development cooperation.  
 
                                                          
476 Hún Brussel, óns Nederland in Dutch. 
477 Page 16 of the 2012 PVV Manifesto featured a full-page photo of a crumpled European flag in a waste-bin. 
478 Specifically, political parties had not questioned the 0.7% target in their election manifestos prior to 2010, when 
the VVD advocated halving the development cooperation budget.    
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What accounts for this rapid shift? The preceding three sections of this chapter have answered 
this question by demonstrating the corrosive influence of the ‘elite hobby’ aid salience shock on 
the 0.7% consensus. What I want to focus on here is showing that, by this stage of the salience 
shocks’ evolution, its key role was in coarsening the development debate. As Fic, Kennan and te 
Velde (2014, 1) state, “[p]ublic discourse around development spending has changed radically 
in recent years.” By the 2012 election, Wilder’s framing contributed to a situation where the 
politics of development was an ‘all or nothing’ proposition, hinging on ascent or otherwise to 
the 0.7% target. Not only had Wilders’ infused the 0.7% target with a new symbolism, his 
ongoing interventions had changed the calculus for successful political discourse. To impact the 
debate decisively now required advancing an almost outrageous proposal, especially when 
dealing with a low issue salience like aid. To demonstrate they were ‘listening’ on development 
cooperation and to prove they were serious about pursuing reform, the VVD was obliged to 
‘make a statement’. 
 
Ingrid de Caluwé admitted as much to me when I asked her if the intention of the column was 
to shake up the debate479. “Of course” she replied, acknowledging that “we chose a radical 
approach and that’s what you do as a politician. Because if you really want to [have] the debate, 
you have to come along with a very strong position.” Blok and de Caluwé knew that they would 
“never get to the €1.4b [their proposed budget cap for development spending]” but instead 
aimed to “[bring] about a debate”. For de Caluwé, development cooperation, as it was 
traditionally pursued by the Netherlands, “didn’t really make a difference”. She felt that the idea 
that “other countries will follow” if the Netherlands leads the way on 0.7% had also been proven 
to be false.  
 
For de Caluwé, the sense of obligation attached to the 0.7% target needed to be dismantled if 
the Netherlands was going to embrace a new, collaborative, trade-orientated approach to 
development cooperation. “It was a taboo [topic]”, she explained. “[We were] talking about 
0.7% because we had to provide this money because they are poor and we are rich and we 
should provide the money” 480. In an admission that tells of the symbolic hold the 0.7% target 
had acquired in signifying the ‘old order’, de Caluwé explained that she believed “we had to 
break this 0.7% to get a debate on what’s really important”481.  
                                                          
479 Personal interview with Ingrid de Caluwé, November 2014. 
480 This comment recalls Mark Rutte’s comment, in light of Arend Jan Boekestijn’s questioning of Dutch 
development cooperation spending in 2008, that “we’re buying off a guilty conscience and it has to stop” (van Os 
2008). 
481 This is not an isolated view, as Spitz, Muskens and van Ewijk (2013, 13) have documented. “To the frustration of 
many experts,” they acknowledge, “the focus on the 0.7% target hinders a fundamental debate on the international 
role of the Netherlands and the need for policy coherence.” 
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In contrast to the VVD, the PvdA chose to go ‘all in’ on development, demonstrating their 
commitment by promising to increase development spending beyond 0.7% to 0.8%. The CDA, 
however, found itself wedged again. The internal fissures around the 0.7% target that were 
exposed by the ill-fated collaboration with the PVV had not been resolved and so the CDA proved 
incapable of matching the bold and decisive politics on 0.7% embraced by the VVD or the PvdA. 
Worse, the CDA’s hesitation in committing to 0.7% target during the election campaign 
reinforced a view that the CDA was unsure of how to approach the present political moment.  
 
The draft version of the CDA’s election manifesto did not include a commitment to adhere to 
the 0.7% standard. However, in a sign of the disconnect between the CDA leadership and the 
party’s grassroots, this commitment “was re-included by popular vote at the CDA congress at 
the end of June” (DutchNews 2012c) and ultimately taken to the election482. In effect, this 
episode amounts to a replay of what happened during the Cathuis negotiations, when the fact 
adhering to the 0.7% target was contested within the party spilled into the public sphere. In 
Kathleen Ferrier’s view, “losing our identity when it comes to development cooperation means 
the [CDA] is perceived by large groups in the Netherlands as a party that has no longer its own 
identity”483. The feeling that the CDA was lacking a sense direction was reflected in the results 
of the 2012 elections, where the party fared even worse than it had in 2010, setting another 
historical low in its vote total.   
7.4.2 Moving On: Development in the 2012 Coalition Agreement 
The nature of the 2012 election results ensured the 2012 cabinet formation process proceeded 
much more rapidly than it had in 2010 (Otjes and Voerman 2013, 168)484. The VVD secured 41 
seats, an increase of 10 from 2010. The PvdA, meanwhile, won 38 seats, an increase of 8. As 
these parties together controlled 79 seats of the 150 seat Tweede Kamer, a ‘purple coalition’ 
was widely accepted to be the most likely outcome of the election (Otjes and Voerman 2013, 
168). Wilders’ extreme positioning on Europe was not as politically effective his anti-Islam-
                                                          
482 As part of the CPB’s assessment of election manifestos for the 10 major parties contesting the 2012 election, the 
budgetary impact of their respective plans on development cooperation were compared (CPB and PBL 2012, 9). 
According to the CPB’s analysis, the VVD’s proposed cuts to the development budget would contribute to a €2.75 
billion reduction in public spending by 2017, compared to the CBP baseline. The PVV and the far right DPK were the 
only parties to advocate deeper cuts to the development budget, shaving €3.5 and €3.25 billion, respectively, from 
public spending by 2017 via their proposals. The CBP projected that the CDA’s plan would result in a small €0.5b 
reduction in public spending, in relation to the CBP baseline, by 2017. The PvdA and D66 plans were shown by the 
CBP to have no effect on the baseline. The proposals of the SP, GroenLinks and the ChristenUnie (CU) all raised 
expenditure on development.  
483 Personal interview with Kathleen Ferrier, October 2016. 
484 The 2012 formation was the shortest since 1971 (Otjes and Voerman 2013, 168). It took 50 days. 
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orientated campaign in 2010, as the PVV lost more than 5% of its vote share and dropped 9 seats 
(Otjes and Voerman 2013, 167)485. Nonetheless, the PVV remained the third largest party in the 
Tweede Kamer. Securing just 8.5% of the vote, the CDA was relegated to being only the 5th 
largest party in parliament, behind the Socialist Party.   
 
 On 29 October, a Coalition Agreement titled Building Bridges consummated the new 
partnership between the VVD and PvdA (VVD and PvdA 2012). As its name suggests, the 
document was conciliatory in tone, projecting stability in the light of the ongoing budget crisis. 
Whereas coalition agreements had previously been developed by working through policy issues 
one at a time, reaching a compromise on each, the 2012 negotiations were approached 
differently (Otjes and Voerman 2013, 168). In what amounted to a new ‘political experiment’486, 
“no attempt was made to reach political or substantive compromises, but instead agreements 
were reached concerning exchanges” (van Holsteyn 2014, 325). In effect, the coalition partners 
“divided the major political issues between them and allowed one party to outline policy on 
‘their’ issues” (Otjes and Voerman 2013, 168).  
 
That the parties resorted to this approach reflects says a great deal about the breakdown of 
Dutch consociational democracy and the influence of Wilders. In this more fragmented, volatile 
and contested Dutch political landscape, the imperative for both the VVD and the PvdA to each 
retain an independent identity trumped the historical imperative to negotiate a compromise on 
each issue 487 . Prominent Dutch political scientist Andre Krouwel explained the underlying 
political logic of the new approach in a post-election column. “The coalition’s two constituent 
members,” Krouwel argued, “need to maintain their appeal to voters that proved very willing to 
support the more radical options of Wilders’ PVV and [Emile] Roemer’s [left-wing Socialist 
Party.” Another factor explaining the new negotiating approach relates to the political capital 
acquired by Mark Rutte and Diederik Samson (the leader of the PvdA) by their performances in 
the campaign—political capital that afforded them the requisite authority to pursue a new way 
of negotiating the coalition agreement488.  
                                                          
485 A common explanation for the PVV’s poor performance relates to Wilders’ role in the collapse of the Catshuis 
negotiations. Rather than burnishing his credentials as a Euro-sceptic, Wilders’ surprise exit from the negotiations 
sealed the PVV’s reputation as an unreliable partner. 
486 This was the phrase used by the national daily NRC Handelsblad on October 30, 2012, the day after the Coalition 
Agreement was finalised (van Holsteyn 2014, 325).  
487 Van Holsteyn (2014, 325) argued that this method of developing the Coalition Agreement meant that “each 
partner could point to success in obtaining ideas that were important to it and could thereby better maintain its 
own identity.” 
488 Diederik Samson’s performance triggered a remarkably rapid turnaround in the polls for the PvdA during the 
2012 campaign. Opinion Polls taken on 22 August suggested the PvdA was in line for between 17 and 21 seats, with 
the Socialist Party expecting between 33 to 37 (van Holsteyn 2014, 324). Less than a month later, on 11 September, 
the eve of the elections, polling shows these positions had effectively been reversed. From late August the gains of 
the PvdA proceeded at almost a seat a day (Krouwel 2012). Samsom’s personal appeal was a key driver of these 
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The new negotiating approach had direct implications for Dutch development policy. The VVD 
chose development cooperation as one of ‘their’ issues and shaped the policy agenda 
accordingly, presenting “some striking reforms” (Wijffels et al. 2012, 3). First, Building Bridges 
announced significant additional cuts to the development cooperation budget (VVD and PvdA 
2012, 20)489. These cuts were framed as a contribution towards solving the Netherlands’ overall 
financial problems (VVD and PvdA 2012, 20). The Agreement itself did not explicitly mention 
0.7%, but the scale of the cuts made it clear the Netherlands would abandon the target in 2013. 
A second noteworthy reform was the creation of a ‘revolving’ fund (later named the Dutch Good 
Growth Fund) to “be used to support investments in developing countries, especially by small 
and medium-sized enterprises” (VVD and PvdA 2012, 20). This policy initiative reinforced the 
message that signalled that the policy shift from ‘aid to investment’ begun under Knapen would 
not only continue, but deepen. A third key reform of Building Bridges involved creating the new 
post of Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, “thus confirming the 
importance of cohesion between these two policy areas” (VVD and PvdA 2012, 20).  
 
In a development that took many observers by surprise, Lilianne Ploumen was appointed as 
Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation. In contrast to her predecessor Ben 
Knapen, Ploumen’s political credentials were not in question, as she had just completed a five-
year term as chair of the PvdA. Rather, the surprise generated by Ploumen’s appointment 
stemmed from the disjuncture between her longstanding position as a development 
cooperation insider and advocate, and her sudden willingness to preside over the abandonment 
of the 0.7% target. Ploumen had a substantial background in various roles in the development 
and not-for-profit sector. Between 2001 and 2007, prior to becoming party char, Ploumen had 
worked for Cordaid, a large Catholic, Dutch-based international development organisation. And 
In one of her last acts as party chair, Ploumen presided over the 2012 PvdA party congress which 
resolved to increase development spending to 0. 8% of GNI490. 
 
                                                          
remarkable gains (Krouwel 2012). Alongside his strong debate performances, Samson ran an unusually personal 
campaign by the standards of Dutch politics, “allowing the public to catch a glimpse of his private life” (Mock and 
Tartwijk 2012; see also Diehl 2012). 
489The financial annex to Building Bridges, specified savings of €750m to the ODA budget, in 2014, 2015 and 2016 
before rising to €1b in 2017, generating of total of €3250 in savings compared to the draft budget in 2013. For a 
more detailed overview of these figures, see A World to Gain (MFA 2013, 60). 
490 The PvdA’s resolution on social democratic international policy, adopted by the PvdA congress on 22 January 
2012, stated that, “[t]he PvdA believes that the Dutch contribution to development aid should be at least 0.8% of 
gross domestic product (GDP).” (PvdA (Labour Party) 2012). It is noteworthy that Jan Pronk, Frans Timmermans 
(appointed Foreign Minister in Cabinet Rutte II) and Bert Koenders (Minister for Development in Balkenende IV and 
Timmermans replacement as Minister for Foreign Affairs in Cabinet Rutte II) were members of a commission 
chaired by Nico Schrijver to draft a resolution on Dutch foreign policy for the congress.  
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The reactions to Ploumen’s decision to accept a Ministerial role overseeing the abandonment of 
0.7% were mixed. The Dutch NGO community took particular umbrage at the decision. The 
PvdA’s willingness to accept the abandonment the 0.7% target was also the key reason Jan 
Pronk—a long serving Minister who held the Development portfolio on three separate 
occasions—highlighted for resigning his party membership after 49 years491. In some quarters, 
however, the PvdA was praised for its pragmatism. Reporting on the Coalition Agreement, 
DutchNews (2012d) argued that “Labour’s decision to abandon the international standard of 
0.7% of GDP shows a new realism within the party.”  
 
In any case, as I have outlined, the new mode of negotiating the coalition agreement meant that 
the VVD controlled the aid policy agenda (although there remains contention as to whose idea 
the DGGF was)492. In the Dutch system, Ministers are obliged to accept the terms of the coalition 
agreement and implement the agreed agenda. If the Coalition Agreement negotiations had 
proceeded in the traditional manner, a compromise may have been reached whereby 0.7% was 
retained at the behest of the PvdA, perhaps for a limited time while a new definition of ODA was 
worked out493. But as it was, the VVD was determined to abandon 0.7%, not only because it was 
a promise in its manifesto but also because of the symbolic political benefits of doing so.  
 
Ploumen was an ally of Samson and, like him, a pragmatist. My sense is that she decided to make 
the best of the opportunity she was presented. While I have no definitive proof for this claim, I 
strongly suspect Ploumen was relieved that 0.7% had been taken off the table as an issue—by 
her political opponents no less. Ploumen had reformist instincts and was now freed up to 
redefine future Dutch development cooperation policy in her image, at least within the confines 
of the Coalition Agreement. The way she approached this redefining process is the subject I 
address next. 
7.4.3 Towards A New Consensus? Ploumen and ‘A World to Gain’ 
Preparation towards what would become the definitive declaratory policy of the Rutte II 
government, A World to Gain: A New Agenda for Aid, Trade and Investment began in earnest in 
mid-January 2013. Given the Coalition Agreement was signed on 29 October 2012, and Cabinet 
officially installed by Queen Beatrix on 5 November, this was the earliest feasible time to 
                                                          
491 Pronk accounted this decision via personal website on 28 May 2013.   
492 I received conflicting reports from interviewees about whose idea the DGGF was. Both VVD and PvdA 
representatives appear to believe it was their own idea.  
493 Building Bridges included a commitment that he Netherlands would “press in the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development for modernising the criteria for Official Development Aid (ODA)” (VVD and PvdA 
2012, 20). 
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commence, given the priority during Ploumen’s early months was to prepare for the budget 
debate. 
 
The drafting of A World to Gain was completed in a very short time frame, at the behest of 
Ploumen. She wanted the policy to be reading by early April, which necessitated completing the 
document by early March in order to allow adequate time to consult with relevant parties and 
circulate the document within cabinet. The report was developed by a small three-person 
drafting team, led by lead writer Selwyn Moons, who had joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, as part of the machinery of government changes that 
accompanied the transfer of trade portfolio functions from the Minister of Economic Affairs to 
the new Minister of Trade and Development Cooperation494.. The choice of Moons to head up 
the writing team was seen by some as a signal of the ‘new order’. Moons was aware of these 
dynamics, acknowledging that coming from the ‘trade side’ “already made me suspicious” and 
conceding that “there was some hostility there”. But he also felt that believing in the message 
of the new policy helped him write it more convincingly. “I also believe myself, which helps, of 
course, if you have to write these particular documents, that this [combining aid and trade] can 
be a very fruitful and beneficial combination if you use it wisely”495.  
 
To meet the tight deadline, the writing team settled into a semi-regular rhythm during the most 
intense three weeks of drafting during late January and early February 2013. Moons would work 
on the document from 9am to noon most days, leaving the afternoon to attend primarily to his 
regular departmental work. After lunch, he would provide the latest draft of the document to 
Ploumen’s chauffer, who would deliver it to the Minister. Ploumen would digest the material 
early the next morning, reporting back to the drafting team in a short meeting to commence the 
day, usually working off a marked-up copy of the latest draft. The cycle would then begin again, 
with Moons and the team revising, updating and adding to the working draft according to 
Ploumen’s feedback, or that obtained from various other consultation activities that were 
conducted during the course of developing the policy.. 
 
The process of development A World to Gain is notable for the close involvement of Ploumen, 
who was eager to recast thinking about Dutch development cooperation. According to Moons, 
“Ploumen really believes that you need a new tone and attitude…” to revitalise thinking about 
Dutch development cooperation. “We were aware of the importance of the narrative”, Moons 
                                                          
494 A speech writer augmented the drafting team over the last two weeks, to assist with fine-tuning the writing. 
Internally, Moons reported to two Directors-General during the development of the document. 
495 Personal interview with Dr Selwyn Moons, October 2014. 
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told me. Ploumen’s key idea was to reconceptualise Dutch international engagement in terms 
of tiered bilateral relationships496. A World to Gain argued that the Netherlands engaged with 
other states in one of three ways: via aid relationships; transitional relationships; or trade 
relationships. The core idea of Ploumen’s policy, then, was that it is in the interests of the both 
Netherlands and its partners to move towards developing trade relationships over time. This 
conceptualisation provided a driving rationale for the merging of Trade and Development 
functions within Ploumen’s new portfolio.  
 
Ploumen recognised the early part of her tenure as a critical window of opportunity to reorient 
the narrative around Dutch development policy. In this respect, the abandonment of 0.7% very 
likely helped Ploumen’s cause, rather than hindered it. As we have seen, 0.7% had come to be 
seen as a symbol of preserving the status quo. The removal of 0.7% freed Ploumen to reform 
development policy in a way that wasn’t available to Ben Knapen, whose positions on reform 
were, in fact, remarkably similar. Discarding 0.7% was like removing a handbrake on the reform 
process that Knapen had started, allowing Ploumen to accelerate in a new direction unhindered.  
As the recent OECD DAC (2017, 11) review of the Netherlands development program 
acknowledged, A World to Gain “cements a significant policy reorientation that was started in 
2010.” Notably, Knapen’s spearheads were left untouched, with no consideration given to 
modifying them.   
 
Ploumen consistently and persuasively made the case for reforming development before, during 
and after the launch of A World to Gain. In March 2013, a month prior to the publication of A 
World to Gain, Ploumen delivered her first key speech on development. It is instructive that she 
chose to do so before an audience of 160 ‘development insiders’ in The Hague. To this core 
constituency, Ploumen mounted a challenging argument for ‘moving with the times’497. “Old-
school development cooperation” was “rather marginal in today’s world”, which is something 
that “some people find… difficult to get used to…” Ploumen said. She then cast her planned 
reforms as part of a natural and inevitable policy evolution which represented an opportunity, 
once again, for Dutch leadership in development:  
First, we had development aid. Then development cooperation took over. 
Now we are heading for international cooperation—including aid, trade and 
investment. I truly hope that we can lead the way. And truly cooperate. 
(Ploumen 2013a). 
                                                          
496 Moons acknowledged to me that it was Ploumen who argued that “we should think in terms of relationships…” 
identifying that there are countries with “which we have an aid relationship and those with which we have a trade 
relation[ship] and there is something in between.”  
497 The speech was delivered at the annual conference of the Netherlands Society for International Development 
Conference, the theme of which was ‘The Future of International Cooperation’ (de Groot and van der Graaf 2014, 
10). 
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After the release of A World to Gain on 5 April, Ploumen increased her public appearances, 
repeatedly making the case for why Dutch development policy needed to change. Her speeches 
riffed, again and again, on the themes of private sector involvement in development, innovation, 
investment and policy coherence. On 11 April, Ploumen explained how the Netherlands needed 
to “adapt” to the changed development landscape with “a new approach, with new tools, new 
partnerships, new ways of stimulating funding and driving development” (Ploumen 2013b). “The 
Netherlands”, she added, “is putting the transition from aid to investment into practice.” At the 
In making this argument, Ploumen was notably conscious of addressing the critique that trade 
would overshadow development—a key concern within the development sector498. 
 
Later, in July 2013, in response to being asked to explain the rationale behind the policy shift 
represented by A World to Gain, Ploumen responded by drawing attention to international 
factors, saying: “[t]hings have changed. We are facing a world of new global power relationships, 
different poverty patterns and increased international interdependence” (Connect 2013, 9). 
Ploumen believed that Netherlands was obliged to adapt if it wanted to remain a forerunner in 
development cooperation.  
 
As my research did not extend beyond the 2013 timeframe, I am not able authoritatively 
comment on the extent to which Ploumen’s “new agenda for aid, trade and investment” 
(Ploumen 2013c) has fundamentally transformed the narrative around development 
cooperation. I have little doubt, however, that Ploumen’s task would have been much more 
difficult if she had been politically obliged to continue fighting the 0.7% battle. The political 
pressure eased once 0.7%, the driving symbolic force of the ‘elite hobby’ aid salience shock, was 
removed from the political agenda.  
 
That said, it is clear the 0.7% target retains a powerful hold in the Netherlands. Very recently, 
the presence of the Christian Union in the coalition that emerged following the 2017 Dutch 
parliamentary elections, has helped ensure that the present Coalition Agreement again assents 
to the 0.7% target, although in a very roundabout way. It promises that, by 2021, development 
cooperation “budget will once more amount to 0.7% of GNI, minus €1.4 billion” (VVD et al. 2017, 
                                                          
498 “So rest assured,” Ploumen (2013a) told delegates at the Society for International Development Conference in 
March 2013, “trade will not overshadow development cooperation”. In a longer article published in November 
2013, Ploumen tackled this criticism again. First, she acknowledge that A World to Gain, “describes a unified agenda 
that bridges the traditional divide between aid and trade.” Ploumen acknowledged that bringing together “two 
worlds that have long been separate… may cause friction…” Nonetheless, she argued that “there is much to be 
gained by seeking common ground and combining agendas that benefit both the poor in development countries 
and stimulate business for Dutch companies” (Ploumen 2013d). 
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53). (The reference to €1.4 billion refers to cuts agreed by the previous government). Time will 
tell whether the desire to adhere to 0.7% in this instance will help or hinder the cause of 
development proponents.  
 
§§§ 
 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has tracked how the ‘elite hobby’ aid salience shock explains aid policy change in 
the Netherlands. The story of aid policy change told in this chapter differs from the previous 
chapters in that change occurred over a longer period of time and without the influence of a 
direct aid salience shock. Instead, Wilders was the progenitor of a classic indirect aid salience 
shock. He saw an opportunity to politicise aid policy in order to position himself and his party in 
a politically beneficial way. What this chapter shows is the especially contingent nature of 
indirect aid salience shocks. Precisely because these changes in aid policy change are achieved 
through an individual’s ability and opportunity to effectively frame the agenda, rather than 
through direct international in the aid policy decisionmaking process (as per direct aid salience 
shocks), these changes processes rely more on ‘permissive conditions’ at the domestic and 
international levels. In the forthcoming chapter, these differences will be further explored. In 
many ways, then, the ‘Elite Hobby’ aid salience shock and the aid policy change it created 
reflected more fundamental changes occurring in the Netherlands and its society. Nonetheless, 
Wilders’ agency was required to initiate and sustain these specific aid policy changes.  
 
Geert Wilders’ opposition to the 0.7% target was one of the means by which he “seized the 
mantle of radicalism by positioning [his party] as the only force that dares to challenge an out-
of-touch political establishment” (Polakow-Suransky 2016). Wilders ability to influence the 
political agenda meant that his politicisation of the 0.7% target had powerful and far-reaching 
effect on aid policy decisionmaking in dynamics during the late 2000s and early 2010s.   
 
Wilders’ framing meant that the Dutch development cooperation debate was reduced to a 
simple political test: whether one supported the 0.7% target or not. This placed the reformers – 
of which there were many, especially in the CDA–in a difficult position. Those who remained 
supportive of development cooperation in general, but who accepted significant reforms were 
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necessary found it almost impossible to articulate this relatively nuanced position given the 
parameters Wilders had constructed around the public debate. Wilders’ politicisation of the 
0.7% had created an environment that stifled anything other than a one-dimensional debate 
where only the most extreme positions could ‘cut through’.  
 
What we see, therefore, by taking an actor-specific perspective to examining aid policy dynamics 
in the Netherlands, is just how interlocked factors from each level of analysis were in 
contributing to the decision to enact aid policy change. Wilders personal impact upon the 
political agenda was immense. His reframing of the 0.7% target then led to a cascade of domestic 
political responses, chief among them splitting the CDA. We then see that ongoing efforts to 
make Dutch development cooperation ‘fit for purpose’ in a rapidly changing world were not 
really able to take root until the 0.7% target had been set aside politically. Furthermore, the 
context for all of these events was the questioning of Dutch identity that began in earnest in the 
aftermath of the ‘long year of 2002’. In the forthcoming chapter, I examine some of these 
interactive dynamics in more detail by highlighting some of the factors that play a key role in 
mediating the impact of aid salience shocks across not only the Netherlands, but also Australia 
and the United Kingdom.   
 
§§§ 
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8 Aid Salience Shocks in Comparative 
Perspective  
his chapter concludes Part II of the thesis by conducting a comparative analysis of aid 
salience shocks based on the material presented in chapters 5, 6 and 7. The chapter 
connects the empirical narratives of aid policy change in Part II with the theoretical explanations 
advanced in Part I. The model at figure 8.A (which reproduces figure 4.A. from earlier in the 
thesis) is the device around which these connections are drawn out.  
Figure 8.A: Aid Salience Shocks as Pathways to Aid Policy Change 
 
 
The theory of aid policy change advanced by this thesis views individual actors as the ultimate 
progenitors of foreign policy change (Hudson 2014, 7)499. Yet adopting this perspective does not 
imply that domestic and international factors are redundant. As I stressed in chapters 2 and 3—
and as the model at Figure 8.A depicts—a complete account of an instance of aid policy change 
requires multilevel integration, where the influence of factors at each level are considered. 
Nonetheless, an actor-specific theory begins with the individual decisionmaker, who ‘funnels’ 
factors from across all levels of analysis when arriving at an aid policy decision (subsection 
3.2.2). As Busby (2007, 20) has pointed out, “[w]hile systemic incentives shape and shove states, 
                                                          
499 Hudson (2014, 7) conveys how “[t]he perspective of FPA is that the source of all international politics and all 
change in international politics is specific human beings using their agency and acting individually or in groups.”  
 
T 
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domestic-level constraints coupled with the agency of actors themselves are important if we 
wish to explain foreign policy outcomes.” 
 
Reflecting the nature of this funnelling process, the three sections that comprise this chapter 
step through each level of analysis in turn. As we will see, however, the interlinkages between 
factors operating between and across levels are significant. In reality, decisionmakers compute 
the nature of the constraints and opportunities they face at a given time in a much more 
instantaneous and integrated manner that we are able to here. Nonetheless, organising this 
account according to levels of analysis not only links the present discussion more clearly to 
earlier ones in chapters 3 and 4 but also allows me to highlight key findings about the way in 
which a number of specific factors decisively influenced the aid policy change process across 
each of the case study countries. In this way, I can demonstrate how the empirical material 
presented to this point in Part II conforms to the dynamics illustrated in Figure 8.A. As a reminder 
of the characteristics of the seven aid salience shocks being compared in this chapter, Table 8.A 
reproduces Table 1.B from earlier in the thesis. 
Table 8.A: Aid Salience Shocks Documented in this Study 
 
Overall, the comparative analysis conducted in this chapter seeks to fortify three interrelated 
arguments made throughout the thesis. First, the analysis demonstrates how adopting an actor-
 # Name Key Political Actor/s (position/s) Type Timeframe Impact on Aid $ 
Au
st
ra
lia
 
SS1 Rudd aid salience shock 
Kevin Rudd (Labor Party Leader, 
Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs) 
I 2006-2012 Increase 
SS2 Budget deficit aid salience shock 
Tony Abbott (Prime Minister) 
Joe Hockey (Treasurer) 
II 2013-2014 Decrease 
SS3 
Liberal Party 
factionalism aid 
salience shock 
Tony Abbott (Liberal Party 
Leader/Prime Minister) 
Julie Bishop (Deputy Liberal 
Leader/Minister for Foreign 
Affairs) 
II 2011-2014 Decrease 
U
ni
te
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
 
SS4 Short aid salience shock 
Clare Short (Shadow/Secretary of 
State for International 
Development) 
I 1997-2003 Increase 
SS5 Cameron-Mitchell aid salience shock 
David Cameron (Conservative 
Party Leader/ Prime Minister) 
Andrew Mitchell 
(Shadow/Secretary of State for 
International Development) 
I 2006-2013 Increase 
SS6 ‘Tory modernisation’ aid salience shock 
David Cameron (Conservative 
Party Leader / Prime Minister) II 2006-2013 Increase 
N
ED
 
SS7 ‘Elite hobby’ aid salience shock 
Geert Wilders (Leader of the Party 
for Freedom, PVV) II 2008-2012 Decrease 
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specific perspective can generate new insights into which factors matter in determining the aid 
giving behaviour of states, and when and how they do. Second, the analysis emphasises how 
factors from all levels of analysis are constantly interacting to inform aid policy dynamics, 
revealing how an integrated, multilevel approach is required to comprehensively explain 
instances of aid policy change. Third, the analysis reinforces the utility of the concepts 
introduced by this thesis in explaining aid policy change. Connected to this, the second section 
of this chapter also engages in some further preliminary theorising about the notion of the aid 
‘salience sweet spot’ as a concept for making sense of the proclivity for aid policy 
decisionmaking to function as the site of elite contestation.    
 
§§§ 
 
 
8.1 Individual Level Factors  
The essence of the argument this thesis advances is that states change the trajectory of their aid 
policy when powerful individual political actors pay sustained attention to aid policy issues. This 
constitutes an actor-specific explanation of change. As Figure 8.A conveys, variations in 
attention (decider salience) trigger the process of major aid policy change (an aid salience 
shock). I have identified two means through which this alteration in attention is initiated. Type I 
aid salience shocks occur when a powerful actor seeks to change aid policy in accordance with 
their policy preferences (the top pathway in Figure 8.A), whereas Type II aid salience shocks 
emerge when a powerful political actor sees changes in aid policy as a means for achieving 
another political end (the bottom pathway in Figure 8.A). 
 
The three subsections of this section of the chapter unfold as follows. In the first subsection, I 
canvass the seven salience shocks traced during chapters 5, 6 and 7 to examine how agency 
operates in direct (type I) salience shocks versus indirect (type II) salience shocks. This discussion 
then opens the way for a subsection which engages in further theoretical reflection. Here I 
further delineate the scope conditions of the new concepts the thesis proposes by 
differentiating them from the ‘policy entrepreneurs’ framework for explaining policy change. 
Finally, I examine how small group dynamics influenced aid policy change across my cases. Here 
we begin to recognise how even the most powerful political actors are hemmed in by constraints 
they can never fully control. As will become increasingly apparent as we step through factors 
Chapter 8 
Page 270 
from higher-order levels of analysis later in the chapter, agency is always contingent, regardless 
of how powerful an individual political actor might appear to be. 
8.1.1 Agency and Aid Policy Change  
Agency and Direct (Type I) Aid Salience Shocks 
A direct (Type I) aid salience shock is triggered when an individual political actor is personally 
motivated to change aid policy in a certain direction. Yet while harbouring such motivation is a 
necessary condition for the emergence of a direct salience shock, it is clearly not sufficient. 
Comparing the three type I aid salience shocks reveals that the ‘power threshold’ for being able 
to initiate and sustain this type of salience shock is very high indeed. This pathway for aid policy 
change can only be navigated by individual actors at the very top of the political hierarchy—by 
leaders of major political parties (as Kevin Rudd and David Cameron were) or else an individual 
with a similarly powerful remit to set policy direction. My research indicates that ministers (or 
shadow ministers) responsible for development cooperation are very unlikely to wield enough 
power on their own to single-handedly trigger an aid salience shock. Even Clare Short, one of 
the most politically powerful individuals to hold such a position, required the ‘political cover’ of 
supportive leadership to direct significant policy change500.  
 
My finding about the relative lack of independent influence of development ministers (or those 
ministers responsible for aid policy) on aid spending is reinforced by recent research quantitative 
research conducted by Fuchs and Richert (2017), which analyses 300 ministers responsible for 
development aid across OECD DAC member countries since 1967. These authors argue that “[i]f 
development ministers possess sufficient power to overcome the constraining influences of 
other actors, their personal characteristics will affect the quantity and quality of aid”. However, 
their research finds that “development ministers’ personal characteristics do not seem to matter 
much with regards to the quantity of ODA” (Fuchs and Richert 2017, 3). In a complementary 
recent qualitative study, Breuning has shown how Reginald Moreels, a former Belgian State 
Secretary for Development Cooperation who was passionate about reforming aid policy, was 
unable to do so given the nature of his interactions with cabinet and, to a lesser extent, the 
limitations placed on his agency by the ‘bureaucratic web’ he operated within (Breuning 2013, 
311). My cases suggest, therefore, that for development ministers to foster major aid policy 
change, they need to partner very closely with the leader of a major political party. Andrew 
Mitchell’s partnership with David Cameron is clearly the epitome of this arrangement.   
                                                          
500 This does not imply that Development Ministers working under a supportive leader will automatically effect 
change. Instead it implies that the presence of a supportive leader it is one of the preconditions that must be in 
place for development ministers. 
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The high threshold of influence required to initiate a direct aid salience shock is further 
emphasised when one considers the remarkably similar circumstances that allowed both Kevin 
Rudd and David Cameron to exercise a higher than normal degree of personal control over the 
political agendas of their respective parties once they became leader. Crucially, both men were 
elected to the party leadership after their respective parties had experienced a prolonged 
absence from power. Rudd became Labour’s leader following four conservative federal election 
defeats, at a time when John Howard’s Prime Ministership was over a decade old. When 
Cameron assumed the Tory leadership, the Conservatives had lost three consecutive elections 
and Tony Blair had served as Prime Minister for eight-and-a-half-years.  
 
Rudd and Cameron each overcame leadership opponents viewed as ‘safer choices’ (Kim Beazley 
and David Davis, respectively) because their colleagues had reached a point where they were 
willing to take political risks to rejuvenate their electoral prospects. Rudd and Cameron each 
represented a ‘new direction’ for their respective political parties and, because each were closer 
to the political centre than many party members, they had the potential to broaden the electoral 
base beyond rusted-on supporters. As personal embodiments of party change, Rudd and 
Cameron were afforded a higher-than-usual degree of control over the political agenda, 
particularly in the early ‘honeymoon’ stages of their leadership. As we have seen, both men used 
this leverage to place aid issues on the agenda. Cameron made achieving the 0.7% target a 
component of part of his program of ‘Tory modernisation’, while Rudd literally ‘doubled down’ 
on John Howard’s aid expansion with his 0.5% promise. Both men made these commitments 
very early in their tenures as Opposition Leader and deployed them as political differentiators. 
In both cases, these commitments would become examples of “symbolic politics” (Busby 2010, 
50), illustrating just how connected the agency of these leaders was intertwined with prevailing 
political conditions.  
 
Precisely because their aid commitments operated as political signifiers, achieving aid spending 
targets soon became a matter of personal political trust for both politicians. Rudd and Cameron 
were personally associated with the aid spending targets to the extent that their ongoing 
political credibility was tied up in reaching them. This then becomes an avenue by which aid 
policy issues become a site of political contestation, connecting factors from the first and 
seconds levels of analysis. Given Rudd and Cameron were clearly personally responsible for 
putting aid issues on the agenda, their personal policy choices became a proxy for evaluating 
their ‘political judgement’. As discussed in greater detail below, this had especially important 
domestic political ramifications in terms of intraparty factional positioning (see section 8.2.1).  
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Cameron was conscious of the symbolic implications of his aid policy choices. By the time he 
became Prime Minister, he knew that achieving the 0.7% target had become irrevocably tied to 
his personal and political credibility. It is instructive that Cameron took particular notice of how 
Rudd’s popularity as Prime Minister plummeted in 2010 when he backed away from his high 
profile promises to tackle climate change (Seldon and Snowdon 2015, Loc 7873)501. The timing 
of Rudd’s downfall following his abandonment of his promise to introduce an Emissions Trading 
Scheme is significant. Coming just months before Cameron and the Quad deliberated on the 
2010 Spending review, it meant that Cameron was especially motivated by the “desire to keep 
promises” as he considered where to allocate budget cuts (Seldon and Snowdon 2015, Loc 
7873). What emerges here is how credibility is important in driving foreign policy change—
something that is recognised in the policy entrepreneurship literature (Mintrom and Luetjens 
2017). 
 
The most importantly similarity between Rudd and Cameron was their shared personal desire 
to see aid spending increased. Crucially, I found that the three progenitors of direct aid salience 
shocks examined in this thesis—Rudd, Cameron and Clare Short—married a strong desire to 
enact aid policy change in a particular direction with a high capability for doing so. These 
individuals furthered their policy objectives by intervening in aid policy decionmaking both to 
initiate policy reforms and protect the policy reforms they initiated.  
 
By initiating aid policy reforms, these actors ‘locked in’ path dependencies that helped secure 
their desired aid policy trajectories. As discussed in the opening section of chapter 6, Clare Short 
was instrumental in establishing DFID, an institutional change that helped ensure that additional 
attention and financial resources would flow to the aid policy area. This reform represented the 
foundational move in the development of the 'Issue-Ownership Spiral' that propelled the UK 
towards achieving the 0.7% target. Other key steps in furthering the ‘Issue-Ownership Spiral’ 
were taken by Cameron, alongside Andrew Mitchell. Cameron initiated the Globalisation and 
Global Poverty Policy Group, while Mitchell initiated and sustained Project Umubano. Cameron 
initiated the Tory commitment to 0.7% and was also responsible for coining the ‘aid ringfence’. 
Not only did Rudd personally secure 0.5% as Labor Party Policy while Opposition leader, he 
remained remarkably engaged in aid policymaking while in leadership positions. These examples 
                                                          
501 George Megalogenis (2010, 4) writes that: “Kevin Rudd had presented [climate change] as our greatest moral and 
economic challenge. So when he shelve his emissions trading scheme (ETS) in April [2010], without so much as a sit-
down press conference to explain why, his personal approval rating collapsed.” As highlighted in chapter 5, 
MacDonald (2012, 2013a) provides further background on Rudd’s back down on climate change.  
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also illustrate the importance of persistence as a trait of individual change agents (Carter and 
Scott 2009, 26). 
 
Yet just as important as the ‘offensive’ policy steps these individuals took to embed aid policy 
change were the defensive ones they took to protect progress. In fact, these individual actors 
required more authority to protect aid policy reforms than initiate them. For example, Short’s 
success in passing legislation to ensure DFID’s poverty reduction focus was protected by law 
ensured the department’s modus operandi would remain distinct. Cameron’s authority within 
the Quad ensured he was able to veto attempts to abandon the 0.7% target. And Rudd’s ability 
to protect aid spending, both while Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, is a key reason why 
Australia’s aid spending expansion lasted as long as it did. Yet perhaps the best demonstration 
of the significance of the ‘political protector’ role was provided by Rudd’s resignation. Once Rudd 
relinquished his position of authority, the aid expansion he had championed became extremely 
vulnerable, with aid cuts beginning almost immediately. The idea of Cameron and Rudd as 
‘political protectors’ resonates with the notion of ‘veto players’ in the policy studies literature 
and closely associated with the work of George Tsebelis (2002). 
 
The comparison between Rudd and Cameron undertaken here also serves to highlight that no 
direct aid salience shocks emerged in the Netherlands over the period of study. More than 
merely a product of coincidence, this reflects how political leaders in Westminster systems are 
able to exercise power with less constraints than their Dutch counterparts. As Kaarbo (2013, Loc 
1549) has explained: 
 “Dutch prime ministers are less powerful than their counterparts in other 
parliamentary systems. The dynamics of coalition government, the collegial 
political norms, the lack of a sizable staff, and the inability to appoint or 
remove cabinet ministers make for a fairly weak prime minister.”  
As highlighted in chapter 7, Dutch policy making has a syrupy quality—referred to as 
stroperigheid—that typically sees policy change move more slowly than Australia and the UK. In 
such circumstances, the likelihood of type I aid salience shocks emerging appears to be less, 
based on the evidence in this thesis. Once again, this shows how the scope for agency is 
intricately tied to the nature of the institutional settings individual actors operate in.  
Agency and Indirect (Type II) Aid Salience Shocks 
Enacting an indirect aid salience shock requires an individual political actor to wield a different 
type of influence than required to generate a direct aid salience shock. Rather than exercising 
power ‘behind the scenes’ by controlling decisionmaking processes, progenitors of indirect aid 
saliences shocks act overtly, seeking to frame how an aid policy issue is viewed by 
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communicating it in a particular way (Entman 1993, 52). As per direct aid salience shocks, a high 
threshold of influence is also required to initiate an indirect aid salience shock. Once again, I 
found that it was individual actors at the level of party leader who were responsible for triggering 
and sustaining the four indirect aid salience shocks detailed in the thesis.  
 
The ability of Geert Wilders to generate a powerful indirect aid salience shock demands special 
attention. Wilders’ dominance of the public aid policy debate in the Netherlands is just one 
manifestation of his capacity to influence the Dutch political agenda. “Wilders’ talent for 
attracting media attention” (Vossen 2017, 101) has been a defining feature of the Dutch political 
landscape since the ‘cultural trauma’ of the early 2000s. Ian Traynor, who covered the 2010 
election for The Guardian newspaper, observed how “[t]he entire Dutch political conversation 
currently pivots around Wilders, whether in support of him or in reaction to his outspoken 
calculated controversy”502. Koen Vossen’s (2017, 89) research reveals that “[b]etween 2007 and 
2010, Geert Wilders saw his name in Dutch newspapers more often than any other Dutch 
politician with the exception of Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende.” And this was despite 
being only the “party chair of the fifth largest party in the country” (Vossen 2017, 89).   
 
Wilders’ influence derives, in part, from his skilful exploitation of parliamentary rules and 
procedures to generate attention. He marries an “enormous passion for parliamentary politics” 
(Vossen 2017, 87) with a deep knowledge about parliamentary processes gained through years 
as a VVD parliamentary adviser. But perhaps most important, he views parliament in an entirely 
different way than other Dutch politicians. Vossen (2017, 87) quotes CDA politician Jan 
Schinkelshoek as describing the PVV as viewing parliament “as ‘a political café, a platform for 
mobilising dissatisfaction amongst voters’, while the other parties were used to seeing the 
Binnenhof [where the Dutch legislature is located] as ‘a market where you negotiate, where you 
have to make decisions’”503.  
 
                                                          
502 This has been the case virtually since 2004, when Wilders resigned as an MP after irking many of his VVD 
colleagues by proposing a ten-step plan to shift the party further right (Vossen 2017, 36). 
503 Wilders treats parliament as a theatre for attracting attention. Wilders’ proposed ‘headrag’ tax—“an attempt to 
regulate the headscarf in the Netherlands” (Korteweg 2013, 759)—is a prime example of how Wilders used the 
platform provided by parliament to advocate a policy which, while being politically and legally impossible to enact, 
nonetheless conveyed a symbolic meaning503. Wilders regularly employed these tactics, including in the reframing 
of the 0.7% target. As Korteweg has documented, Wilders “manipulates the press” by deploying “pithy, quotable 
responses” during “highly mediatized events like Parliamentary debates” (Korteweg 2013, 765). Led by Wilders, the 
PVV introduced “its own recognisable idiom” featuring terms such as “Islamisation, ‘left-wing hobbies’ and ‘Henk 
and Ingrid’ (Vossen 2017, 90). The PVV consciously and continuously pushes the “boundaries of parliamentary 
mores, for instance by threatening to sue the government and by filibustering” (Vossen 2017, 96). Wilders also 
judiciously limits his own domestic media appearances, meaning his pronouncements in parliament have more 
impact. 
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Wilders’ ongoing willingness to speak out and his skill in attracting attention when doing so were 
clearly factors in his capacity to influence Dutch political discourse. Yet his ability to shape the 
political agenda is also the product of several contingent factors, a number of which Wilders 
had no role in. For example, Wilders’ political rise was arguably made possible only through the 
prior influence of Pim Fortuyn. Wilders perfected a template that Fortuyn provided. The 
sequence of ‘focussing events’ in the first half of the 2000s, following the ‘the Long Year of 2002’ 
also aided Wilders’ rise.  
  
A less obvious, but no less important, reason why Wilders is able to exert such influence over 
the political agenda relates to his personal dominance of the Party for Freedom (PVV). The party 
was established as vehicle for realising Wilders’ personal political ambition, and remains so. As 
Vossen (2017, 1) writes:  
“there is probably no other party so intrinsically linked with its leader as Geert 
Wilders’ Party for Freedom. Not only is Wilders the founder, chairman, 
leading candidate and figurehead of the party, he is officially its only member. 
In a legal and literal sense, this makes the PVV a one-man party.” 
Wilders enjoys complete control over party policies and messaging in a manner which, at times, 
is likely the envy of party leaders who front more traditional, democratic, casually-driven parties. 
Wilders is free to speak his mind and court controversy in a way that is impossible for his political 
counterparts. He can follow “a strategy of confrontation and conflict” that allows him to stand 
out “in a political culture traditional characterised by consensus and negotiation” (Vossen 2017, 
166). And despite the mismatch in party structures, the Party for Freedom and the ‘Big Three’ 
traditional parties are all subject to the same rules when it comes to the Dutch electoral process.  
 
This leads to a final point about Wilders’ influence being magnified by the Dutch system of 
proportional voting. Precisely because any support Wilders receives is immediately transferred 
into representation at elections, Dutch political parties are obliged to respond. This is the 
essence of the ‘Wilders effect’, which has had an “immense” impact on the other parties (The 
Economist 2017), incentivising them to move to the right (Mudde 2017). In sum, it means that 
“mainstream parties having to shift towards an agenda and policies he is dictating” (Traynor 
2010a). This is precisely what chapter 7 documented as having occurred in the realm of aid 
policy. Wilders’ confrontational rhetoric forced the mainstream parties to address issues which 
had been consciously avoided. Once these issues reached the political agenda, the mainstream 
parties then fractured, usually along factional lines, about how to respond. Wilders of course, 
did not need to concern himself with managing internal factions, as his party essentially had 
none.  
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8.1.2 Comparing Aid Salience Shocks: Theoretical Reflection 
In chapter 4, I theorised the distinctions between two ideal types of aid salience shocks. The 
essence of these distinctions were conveyed in Table 4.B. To facilitate the following discussion, 
I have reproduced this table below as Table 8.B. In this subsection, I draw on the comparative 
analysis above to draw out additional theoretical distinctions in the two types of aid salience 
shocks. In a further complementary step, I also seek to further delimit the scope conditions for 
the operation of the aid salience shock concept by considering how these ideas are distinct from 
the concept of policy entrepreneurs.  
Table 8.B: Two Types of Aid Salience Shocks  
 
When digesting the stories of aid policy change presented in Part II, the easiest way to different 
differentiate whether a direct (type I) or indirect (type II) aid salience is in operation is to identify 
the motivation of the initiating actor. As intimated by the theory, the driving motivation behind 
why a powerful political leader directs their attention toward aid dictates the way the change 
process proceeds. It is also striking that the initiators of all three direct aid salience shocks were 
all personally motivated to increase aid spending. This empirical pattern suggests that direct aid 
salience shocks have a proclivity to lead to aid increases. Theoretically, this pattern can be 
explained by the fact that enacting increases in aid can be assumed to be more difficult than 
achieving decreases in aid spending because of the low salience of aid (and the related ‘rules of 
the game’ outlined in section 4.4). This reality would prevent leaders without a strong 
motivation to increase aid spending from trying in the first place. From the opposite perspective, 
it is difficult to imagine that a powerful politician who would prefer to reduce aid would use their 
 Direct Aid Salience Shocks Indirect Aid Salience Shocks 
Classification Type I Type II 
Why initiating 
political actor/s seeks 
to put aid policy on 
political agenda 
Initiating actor is personally 
motivated to change aid policy in a 
certain direction. 
Initiating actor sees an opportunity to 
politicise aid policy. 
Posture of initiating 
political actor/s “What can I do for aid?” 
“What can aid do for me (and my political 
cause)?” 
Key means of 
influencing desired 
policy change 
Direct intervention in the aid policy 
decisionmaking process, either to 
initiate policy action or protect 
existing policy choices. 
Framing of agenda to position aid policy as a 
proxy for another more salient political policy 
or position. 
Preconditions for 
action 
A powerful political decisiomaker/s 
has the inclination and opportunity 
to intervene in aid policy 
decisionmaking to further an aid-
related policy agenda. 
When taking a position on aid policy issue 
represents a relatively low-cost way for 
initiating actor to position themselves/their 
party in a politically beneficial way in relation 
to a more salient political issue or position. 
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limited political capital little to enact what might be seen as an ‘easy’ policy win of reducing aid 
for purely for personal reasons. Instead, they are more likely to reduce aid as a secondary 
component of a broader policy shift, for example a shift reflective of ideology (as undertaken by 
Tony Abbott, for example).  
 
In contrast to the finding that direct aid salience shocks are likely to increase aid salience shocks, 
three of four indirect aid salience shocks examined brought downward pressure on aid spending. 
As indicated by their name, during indirect salience shocks, the initiating actor/s have a much 
more indirect role in shaping policy choices. So, whereas the initiators of direct aid salience 
shocks effect change via through direct involvement in aid policy decisionmaking processes, 
powerful political actors who seek or choose to effect change through reframing the agenda are 
much more dependent on the presence of favourable domestic and international conditions, in 
particular the impact of ‘focussing events’. This inevitably means that indirect aid salience shocks 
will be less predictable than direct aid salience shocks. Anticipating the trajectory of the salience 
attachment process—which I earlier defined as a process whereby an aid policy issue becomes 
increasingly intertwined with, or symbolically linked to, another more salient issue over time as 
a result of framing by political actors—is difficult because of its contingent nature. For aid 
advocates, this suggests that seeking to create conducive conditions to support the emergence 
of direct aid salience shocks is a more reliable strategy than trying to support instances of change 
driven by indirect aid salience shocks.  
 
These distinctions aside, it is clear that both types of aid salience shocks seek to understand and 
describe dynamics that the concept of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ might be reasonably deployed to 
study. Given this, it is useful to distinguish the ways in which the concepts I introduce are distinct 
from this existing tool, which is more prevalent in the policy studies literature and which 
continues to undergo theoretical development (Mintrom and Norma 2009; Mintrom and 
Luetjens 2017).  
 
Mintrom and Luetjens (2017, 1) define as policy entrepreneurs as “energetic actors who work 
with others in and around policymaking venues to promote significant policy change.” 
Immediately it is clear that this broad definition could easily include each of the progenitors of 
the aid salience shocks traced in this thesis. The question that arises, then, is this: what 
additional leverage might the concepts of decider salience and aid salience shocks yield? I 
answer this question by highlighting three key ways in which the concepts I propose provide an 
analytically distinct perspective from that offered by the policy entrepreneurs framework. In 
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short, the salience shock framework is conceptually distinct because it is designed to focus on 
the politics of attention for a political leader in a specific policy context.  
The Politics of Attention 
In a key article that reviews the “concept of policy entrepreneurship and its use in explaining 
policy change…” Mintrom and Norman (2009, 649) observe that “[t]he motivations of policy 
entrepreneurs have gained limited attention to date.504” In contrast, the salience shock model 
begins with the motivation of individual political actors and offers alternative pathways for 
policy change depending on whether the initiating actor is motivated to change aid policy in a 
certain direction or to politicise aid policy as part of a broader political strategy. The concept of 
decider salience was created as a means the measure the degree to which an individual political 
actor is personally motivated to devote serious and sustained attention to an issue. 
Furthermore, the salience shock model was developed by explicitly appropriating ideas from the 
agenda setting literature—most notably by foregrounding the connection between the political 
agenda and policy change.  
Political Leadership 
The salience shock model explains the behaviour of a specific type of change agent—the political 
leaders. In contrast, the notion of policy entrepreneurs is designed to be much more broadly 
applicable, and extends to any actors engaged in the policy process at any level. That said, I 
acknowledge—as Mintrom and Luetjens do (2017, 6)—that “political leadership and policy 
entrepreneurship are not readily distinguished from one another, especially in the case of 
foreign policy decision-making.” When dealing with party leaders, however (the focus on my 
study), the politics of attention are unique from other political actors. Party leaders have an 
outsized influence on the political agenda and therefore their decisions about where to allocate 
their scare attention have important bearings on prospects for policy change, especially in low 
salience domains (refer section 4.4). 
A Specific Policy Context 
The salience shock model was designed to explain instances of policy change in a circumscribed 
policy domain. While the concept of policy entrepreneurs was first developed in reference to 
domestic policy (Kingdon 1995), I developed the concepts proposed in this thesis with the 
assumption that aid policy constitutes a sui generis foreign policy issue area. Most importantly, 
aid policy is distinguished by its low issue salience and this factor underpins the rules of the game 
                                                          
504 In a related comment, Mintrom and Norman (2009, 661) argue that the literuatre on policy entrepreneurs and 
policy change has not asked: “Why are people prepared to allocate large amounts of time and energy to activates 
where great uncertainty surrounds what impacts they will have?” The salience shock model goes some way to 
explaining this.  
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governing aid policy decisionmaking dynamics at the strategic level (refer Figure 4.B). These 
‘rules’ have important implications for the way leaders exercise agency in this narrow policy 
domain.  
 
The brief theoretical reflections shared in this subsection have sought to demonstrate that the 
aid salience shock model and the policy entrepreneurs framework for explaining policy change 
are similar yet distinct. These reflections are by no means exhaustive. Instead, it is intended that 
they serve to highlight the potential benefits of continuing to bring these ideas into conversation 
with one another to further theorise how change happens. As Mintrom and Norman (2009, 663) 
acknowledge, “the concept of policy entrepreneurship is yet to gain a central place within 
explanations of policy change.” Furthermore, very little scholarly attention has been paid to “the 
potential role that policy entrepreneurs play in understanding foreign policy decision-making” 
(Mintrom and Luetjens, 2017, 1). Clearly this is a potentially fruitful avenue for further 
exploration. The immediate task at hand, however, is to relate how decision unit dynamics 
impacted the instances of policy change examined in Part II of the thesis. 
8.1.3 Decision Unit Dynamics: The (Financially-orientated) Deliberations of Small 
Groups  
Given the absence of scholarly attention to the role of small group dynamics in determining aid 
policy, one of the more striking findings of this research is how regularly crucial decisions about 
aid spending were made in the context of small groups. Important aid spending decisions were 
taken by the following small groups across the three empirical chapters: the Expenditure Review 
Committee (ERC), the shadow ERC and the ‘Park Hyatt Group’ in Australia; the ‘Quad’ in the UK; 
and teams responsible for negotiating coalition agreements (in 2010 and 2012), and the Catshuis 
Agreement in the Netherlands. Decisions made in each of these small group settings had direct 
and significant impacts on the trajectory of aid policy in each state. 
  
Two substantial points emerge when considering the small groups mentioned above in 
comparative perspective. The first is the extent to which key decisions on aid policy were made 
by small groups constituted for the purposes of providing financial oversight. The shape of the 
aid policy system in each state largely determines the exact structure of these groups and the 
point in the policy process at which they are important. Despite the differences that emerged 
because of this, Australia, the UK and the Netherlands were alike in having key aid policy 
decisions made by small groups comprising individuals whose key political responsibilities were 
economic ones. When these small groups considered aid policy, they did so through the narrow 
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lens of budgetary considerations. Members are not required to have aid policy (or foreign policy) 
expertise, and rarely do. Yet, to paraphrase a comment made to me by Frans Bieckmann I shared 
in Chapter 7, the deliberations of these small groups had “very important” implications for aid 
policy, despite aid policy being “not important at all” in the deliberations themselves505.  
 
What these realities emphasise is how important it is, especially in the absence of any legislated 
requirements about aid spending levels (as now exists in the UK), for a powerful ‘aid advocate’ 
to have membership in these small groups if aid spending levels are to stay above ‘status quo’ 
levels. As highlighted above, it is in these small group forums—usually consisting of between 
four (e.g. the Quad) to six (e.g. the ERC) members—where the protecting functions of Rudd and 
Cameron were most important in securing the respective aid spending expansions each oversaw 
(Treasurer Gordon Brown performed a similar role for Clare Short). Conversely, the absence of 
a powerful ‘aid protector’ makes it much more likely for aid spending to be cut. In the Australian 
context, Rudd’s resignation opened the door for Labor to make cuts to aid. Similarly, Julie Bishop 
was unable to prevent the ERC from making repeated cuts to aid spending during the Abbott 
Government, despite being the Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party and the Foreign Minister. 
These findings align with the ideas on how ‘veto players’ can be crucial handbrakes on policy 
change.   
 
The Bishop example links to the second key finding with regards to small group dynamics and 
aid: that the aid policy dynamics at play within these small groups around are typically 
microcosms of the broader power dynamics shaping aid policy in the broader polity. The 
membership of the ERC during the Abbott Government reflected the Conservative wing’s 
dominance over the moderate wing of the Liberal party, with the attendant prioritisation of 
budget repair and nationalist (rather than internationalist) perspectives on international 
engagement. Bishop’s inability to influence the ERC was an indicator of the broader ascendency 
of the ideas and priorities of the conservative wing during this period. Furthermore, as discussed 
in chapter 5, Bishop’s status as a potential leadership contender only added to the sense that 
these disputes, manifested in battles over aid spending were, in fact, about intraparty politics.   
 
In the Netherlands, we also find that key small groups demonstrate dynamics that are a 
microcosm of broader political crosscurrents. This was very evidently the case during the 
Catshuis negotiations, where two of the major parties ultimately found it impossible to find a 
compromise with Wilder’s Party for Freedom. Aid policy emerged as a wedge issue during these 
                                                          
505 Personal interview with Frans Bieckmann, November 2014. 
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negotiations, as it had in Dutch society more broadly. Numerous interviewees also told me that 
they believed that the outcome of the 2010 coalition formation negotiations also reflected the 
reduced political status of aid. “It was a political message if you downgrade a minister to a state 
secretary”, Ms Kitty van der Heidjen told me, reflecting on a key aid policy from the 2010 
Coalition Agreement506. “It’s a very clear message because state secretaries don’t meet in senior 
cabinet meetings.” From what I have been able to ascertain, the CDA acquiesced to this 
‘downgrade’ in return for maintaining the 0.7% target, which was essentially a repeat of a deal 
made during coalition negotiations in 2002, the last time the development cooperation post was 
downgraded507. What we see, therefore, is aid policy being caught up in coalition politics (Kaarbo 
2013, chapter 4). I return to this notion that aid policymaking is especially prone to becoming a 
site of elite political contention in subsection 8.2.3, where I propose the concept of an aid 
‘salience sweet spot’. More immediately, however, we shift our attention away from individual 
level factors and towards comparing how domestic level factors shape the trajectory of aid 
policy change. 
 
§§§ 
 
 
8.2 Domestic Level Factors  
The recent focus of the determinants of aid literature has been on ascertaining how particular 
domestic political factors impacting aid giving (chapter 2). While the stories of aid policy change 
presented in chapters 5, 6, and 7 feature cameo roles (at least) for many domestic level 
determinants of aid, in this section I examine two factors that stand out as worthy of more 
considered comparative analysis, given the extent and degree of their influence in shaping aid 
saliences shocks across all three case studies. First, I examine the role each state’s development 
constituency played in resisting or reinforcing the momentum for aid policy change. Second, I 
                                                          
506 Development Cooperation has traditionally been a Ministerial post in the Netherlands, typically sitting as 
Minister without portfolio (Kaarbo 2013, Loc 1576). 
507 The previous coalition agreement which did not have room for a Minister for Development Cooperation 
(Balkenende I) had also been negotiated with a similar cast of Coalition partners: the CDA, VVD and the far-right Pim 
Fortuyn List (LPF). The CDA’s spokesperson for development at the time, Kathleen Ferrier, has explained that the 
CDA then faced a choice of either acquiescing to the downgrading of the portfolio from Ministerial-level to State 
Secretary-level and keeping the development cooperation budget at 0.8%, or maintaining a Minister for 
Development Cooperation with a substantially reduced budget (Koenders and Ferrier 2010). The CDA chose the 
former option. Faced with essentially the same broad negotiating circumstances in 2010, the CDA effectively 
repeated the decision they made eight years earlier.  
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highlight how aid became a ‘wedge issue’ within the dominant centre-right political parties in all 
three case study countries, a phenomenon which I argue is related to conceptions of national 
identity. Then, in the third subsection, I advance the concept of the ‘salience sweet spot’ as a 
way of explaining the proclivity of aid policymaking to function as the site of elite contestation 
in the domestic political arena.   
8.2.1 The Development Constituency and Aid Policy Change 
An important finding of this research is that the strength and character of the development 
constituency in a state, and especially its political adroitness, shapes the momentum for aid 
policy change. The comparative size and political strength of the UK development constituency 
helps explain why the UK was able to achieve a dramatic increase in aid spending. Meanwhile, 
the lack of influence of the Australian development constituency contributed both to the 
Australian spending expansion being less secure than it appeared, as well as the rapid spending 
reversal that transpired after 2013. The Dutch development constituency falls in the middle of 
the Australian and UK sectors, in terms of influence. But the sense of paralysis that overcame 
the sector during the mid-to-late 2010s was also a factor leading to the abandonment of the 
0.7% target. 
 
The influence of the UK development constituency was such that powerful politicians 
considered the implications of how the sector would react when making key aid policy decisions.  
According to David Laws’ account, part of Cameron’s rationale for not backing away from his  
0.7% pledge when it was discussed by the Quad ahead of the Autumn Statement in 2012 was 
that “the NGOs would be really angry and they would mount a huge campaign against us” (Laws 
2016, Loc 3250)508. Seldon and Snowdon (2015, Loc 7878) confirm that one of the reasons 
Cameron backs away from change is his “desire to avoid war with charities and non-
governmental organisations, including with popular figures like Bob Geldof”. In their biography 
of Cameron, Ashcroft and Oakeshott (2015, 279) relate an insightful anecdote about George 
Osborne.  At a lunch in 2008, a friend of Osborne’s purportedly asked him about the 0.7% target. 
“It’s to keep the aid agencies off my back,” Osborne replied. Whatever the truth of this 
anecdote—and Ashcroft and Oakeshott do acknowledge that Osborne may just have been 
placating “a critic at a social gathering”—it conveys how, in the UK, the development 
constituency has considerably more political clout than in Australia and the Netherlands.  
                                                          
508 This expanded meeting of the Quad, for which Laws was present, was held at Chequers on Monday 17 
September 2012 (Laws 2016, Loc 3175).  
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Why is this the case? The most immediately striking feature of the UK development constituency 
is its relative size and density. The dynamism of the UK’s development constituency is a major 
reason why the United Kingdom is “such an outlier on aid” (D. Green 2015). “For an aid wonk,” 
wrote Oxfam GB’s strategic adviser and popular blogger Duncan Green in 2015, “being British 
means you live, talk and debate in a bubble characterized by a high degree of interest, resources 
and a constant and exhilarating exchange of ideas” (2015)509. Green (2015) has described the 
presence of a UK aid cluster as akin to a developmental Silicon Valley. Four of the eleven largest 
international NGOs working in development cooperation are headquartered in (or close to) 
London—Oxfam International, Plan International, Save the Children and Christian Aid—and 
together oversee international networks of close to 30,000 staff (Morton 2013, 346). The 
Department for International Development (DFID), which employs 2700 staff, is now the world’s 
only cabinet-level independent aid ministry. The UK is home to two of the world’s largest and 
most influential international development think thanks, the Overseas Development Institute 
(ODI) and the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), which celebrated its 50th anniversary in 
2016. Together these institutions employ over 500 staff, including approximately 200 
researchers alongside knowledge professionals and professional staff (Overseas Development 
Institute 2016, 3; Institute of Development Studies 2016, 42)510.  
 
Despite its relative size, there is also a coherence and purpose to the UK development sector 
that is not as apparent in the development constituencies in the Netherlands and Australia. The 
Dutch and especially the Australian development constituencies are marked by cleavages, 
splitting into pockets of academics, NGOs, development practitioners, private contractors and 
aid bureaucrats that impede the sector speaking with a collective voice when seeking to 
influence government policy. In contrast, the interplay between the components of the UK’s 
development constituency is more pronounced. More than anything, this appears to be a 
function of the mobility of the UK sector’s leadership. The level of cross-pollination and staff 
movement across the top levels of ODI, IDS and the large NGOS, in particular, is striking, as is 
                                                          
509 Furthermore, a decade earlier, the OCED DAC’s peer review team recognised the unique setting within which UK 
development policy was made, observing how “[n]ational dialogue is also flourishing in the current environment, 
involving a rich assortment of NGO, academic, think tank and other civil society groups” (OECD DAC 2006a, 11).  
510 According to the 2017 QS world university rankings by subject, the University of Sussex, where IDS is located, is 
the world’s leaving university for development studies (QS 2017, 39). In a reflection of how the UK has become the 
global focal point for international development research, innovation and learning, four of the top five ranked 
development studies universities are in the UK (Sussex, University of Oxford, University of Cambridge and the London 
School of Economics and Political Science), with an additional two (SOAS University of London and the University of 
Manchester) also ranking in the top ten (QS 2017, 39). The UK is also a global hub for international development 
media coverage, too, led by The Guardian, which launched a dedicated global development site in 2010, with part-
funding from the Bill and Melinda gates foundation.  
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the movement between these organisations and government (chiefly DfID) 511 . Yet, as the 
current director of the UK Aid Network, Amy Dodd, explained to me, the sector has also been 
relatively effective in informally delineating a division of labour when it comes to policy, 
advocacy and campaigning, especially amongst the larger NGOs512. The UK sector’s leadership 
cohort is distinguished by strong political connections513, especially relative to the Australian 
development constituency, meaning convincing arguments advocating aid are heard more 
often, and with more authority, at the highest political levels in the UK system514. Together, 
these factors contribute to the UK development constituency being considerably more 
comfortable and effective at wielding political influence than its counterparts in Australia and 
the Netherlands. The result was that the UK development constituency reinforced the 
momentum towards 0.7% in the UK.  
 
In contrast, I found that the Australia development constituency’s lack of political influence and 
instincts caused it to make a series of crucial miscalculations that contribution to the downfall 
of the ‘Golden Consensus’. In an article published in 2016 that represents an offshoot of this 
research project, I argued that the golden consensus proved ephemeral, in part, because this 
consensus was, like the development constituency that advocated for it, “shallow, narrow and 
isolated” (Day 2016, 647). Rather than duplicating that argument here, I develop it to show how 
the Australian development constituency’s lack of political nous worked against the realisation 
of its ultimate objective—to increase Australia aid spending to 0.5%. I do this by outlining four 
key miscalculations the sector made during the aid expansion overseen by Kevin Rudd. 
 
The Australian development constituency’s first miscalculation involved its failure to recognise 
the political vulnerability of the ‘golden consensus’ and hence the need to actively work to 
                                                          
511 To illustrate this point, it is instructive to consider the careers of the three most recent executive directors of 
ODI. Kevin Watkins recently became Chief Executive of Save the Children UK, following his tenure as executive 
director of ODI. In the early 1990s, he was Head of Research for Oxfam. Watkins’ predecessor, Dr Alison Evans, 
became the Chief Commissioner for the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) following her tenure at ODI. 
Evans obtained her PhD from the IDS. Simon Maxwell, who led ODI from 1997 to 2009, had earlier been a senior 
manager at IDS. Amongst a range or other roles, he is currently an adviser to the Select Committee on International 
Development.  
512 Personal interview with Amy Dodd, November 2016. BOND, the umbrella body for approximately 450 
organisations working in international development in the UK, also plays a key coordinating role in the sector, 
including hosting increasingly large international conferences that regularly feature keynote addresses from the 
International Development Secretary. 
513 Kirsty McNeill, for example, became one of Gordon Brown’s chief speech writers after working on Make Poverty 
History and is now Executive Director of Policy, Advocacy and Campaigns for Save the Children UK. Another example 
is Justin Forsyth, who was chief executive of Save the Children UK between 2010 and 2015. Before that appointment, 
Forsyth was Gordon Brown’s Strategic Communications and Campaigns Director, coming to that role after a prior stint 
as an adviser to Prime Minister Tony Blair, who recruited him from a senior policy and campaigns role at Oxfam. 
514 My interactions with UK development experts left me with the impression that, during the Brown and Cameron’s 
premierships, that there might be half-a-dozen individuals working primarily in international development who would 
be able to get the Prime Minister to personally answer their phone call. With the potential exception of Tim Costello, 
I could think of no such examples in the Australian context, for example. 
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broaden, deepen and reinforce it. A form of Groupthink emerged that prevented a realistic 
appraisal of the politics of aid spending. Peter McCawley, a former Deputy Director General at 
AusAID, refers to this time as the ‘hubris period’. It appeared to him that “a lot of people in the 
aid community lost touch with the basic forces of politics in Australia.” By 2010, Graeme Dobell 
(2010c) was warning that “the new golden aid consensus is being taken by some in the aid lobby 
as the new normal”. Within the ‘development sector bubble’, which was dominated by idealists 
who believe deeply in the inherent value of what they are doing, the idea that aid cuts would 
even be contemplated, let alone enacted, was alien515, and calls to articulate a more thorough 
policy rationale for expanding aid beyond simply ‘achieving 0.5’ went unheeded. Professor Hugh 
White spoke for foreign policy elite when he observed, “there is an uneasy sense that we might 
all be deluding ourselves [about the rapid aid spending expansion]” (Hugh White 2011). In his 
view, neither the Independent Review, nor the accompanying Government Response provided 
a “convincing answer to the bigger underlying questions about the purpose of our aid program 
and the reason it's growing so fast” (2011)516.  
 
The sector’s second miscalculation related to its inability to perceive the need to move the 
consensus, and the surrounding debate, beyond aid volume. Annmaree O’Keeffe, a Deputy 
Director General at AusAID until 2010, told me that she believed the development constituency 
was lazy in failing to move the aid discussion beyond volume, suggesting it was much easier to 
“make a fuss about dollars”, than starting a meaningful debate on policy matters517. “We never 
sought to deepen the commitment when the 0.5 came about” admits Andrew Johnson, speaking 
of the sector as a whole; “we never sought to deepen that commitment inside the Parliament.” 
Amanda Robbins also lamented the shallowness of the volume-based consensus: “a lot of this 
high-level, overarching advocacy around the aggregate aid target requires more substantive 
work to be done on exactly what this implies for policy implementation at the next level 
down”518.  
 
A third miscalculation relates to the premature way the sector decided to ‘move on’ from 
advocacy efforts to secure the aid ramp up in the mistaken belief that enough had been done. 
Stephen Howes told me how, just after the Independent Review, he and others in the sector 
                                                          
515 When I asked Amanda Robbins what it was like to move from advising the Treasurer to advising the CEO of World 
Vision, (in February 2011) she responded: “going to World Vision from the Treasurer’s office made me aware of the 
bubble that every sector exists in. I would explain to my new colleagues ‘you need to know that this [aid spending 
expansion] is not sustainable and things will change’ but people were reluctant to listen. Certainly at the senior levels, 
people would listen, but talking generally across the NGO sector and people who were really focused and committed 
to fieldwork, many couldn’t believe that even the idea of cuts would be contemplated.” 
516 See also White (2012a, 2012b) and Callick (2011). 
517 Personal interview with Annmaree O’Keeffe, February 2016. 
518 Personal interview with Amanda Robbins, February 2016. 
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“suddenly detected a kind of loss of interest in [the 0.5%] target by the sector and especially 
groups like Oaktree and Make Poverty History....” Hugh Evans, who founded Oaktree and was a 
co-chair of the national Make Poverty History coalition acknowledges that, "[w]ith the benefit 
of hindsight, we should have maintained a stronger post-success campaign” in order to 
“consolidate bipartisan support" (quoted in Powell 2014).  
 
The fourth miscalculation made by the development constituency in Australia was to 
inadvertently create a situation whereby, when aid was eventually cut, no new consensus could 
be reached: it was either 0.5% or bust. The sector was so heavily invested in the 0.5% target 
that, when circumstances changed, it lacked the perspective, flexibility or imagination to adapt. 
Insiders recall that, given the political circumstances, the 2013-14 budget was the best possible 
result for aid519. This budget ultimately projected an increase in the aid budget of half-a-billion 
dollars, the third largest single-year increase in the history of the aid program. However, as 
Howes (2013b) noted, “[w]e had the third largest increase ever, but the aid community was still 
disappointed.” When I later asked Howes to explain this anomaly, he explained how, “the 
problem was, it wasn’t a bad situation for aid, but there was no way to get a new consensus, 
you couldn’t build the consensus out of the new situation”520. Robbins (2013) would later write 
that “the aid sector must… bear its share of the blame for sticking with the strategy of 
significantly increasing the aid budget when it was arguably no longer viable or constructively 
promoting the cause of international development.”  
 
The reason for highlighting these four miscalculations is to demonstrate how the character of a 
given development constituency can impact the trajectory of an aid salience shock. Rather than 
providing additional momentum for the policy change Kevin Rudd initiated, or supplying the 
changes with extra ballast amongst the elite, the Australian development constituency proved 
incapable of embedding the very changes it had long advocated for. This stands in stark contrast 
to the situation in the UK, where the development constituency subtly but steadily provided 
momentum to the aid policy changes sparked by Clare Short and then David Cameron and 
Andrew Mitchell. To sum up, the evidence in chapters 5, 6 and 7 shows that the capacity of a 
development constituency to mobilise in response to a prospective aid spending change, 
whether to support it (when increases are proposed), or to oppose it (when cuts are floated), 
will influence whether such a change eventuates.    
                                                          
519 Personal interviews with Amanda Robbins February, 2016, and Andrew Johnson, November 2015.  
520 Personal interview with Stephen Howes, January 2016. 
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8.2.2 National Identity: Aid and the Centre-Right  
One of the more unexpected yet interesting findings emerging from this study is how aid 
spending became a ‘wedge issue’ within the dominant centre-right political parties in all three 
case study countries—the Liberal Party in Australia, the Conservative Party in the UK, and the 
Christian Democrats (CDA)521 in the Netherlands. Broadly speaking, the conservative wings of 
each of these parties favoured cuts to aid spending, while the moderate wings desired aid 
spending to be maintained or increased. More importantly, however, was how positions on aid 
spending tended to be expressions of other factional conflicts around other contested issues.  
Positioning on aid spending functioned as a proxy for where intraparty factions stood on issues 
such as party leadership (Australia and the UK), approach to managing the budget deficit 
(Australia and the UK), the degree of appropriate cooperation with far-right political parties (the 
Netherlands) and future party electoral positioning (UK).  
 
In the hypothetical situation where I was required to obtain the best possible impression of aid 
policy dynamics in a given Western democracy by asking only one question, it would be this: 
which faction of the dominant right-wing political party is ascendant? The answer to this 
question appears to capture much of the politics of aid in a given state. My explanation for this 
is that the centre-right is the location on the political spectrum at which one starts getting a 
different answer to the more fundamental question of ‘who are we’? At least in the 
contemporary political moment, this is where it appears that notions of national identity reach 
their tipping point, especially as they relate to informing how to approach engaging with the 
outside world.   
Marijke Breuning (1995, 236) has shown how “[d]ecision makers' perceptions of their state's 
role in the international environment form an important cue to the motivations and objectives 
that determine the policies they pursue”. Across each of the states examined, it is clear that 
advocating for higher aid spending was the symbolical equivalent of signalling an internationalist 
orientation towards engaging with the world. The moderate factions of the centre-right parties 
examined in this thesis were more favourably to this worldview, while the conservative factions 
were much more reflexively nationalist in orientation. In each state, intraparty conflicts in 
centre-right parties around aid spending spilled into the open, receiving significant media 
attention not because they were about aid, but because of what these conflicts portended about 
more significant issues. In Australia, while the Liberal party were in opposition, Opposition 
Leader Tony Abbott and his deputy repeatedly clashed on aid spending. Abbott’s failure to 
                                                          
521 CDA is the Dutch acronym for Christen-Democratisch Appèl. 
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inform Bishop about proposed cuts to aid called into question her authority. In the UK, 
Cameron’s commitment to the 0.7% was the subject of scorn from a number of MPs on the right 
of his party, especially as economic conditions deteriorated and defence spending was reduced. 
And in the Netherlands, we saw how 0.7% became totemic in the divide in the Christian 
Democrats over whether to partner with Wilders or not.  
In the final section of this chapter, I further develop the theme or aid’s role in signifying a 
fundamental posture regarding how to engage with the world. Before moving to those 
discussions, however, it is worth noting the parallels between the intraparty politics involving 
aid and those involving climate change. As highlighted in subsection 5.4.1 of chapter 5, the split 
between the moderate and conservative wings of the Liberal Party of Australia over aid spending 
mirrored an earlier, more serious, split over climate change—a split which cost then Opposition 
Leader (now Prime Minister) Malcolm Turnbull his job. A focus on climate change also formed 
part of Cameron’s modernisation program. Views on climate change map closely with those on 
aid and, in turn, spring from a shared proclivity for an internationalist rather than nationalist 
global orientation. In light of this, it is interesting to note how McDonald casts Rudd’s failure to 
consolidate an internationalist approach to climate change and asylum in Australia as stemming 
from an inability to frame these issues in terms of national identity. McDonald (2013a, 113) 
argues that the Rudd Government failed: 
to articulate a broader vision of the world: to link internationalism to a 
particular conception of Australian identity, for example. In this sense, what 
might be viewed as missing from Rudd’s ‘new’ foreign policy agenda is an 
associated conceptualisation of what it means to be Australian, of Australian 
core values, and of the means through which these can be protected or 
advanced.  
In stark contrast, Wilders proved adept at linking a conception of aid spending with his broader 
vision of Dutch identity. 
8.2.3 The Aid ‘Salience Sweet Spot’: Aid Policy and Elite Conflict 
A strong theme that emerges when examining aid salience shocks in comparative perspective is 
the extent to which aid policymaking appears remarkably prone to becoming a site of conflict 
amongst domestic political elites. To link together several of the key findings that emerge in this 
chapter, as well as to contribute to making the thesis findings more generalisable, I take the time 
in this subsection to convey the concept of the ‘salience sweet spot’ and engage in some 
preliminary theorising about why it exists. As I noted in passing in chapter 1, this term does not 
imply that aid policy is especially prone to attracting the attention of policymakers. Instead, it 
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seeks to highlight and explain why debates over aid policy issues seem especially capable of 
triggering discord amongst elites. 
 
I theorise that aid policymaking (especially around aid spending) operates at an optimal level of 
salience—very low, but not exceedingly so—for making it vulnerable to becoming a site of 
conflict amongst political elites. It appears that, during aid salience shocks, aid is just salient 
enough to make ‘playing politics’ with aid policy potentially beneficial, but not so important that 
the political costs of doing so are prohibitively high. The arena of aid policymaking is therefore 
uniquely placed to operate as a political ‘escape valve’ of sorts, offering a relatively safe place 
where internal political conflicts can play out. Repeatedly across the three accounts of aid policy 
change presented in Part II, a position on aid spending readily becomes a proxy, or signifier, of 
a policy position regarding another more salient issue. In short, political debates that appear to 
be about aid are, when thoroughly examined, most often about something else. Table 8.C below 
illustrates how factors which I highlight as exerting influence on aid policy change across each 
case study presented in Part II of the thesis do so partly because how readily they can become 
transformed into a ‘blank canvas’ onto which ideological, factional, political, or personal conflicts 
are projected. 
Table 8.C: The Aid Salience Sweet Spot and Factors Shaping Aid Policy Change 
Influencing 
Factor 
Means by which an aid policy decision 
becomes a site of political conflict Case Study Example/s 
Individual 
political actors 
A decision to commit to an aid spending 
target becomes closely politically 
associated with a political leader. 
Rejection of the target can become 
somewhat equated with rejection of the 
leader and vice versa.   
 Kevin Rudd’s ‘ownership’ of the 0.5% target 
(Australia) 
 David Cameron’s ‘ownership’ of the 0.7% 
target (UK)  
Small group 
dynamics 
Small groups with budgetary oversight 
can use cuts to aid spending to signal the 
preferences of party leaders.   
 Abbott-era Expenditure Review Committee 
cuts to aid (Australia) 
 Cameron’s ability to ensure ‘The Quad’ 
upheld the 0.7% target (UK)  
Intraparty 
Factionalism 
A political actor’s position on aid policy 
functions as a proxy for factional 
identification. 
 Aid’s role in the split in the CDA on being in 
coalition with Wilders’ PVV (the 
Netherlands) 
 Aid’s role in the conflict between the 
moderate and conservative wings of the 
Liberal Party during Abbott’s leadership 
(Australia) 
Global 
Dynamics 
Positions on aid policy typically reflect 
broader orientations regarding 
preferences for maintaining an inward or 
outward looking foreign policy. 
 Wilder’s reframing of the 0.7% target to 
link it with the ‘elite consensus’ on 
immigration and European integration 
(Netherlands) 
 
Ultimately, it is the ‘rules of the game’ that govern the aid policy issue area (described in section 
4.4) that create the conditions whereby aid policy decisionmaking is liable to becoming a site of 
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elite political contestation. For the purposes of this discussion, it is useful to reiterate the links 
between the characteristics of the aid issue area and why this makes aid policymaking prone to 
elite conflict.  First and foremost, aid is a highly discretionary spending item. The effects of aid 
spending do not directly impact domestic constituents. This makes aid a vulnerable target in 
times of austerity such as those experienced in each case study country after the Global Financial 
Crisis. Added to this is the fact that the ostensible target group for development aid has no direct 
political agency in the aid giving country. This helps explain why debates about aid spending get 
drawn into wider debates about how to approach austerity, which often break along ideological 
lines. In this way, debates about aid spending often function as proxy debates for views on 
appropriate fiscal strategies. 
 
Second, as highlighted in section 8.1, aid policy is highly responsive to agency, so long as a 
powerful political actor is willing to give it attention. In Corbett’s (2017, 7) phrase, aid spending 
is highly dependent on “executive discretion”. The considerable scope for agency enjoyed by 
political leaders when it comes to aid policy can bring a personal flavour to major aid policy 
decisions, with attendant political implications. For example, as documented in chapter 5, Kevin 
Rudd was personally associated with the 0.5% target in Australia, which coloured internal Labor 
Party views on aid policy, and which had political ramifications for the levels of aid spending 
once Rudd was deposed as Prime Minister. Likewise, the ‘symbolic politics’ of the 0.7% target 
was cultivated and leveraged by both David Cameron and Geert Wilders, albeit for different 
ends.  
 
Third, because aid is a complicated policy area that political actors typically know very little 
about, it is especially vulnerable to framing. The lack of media and public attention to aid only 
increase the likelihood that aid policy positions become caricatured in such a way that they play 
into existing political debates. A fourth, related, reason why aid policy decisionmaking is liable 
to becoming a site of political contestation relates to aid policy being the ‘swiss army knife’ of 
foreign policy (van der Veen 2011, 2). Aid is a means to potentially achieve multiple (often 
competing) ends (often at the same time). This means that aid policy can readily accommodate 
different ideological preferences. What tends to happen is that different political ideologies see 
different ends of aid as more important than others. It is these ideological differences, rather 
than aid policy itself, that often dominate internal aid policy debates, especially amongst those 
not directly involved in aid policy decisionmaking.  
 
While the notion of the aid ‘salience sweet spot’ is most directly relevant to domestic factors 
that influence aid policy decisionmaking, I now move to show that it is also useful for 
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understanding how international level factors are transmitted and absorbed into the domestic 
context.  
 
§§§ 
 
 
8.3  International Level Factors  
Aid salience shocks are shaped by international level factors more subtly than domestic level 
factors. The task of this section is to demonstrate how international factors “set the stage” for 
domestic politics to play out and, by extension, condition the way in which powerful political 
actors are able to exercise agency. This section of the chapter is structured similarly to the 
previous one, in that I highlight two factors that stand out as worthy of more considered 
examination. First, I discuss how the international aid regime influences aid policy 
decisionmaking through the enduring symbolic importance of the 0.7% target. I then move to 
describe how shifts in global power dynamics influence aid policy decisionmaking. Finally, I 
reflect on how international factors establish the parameters for action for each aid salience 
shock by limiting what is possible at other levels of analysis.  
8.3.1 The International Aid Regime: 0.7% and its Discontents 
The 0.7% target is paradoxical in numerous ways. It remains the defining standard of the 
international aid regime and yet few countries meet the target (Hook and Rumsey 2016, 61). 
The target was relatively arbitrarily set, and yet is often held up as an article of faith by aid 
supporters. And while it increasingly appears to be an anachronistic measure amidst the rise of 
the beyond aid agenda (Janus, Klingebiel, and Paulo 2015), the target retains a stubborn hold on 
domestic political debate, as each case study chapter clearly demonstrated.  
 
The 0.7% target remains the cornerstone of the international ODA regime. Yet in many ways, it 
acquires its significance because it embodies a suite of agreed norms about the way aid should 
be provided (Hook and Rumsey 2016). While at the international level, these norms are being 
challenged by global shifts—I found that the way the target most influenced aid policy 
decisionmaking was to function as a reference point against which domestic political debates 
can occur. In short, the 0.7% target has become symbolically loaded at the domestic level too, 
albeit in slightly different ways across different states.  
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This research has demonstrated how the 0.7% target is a double-edged sword for politicians and 
policymakers. The symbolism it carries means that, depending on the political circumstances, 
having a target in place can drive spending up (like in Australia or the UK) or down (as per the 
Netherlands). Moreover, as we have seen in the Netherlands, it is possible for the symbolic 
loadings of the 0.7% target to change over time. Like with many things, the simplicity of the 0.7% 
target is both its major political strength and its major political weakness. Precisely because of 
the symbolism the target carries, when declaring a commitment to 0.7% (or 0.5% in the case of 
Rudd), a politician immediately signifies their commitment to development and their 
internationalist approach to global engagement. A single number has political cut-through. 
Owing to its clarity, such a commitment can coalesce supporters and provide the bureaucracy 
with a clear and measurable objective. Furthermore, if the target is achieved, it represents a 
clear political victory for advocates.  
 
On the other hand, however, input-driven targets are very blunt tools with which to drive aid 
policy discussions. Especially at the elite level, there is a clear desire to move the debate beyond 
this input-driven target (the findings of Less Pretension, More Ambition being the obvious 
example to cite from the empirical chapters). An example of this is how each state considered 
in the thesis made a point of commiting to lobby to change how ODA is measured. An explicit 
promise to “press in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development for 
modernising the criteria for Official Development Aid (ODA)” was included in the VVD—PvdA 
coalition agreement (VVD and PvdA 2012, 20), for example, with Ploumen (2014) responding to 
an interministerial policy review on the subject two years later. As Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop, 
too, publicly registered her desire to see aid measurement standards change (Bishop 2015). 
 
The most common concern I heard amongst people I spoke with for this interview was how the 
focus on an input-driven target is liable to crowd out questions of aid quality522. A risk arises 
whereby reaching a particular spending goal becomes all encompassing. An additional 
miscalculation made by the Australian development constituency was to focus so intently on the 
objective of increasing aid volume at the expense of quality (Robbins 2013). This was despite 
many politicians growing increasing worried about the ability of AusAID to handle to aid scale 
up during this period. In the view of Andrew Johnson, head of political relations for World Vision 
Australia during the period the consensus was breaking down, “[the development sector] was 
completely disproportionately committed to 0.5[%]”. The advocacy efforts of the development 
                                                          
522 Input-driven policy making is not restricted aid, as Carr and Dean (2013) show in their recent article on the 2% 
target in Australian defence policy debates.  
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constituency remained volume-based in part because there was little agreement within the 
sector about aid priorities beyond the desirability of expanding aid volumes.  
 
This invariably meant that the development constituency, in constantly calling for more aid, 
began to appear self-serving. Amanda Robbins, who moved from a senior public relations role 
in World Vision to the Deputy Chief of Staff to Treasurer Wayne Swan, saw evidence of this 
during the preparation of the 2013 budget: “There is a risk that in calling for more aid,” Robbins 
told me, “[the sector], like every other sector in lobbying government, have to be mindful of 
their own vested interests.” For political decisionmakers, especially those from the conservative 
wing of the Coalition, the emergence of what appeared to be an ‘aid lobby’ cast doubt about 
the extent to which the broader public, and Australia’s national interests, were served by the 
aid expansion. Ultimately, this became another factor in the decisions to rapidly cut Australia’s 
aid budget from 2013. Of course, the input-driven focus on the Australian aid expansion also 
meant it was vulnerable to an economic slowdown, such as that prompted by the Global 
Financial Crisis.    
8.3.2 Global Power Dynamics: The Catalysing Impact of the Global Financial Crisis  
By 2007, for the first time in two centuries, the majority of the world’s economic growth took 
place in the developing world (Ablett and Erdmann 2013, 3). Thanks in part to the impact of the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC), which disproportionately affected the West, the economic ‘rise of 
the rest’—to use Zarakia’s (2008) phrase—has accelerated remarkably since the turn of the 
Century. According to Ablett and Erdmann (2013, 4), “the ten years from 2000 to 2010 saw the 
fastest-ever shift in the world’s economic center [sic] of gravity.”  
 
The GFC derives significance as a marker, or ‘historical hinge’523, not because the event itself 
spawned new trends, but because of the distinct way it alerted the broader population to the 
implications of these existing trends524. Power in the international system has been becoming 
more diffuse, and shifting from East to West, for a considerable time. The GFC simply made 
these realities tangible to an audience beyond merely academics and policymakers, acting as a 
catalyst for more conscious contemplation about how to engage a changing world order.  
                                                          
523 Increasingly, International Relations scholars are interpreting the GFC as a turning point in the international 
system. For example, Joseph Nye has noted how, wrongly in his view, many observers “have interpreted the 2008 
global financial crisis as the beginning of American decline” (Nye Jr 2010, 2). Other scholars have used the GFC as a 
temporal marker to assess how global governance is changing by comparing pre-and-post GFC conditions (Woods 
2010; Garrett 2010).  
524 As Geoffrey Garrett (2010, 29) has remarked, “the geopolitical trajectory of the post-financial crisis era will be 
the same as it was before.” 
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It is as if the GFC shocked much of the Western world into facing up to geopolitical reality; they 
are facing relative decline. Australia, the UK and the Netherlands became increasing aware of 
the pending restraint on their agency, acknowledging it plainly in key post-GFC policy 
documents. Australia’s 2013 National Security Strategy recognises that “as the global order 
shifts, our capacity to shape institutions and forge consensus is more important than ever” 
(Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2013, ii). Britain’s 2010 National Security 
Strategy (Cabinet Office 2010, 4) recognised that, “in order to protect our interests at home, we 
must project our influence abroad. As the global balance of power shifts, it will become harder 
for us to do so.” A World the Gain, meanwhile, conceded that that, “the influence of [the 
Netherlands] is decreasing due to the emergence of new actors on the world stage” (MFA 2013, 
16)525. 
 
The significant change occurring within the international system clearly formed the backdrop to 
the six decisionmaking episodes recreated by this thesis (refer Table 3.B). Indeed, one of the 
reasons White-paper type exercises are undertaken is to provide policymakers and experts with 
the time and space required for considered reflection on how to respond to long term global 
trends. And, accordingly, a feature of the declaratory policies that emerged from these 
processes was their detailed assessments of the international environment and the 
corresponding reflections about how development policy needed to adapt. Yet while I 
acknowledge these analyses led directly to a degree of aid policy change likely noticeably by 
practitioners ‘on the ground’, their impact on the ‘strategic level’ of policymaking that I 
considered in this thesis was relatively small. This is not to say that these declaratory outputs 
were not important or influential. It is simply to say that these aid policy documents did not 
fundamentally shift the existing strategic level aid policy dynamics. Indeed, rather than shaping 
them, they more often reflected them.  
 
Nevertheless, I did find that international level factors influenced aid policy decisionmaking, just 
in a far cruder and rudimentary way than I originally expected. The global financial crisis 
influenced domestic politics in Australia, the UK and the Netherlands by ratcheting up the 
attention paid to fiscal decisions. Given the sudden and severe budgetary pressures 
governments in the UK and the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, Australia, were facing, 
                                                          
525 Attached to the World acknowledged that the rapid geopolitical shift underway had produced a “fundamental 
reshuffle in the traditional global balance of power” (Knapen et al. 2011, 18). For the Netherlands, this shift was 
powerfully illustrated when Indonesia, its ex-colony, became a full member of the G20, which was created to 
respond to the GFC. Despite having the 16th largest economy in the world, the Netherlands was excluded from this 
new institution. 
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choices about where to allocate resources became highly political. Furthermore, the financial 
vulnerability felt by much of the population during this period merged with a nebulous yet 
palpable feeling that a “moment of transition” (Cooper 2013, 963) in the international system 
was underway.  
 
In this environment, the national debate about aid policy, to the extent that it played out in the 
political arena, was largely reduced to binaries. What is evident across all the case study 
countries is that, during this period, two broad camps emerged with different views about how 
best to respond to global change. Essentially, these groups differed on whether they sought 
security by looking inwards, or looking outwards. The implicit strategies advocated by these 
groups, then, was retreat and consolidation versus engagement. These cleavages were most 
obvious in the Netherlands, where the inclination of “voters from the periphery” to ‘retreat 
behind the dikes’ contrasted with those who believed that the “international orientation” of the 
Netherlands remained its “crucial source of prosperity and well-being” (Knapen et al. 2011, 
107)526. The critical role the GFC played was to enlarge the size and grievances of the former 
group. As Rob de Wijk, director of The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies was quoted as saying, 
“[t]he economic crisis has made the country preoccupied with itself…” (Cendrowicz 2010a). 
 
They key point here is this: once the broader nationalist—internationalist binary is activated, aid 
spending propositions almost inevitably become a proxy for indicating which side of this divide 
one prefers. Once again, we see evidence of the ‘salience sweet spot’, with aid policy becoming 
a site of contestation as it is absorbed into a broader debate which is not directly about aid. The 
same dynamic occurs in another closely related debate which also derives from the fundamental 
question of ‘how should we engage with the world’? This is because underneath the 
nationalist—internationalist response to this question lies a bigger questions about national 
identity. International orientation is fundamentally a function of how a state collectively 
answers the question of who we are. In the Netherlands case, it was especially apparent that 
change notions of identity were impacting upon the way the Dutch engaged with the world and 
then, in turn, their enthusiasm for development spending.  
 
Deeply ingrained notions of national identity also infuse the UK’s aid spending expansion.  Mid-
way through his tenure as Development Secretary, Andrew Mitchell expressed his desire to see 
                                                          
526 These dynamics were also apparent in Australia and the UK, manifest most obviously in the differing 
international orientations of the moderate and conservative wings of the Liberal and Conservative parties and what 
this implied for support of aid spending. 
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the UK become an ‘aid super power’ (A. Marr 2011; Kirkup 2011; The Economist 2011)527 . While 
Mitchell was ridiculed for this suggestion by some, his comment is nonetheless illustrative of a 
powerful motivational thread that runs through British international development policy; that 
of demonstrating British leadership. Since the Second World War, discussions about Britain’s 
role in the world—specifically related to how to deal with decline—have dominated British 
foreign policy (Rose 2001; Williams 2005, 3).  
 
DFID’s international renown, and the status this brings the UK, remains a powerful rationale for 
keeping aid spending at high levels relative to other large donors. As Andrew Mitchell (2015a) 
recently argued, “[i]n the Department for International Development, we have a unique 
institution - with the right mandate and funding - which gives the UK world-leading soft power 
capacity”. Once of the explanations for why Cameron took the political risk of increasing aid 
spending, explains Mawdsley (2015, 348), is because the “UK’s claim to an international 
leadership role in this arena [negotiating emerging development norms] depends on DFID’s 
ongoing credibility…” 
 
There is also a sense, however, that Britain’s current leadership in international development 
traces directly back to its past status as the centre of an empire and a colonial power. Without 
quite being able to explain exactly how Britain’s colonial legacy infiltrated its current policy 
choices, many of the interviewees I spoke with nonetheless suggested this was an important 
factor to take into account. According to Ashcroft and Oakeshott (2015, 285), lifting aid 
spending, fits “comfortably with the Prime Minister’s patrician view of his role in Britain and the 
world”. Cameron, these authors assert, “has no difficulty with the concept of noblesse oblige”. 
The notion that with opportunity comes responsibility does seem to resonate strongly with the 
British elite. Neither Cameron nor Mitchell are particularly religious. And Cameron, in particular, 
is not especially ideological (Seldon 2014, 115). Yet both men do appear to be driven by a sense 
of mission, convinced of the innate ‘rightness’ of reducing global poverty and that the UK should 
be at the forefront of these efforts.  
8.3.3 Shaping and Shoving: “Setting the Stage” for Aid Policy Change  
For Valerie Hudson (2014, 161), the role international level factors play in explaining foreign 
policy is akin to the role a stage plays in the presentation of a drama: it is what ultimately sets 
the parameters for action. Hudson relates how “[c]ertain types of actions by human actors 
                                                          
527 On an appearance on the BBC’s Andrew Marr Show, Andrew Mitchell specifically clarified that he had advocated 
for Britain becoming a ‘development superpower’, not an ‘aid superpower’.  
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become more or less likely depending upon the layout of the stage and its props”. History shows 
us that international level conditions have always “set the stage” for aid policy making. The task 
of European reconstruction dominated in the aftermath of World War II. Strategic imperatives 
governed aid giving during the Cold War. After the Berlin Wall fell, the relevance of aid was 
questioned, only for its role to be repurposed as a tool for collective progress. A focus on poverty 
reduction was enshrined with the adoption of the MDGs.  
 
Now, with the international system again in a ‘moment of transition’ (Cooper 2013, 963), the 
stage the aid policy story is playing out on is again uncertain (Eyben and Savage 2013, 457). The 
world is undergoing a scene change. In many ways, the GFC signalled the opening of the curtain 
for a new act. As discussed above, the systemic shifts that the GFC confirmed – the sheer reach 
of globalisation and the dramatic shift in power from West to East – opened new domestic 
political fissures. These changed conditions forced states and the people within them to reassess 
core questions. Who are we? Where are we going? The responses to these questions of national 
identity had direct implications for the politics of aid. Key new binaries emerged in domestic 
political debates across each of the states examined in this thesis and in the West more broadly. 
Especially in the Netherlands, the role of aid was drawn into much bigger debates about 
international orientation. 
 
International factors set the scene for each aid salience shock examined. In each case, these 
factors set the broad parameters for domestic political debate. These parameters proved more 
important for indirect aid shocks, which depend on the framing efforts of a powerful political 
actor. In the cases of the budget deficit aid salience shock (SS4) and the ‘elite hobby’ aid salience 
shock (SS7), for example, aid issues were co-opted and actively politicised using framing 
strategies that linked them to the impact of the GFC and the internationalist-nationalist divide 
respectively. The process of salience attachment in these cases—where an aid policy issue 
becomes increasingly intertwined with, or symbolically linked to, another more salient issue 
over time as a result of framing by political actors—depends on the prevailing international 
climate.  
 
Yet even if the influence of international factors was more direct for some aid salience shocks 
compared to others, it is clear they were decisive in all cases. This is because international factors 
shape the domestic political terrain—the very terrain in which powerful political leaders operate 
within and in which they develop their personal salience profiles.  These profiles are inevitably 
formed with reference both to what a political leader believes is important, as well as what they 
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believe to be politically feasible. In turn, these considerations are then inputs into the 
determination a leader makes about where they should focus their limited attention.  
 
Finally, it is very easy to overlook the fact that the international norm of 0.7% “sets the stage” 
for all the aid salience shocks this thesis examines. Indeed, this norm is the backdrop for the 
thesis itself. The extent to which the politics of aid responds to this enduring symbol of aspired-
to generosity, despite its arbitrary definition and questionable relevance, is remarkable. Despite 
the best efforts of politicians and advocates to reframe the aid debate, the gravitational political 
hold of the 0.7% target endures. In itself, this represents an important finding of this thesis. As 
many interviewees relayed to me, the fact that aid policy revolves around this target to such an 
extent is not only of questionable benefit, but acts as a key blockage to creative thinking about 
how development should be conceived and pursued.  
 
§§§ 
 
 
8.4  Conclusion 
In the introduction to this chapter, I highlighted a quote from Joshua Busby that is worth 
revisiting as I conclude. “While systemic incentives shape and shove states,” Busby (2007, 20) 
writes, “domestic-level constraints coupled with the agency of actors themselves are important 
if we wish to explain foreign policy outcomes.” What Busby is saying is that to fully appreciate 
why a given foreign policy outcome eventuated requires adopting multilevel perspective. By 
examining the stories of aid policy change told in the previous chapters, and comparing the aid 
salience shocks which animate these narratives, this chapter has provided further evidence that 
aid salience shocks are a conceptual decide which can provide such a perspective. Moreover, 
they also function to help to identify which factors matter in determining aid policy change.  
 
Hudson (2014, 221) argues that “FPA is dedicated, among other things, to the “seeing” of human 
agency, human accountability, and human creativity.” Aid salience shocks are conceptual 
devices through which to see how human agency triggers aid policy change. Yet while aid 
salience shocks begin with the individual actor, they do not end there. The concept also provides 
a lens through which the influence of domestic and international factors affecting aid policy 
change can be detected. The comparative analysis conducted in this chapter has highlighted the 
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most important of these factors for the seven aid salience shocks traced through chapters 5, 6 
and 7.   
 
At the individual level, it is the attention of powerful political actors that initiates major aid policy 
change. At the same time, the dynamics that operate in the small groups that have financial 
oversight authority for aid are much more important than previously recognised. At the 
domestic level, the political sophistication of a state’s development constituency helps 
determine whether aid spending levels are politically sustainable. Another finding is that aid 
policy dynamics are particularly fraught at the point in the political spectrum where the 
moderate and conservative factions of right-wing parties meet. The concept of the aid salience 
sweet spot was also introduced to help make sense of the proclivity for aid policy to function as 
a site of elite political contestation at the domestic level. At the international level, the 0.7% 
target powerfully sets the scene for the politics of aid. So do global power shifts, which cause 
states and the people in them to reassess how to engage in the world, activating new binaries 
that frame domestic political debate in new ways. In sum, the pathway to aid policy change 
conceptualised by an aid salience shock is one which involves the interaction of factors operating 
at each level of analysis.  
 
§§§ 
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9 Conclusion 
It was one of the great myths of that 
time that foreign policy was this pure 
and uncontaminated area which was 
never touch by domestic politics…     
—David Halberstam, 1993528. 
 
he Australian National University recognises the start date of my doctoral studies as 28 
March 2013. Yet as this project has neared its completion, and as I have reflected more 
intentionally on my thesis journey, I am increasingly convinced that the real ‘start date’ of this 
thesis was August 2009. It was then, during a three-year stint living and working in Papua New 
Guinea as ‘aid workers’, that my wife Laura and I visited Mount Hagen for a weekend to attend 
the cultural celebrations of the Mount Hagen show.  
 
While the show itself was an amazing experience, my most vivid memories of that weekend are 
of being engrossed in David Halberstam’s account of how the U.S. became entangled in the 
Vietnam War, The Best and the Brightest. The way Halberstam presented incredibly detailed and 
penetrating personal portraits of key decisionmakers in the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations, and then layered these into a broader narrative documenting how the 
contingent pressures of domestic politics and shifting international conditions impacted upon 
them, was enthralling. Given my circumstances at the time, I naturally drew parallels between 
the world Halberstam described and the ‘aid world’ I inhabited. In particular, I related the 
discrepancies Halberstam highlighted between what was happening ‘on the ground’ in Vietnam 
and in Washington D.C., to the discrepancies that I was increasingly becoming aware of between 
what was happening in Australia’s aid program ‘on the ground’ in Papua New Guinea versus in 
Canberra.  
 
Looking back, it was reading Halberstam that marks the beginning of a concerted interest in 
trying to understand how decisions are made in the world of aid. At the most foundational level, 
this study is an outworking of that curiosity. This conclusion continues this process of reflection 
by putting this thesis in context across three dimensions. First, I ‘look back’ and recount what 
                                                          
528 This quote is taken from the new preface to the Twentieth-Anniversary edition of Halberstam’s book The Best 
and the Brightest, first published in 1972 (Halberstam 1993, xvii). 
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this thesis did. Next, I ‘look out’, and situate the contribution made by the thesis within the 
International Relations literature. Finally, I ‘look ahead’ and suggest avenues of future research 
that arise from the findings of this thesis.  
 
§§§ 
 
 
9.1 Looking Back: What this Thesis Did 
The empirical hook that powered this thesis was a series of similarly timed decisions by a trio of 
similar states to reorient their aid spending trajectories. Australia abandoned its decade-long 
spending ramp-up to 0.5%. The Netherlands abandoned its almost four-decade long adherence 
to the 0.7% spending target. And the UK realised its promise to achieve 0.7% for the first time 
in its history.  
 
There are many possible ways to approach solving this empirical puzzle. My approach was to 
explain these ‘real world’ events by asking about their causes (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 42). 
This thesis answered the question ‘why do states change the trajectory of their aid policy?’ by 
advancing an actor-specific theory of aid policy change. This theory operationalises the idea that 
states change the trajectory of their aid policy when powerful individual political actors pay 
sustained attention to aid policy issues. Arriving at this response to the thesis question entailed 
making a series of choices which, while not always entirely conscious at the time, were choices 
nonetheless. In looking back on what this thesis did, a sequence of four major ‘theoretical 
moves’ is apparent. In the remainder of this section, I recapitulate the thesis by outlining each 
of these moves in more detail.   
I examined aid policy as a sui generis issue area 
Steven Hook (1993, 44) argues that “the failure to consider foreign assistance as a sui-generis 
tool of foreign policy has precluded theoretical cumulation”. Hook’s contention recalls Jervis’ 
advice about theorising in foreign policy. “While it might be impossible to formulate a viable 
theory that would purport to explain all types of foreign policy,” counsels Jervis (1976, 18), 
“there is good reason to think that theoretical progress would be easier to achieve if the 
ambition was limited to explaining certain types of foreign policy.” From the outset of the 
project, I conceptualised a state’s aid policy as a distinct subset of its foreign policy, working on 
the assumption that while the issue area properties of aid policy would be similar to those of 
foreign policy more broadly, they would also differ in some key ways.  
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I embraced actor-specific theory 
My review of the determinants of aid literature in chapter 2 argued that the major existing 
frameworks this subliterature offers for understanding why states give aid are built on actor-
general theory. The selfish-selfless framework is rooted at the international level of analysis, 
while the domestic determinants framework prioritises the domestic level of analysis. Neither 
of these frameworks give credence to the individual level of analysis. This thesis has 
demonstrated that this stance is problematic, not just because it showed by the agency of 
powerful political actors is crucial in driving aid policy change, but also because it illustrated how 
the interplay between factors from all levels of analysis is crucial in shaping how theaid policy 
change process transpires.  
 
In response to the partial nature of existing frameworks, I mobilised theoretical insights from 
the Foreign Policy Analysis subdiscipline to construct a multilevel aid policy decisionmaking 
framework which incorporates factors from all levels of analysis. The key insight the powers this 
new framework is the idea that the human decisionmaker, rather than the state, is “the point of 
theoretical intersection between the primary determinants of state behaviour” (V. M. Hudson 
2005, 3). Beginning with the human decisionmaker allows the integration of individual, domestic 
and international factors into explanations of aid policy change because “decision makers can 
take their cue from any level of analysis” (Welch 2005, 23). 
I built on inductive insights derived from process tracing  
To generate the empirical data analysed in this thesis, I applied the ‘multilevel aid policy 
decisionmaking framework’ to reconstruct six aid policy decisionmaking episodes. 
Reconstructing these White-Paper-type decisionmaking episodes was a novel methodological 
step that provided a ‘way in’ to discovering the prevailing decisionmaking dynamics and the 
nature of the web of forces that are exerted on individual aid policy decisionmakers. Using 
process tracing, I was able to piece together “the course of events and the constellation of 
variables that led to a given outcome” (Lundsgaarde 2013, 15). 
 
As I explained in chapter four, by immersing myself in the details of my cases, I inductively came 
to appreciate the centrality of agenda-setting dynamics in triggering major aid policy change 
(Bennett and Checkel 2015). A key turning point in my thinking was a conversation I had with 
Professor Hugh White, which warrants relaying again in this context. White, who was previously 
a senior adviser to former Australian Defence Minister Kim Beazley and former Australian Prime 
Minister Bob Hawke, explained to me how he observed politicians—including those he worked 
with—becoming familiar with intricate details of highly salient domestic policy issues, such as 
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how to reduce hospital waiting times, because such matters were the predominant concerns 
raised by constituents in their electorates. Parliamentarians and their staffers are obliged to pay 
attention to matters that resonate with their constituents and therefore build an in-depth 
understanding of them. On the other hand, the knowledge-building process for lower salience 
policy issues, such as the defence and international affairs portfolios White advised Beazley and 
Hawke on, had to be much more self-directed. White pointed out that one of the implications 
of this was that policy discussions in cabinet regarding high salience issues tended to be of 
noticeably higher quality than for low salience issues.   
 
The idea that White, as a senior adviser, had to battle to ‘create the space’ for senior officials to 
actively contemplate foreign policy issues crystallised my thinking around the importance of the 
interrelated roles that issue salience and agenda-setting played aid policy decisionmaking. In 
hindsight, this is the point at which I began to directly grapple with the implications of the reality 
that “political attention is scarce, and it is consequential” (Green-Pedersen and Walgrave 2014a, 
6), the epigraph that began this thesis and serves as its leitmotif.  
I embraced mechanisms-based theorising 
My preoccupation during the final third of this project was in ‘packaging’ the explanatory utility 
of the ‘agenda lens’ (Green-Pedersen and Walgrave 2014) in a way that allowed me to convey 
the complex process of aid policy change. According to Bennett (2013, 461), one of the “two key 
functional roles” that mechanisms play is that they constitute “a useful, vivid, and structured 
vocabulary for communicating findings to fellow scholars, students, political actors, and the 
public.” In my case, I found it valuable, albeit extremely challenging, to create a new vocabulary 
to explain aid policy decisionmaking dynamics. They laeding innovation of this thesis was to 
develop the concepts of decider salience and aid salience shocks to model how the aid policy 
change process proceeds.  
 
§§§ 
 
 
9.2 Looking Out: Research Contribution 
This Thesis Contributes New Information 
This thesis makes a contribution by explaining how and why three states recently changed the 
trajectory of their aid spending. To this point, these changes have not been documented in the 
scholarly literature. This thesis provides a detailed documentary record of these events and, in 
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doing so, brings to light a range of hitherto undocumented empirical findings. For example, the 
thesis documents the unusual lengths the Abbott Government went to in order to make the cuts 
to aid the largest cuts in the 2014 budget. It confirmed that it was David Cameron, rather than 
the Liberal Democrats (as is typically presumed), who was responsible for personally intervening 
to protect the aid ringfence. And it showed in detail how the pressure applied by Wilders helped 
fracture the CDA, especially around its historical commitment to upholding the 0.7% target.  
This Thesis Reinvigorates the Determinants of Aid Literature 
This thesis contributes to the determinants of aid literature. As I explained in chapter two, this 
study emerges from a distinct vein of research within the determinants of aid literature that I 
referred to as ‘qualitative studies in comparative aid policy’ (Table 2.B). Most obviously, this 
study contributes to this subliterature by updating it. To this point, only one of the key studies I 
identified in Table 2.2—that of Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi (2015, 13)—considers events from the 
last decade529. More substantially, this thesis extends the determinants of aid literature in the 
way previous contributors have: by pressing existing ideas and concepts from International 
Relations into the service of explaining why states give aid. My contribution derives from 
‘bringing in’ the insights from Foreign Policy Analysis, while also borrowing from the agenda-
setting literature.    
 
This study stands to reinvigorate the broader determinants of aid literature by demonstrating 
the insights that can be generated by adopting an actor-specific perspective. In chapter 2, I 
highlighted the growing sense that scholarship seeking to understanding factors shaping foreign 
aid had reached an intellectual cul-de-sac. By demonstrating the ‘joining up’ potential of 
employing an actor-specific perspective, this thesis provides a way out of this dead end. It offers 
a blueprint of how to move beyond the tendency of the literature to focus on what factors 
influence why states give aid towards understanding when and how particular factors matter.  
 
This thesis also offers a suit of specific factors the shape aid policy that would benefit from 
further investigation. In chapter 8, I highlighted six specific factors that influence aid policy 
decisionmaking that have not been well explored in the determinants of aid literature. A key 
finding emerging from this study is that major aid policy change is driven by a very senior political 
figure, usually an individual at the party leader level.  I also found that crucial decisions about 
aid spending were often made in the context of small groups responsible for budgetary 
oversight.  
                                                          
529 Joanna Spratt’s (2017) recent doctoral thesis, which also draws heavily from this subliterature, also covers a 
more recent timeframe.  
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I did not expect to find that the fault lines around aid spending lie between the factions in centre-
right parties. I also did not understand the symbolic weight that the 0.7% target could carry, and 
how the burden of this weight shifted over time. Nor did I expect to see such a strong link 
between the way support for the 0.7% (or 0.5%) typically reflects a deeper conviction about 
whether an outward or inward looking approach to dealing with global changed is preferred. 
This conviction then brings in questions of conceptions of national identity. Each of these ideas 
presents an avenue for further research.  
 
To help guide such research, the thesis advanced understandings of the issue area properties of 
aid, building on the work of Lundsgaarde (2013, 22) and responding to a call from Hook (1995, 
xiii) to consider aid as a sui generis tool of foreign policy. By specifying the implications of the 
low salience of aid for aid policy decisionmaking dynamics, this thesis further clarified how the 
aid issue area “display[s] a set of dynamics that distinguishes [it] from other domestic and 
foreign policy problems…”(Lundsgaarde 2013, 6). The characteristics I have catalogued form a 
foundation for further research and testing.   
 
This thesis also contributes a multilevel ‘aid policy decisionmaking framework’ that functions 
both as a tool to conceptualise aid policy decisionmaking episodes and reconstruct them. With 
minor adaptions, this framework can be used to reconstruct non-aid foreign policy 
decisionmaking episodes. In this way, the thesis adds to ongoing efforts of FPA scholars to 
develop integrated frameworks for explaining foreign policy (Mintz and DeRouen 2010; Yetiv 
2011b; V. M. Hudson 2014). 
 
This Thesis Brings New Concepts to the Study of Foreign Policy  
There are very few comparative accounts of foreign policy change in the literature, especially 
comparative accounts that consciously seek to operate across multiple levels of analysis. By 
explaining three “[c]hanges that mark a reversal or, at least, a profound redirection of a 
country’s foreign policy” (C. F. Hermann 1990, 4) this thesis furthers our understanding of the 
complex process of foreign policy change. The most novel contribution this thesis makes is in 
advancing the concepts of decider salience and aid saliences shocks as tools to conceptualise 
and explain how this process operates. These concepts promise to have utility for scholars and 
practioners seeking to understand and explain other realms of foreign policy decisionmaking, 
especially those realms of foreign policy which, like aid, are characterised by low issue salience. 
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Accordingly, the main thrust of my suggestions for further research revolve around refining and 
applying the ‘salience shocks’ concept developed in this study. 
 
§§§ 
 
 
9.3 Looking Ahead: Suggestions for Future Research 
In this concluding section of the thesis, I look ahead, and offer suggestions for further research 
that emerge from this study. Below I highlight three areas that, in my estimation, most warrant 
from further attention.   
Exploration of the ‘salience sweet spot’ 
As I documented in chapter 8, using decider salience and aid salience shocks to explain aid policy 
change across my case study countries revealed a number of common factors— from across all 
levels of analysis—that decisively shaped the aid policy change process. The animating theme 
tying together these common factors was the notion that aid policy resides in a ‘salience sweet 
spot’ for engendering internal political conflict. This phenomenon invites further exploration. 
Does it arise solely as a consequence of the unique issues area characteristics of aid policy, or is 
it more of a function of the symbolic ‘carrying capacity’ of the 0.7% target? Or is it a function of 
both? 
 
Refine the Theory of Aid Policy Change 
The actor-specific theory of aid policy change the thesis advances would benefit from further 
refinement. I see three immediate avenues for ‘stress-testing’ the concepts underlying the 
theory. First, it would useful to use quantitative methods to empirically verify variations in the 
decider salience of aid for a variety powerful political actors (for example, along the lines of B. 
D. Wood and Peake 1998; and J. S. Peake 2001). In other words, while I would hypothesise that 
that Rudd and Cameron, for example, devoted a greater proportion of their time to aid issues 
than relevant counterparts, such as John Howard or Teresa May, is this borne out in empirical 
data? Second, it would be beneficial to validate the theory by conducting a case study on 
another similar state which decided to change the trajectory of its aid spending. Canada, Norway 
and Germany stand out as potential test cases.   
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Successfully navigating a third ‘stress-test’ is likely most important in shaping whatever future 
these concepts have. This test relates to a difficult challenge I have had to navigate as this 
research progressed—that of engaging with the closely related agenda-setting and policy 
change literatures, without going so far as to embed myself in them rather than in the 
International Relations literature. To guard against this trap, I self-consciously saw myself as 
‘bringing in’ concepts from these supplementary literatures to the determinants of aid 
subliterature. Yet clearly, to have broader and lasting relevance, the concepts the thesis 
develops must also ‘speak’, on their own terms, to these supplementary literatures.  I am 
confident that they do, but positioning them for broader influence will require further and 
deeper engagement with the policy change literature, for example, than what was possible 
during the evolution of this project.  
 
Apply ‘Decider Salience’ and ‘Salience Shocks’ Beyond Aid 
A final avenue for further research involves exploring the potential for the concepts of decider 
salience and salience shocks to contribute to our understanding of decisionmaking dynamics in 
low salience foreign policy issue areas beyond aid. For example, are these concepts capable of 
helping to explain why military intervention is pursued under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
in one case and not another? Or might an ‘international health salience shock’ explain why a 
particular state chooses to respond to some international health emergencies and not others? 
My initial discussions around such questions indicate these concepts may have broader traction. 
 
A related point concerning broader application of these concepts concerns exploring their 
predictive capacity. During this thesis, I deployed these concepts as ‘backward looking’ devices 
which predominantly seek to explain why decisions were made. Policymakers, however, will 
presumably gravitate towards the predictive implications of these concepts. While limited, there 
are a number of policy-related implications to draw from the dynamics described by ‘decider 
salience’ and ‘aid salience shocks’.  
 
Drawing on my research, the most notable recommendation I would make to development 
constituencies in Australia and the UK, especially, is the need to move the focus of advocacy 
efforts away from the general public and towards political elites. The ‘rules of the game’ that 
this thesis has outlined (section 4.4) dictate that aid policy change is unlikely to be driven by a 
‘bottom up’ process whereby change is effected through the mobilisation of greater public 
support for aid.  The effort required to ‘move the needle’ and make aid a salient issue among 
the public is too large to be feasible, particularly in the current global political climate. As 
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discussed in subsection 6.1.3, despite the remarkable level of ‘cut through’ gained by the Make 
Poverty History campaign in the UK in 2005, subsequent research showed that this effect was 
short-lived and that “a vast amount of effort was required to deliver relatively small shifts in 
public perceptions” (Darnton 2006, 10–11). Instead, as the series of seven aid salience shocks 
documented in this thesis demonstrate, major aid policy change occurs via a ‘top down’ 
approach, when aid becomes salient for a powerful individual political actor.   
 
§§§ 
 
 
9.4 Conclusion 
The title of this thesis, ‘Paying Attention to Aid: A Comparative Analysis of Aid Policy Change in 
Australia, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands’, conveys the essence of the study. The title 
is at once an expression of the approach taken by this study and an encapsulation of its primary 
finding. As I have explained, by ‘paying attention to aid’, and considering it to be a sui generis 
domain of foreign policy, not only was the scope for this thesis to understand and explain aid 
policy dynamics expanded, but so too was the prospect of this study contributing to the broader 
theoretical advancement of the study of foreign policy. The concept of salience shocks 
ultimately represents this contribution. Yet as we have also seen, the central argument of this 
thesis is that the very act of a powerful individual ‘paying attention to aid’, is what leads to aid 
policy change. Attention, it transpires, is the crucial ingredient for explaining why three the three 
states examined here made puzzling and divergent choices about the trajectory of their aid 
spending in 2013. There is a neat symmetry, therefore, in ending this thesis with a call to pay 
more attention to aid. If there is one contribution to be drawn from this exercise, it is that the 
scholarly benefits of paying attention to aid are yet to be exhausted.  
 
§§§ 
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